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A considerable body of recent research has examined the capacity to 
experience the personal future, known as episodic future thinking or 
prospection (MacLeod, 2017). One function of prospection is to align plans 
with current goals (Szpunar, Shrikanth & Schacter, 2018). Although 
planned behaviour is only weakly related to enacted behaviour (Sheeran & 
Orbell, 2000), attempts have been made to examine episodic future 
thinking as a hallmark of veracity when individuals lie or tell the truth about 
their intentions (Granhag & Mac Giolla, 2014). This PhD investigates 
whether true experience and veridical intention influence i) subjective 
phenomenology; ii) plausibility, likelihood and detail; and iii) memorial 
performance.   
 
Study 1 (n = 60) examined subjective features of events that are believed 
compared to plausible but not-believed events in the near future. 
Participants also simulated believed and not-believed events from the 
recent past. In both temporal directions, belief was related to longer 
statements, heightened autonoesis, sensory, spatial and affective ratings 
and field perspective. Judges did not agree on what constituted a plausible 
statement but believed past events were more detailed and seen as more 
likely to have occurred. 
 
Words encoded in the context of the future are better remembered than 
atemporal or past scenarios (Klein, Robertson and Delton, 2010). Across 
three experiments, Study 2 (n = 114, 77, 156) showed that the intention to 
participate in a future event did not enhance memorial performance. 
 
Events related to personal goals engender more vivid prospection than 
experimenter-cued or atemporal events (Lehner & D’Argembeau, 2016). 
Study 4 (n = 34) compared salient and not-salient goals set two weeks and 
one year in the future. Salience but not temporal distance led to higher 
ratings for personal plausibility, autonoesis, sensory and spatial details.  
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Study 4 (n = 90) extended findings from Studies 1 with teenagers, who 
made drawings of believed and not-believed events set two weeks around 
the present. Belief was associated with subjective vividness but judges did 
not agree on detail, plausibility or visual perspective. 
 
Previous research has employed drawings to discriminate liars from truth 
tellers (Mac Giolla, Granhag & Vernham, 2017). Study 5 (n = 74) 
employed a mock-crime paradigm about an imminent future activity 
(Granhag & Knieps, 2011). Judges rated truth tellers’ drawings as more 
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Chapter 1  
Introduction and Literature Review  
 
1.1 Defining Episodic Future Thinking 
Prospection is the mental simulation of future possibilities (Bucker & 
Carroll, 2007; Gilbert & Wilson, 2007). Episodic future thinking is the ability 
to mentally simulate specific personal episodes that are anticipated to take 
place in the future (Szpunar, 2010). This cognitive capacity occurs so 
fluidly and frequently that we rarely question how we come to have a 
veridical sense of what lies ahead, when the future is by definition both 
unlived and unknown (Tulving & Szpunar, 2012). The neural and cognitive 
mechanisms engaged when sampling future events have been the focus 
of new avenues of research in cognitive psychology, neuroscience, 
developmental and clinical psychology (Schacter, Benoit & Szpunar, 
2017). Although still emerging, the evidence suggests that remembering 
the past and pre-experiencing the future share a core neural network 
(Benoit & Schacter, 2015; Schacter, Addis, Hassabis, Martin, Spreng & 
Szpunar, 2012). Parallels in these systems are striking, from the age in 
which mental time travel first emerges in young children to mirror 
neuropsychological deficits in patients who struggle to access a 
continuous sense of self across time (Klein, 2012; Suddendorf & Moore, 
2011; Szpunar & Chan, 2018). From functional and clinical perspectives, 
recent research has explored commonalities between thinking about the 
past and projecting the self into the future because the faculty of 
prospection is a requisite of psychological functioning (MacLeod, 2017; 
Seligman, Railton, Beaumeister & Stripada, 2013). 
 
Some argue that the ability to re-experience events from our past is a late 
adaptation marking a unique difference between human and non-human 
animals (Tulving, 1985). Although most individuals assume their 
recollections to be accurate and reliable, psychologists have long known 
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that memory is subjective and prone to bias (Bartlett, 1932). The 
experience of reconstructing and re-experiencing an event from memory 
was characterised by William James as remembrance: A direct feeling; its 
object is suffused with a warmth and intimacy to which no object of mere 
conception ever attains (1890, p. 239). This sense of subjective re-
experiencing that accompanies episodic memory is implicitly used as a 
veracity marker, a process called reality monitoring (Johnson & Raye, 
1981). A memory accompanied by sensory detail and a feeling of re-living 
prompts an individual to believe that what they remember is accurate and 
true (Foley, 2018). 
  
This distinction in the extent to which recall is accompanied by a sense of 
immersion and affect has been framed as noesis or ‘knowing’ (Tulving, 
1985). Procedural memory – knowledge that can be accessed without 
awareness, such as riding a bicycle – is anoetic (non-knowing). Semantic 
memory is knowledge that can be retrieved without subjective re-
experiencing. This type of recall is associated with noetic consciousness 
or knowing without experiencing. By contrast, episodic memory is 
characterised by autonoetic consciousness: the ability to retain a 
subjective sense of self and identity across time, from the personal past to 
the personal future. Using a combination of episodic memory and 
autonoetic consciousness, humans are at liberty to re-experience the past 
and this has been assumed to underlie the capacity to generate 
representations of the personal future (Suddendorf and Corballis, 1997, 
Wheeler, Stuss & Tulving, 1997). In recent years memory scientists have 
extended research on the processes of memory to examine the means by 
which it is possible to report on the subjective experience of an event that 
is set in the future: a process known as episodic future thinking (cf. Atance 




Episodic future thinking differs from semantic knowledge of the future 
because it involves simulation of an anticipated experience. The 
constructive episodic simulation hypothesis suggests that when generating 
future imagined scenarios, situation-relevant goals will determine flexible 
retrieval from past personal experience to furnish these accounts (e.g. 
Addis et al., 2007; Madore, Gaesser & Schacter, 2014; Schacter & Addis, 
2007; Schacter, Addis & Buckner, 2007). Schacter and colleagues refer 
here to a memory system with the capacity to flexibly recombine elements 
of past experience to construct a likely representation of an event in the 
future (Schacter, Carpenter, Devitt, Roberts & Addis, 2018). When 
simulating a future event, projections will be shaped by semantic 
knowledge about likely constraints such as time and practicalities and also 
by prior experience (Szpunar, 2010; Gilbert & Wilson, 2007). Thus future 
episodic thinking is more than daydreaming or imagining (McMillan, 
Kaufman & Singer, 2013; Singer, 1966; 1975). The benefit of the ability to 
orient behaviour by drawing on past experience to simulate potential future 
scenarios is clear. In a survival scenario, knowing from memory that a 
bear is dangerous would not be enough to keep you alive if you did not 
also have the ability to evaluate hypothetical solutions and make choices 
that allow you to evade or escape the encounter (Gilbert & Wilson, 2007). 
The capacity to mentally travel in time allows flexible recombination of 
past, present and future information to generate action plans (Ingvar, 
1979). Sometimes this can lead to errors in judgement, which arguably 
might enhance the benefit of lived experience as a resource available in 
the future because we can learn from our mistakes (Wilson, Meyers & 
Gilbert, 2001). Less obviously, this capacity to flexibly recombine traces is 
subject to processing errors that may reduce the accuracy of memory and 
future thinking and can even lead to bilateral distortion (Devitt & Addis, 
2016). 
 
In a speech made in Washington on March 17 2008, Hillary Clinton said of 
a trip to Bosnia 12 years earlier:  
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We came in in an evasive manoeuvre… I remember landing under 
sniper fire… there was no greeting ceremony… we ran with our 
heads down, we basically were told to run to our cars… there was 
supposed to be some kind of a greeting ceremony at the airport, we 
basically were told to run to our cars, that is what happened. 
 
While Clinton clearly had a specific scenario in mind when describing this 
scene from 25 March 1996, the accuracy of her recollection was 
contradicted by journalists. The story is summarised in feedback on The 
Washington Post website (http://voices.washingtonpost.com/fact-
checker/2008/03/hillarys_balkan_adventures_par.html). Video footage of 
the event shows that on disembarking from the flight, Hillary and Chelsea 
Clinton were welcomed by a young girl in an official ceremony on the 
tarmac (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=iOsGo_HWP-c). There were no 
snipers and there was no sign of any kind of security threat.  
 
Clues to how this mistaken recollection came about can be found in a 
witness report from Lissa Muscatine, a Clinton aide who was a passenger 
on the same military flight. On the approach to landing, Clinton was briefed 
to expect a potentially threatening scene on arrival. Muscatine recalled: 
We were put on a C17 – a plane capable of steep ascents and 
descents – precisely because we were flying into what was 
considered a combat zone. We were issued flak jackets for the final 
leg because of possible sniper fire near Tuzla. As an additional 
precaution, the First Lady and Chelsea were moved to the 
armoured cockpit for the descent into Tuzla. We were told that a 
welcoming ceremony on the tarmac might be cancelled because of 
sniper fire in the hills surrounding the airstrip. From Tuzla, Hillary 




While it is possible that Clinton was lying it seems more likely that this was 
a mistake. Until corrected by video evidence, Clinton chose to publicly 
defend her recollection, which suggests that she privately believed that 
what she had remembered was accurate. This type of mistake is an 
example of a memory source confusion (Johnson, Hashtroudi & Lindsay, 
1993). On the basis of the information presented by these witness 
accounts, the source of the confusion was an imagined but never-
experienced, future event (Loftus, British Psychological Association 
Conference, Glasgow, May 2011). Furthermore, when considering how 
this error could happen, it is worth noting that the event described is 
analogous to a survival scenario, a highly effective mechanism for 
encoding information (Nairne & Pandeirada, 2016; Nairne, Thompson and 
Pandeirada, 2007). In Chapter 4 the evidence for survival processing and 
future thinking as encoding mechanisms is reviewed and the extent to 
which memory can be primed by intention is examined in a series of 
experiments. 
 
This example highlights several aspects of this PhD project, which 
investigates the subjective experience of prospection for anticipated and 
non-anticipated events in the future. It is well established that the 
reconstructive nature of memory can result in memory errors (Devitt & 
Schacter, 2016; Schacter, 1999; 2001). In this thesis, research is 
presented that shows that the subjective experience of prospection varies 
by the extent to which the future event is believed to be something that is 
really going to happen. The Clinton example demonstrates that the high 
salience of a future scenario can lead to preferential encoding. In this 
example, an anticipated but never-experienced scenario was more 
available than the true events of that day when recalled 12 years later. 
The extent to which memory is veridical has received recent research 
attention (Mahr & Csibra, 2018; Schacter et al., 2018). The research 
presented in this thesis provides evidence that people are able to generate 
future events whose characteristics significantly differ on the basis of 
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whether or not they are believed to tap into a veridical sense of the 
personal future at a distance of two weeks Studies 1(b), 4(b) and one year 
in study 3(b). Results contribute to the evidence that having a belief in the 
occurrence of a future event, despite the meta-awareness that the event 
may never actually happen, is an orienting aspect of prospection (Ernst & 
D’Argembeau, 2017).  
 
Judgements about whether an autobiographical event is real or true have 
been examined (for recent reviews, see Conway, Justice & Morrison, 
2014; Foley, 2015) and there is a literature on how plausibility evaluations 
guide us to trust the content of our memories (Mazzoni, 2007; Mazzoni & 
Memon, 2003; Sharman & Scoboria, 2009; Scoboria, Mazzoni, Kirsch & 
Relyea, 2004). Less is known about how a future event could be rated 
plausible or true, since by definition, the event has yet to occur and may 
indeed never occur. This sense of likelihood that something will happen in 
the future has been examined by contrasting the nature and determinants 
of belief in past and future events (Ernst & D’Argembeau, 2017). After 
generating autobiographical events, participants rated phenomenological 
qualities and reported metacognitive judgements on the accuracy, 
autonoesis and likelihood of occurrence for each event. Qualitative and 
quantitative analyses indicated that the processes underlying belief varied 
by temporal direction. Specifically, future events felt more real when 
autobiographical context was strong, the event was more personally 
plausible and the event was personally important. Knowing when in the 
future the event was located made it seem more real. Distance from the 
present moment was not constrained by Ernst & D’Argembeau, thus all 
remembered events may have been easily accessible and highly believed 
(Scoboria & Talarico, 2013). The authors called for further research to 
expand the variability of belief in occurrence in both past and future events 
to extend and refine these results.  
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1.2 Terminology in the Thesis   
The research in this thesis follows two strands. Evidence that the 
subjective experience of mental time travel varies by the extent to which 
the event is believed to be a veridical representation of the future is the 
first. The second strand refers to a literature that is not often drawn upon 
within the broader field of memory science. The relationship between 
intention and behaviour and the extent to which goals lead to action has 
long received research attention in health and forensic psychological 
literature (for a recent review, see Sheeran & Webb, 2018). Prospective 
memory research investigates the means by which people can be helped 
to adhere to their future plans (Gollwitzer, 1999; Gollwitzer & Crosby, 
2018). The second strand of evidence explored in this thesis is drawn from 
psycho-legal literature. Future thinking and intention are current topics 
because sometimes individuals make false claims about specific personal 
episodes that will occur in the future. For example, if a suspect is arrested 
and interviewed before an alleged and/or intended crime has taken place. 
Early indications have suggested that deceptive statements made about 
future events are more readily detected than deceptive statements about 
the past (Vrij, Leal, Mann & Granhag, 2011; Vrij, Granhag, Mann & Leal, 
2011). This thesis makes a contribution to existing knowledge on 
behaviour in the presence and absence of intention that is relevant to the 
study of episodic future thinking and also to psycho-legal research. In 
study 5, a deception paradigm is employed to show that intended events 
are represented in more detail in words and drawings but that this was not 
accompanied by variation in the phenomenology associated with episodic 
future thinking. The primary aim of this PhD is to identify 
phenomenological characteristics and markers associated with  truly 
intended future events. A secondary aim is to examine the processes by 
which veracity or credibility judgements are made when intended and not-
intended future events are described in words or depicted in drawings. 
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In describing the studies in this thesis, it was difficult to find an all -purpose 
terminology that captured veridical belief in the occurrence of events 
whether these were set in the past or future, close or distant in time. Sin ce 
only the passage of time can verify the future as objectively ‘true’, 
considerations of belief in occurrence of prospective events are 
necessarily more nuanced, especially when these vary in temporal 
distance from the present. For example, it may be easier to rate belief in 
the occurrence of a hypothetical event due to take place later today 
compared to an event set two months in the future. Therefore in the 
studies of the thesis, different terms such as salient, believed, intended 
and fictitious are employed and these will now be explained in more detail 
showing how belief in the occurrence of events is the principal that unites 
this terminology. 
 
The term salient is employed in Studies 2 and 3 of this thesis to indicate 
future events that are believed to be going to occur, and are therefore 
hypothesised to be more available and accessible. For example in study 
3(b) all events were set in the near (two weeks) or distant (one year) 
future. Salient near future events were self-selected as believed on the 
basis that these were already in each participant’s diary or calendar. 
Salient distant future events were nominated on the basis of being 
important goals that participants believed they were already moving 
towards carrying out in the future. In this way the status of salient events 
as being believed to be going to occur was comparable in all respects bar 
temporal distance. Subsequent self-ratings of belief in occurrence 
confirmed salience as an index of belief. Salient future events received 
significantly higher belief ratings compared to non-salient events, whether 
these were close or distant in time. In study 2, the salience of events that 
were believed to be going to occur at a distance of two months was 
examined as a potential mnemonic. Here it was of interest to see if 
participants who believed they would carry out an activity would show a 
salience-related preference to recall related words. In terminology used in 
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Chapters 4 and 5, events described as salient are events that are believed 
to be going to occur.  
 
In psycho-legal literature, discrimination of events that are really believed 
to be going to occur is an important consideration. This has application in 
real world investigations where deliberate deception is sometimes used to 
deflect questioning about future plans. A fictitious intention might be 
employed to mask a person’s true (illicit) intention. In the course of the 
thesis, future events described as intended are believed by that person to 
be going to occur. Not-intended events are not believed to be going to 
occur. In studies 1 and 4, the term fictitious is sometimes used as a 
synonym for events that are not believed to have occurred in the past or 
are not believed to be going to occur in the future. Although there is no 
belief in occurrence or intention to carry out these activities, nor were 
these conceived as or constructed to be deliberate lies. Nevertheless, 
where discussion of belief in future events is relevant to psycho-legal 
considerations, the terms intended or not intended are sometimes used in 
this thesis to highlight examples of mental time travel for not-believed (but 
not-lied-about) events.  
 
Deliberate lies are examined in Chapter 7, which investigated the desire to 
conceal true intention with a cover story that sounds believable or true to 
other people. Truth tellers were given a mission and then interviewed 
about how they would carry out this mission in the immediate future. Liars 
were given a different mission (to plant a memory stick in a specific 
location). During interviews, liars followed experimental instructions to 
conceal the mission they believed they would carry out by presenting a 
cover story to the interviewer. Results of this study confirmed a group 
difference between liars and truth tellers in self-rated belief in the 
occurrence of the future event that had been described. Thus in study 5, 
although the intention to carry out the activity was based on experimental 
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instructions rather than participants’ pre-existing personal plans, groups 
still varied on the basis of belief in occurrence.  
 
To summarise: in this thesis, the term veridical is an overarching term for 
intended or experienced personal events that are believed to have 
occurred (past) or to be going to occur (future). The extent to which 
personal intentions, plans or goals form constituent parts of veridical 
representations of the future is examined. This thesis explores cognitive 
mechanisms of prospection and memory for veridical events to see how 
these differ from personally plausible events that are either set in the past 
(studies 1 & 4) or are not current intentions, plans or goals (studies 1–5). 
In studies 1-4, belief in occurrence as a veridical construct is the focus of 
the studies. In study 5, events varied on the basis of belief in occurrence 
but this belief was not veridical in the sense that no participant entered the 
laboratory with a pre-existing intention to carry out the activities that took 
place in either condition. Thus the presence or absence of veridical belief 
in the occurrence of events is the uniting theme across all studies in the 
thesis but a range of terms (salient, believed, intended, fictitious) are used 
to capture specific aspects of veridical belief. 
 
1.3 Functions Supported by Episodic Future Thinking 
Taxonomies of prospection have attempted to capture the functions of 
episodic future thinking and consider the capacities made by the noetic 
component of episodic future thinking compared to anoetic mental time 
travel (Szpunar, Spreng & Schacter, 2014). The capacity to travel forward 
in time by sampling hypothetical future scenarios allows a range of 
functions, some of which involve episodic future thinking and some 
engage scaffolding comprised of semantic knowledge about what is likely 
in the future (Irish & Piguet, 2013). A range of theories address the 
mechanisms of mental time travel and the extent to which it may or may 
not depend on episodic and semantic memory (for a recent summary of 
conceptual arguments see Michaelian, Klein & Szpunar, 2016). The 
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organisational framework in which episodic future thinking processes are 
believed to operate has been illustrated by work focusing on how 
simulation, prediction, intention and planning are carried out (Szpunar et 
al. 2014). Studies 4 and 5 may capture aspects of spatial navigation in 
mental time travel. The particular focus of research in this thesis is 
prospection for believed events, thus the question of how goals shape 
thoughts about the future is the primary focus of the literature reviewed 
here. 
 
1.3i Goal Setting. Goals vary in the level of abstraction with which they 
are represented (Austin & Vancouver, 1996). D’Argembeau (2016) has 
suggested that concrete goals such as arriving to an appointment on time 
are organised in a hierarchy below abstract goals, such as being a better 
person. In this model, episodic future thinking is a process by which plans 
are fine tuned in relation to higher order, more abstract goals. The goal-
relatedness of the representation of a future event has been shown to 
differentiate cortical activation (D’Argembeau, Stawarczyk et al., 2010) 
and ease of generation (D’Argembeau & Mathy, 2011). Goal-related future 
thoughts can be consciously and effortfully thought about or can occur 
during mind wandering (Stawarczyk & D’Argembeau, 2015). The capacity 
to pre-experience possible scenarios allows the feasibility of goals and 
plans to be calculated, evaluated and adjusted, minimising risk and 
conferring adaptive advantages. Study 3 of this thesis shows that 
prospection for future events related to personal goals feels subjectively 
different to plausible but goal-unrelated future events.  
 
The goal-relatedness of prospection has bi-directional benefits. Successful 
goal-striving not only brings goal attainment closer but also shapes and 
maintains a subjective sense of self across time, enabling a coherent 
narrative that extends from what was important in the past to what will be 
important in the future (Conway, 2005; D’Argembeau, 2016; Demblon & 
D’Argembeau, 2017; Rathbone, Conway & Moulin, 2011). In particular, we 
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experience a heightened salience for the just-experienced and imminently-
anticipated: mental time travel in both directions is more available and 
vivid in a three-day window around the present, conceived as the 
remembering imagining system (Conway, Loveday & Cole, 2016). Within 
this framework, spontaneous future thoughts close to the present tend to 
centre on specific personal planning whereas temporally distant thoughts 
are more related to cultural life scripts about what other people like us do 
across the lifespan (Berntsen & Bohn, 2009) or higher order goals such as 
autonomy, competence and relatedness (Ryan & Deci, 2017; 2000). It has 
long been suggested that episodic future thinking is particularly relevant to 
the first stage of goal-directed prospection: forming a plan (Atance & 
O’Neill, 2001; 2005). 
 
1.3ii Planning and decision making. In the summer of 1971, Schank and 
Abelson attended a workshop which brought together academics from 
what the authors describe as an ill-defined field at the intersection of 
psychology, artificial intelligence and linguistics (1973, preface first page, 
not numbered). In the book subsequently published about this 
collaborative project, cognitive science is described as the common model 
by which the academics could advance a theoretical model explaining the 
knowledge system of scripts, plans, goals and understanding. In an 
attempt to set out the model so that it might be entered into a computer, 
theory is presented by means of a complex coding system. Some of the 
content can be difficult to understand however the concept that goals drive 
intentions which are enacted through an interplay of scripts and 
instrumental goals has enduring appeal and the text is much cited in future 
thinking and goal literature. Scripts are explained as automatic behaviours 
that unfold in situations where the actors know what is expected of them. 
For example, when ordering a coffee, both the customer and waiter have 
pre-existing scripts for how this interaction is likely to unfold. Plans are 
initiated by a drive to realise a goal. Plans are enacted through a 
combination of semi-automatic scripts and situation-specific D-goals and I-
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goals. I-goals are script-like knowledge structures that allow situational 
flexibility. For example, you may have a script for how to make a certain 
recipe but an I-goal allows you to flexibly adapt that script to make that 
particular dish better than the next person. D-goals are described as 
stereotyped instrumental goals that explain how plans change in response 
to external events. Planboxes are slave to D-goals and are packs of action 
knowledge that will be enlisted by a D-goal. If you are lost and don’t know 
your way, the action of asking someone else for directions might be the 
planbox to the D-goal of getting to the place where you are intending to 
go. As the authors note, there is a fine line in the distinction between 
where scripts leave off and plans kick in.  
 
Planning has component processes which, when applied to a future event, 
would typically consist of four stages: the ability to imagine potential 
scenarios; to set long-term goals; to generate future scenarios that might 
facilitate these long-term goals; and to evaluate the likelihood that 
implementing that scenario will enable you to realise the goal (Klein, 
Robertson & Delton, 2010). The extent to which goals frame plans, that 
lead to actions, in a top-down process that functions without impediment, 
have been extensively examined in social psychological literature (Locke, 
2018; Locke & Latham, 1990; 2002). Examples include the intention-
behaviour gap, showing that conviction is not a reliable index of action 
(Ajzen, 1991; Sheeran & Webb, 2018); the planning fallacy that inclines 
people to be unrealistic about the costs of goal attainment (Kahneman & 
Tversky, 1979; Buehler & Griffin, 2018); and prospective memory, which is 
the facility to recall an intention at the critical moment so that the planned 
task is enacted (Einstein, McDaniel & Anderson, 2018; Kliegel, McDaniel 
& Einstein, 2008). Prospective memory is intimately related to human 
planning and future oriented behaviours (McDaniel & Einstein, 2007).  
 
An implementation intention is a technique by wh ich prospective memory 
or behaviour change can be enhanced by pre-deciding specific strategies. 
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An implementation intention takes the form of if-when situation X arises, 
then I will perform response Y (Gollwitzer, 1996; Gollwitzer & Crosby, 
2018; Gollwitzer & Oettingen, 2013). Implementation intentions are 
decided upon in advance and are then brought into use when obstacles to 
the desired change are encountered (Gollwitzer, 1999). By contrast, goal 
intentions merely state a desired end point and take the form of I intend to 
reach X (Gollwitzer 1993, 1999). A future event is more likely to be 
remembered when planned with implementation intentions compared to 
mere rehearsal, (from which if/when-then thinking is absent) (McCrea, 
Penningroth & Radakovich, 2014). Generating a sincere intention to do 
something vs. merely thinking about future desires is likely to involve 
simulating alternative scenarios. By mentally pre-experiencing these, 
relative costs and benefits can be weighed up, allowing the selection of 
the most effective plan. The likelihood of a plan becoming a future action 
has been shown to be significantly enhanced when the individual has 
corresponding implementation intentions (McDaniel, Howard & Butler, 
2008). By projecting yourself forward in time to sample potential scenarios, 
plans become more efficient and more effective and implementation 
intentions are reinforced. 
 
The link between planning and future thinking goes beyond mere semantic 
understanding about the future, the desire for a specific outcome informs 
decisions about actions in the present. Oettingen and Mayer looked at the 
realism of future goals in an experimental study (2002). Judging a desired 
future as likely predicted high effort and successful performance compared 
to positive fantasies that were not expected to come to fruition. Merely 
focusing on a desirable outcome is not enough; it is the mental simulation 
of the process of attaining the goal that is associated with successful 
attainment (Pham & Taylor, 1999). Construal level theory stipulates that 
the temporal distance of an event affects the conceptual level of 
prospection, so that events set closer in time are more concrete and 
specific (Trope & Liberman, 2003). When events are more temporally 
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distant it is harder to grasp the detail but easier to think about more 
abstract aspects such as the goals and values activated by that event 
(Liberman & Trope, 2014). When events are set closer in time, the 
concrete, specific and contextual information is more available (Forster, 
Friedman & Liberman, 2004).  
 
1.3iii Emotion Regulation. One adaptive function of the capacity to 
project the self into a sense of what is believed to be one’s future is that 
this permits evaluation of the hedonic consequences of plans and actions 
(Gilbert and Wilson, 2007; Ingvar, 1979; 1985; Suddendorf & Corballis, 
1997). Selective biases in autobiographical memory can help to promote a 
positive view of the self; an optimistic outlook on the world; enhance 
interpersonal relationships and create a sense of best-guess knowledge 
about likely outcomes in the future (Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000; 
D’Argembeau & Van der Linden, 2007; Devitt & Schacter, 2018). Just as 
personal memories are known to serve an important function as part of an 
emotion-regulating self-system (Walker and Skowronski, 2009), mental 
simulations about future events are often used for self-regulation and 
coping (Taylor, Pham, Rivkin & Armor, 1998). The effective integration and 
regulation of emotional and autobiographical information in healthy 
individuals leads to positive bias when thinking about the future and is 
related to optimism (Carver & Scheier, 2018; Sharot, Riccardi, Raio & 
Phelps, 2007). However this positive skew can leads to errors of 
judgement.  
 
Often the exemplars selected from memory to guide decisions about 
future events are subject to implicit bias: people tend to use atypical 
memories when simulating future plans. Unrealistic optimism refers to the 
tendency to overestimate the factors that could go well in the future for the 
self when these are thought about more realistically for other people 
(Weinstein, 1980). Like many biases, most people are unaware that this is 
the case. A neat demonstration of unrealistic optimism associated with 
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prospection comes from a study where neurotypical participants were 
asked to rate their own (vs. others’) chances of developing life-threatening 
illness in the future. Participants were given left-ear caloric irrigation, a 
process known to attenuate anosognosia in clinical patients. Afterwards 
the same individuals were asked again to rate their chances of developing 
serious illness a second time and gave a significantly more realistic 
appraisal of their chances (McKay et al., 2013). The authors explain this 
finding in the context of unrealistic optimism as a type of sub-clinical 
anosognosia. The tendency to maintain an optimistic view of the future is 
hardwired and forms the bedrock of emotion regulation and self -
evaluation. 
 
Mental time travel is peppered with examples of biases. For example, the 
valence of events is strongly connected to the ways in which we join up 
our thinking about the past and future. Long before other distinctions about 
the subjective qualities of future thinking were raised, psychologists have 
long observed the tendency for people to hold a rosy view of the future 
(Lench, 2009; Taylor & Brown, 1988; Weinstein, 1980). Newby-Clark & 
Ross (2003) asked participants to recall and anticipate events cued by 
personal significance. The valence of personal memories was mixed 
whereas future events were consistently more idealised. When asked to 
generate negative events, latencies were greater for future events but 
latencies to recall positive or negative past episodes were undifferentiated. 
The tendency to look forward to a rosy future with unrealistic optimism 
extends in both temporal directions (Szpunar, Addis & Schacter, 2012). 
For example, positive simulations of future events are also considered 
more favourably in retrospect (Devitt & Schacter, 2018). The valence of 
thoughts about the future lead to encoding and retrieval processes that are 
subject to a liberal bias for positive information and a conservative bias for 
negative information. This adds to an existing literature on the fading effect 
bias. The affective intensity of negative but not positive emotional 
experiences tends to decay over time (Landau & Gunter, 2009). 
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Individual differences in emotion suppression have been shown to affect 
the vividness of memory and future thinking with those higher in trait 
emotion suppression having less vivid and detailed mental imagery for 
both the past and the future (D’Argembeau & Van der Linden, 2006). 
Individuals high in the personality dimensions neuroticism and harm 
avoidance experience more negative episodic memories and future 
projections, emphasising the strong relatedness between memory and 
future thinking (Quoidbach, Hansenne & Mottet, 2008). What is not clear is 
whether the reduced vividness of future thinking in such individuals is as a 
result of reduced specificity when events are encoded and thus less detail 
is available from memory to furnish future thoughts. Another explanation 
may be that this reduced ability to engage vividly with mental time travel is 
a self-protective cognitive style whereby the emotional content of personal 
past and future is minimised.  
  
1.3iv Future thinking and wellbeing.  Since future thinking is critical to 
processes of goal setting, decision-making and emotion regulation, it is 
perhaps not surprising that biases and specific difficulties with mental time 
travel are related to mental health and wellbeing. Many clinical groups 
exhibit specific biases when envisaging the future so that the (unrealistic) 
optimism discussed in the previous section is less evident. There may be 
biases that limit the accessibility of representations of possible outcomes 
or difficulties in reorienting to new goals should old ones become 
unattainable (Dickson, Moberly, O’Dea & Field, 2016; MacLeod & 
O’Connor, 2018). Some of the earliest research on autobiographical 
memory showed that when asked to generate specific memories from the 
past, depressed patients often cited over-general examples (Williams & 
Broadbent, 1986). These types of memories can be further classified into 
categorical (general summaries of a class of activity such as knowing what 
it is like to go on a picnic) and extended memories, (for example, a 
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weekend away), with the former more typical among depressed patients 
(Williams & Dritschel, 1992).  
 
This pattern of memory retrieval has been found in a range of patient 
groups including post-traumatic stress disorder (McNally, Litz, Prassas, 
Shin & Weathers, 1994), dementia (Naylor & Clare, 2008), and autism 
(Crane, Pring, Jukes & Goddard, 2012). As a key resource for accessing 
personal knowledge and maintaining a sense of self, past experience is a 
critical component for orienting towards the future. Depression has long 
been known to impact on social problem-solving, a task that involves 
drawing on past experience to generate solutions to hypothetical problems 
(Anderson, Goddard & Powell, 2009; 2011; Goddard, Dritschel & Burton, 
1996; 1997). Where the specificity of remembering is reduced in patients, 
mirror difficulties in generating specific future events have also been found 
(Williams et al., 2007), with examples including schizophrenia 
(D’Argembeau, Raffard & Van der Linden, 2008), bipolar disorder 
(Boulanger, Lejeune & Blairy, 2013, complicated grief (Robinaugh & 
McNally, 2013); autism (Lind & Bowler, 2010); and post-traumatic stress 
disorder (Brown et al., 2013; Kleim, Graham, Filhossy, Stott & Ehlers, 
2015).  
 
The reduction in access to positive scenarios about the future is not 
caused by impaired future thinking per se but relates to specific difficulties 
accessing positive future representations for the self. In one early study of 
this phenomenon, patients who had recently attempted suicide were 
shown to differ from non-depressed controls in the number of positive 
future events they could imagine for themselves but not for other people 
(MacLeod & Conway, 2007, study 2). Recent research suggests that 
depressed individuals are able to nominate future goals and ascribe 
importance to these but see these goals as difficult to achieve and unlikely 
to occur for themselves (Dickson, Moberly & Kinderman, 2011; Thimm, 
Holte, Brennen & Wang, 2013). MacLeod (2017) posits that the lack of 
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specificity in mental time travel leads to a reduction in positive affect when 
simulating a future event and concurrently a reduction in goal orientation 
because the reduced specificity of the representation is missing positive 
components that typically enhance salience, motivation and drive. New 
research has found promising utility in employing a future episodic 
specificity intervention as a means by which to improve moderately and 
highly depressed individuals’ estimates of positive events occurring in the 
future (Boland, Riggs & Anderson, 2018). Another new direction for 
research on future thinking bias in patients comes from the argument that 
future thinking is generally less episodic than memory to the extent that 
Klein (2013) questions if it is even possible to pre-experience an event in 
the same way as a memory can be revisited. MacLeod (2017) concurs 
that future thinking is likely to contain semantic as well as episodic 
memory components and has suggested that the word cue techniques 
used to generate memories might not be equally effective in generating 
specific future representations among patients (pp.140–141).  
 
1.4 Anticipation. Klein (2016) points out that research on mental time 
travel over the last ten years or more has characterised episodic future 
thinking as a system by which episodic memories and semantic 
knowledge are recombined to conceive a possible future, with the 
experiencing component delineated as autonoetic by Tulving (1985) 
receiving relatively little attention. Although the past is validated by 
experience, the future is not. Memory-based accounts of future thinking 
may not be enough to explain the nuanced appraisals that can be made 
about possible future events. We may not know the future but we live as if 
we do. People can report not just their beliefs, hopes and expectancies for 
the future but also the subjective qualities of their anticipation for such 
events both in terms of what they think the event should feel like but 
separately, also how it feels while they are pre-experiencing that event. 
For example, feelings associated with an anticipated event were it to take 
place have been described as qualitatively different to the anticipatory 
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feelings that are pre-experienced in the present moment when imagining 
that event unfolding (Van Boven & Ashworth, 2007). 
 
Although the past makes a convenient comparison point in that it is 
assumed to establish some ground truth about what is real in a person’s 
life, anticipatory feelings about the future can feel more real and more 
directive of current behaviour than remembering past events. One aspect 
of research that has received relatively little attention centres on the 
question of how it is that anticipated feelings and subjective experience 
when projecting forward to pre-experience the future feel so real (Dalla 
Barba, 2000). In daily life, plans and decisions are made on the basis of 
representations of a future that is, at best, only probable (Klein & 
Steindam, 2016). This somewhat overlooked aspect to mental time travel 
has led researchers to turn to the questions of how memories can be 
brought to mind and subjectively experienced even when they are not 
believed to be true (Justice, Morrison & Conway, 2012; Justice & Smith, 
2018). This has obvious parallels with the puzzling question of how it is 
that representations of the future can be judged and believed to be 
unlikely, likely or true (Ernst & D’Argembeau, 2017; Lehner & 
D’Argembeau, 2016). 
 
1.5 Belief. The experiential component of recalling a memory can persist 
even when memories are no longer believed to be true (Foley, 2015). 
Differences between non-believed memories and believed memories have 
led to nuanced considerations. Non-believed memories are less linked to 
other autobiographical memories and tend to be rated (after invalidation) 
as less personally plausible. In line with Klein (2016), it has been 
suggested that recollections can persist in the absence of belief because 
the experiential component is a judgement made separately to the 
judgement of belief in occurrence. Foley draws on memory science, 
literary diarists and the records of historians to demonstrate sub types of 
impossible memories that retain their warmth and intimacy in the face of 
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factual contradiction. These non-believed memories are distinguished from 
illusory memories of the type sometimes experimentally induced in 
psychological research studies, where people come to realise that their 
beliefs about an event are not true (for example, after contamination f rom 
a co-witness, seeing a doctored video or photograph or through 
suggestive questioning).  
 
Three clusters of impossible memories demonstrate the persistence of 
phenomenology in the absence of memory belief (Foley, 2015). Pseudo 
memories are spontaneous episodic memories, often stemming from 
childhood, that are subsequently invalidated after some event or 
realisation renders the event impossible. For example, Siri Hustvedt 
(2012) describes a detailed emotional memory from childhood that took 
place in a house that she subsequently realised was not built until years 
later. Although the memory is impossible, the associated subjective 
recollection is defended by the writer, who comes to decide that the 
memory was an amalgam of other (real) events. Another kind of 
impossible memory, the post-memory, is drawn from historical texts 
(Hirsch, 2008; 2012). Post-memories can occur where traumatic witness 
accounts or vicarious experience of trauma can lead to representations of 
these events that feel like real memories. Memories described by a child 
holocaust survivor to her child were later described as more vivid and real 
than the child’s person’s own childhood memories. The vicarious 
experience of trauma can also lead to prosthetic memories, which can be 
installed through exposure to media or interactive museum exhibits. 
Memories can take on the features of autobiographical experience so that 
the boundaries between experienced memories that have been lived and 
those that have not been lived can blur so that the subjective experience 
becomes a stand-in for eyewitness recall (Landsberg, 1997; 2004; 2009).  
 
This consideration of the fallibility of memory serves to demonstrate the 
extent to which important memories can be accompanied by a sense of 
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veridical familiarity without ever having been personally experienced. Thus 
belief in occurrence is not a prerequisite for a memory to be integral to a 
person’s autobiographical sense of self. Just as important personal 
memories may be acquired without experience, future events that have 
not and may not ever happen can be summoned and described as 
significantly personally important, subjectively different, and even self -
defining (D’Argembeau, Lardi & Van der Linden, 2012; Hamilton & Cole, 
2017; Lardi, D’Argembeau, Chanal, Ghisletta & Van der Linden, 2010; 
Markus & Nurius, 1986). Literature reviewed in this chapter suggests that 
episodic future thinking is particularly vivid when temporally close or, in the 
case of temporally distant events, when these are personally important. 
The subjective experience of mental time travel for believed and not-
believed events is a central theme of this thesis, for example in study 3 
where this is examined at temporal distances of two weeks and one year 
into the future. There now follows a review of methods used to investigate 
episodic future thinking. This will address the means by which mental time 




 Methods of Investigating True and False Intentions 
 
2.1 Methods used to investigate prospection  
The upsurge in interest in the cognitive mechanisms of episodic future 
thinking from a variety of sub disciplines within psychology has led to a 
diversity of methodological approaches. Some of these techniques will be 
described, with particular focus on those relevant to the current thesis. 
Many active and important areas of research are not described. For 
example, a significant contribution to the understanding of mental time 
travel has come from neuroimaging studies using positron emission 
tomography and functional magnetic neuroimaging to investigate the 
neural architecture of episodic and semantic time travel (for a recent 
review, see Schacter, Benoit & Szpunar, 2017). As noted by Klein (2012), 
neuroimaging and neuropsychological data are important means by which 
to tease apart the relative contributions of episodic and semantic self -
knowledge to the continuous experience of the self across time. 
Competing explanations of the constructive nature of mental time travel 
such as the constructive episodic simulation hypothesis or scene 
construction (Hassabis & Maguire, 2007; 2009) do not place much 
emphasis on the temporal processes of mental time travel. This is in part 
due to difficulties creating comparison conditions that will enable isolation 
of relevant neural architecture. As noted by Schacter and colleagues 
(2012, pp. 679–680), an in-depth understanding of the brain bases of 
subjective experiences associated with mental time travel is a goal for 
future research. Thus a more detailed summary of this literature is beyond 
the scope of this review at this time.  
 
Diary studies show the frequency and characteristics of spontaneously 
generated mental time travel, enabling the examination of the processes 
by which these thoughts come to mind (Foley, 2018). Uncued, future 
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oriented thoughts have been shown to be more positive and positive 
thoughts are also more specific and are accompanied by more visual 
imagery (D’Argembeau, Renaud & Van der Linden, 2011). More than half 
(52.5%) of recorded future thoughts in a day centre on planning an action 
(D’Argembeau et al., 2010). The same study examined the importance of 
future thinking for decision making and goal-setting (17.5% and 11% 
respectively). Thoughts about the future are as common as spontaneous 
autobiographical memories in daily life but are more positive and idyllic in 
valence (Berntsen & Jacobsen, 2008). Other evidence suggests a range 
of themes in thoughts about the future with preoccupation with family 
forming the largest proportion (24.5%), followed by work (22.5%) then 
leisure (11.5%), romance/sex (10.5%), health and physical fitness and 
money (both 10%) and social relationships (9%) (Quoidbach, Hansenne & 
Mottet, 2008). At 30 years, participants were slightly older than many 
studies using student participants, which might have influenced the 
predominance of family over other event types. In this study the quantity of 
events was elicited using a verbal fluency paradigm (MacLeod & Byrne, 
1996) where participants were cued to different temporal distances and 
were asked to report as many items as they could within  a specified time 
frame.  
 
2.2 Cues  
Behavioural studies have included research designed to pinpoint 
developmental changes across the lifespan in mental time travel. The 
finding that the capacity to be able to answer questions about yesterday at 
the same developmental stage that children can conceive of their plans 
tomorrow was one of the earliest ways in which mental time travel began 
to receive research attention. The ability of children to engage in mental 
time travel has been investigated by asking participants to imagine 
scenarios centred around thirst, cold and hunger. Three, four and five year 
olds were asked to select items relevant to these states from sets of three 
objects (Atance & Meltzoff, 2005). By extending this experiment to 
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introduce semantically-related choices, performance in three and four year 
olds was reduced but five year olds were able to discriminate relevant 
items, indicating an enhanced ability to anticipate their own psychological 
states. Younger adults recall more specific details about past and future 
episodes compared to older adults (Cole, Morrison & Conway, 2013). 
Some evidence suggests this is particularly difficult when events are set in 
the future (Rendell et al., 2012). 
 
Future thinking has been estimated to be inherently more semantic and 
less episodic than recalling the past (Addis, Wong & Schacter, 2008; 
Addis, Musicaro, Pan & Schacter, 2010). These studies assessed 
cognitive performance in older and younger adults by using an  adapted 
version of the autobiographical interview (AI) in which individuals recall 
past and future personal experiences in response to probes. Interviews 
are transcribed and analysed by separating internal details (who, what, 
why, where, when) from external details (semantic facts, elaborations or 
details being related to other events). Using this method, older adults 
typically produce fewer internal details (Abram, Picard, Navarro, & Piolino, 
2014; Schacter, Gaesser & Addis, 2013; Anelli, Ciaramelli, Arzy & 
Frassinetti, 2016; Lyons, Henry, Rendell, Corballis & Suddendorf, 2014; 
Terrett et al., 2016; Devitt, Addis & Schacter, 2017; Lapp & Spaniol, 2017). 
 
This finding is sometimes suggested to reflect age-related deficits in 
executive processes, although it could be argued that the results are 
shaped by the measure employed. There are adaptive benefits to a 
system by which as life experience increases, processes of mental time 
travel are streamlined. Highly detailed episodic recollection would be 
costly were it to be performed on the basis of every related instance from 
past experience. Nevertheless, it is prudent to consider the age of 
participants for reasons beyond possible differences in executive 
functioning. The studies reported in this thesis aim to tap into processes of 
thinking about past experience and truly anticipated goals and plans. In 
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doing so, the distance of the horizon and what lies on that horizon are 
salient issues. There comes a tipping point in a long lifespan where the 
subjective sense of lived time exceeds the subjective sense of to-be-lived 
time, so that the past is represented by a bigger and more crowded 
canvas than the future (Carstensen, 2006). Socioemotional selectivity 
theory describes how it is not physical age so much as the perception of 
how much lifespan is left and the ability to monitor that horizon that 
influences goal cognition in later life (Carstensen, Issacowitz & Charles, 
1999). Interestingly, this finding has also been extended to younger people 
who perceive that they have a limited life span, for example AIDS patients 
before the advent of effective treatment (Carstensen, Fredrickson, Krantz, 
Siegler & Vitaliano, 1998). There is also evidence for a developmental shift 
towards positivity in older people’s autobiographical memory, working 
memory and attention processes (Carstensen, Mikels & Mather, 2006) and 
a partiality for emotionally positive vs. negatively valenced information 
(Charles, Mather & Carstensen, 2003; Mather & Carstensen, 2005; Reed, 
Chan & Mikels, 2014). This positivity effect is in contrast to a 
comparatively greater sensitivity to negative stimuli in young adults 
(Baumeister, Bratslavsky, Finkenauer, & Vohs, 2001; Cacioppo, Gardner, 
& Berntson, 1997). Thus age-related differences in mental time travel are 
subject to valence as well as specificity effects. 
 
 
Just as the accessibility and detail of memory are differentiated by 
development, orientation of personal goals in prospection also changes 
across the lifespan. When the future is perceived to be open ended, a 
perspective more common in younger than older people, goals are more 
likely to centre on the acquisition of knowledge or novel experiences in 
general (Carstensen, 2006; Reed & Carstensen, 2012). When the future is 
perceived to be constrained, goals are more likely to be related to emotion 
regulation and a preference for deepening existing social bonds. 
Carstensen (2006, p. 1914) acknowledges that younger people sometimes 
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pursue goals related to social networks and older adults can pursue goals 
related to broadening their horizons or learning new skills but the salience 
of these goal types differs between younger and older individuals. Recent 
research in which age-related goals were experimentally manipulated 
between young and older adults had no effect on the specificity or 
vividness of mental time travel (Lapp & Spaniol, 2017). Results from a 
follow up questionnaire supported the premise that goal themes change in 
importance with age, but in this study, the themes were imposed by the 
experimenters. On this basis, the authors suggest that studies that allow 
for individualized selection of goals and using more elaborated cues would 
be useful avenues for future research in goal-oriented prospection. In 
study 4 of this thesis, goals were experimentally manipulated by temporal 
distance (2 weeks, 1 year) and by personal salience where participants 
selected events that were or were not anticipated to take place in the 
future. In the experimental studies that form this thesis, a novel paradigm 
is used in studies 1, 3 and 4 in which event cues are presented that have 
been validated as plausible events that are frequently experienced by 
participants. In order to do this, age restrictions were imposed in order that 
events would be controlled for salience and goal-relatedness. Pilot studies 
were used to obtain evidence of the types of events that were seen as 
plausible, easy to imagine and frequently experienced by cohorts of 
students and school pupils and are reported in studies 1(a), 3(a) and 4(a).   
 
 
Temporal proximity affects the specificity with which an event is pre-
experienced. Temporal construal theory states that individuals are 
egocentric so that projections into the past and future are defined by the 
sense of self in the here and now. Travelling in time involves mental 
construal so that the further away an event is in time, the less real and 
detailed a mental representation of that event will be (Liberman and Trope, 
1998; Trope & Liberman, 2003; 2010; Spreng & Levine, 2006). When 
considering the costs and benefits of future actions, distant events will be 
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assessed on the basis of perceived benefits whereas any attendant 
drawbacks of events are more evident and salient when events are set 
closer in time (Eyal, Liberman, Trope & Walther, 2004). When people are 
asked to think of important events in the future or the past, temporally 
distant memories or projections are more likely to map onto cultural scripts 
about normative life events (e.g. starting school, first friend, settling on a 
career, having children), (Berntsen & Bohn, 2009; 2010). Chronesthesia, 
the awareness of a subjective sense of temporal distance (Tulving, 2002b) 
can be manipulated by retrieval style. People feel closer to a past event if 
it is retrieved by imagining a string of related events working backwards in 
time from the present compared to imagining the target and then a string 
of related events going forward from the memory towards the present 
(Lam & Buehler, 2009).  
 
When investigating mental time travel, experimental cues are often taken 
from previous research, which has the advantage of making results more 
directly comparable. However, closer examination of cues can beg the 
question of whether they engender genuinely anticipated representations 
of the future, which is the focus of the research in this thesis. To give one 
example, events used by McDermott and colleagues (2016) were 
anticipated to be salient for experienced past and plausible future activities 
when employed by Rice & Rubin (2011) and were originally taken from 
Nigro & Neisser (1983). The events were: being in a group performance; 
demonstrating a skilled act to a child or a friend; giving an individual public 
presentation; having a face-to-face conversation; in an accident or near an 
accident; running for exercise; studying; swimming; walking or running 
from a threatening situation; and watching the news on television. Each 
event cue was paired at random with a time cue, which instructed 
participants either to remember a personal event (past) or to imagine a 
plausible personal future event (future). First person perspectives were 
associated with greater (p)re-experiencing and clarity of people. The 
authors compared these results with previous research that examined 
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events cued by an instruction to think of events set this year or next year 
(no event descriptions were given) where a greater proportion of first 
person perspectives were reported and noted that the kind of events used 
as cues may have impacted on the results. When remembering or 
forecasting are experimentally cued, the salience of these cues should be 
carefully considered if these are intended to elicit real memories or 
personally plausible future events. For example, the extent to which being 
in a group performance is salient or plausible to all participants is not 
made clear in the study just described. 
 
Prospection has been posited to be more effortful in the construction of a 
not-experienced scene (Buckner & Carroll, 2007; Hassabis & Maguire, 
2007; Schacter et al., 2007; Szpunar et al., 2007). However evidence 
suggests that future thinking can be demonstrably rapid and fluent when 
unconstrained by temporal distance and the imageability of cues 
(Anderson, Dewhurst & Nash, 2012). The process of identifying and 
isolating a specific episode in the past places demands on executive 
processes that are less well understood in future thinking. Explanations of 
episodic future thinking as semantic memory construction seem to depend 
on the notion that the imagined future has not received the verification that 
comes about as a consequence of experience. However this semantic 
explanation does not account for the finding that people are easily able to 
endorse future events as ‘real’ on the basis of belief in occurrence (Ernst & 
D’Argembeau, 2017). 
 
2.3 Reality monitoring criteria, real and imagined events  
The process of pre-experiencing a future event has been suggested to 
draw on past experience in a manner that flexibly extracts and re-
combines elements of previous experiences. According to this hypothesis, 
some of the vulnerabilities of episodic memory, such as memory 
distortions and illusions, may be attributable to the role of the episodic 
system in allowing simulations of the personal future to be created by 
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flexibly drawing on elements of the past. As noted by Devitt & Addis (2016, 
p.107), the nature of an imagined scenario has an influence on its 
subsequent memorability, and can also contribute to the formation of 
distortions in memory. Learning more about how future representation are 
constructed lies in understanding how we construct the past, “while 
bearing in mind that the past may in turn be a product of our imagination”. 
 
Reality monitoring theory distinguishes experienced memory from 
invented memory by a greater amount of sensory and contextual details 
(Johnson, 1988). The reality monitoring framework suggests that 
individuals implicitly use phenomenal characteristics of a memory as a 
checking guide to decide that an event is true. Reality monitoring criteria 
have been applied to witness testimony coding memory reports of 
witnesses for detail, a process known as interpersonal reality monitoring 
(IRM). This leads to the hypothesis that true accounts of experienced 
events contain more contextual, temporal and auditory details and are 
more detailed than fabricated accounts (Memon, Fraser, Colwell, Odinot & 
Mastroberardino, 2010).  
 
Another application of reality monitoring criteria has been to look at the 
characteristics of true recall when considering how to detect deception 
(Colwell, Hiscock-Anisman, Memon, Rachel & Colwell, 2007). The extent 
to which reality monitoring criteria have been found to be indicative of 
deceit in statements about past events was examined in a meta analysis 
of deception studies (Vrij, 2008, p. 278-9). In these data, heightened 
sensory information in truthful accounts was well supported, particularly in 
terms of spatial detail. To a lesser extent, truthful accounts tend to contain 
more visual and auditory details. Deceptive statements are associated 
with more cognitive operations (fairly well supported). Truthful accounts 
are perceived to have more clarity (slightly supported). Verbal cues to 
deceit include more negative statements, more immediacy, shorter 
responses and less plausible answers. In study 1(c, d) of this thesis, true 
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and imaginary accounts of past and future events are assessed by judges 
with and without contextual information to examine the effects of context 
on likelihood and plausibility judgements of real and imagined events from 
the recent past and future. 
 
2.4 Plausibility  
The list of distinctive characteristics of episodic future thinking is still 
evolving. The distinction between plausible and implausible future thinking 
is one such area of interest. Noting that some amnesic patients show poor 
ability to generate plausible or implausible future events compared to 
controls (Hassabis et al. 2007), Szpunar (2010) points out that research is 
needed to determine if there are any real differences between plausible 
and entirely fantastic events set in the future. The cognitive mechanisms 
of plausibility have been investigated within episodic memory literature, for 
example, plausible events are more easily remembered (Sharman & 
Scoboria, 2009). Plausibility operates as a credibility heuristic: the 
plausibility of an event increases the latency to decide whether or not the 
event has happened to you (Mazzoni, 2007). Implausible events (e.g. 
have you ever witnessed a demonic possession?) give rise to shorter 
latencies to respond because the search through autobiographical 
memory will only be run if an event is deemed sufficiently plausible. 
Mazzoni (2007) distinguished between autobiographical beliefs (most 
people know when and where they were born but have no memory of the 
event) and plausible autobiographical events (most people agree that 
choking on a small object as a young child is a plausible event, regardless 
of whether or not this happened to them).  
 
Plausibility, belief and memory are partially independent but operate within 
a predictable hierarchy where memory cues belief, belief implies personal 
plausibility and personal plausibility leads to an assumption of general 
plausibility (Scoboria, Mazzoni, Kirsch & Relyea, 2004; Sharman & 
Scoboria, 2009). If you have a memory for an event, you will believe that 
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the event is true, the event is therefore personally plausible for you and 
thus it is also globally plausible for other people. Reversing this model, a 
memory search for an event will not be carried out if the target is globally 
or personally implausible. If you are asked if you remember being lost in a 
shopping centre, a memory search will be performed since this is a 
plausible event. If you are asked if you remember witnessing a demonic 
possession, the implausibility of the event will be a sufficient basis from 
which to say no, without performing a search through memory. However, 
plausibility is subject to contamination, for example asking someone to 
briefly visualise an implausible event (having a piece of skin removed as 
part of a routine medical procedure as a child) increases their belief that 
the event happened to them (Mazzoni & Memon, 2003), a process known 
as imagination inflation. Sharman & Scoboria found that imagination 
inflation can influence confidence that a false memory is true, regardless 
of the plausibility of the event (2009). The processes of plausibility 
assessment in relation to prospection are little understood. The Clinton 
example outlined in Chapter 1 suggests that it is possible for an event 
deemed implausible by the wider world to have been accepted by Clinton 
as a plausible memory, perhaps through the process of imagination 
inflation. However the mechanisms by which the plausibility and likelihood 
of events are judged by other people are not explained at all by existing 
theoretical models of plausibility. In study 1 (c, d), judges rated transcripts 
of believed and not believed events set in a two-week boundary around 
the present for hallmarks of perceived plausibility and likelihood. These 
two studies provide an exploratory investigation of how judges with and 
without contextual information make credibility assessments on the 
content of other people’s descriptions of personal events set in the past 
and future.   
 
2.5 Deceptive intentions 
A new direction for episodic future thinking research has been the idea 
that it might be applied to the detection of deception (Granhag & Knieps, 
 45 
2011). If malicious intention could be identified through structured 
interviews, this has potential application in the prevention of  a range of 
criminal activities. One example is a case that occurred in September 
2008, at a university in Western Finland, cited by Granhag & Knieps 
(2011). Student Matti Juhani Saari, shot and fatally injured ten people with 
a semi-automatic pistol, before shooting himself in the head. He later died 
in hospital. In the weeks leading up to the incident, Saari had posted 
videos on YouTube, including one where he could be seen firing a 
handgun at a local shooting range accompanied by the quote Whole life is 
war and whole life is pain. And you will fight alone in your personal war. 
Finnish police were alerted to the videos in an anonymous tip-off and 
visited Saari the day before he carried out his crime. Officers searched the 
house and questioned the suspect but no further action was taken. On 
balance, the officers reasoned that Saari did not have a criminal record, 
held a recently-obtained permit for the weapons in his home and thus was 
probably not a risk to others or himself. If officers had access to a protocol 
by which a suspect could be interviewed and a more accurate risk 
assessment made, in this situation several lives might have been saved.  
 
Another example is Anders Behring Breivik who planned and executed a 
complex crime resulting in mass murder with 77 victims. According to 
reports in the Sunday Telegraph in 2011, Breivik had been flagged up to 
the authorities in advance of his crime by reports of multiple online 
purchases of bomb-making equipment. The need to detect deception 
about future events and foil plots before they are carried out is far from 
unusual in police and security settings and increasingly so as security 
services rely on a range of sources of intelligence to assess threat. In 
another well-publicised case cited by Clemens, Granhag, & Strömwall 
(2011), terrorists planned to detonate liquid explosives on board ten 
passenger planes travelling from the United Kingdom to the United States 
and Canada. On this occasion, the plot was intercepted and foiled by 
British Police. Granhag & Mac Giolla (2014) provide a summary of how 
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identifying hallmarks of true and false intent might be useful in a range of 
criminal contexts.  
 
It is easy to see how the application of an interview protocol to detect 
deceptive statements would be desirable. However the ability to detect 
detection is an elusive goal. The literature on deception detection goes 
back decades with the consistent finding that liars are detected with 
reliability at just above chance: the figure most cited is 54% (Bond & 
DePaulo, 2006; Vrij, 2008). The vast majority of these studies have 
focused on deception about past events. While the detection of deception 
for criminal activities set in the future events has clear utility, the risk of a 
miscarriage of justice is high. There is very little evidence for hallmarks of 
veracity when events are set in the past. For deception detection 
techniques to be applied to future activities and reliably employed in real 
world settings, the mechanisms of veridical intention should be clearly 
understood and well supported by psychological science (Granhag, 2010). 
As noted by Tulving & Szpunar (2011), the fu ture exists only in the human 
mind. 
 
The tactic of embedding lies in otherwise true content is not unusual 
(Leins, Fisher & Ross, 2013) and can be particularly difficult to detect (Vrij, 
2008). The extent to which lies about future activities may be embedded in 
descriptions of truly anticipated events is not known but it seems likely that 
expectancies about the future will be used to structure a future oriented 
cover story. A stated aim of research in deception detection is to seek 
hallmarks of true intention within representations of future events 
(Granhag & Mac Giolla, 2014). The majority of the research in this thesis is 
not directly related to deceptive behaviour, with the exception of study 5, 
but does compare believed future events with events that are not believed 
but are equally plausible, frequent and easy to generate in verbal and 
visual representations (Studies 1 and 3). By examining prospection for 
believed events and obtaining insight into differences between how people 
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represent things they intend to do and things they do not intend to do in 
the future (at a distance of two weeks or one year; study 4) or when 
comparing recent past and near future (at a distance of up to two weeks; 
Studies 1 and 3), this thesis contributes useful evidence to a literature that 
seeks to understand what happens when someone deliberately relays 
misleading information designed to conceal their true intentions.  
 
Early studies looking at credibility assessments of true and false future 
intentions used a range of designs. The first such study employed a field 
design where travellers were recruited at an airport. Participants were 
randomly assigned to tell the truth or to lie about their forthcoming trip. A 
second interviewer then approached and questioned each person (Vrij, 
Granhag, Mann & Leal, 2011). Responses to nine questions were 
transcribed and coded to yield five dependent variables: response length, 
amount of detail, plausibility, contradictions, and spontaneous corrections. 
The number of details in responses did not differentiate truth tellers from 
liars but liars’ statements were judged to be markedly less plausible. On 
the basis of plausibility ratings made by judges, truth tellers (72%) and 
liars (74%) were correctly classified; a result that far exceeds the 54% 
discriminative ability of past research. No more correct classifications of 
truth tellers and liars occurred on the basis of plausibility scores, 
contradictions and spontaneous corrections together than on the basis of 
plausibility scores alone. However, the question of how judges rated 
plausibility remains to be clarified. This field design has been extended 
and replicated and is referred to as the Portsmouth method (Granhag & 
Mac Giolla, 2014). Study 5 of this thesis also investigates perceived 
plausibility as a discriminator of intended and not intended future events 
with a particular focus on the reliability of plausibility judgements. 
 
The next study to investigate true and false future intentions compared 
these with true and false statements about past events (Vrij, Leal et al., 
2011). Participants were military police and police officers who acted as 
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undercover agents. Their task was to plan and undertake a mission to 
collect an item from building A, deliver it to building B and then return to 
base. While carrying out this task, participants were intercepted and 
interviewed by friendly or hostile agents: once on the way out (future) and 
again on the way back (past). During these interviews, liars gave a cover 
story, truth tellers told the truth. Consistent with Vrij, Granhag et al. (2011), 
results showed that there was no difference in the number of details in 
interview transcripts. However raters (N = 99) found that liars’ statements 
about future actions were significantly less plausible than liars’ statements 
about past actions. False future statements could be detected with 70% 
accuracy whereas deceptive statements about past activities could only be 
identified with 50% accuracy, in line with previous deception literature. The 
amount of detail did not differ between true and false future statements 
(but did differ in past statements). However detail alone could not 
differentiate false statements about past events above chance. Plausibility 
significantly differed by temporal direction (past, future) and veracity, but 
truth and lie detection were easiest in the intentions statements and 
hardest in the past activities statements, where accuracy rates for both lies 
and truths did not differ from chance. The authors hypothesise that 
observers may not expect statements about future intentions to be 
detailed but plausibility would still be evident. They suggest that in future 
research, judges should be asked an open question about why they made 
the veracity judgements that they did. Judges in studies 1(c, d) viewed 
statements about believed and not believed events in the recent past and 
future and made comments about what informed their plausibility and 
likelihood judgements in each temporal direction (see Appendix F). 
 
A new direction for this research was taken by using episodic future 
thinking as an index of true and false intentions (Granhag & Knieps, 2011). 
Participants rated mental imagery during the planning phase using an 
adapted memory characteristics questionnaire (D’Argembeau et al., 2004; 
2006). Half the student participants planned to place a memory stick 
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containing illicit material on a particular shelf in a shop in a shopping mall. 
In addition to planning the mock crime, participants were told to plan a 
cover story based on a shopping trip, which should be used if they were 
intercepted. Control participants were told to plan a shopping trip to buy 
items from the same shop. All participants were instructed that they had a 
single opportunity to carry out the task and ten minutes to plan the activity. 
After the planning phase, participants visited a second room, ostensibly to 
be given a tram ticket. Here they were intercepted by a second researcher 
an asked to imagine they had been stopped by a guard at the shopping 
centre. An interviewer blind to experimental condition questioned 
participants on their intentions. On the basis of word counts performed on 
interview transcripts, truth tellers said more than liars during the interviews. 
Phenomenological ratings on the planning phase indicated that truth 
tellers reported more a greater sense of mental time travel, greater clarity 
of temporal information and spatial location of people but no difference 
was found in sensory details (visual, auditory, smells/tastes) or other 
spatial contextual detail. This procedure has since been much replicated 
and is sometimes referred to as the Gothenburg method (Granhag & Mac 
Giolla, 2014). Study 5 of this thesis makes use of the Gothenburg method 
to examine intention, strategic interviewing and the use of drawings as a 
dependent variable. 
 
The Gothenburg method has been used in multiple studies as a reliable 
means by which to examine episodic future thinking for events planned to 
be carried out in the immediate future and compare differences between 
liars and truth tellers (Knieps, Granhag & Vrij, 2013a; Knieps, Granhag & 
Vrij, 2013b; Knieps, Granhag & Vrij, 2014; Sooniste, Granhag, Knieps and 
Vrij, 2013). Other theoretical approaches that have been investigated as 
likely sources of difference between true and deceptive intentions have 
included implementation intentions (Mac Giolla, Granhag & Liu-Jönsson, 
2013), spatial and temporal details (Warmelink, Vrij, Mann, Granhag, 
2013), spontaneous thoughts (Mac Giolla, Granhag & Ask, 2017a), goals 
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(Ask, Granhag, Juhlin & Vrij, 2013; Mac Giolla, Granhag & Ask, 2017b), 
externally-verifiable details (Jupe, Leal, Vrij and Nahari, 2017), groups of 
suspects (Mac Giolla & Granhag, 2015), and forward and reverse 
chronological interviewing (Fenn, McGuire, Langben & Blandon-Gitlin, 
2015). Results of these and other studies (Sooniste, Granhag, Strömwall 
& Vrij, 2014, 2015) have centred on hypotheses that i) increasing cognitive 
load will be more difficult for liars than truth  tellers; ii) unanticipated 
questions on how the planned action will be carried out are answered in 
more detail by truth tellers; and iii) liars may be exposed by the content of 
their answers to unanticipated questions about their intentions. These 
approaches to discriminating the veracity of events that are set in the 
future (and thus have yet to take place) are now the subject of attempts to 
create a training protocol for use by police investigators (Sooniste, 
Granhag & Stromwall, 2016).  
 
These studies seem to hint at the existence of some discernible 
differences between true and deceptive statements about future events. 
Deceptive statements about future events in these studies were found to 
be less plausible and to contain fewer spatial features (Vrij, Leal et al., 
2010; Vrij, Granhag et al., 2011). Most notable of these is the difference in 
plausibility. One criticism that might be made of asking raters to estimate 
plausibility is that a theoretically-derived definition of what constitutes 
plausibility has yet to be established. Thus it is difficult to pin down the 
exact construct being measured. This ambiguity is reflected in inter-rater 
reliability for plausibility ratings in this type of research which tends to be 
very low, for example,  r = .41 (Vrij, Granhag et al., 2011). For plausibility 
to be applied diagnostically as a reliable interviewing technique for 
detecting deception, elucidation of the mechanisms underlying such 
judgements is essential. Only then could this potentially useful finding 
have practical application.  
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This point highlights one limitation to the research reviewed here. These 
studies are based on field and experimental research with interesting 
results but without a clear theoretical basis. Results suggest that deceptive 
future statements do not have the same characteristics as deceptive 
statements about the past. They seem to contain less detail yet are easier 
to detect on the basis of plausibility. As previously highlighted, plausibility 
has been shown to be used as a heuristic for judging the likelihood of a 
person’s own memories (Scoboria et al., 2004; 2009) but the mechanisms 
that underlie reliable detection of plausibility in  statements made by others 
about future events has yet to be elucidated. The question of what raters 
are using to make a plausibility distinction is unanswered by existing 
research. For example, the cited definitions for plausibility in Vrij, Granhag 
et al. (2011) are The degree to which the message seems plausible, likely 
or believable (DePaulo, Lindsay, Malone, Muhlenbruck, Charlton & 
Cooper, 2003) and Plausible answers: statements that make sense and 
sound credible and reasonable (Vrij, 2008). Both of these definitions could 
be criticised for circularity and lack of clarity. Further research is needed to 
hone a more precise definition for plausibility before this could be 
operationalized as a method to examine statements about future events in 
psycho-legal research. 
 
Verbal descriptions are one source of material for judging plausibility and 
easily the most common one. As part of a wider focus on means by which 
hallmarks of truly intended future activity might emerge, a recent avenue 
for research has been ask people to draw pictures that represent their 
future plans. For a recent review of drawing-based deception detection 
techniques, see Mac Giolla, Granhag & Vernham (2017). The use of 
drawings as an interview tool has the advantage that it can be employed in 
contexts where language barriers exist and has been suggested to be a 
useful method in terms of reducing cost, ease of implementation and 
analysis (Vrij, Leal, Mann, Granhag & Fisher, 2010). Studies 4 and 5 of 
this thesis employed sketch making as a means by which to investigate 
 52 
believed and not believed events set in the recent past and near future 
(study 4) and true and deceptive future events (study 5). 
 
2.6 Aims of current research  
The primary aim of this PhD project is to investigate whether belief in 
occurrence moderates mental time travel to events in the past and future. 
The studies in this thesis examine the extent to which belief (that an event 
will really occur) can be shown to impact on mental time travel, memory 
and behavior, with a particular focus on the personal future. A secondary 
aim was to examine the evidence that hallmarks of belief, should they 
exist at all, might yield explicit verbal and non-verbal indicators that can be 
reliably detected through strategic interviewing techniques. Comparisons 
are made between recent past and near future events (studies 1 and 4), 
near and distant future events (study 3), intention as a mnemonic at a 
distance of two months (study 2) and deliberately lied-about and believed 
future events that take place in the immediate future (study 5).  
 
In order to examine veridical intention and belief, a series of pilot studies 
was used to develop a novel method by which mental time travel would 
vary on the basis of belief. Recent research on detection of lies about 
future intentions is predicated on the notion that reliable hallmarks of truly 
intended behaviour may exist (Granhag & Mac Giolla, 2014). The 
suggestion is that mechanisms of episodic future thinking for believed 
future events may differ if target events are not believed to be going to 
occur. Such differences may parallel mechanisms for believed memories 
that are not an accurate record of the past. As highlighted by Schacter and 
Addis (2007), exploring the possible link between constructive aspects of 
memory and simulation of the future may help to provide fresh 
perspectives on such fundamental questions as why imagination is 
sometimes confused with memory and, more generally, why memories 
can sometimes be mistaken.  
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In study 1 of this thesis, time travel for recently experienced and 
imminently anticipated events was examined by asking participants to 
choose experimental cues that mapped onto recent experience and 
current plans. This method of investigating mental time travel was used in 
study 3 to contrast goal-related prospection for plans set close in time and 
at a distance of one year ahead. Results showed that believed events 
were experienced with similar vividness whether set in the past or future 
(studies 1b and 4b) or two weeks or one year ahead (study 3b).  
 
In study 4, the same cueing method was used to experimentally 
manipulate belief in occurrence of recent past and near future activities 
and drawings were made of these events. In study 4(c) these sketches 
were viewed by age-matched judges and rated on measures taken from 
psycho-legal research. Judges showed poor agreement on nearly every 
measure and no differences were identified on the basis of belief in 
occurrence. In study 5, a mock crime paradigm was used to investigate 
believed and lied-about future actions in a between-group design. Again, 
participants drew as well as described their plans. In study 5(b) the 
drawings were viewed by three judges and rated on the basis of 
plausibility, detail and content. Ratings of detail in these drawings were 
reliable and showed that truth tellers’ sketches were perceived as more 
detailed.  
 
A separate attempt to find explicit markers of belief was made by 
examining memorial performance for believed events. Words encoded in 
the context of the future are better remembered than atemporal or past 
scenarios (Klein et al., 2010). Study 2 extended this finding to see if the 
salience of a believed event set two months in the future would act as a 
mnemonic. Results showed that the relatedness of word lists to an 




Chapter 3 – Travelling in Time  
(Studies 1a, b, c, d)    
 
3.1 Background Literature, Objectives and hypotheses 
 
A recent new avenue for research has been to address the metacognitive 
processes by which people are able to report belief in occurrence for 
future events, despite the objective fact that any event set in the future is 
by definition hypothetical and yet to be corrected or validated by 
experience. Ernst and D’Argembeau (2017) investigated the basis by 
which individuals derive a sense that an event is likely to form part of the 
personal future and contrasted this with believed events in the recent past. 
After generating word-cued autobiographical events, participants rated 
phenomenological qualities and reported metacognitive judgements on 
autonoesis, accuracy, and likelihood of occurrence for each event. 
Location clarity, personal importance, personal plausibility and rehearsal 
were the strongest predictors of belief in occurrence for future events. 
Knowing the exact time in the future that an event would take place made 
it seem more real. All events were associated with high levels of belief and 
the authors note that this may be an artefact of the design: neither 
distance from the present moment nor the importance of events was 
constrained. It was suggested that further research might expand the 
variability of belief in occurrence in both past and future events.  
 
The first step in an attempt to investigate the effect of belief in occurrence 
is to consider variables that might impact on metacognitive assessments 
of the likelihood that a future event will occur. The notion that some future 
events are true has received some attention in deception detection 
literature (reviewed in Chapter 2). Believed and lied about events are 
investigated by randomly assigning participants to tell the truth or give a 
false cover story about a future activity. In the Gothenburg design, each 
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group is instructed to make plans to carry out a specific task. Truth  tellers 
plan to carry out a task that involves navigating from where they are 
participating in the experiment to a library or shopping centre somewhere 
nearby to carry out an action. Liars have two tasks: to plan a covert action 
and simultaneously plan a cover story on a given theme (selected by the 
experimenter to match truth tellers’ stories).  
 
Results from such studies suggest that when people are deliberately lying 
about future events, they are less likely to form a clear mental image when 
planning the event, and sensory and perceptual components are less 
likely to bear the hallmarks of cognitive operations related to active goal 
pursuit. However it could be argued that this experimental design does not 
tap into latent processes of belief in occurrence. Even truth tellers in this 
paradigm have been instructed to do something that they had not 
previously intended to do. Liars have been instructed to carry out two 
simultaneous goals: to successfully carry out a mock crime and to 
generate and describe a cover story on a supplied theme that should 
sound plausible and convincing if intercepted and interviewed. Compare 
this to a field investigation involving an interview about future intentions, 
which would involve the detection of a contrast between latent veridical 
intention (truth teller) and concealed intention (liar). Since the cover story 
theme is not predetermined (by an experimenter), a liar is at liberty to 
embed deceptive elements within an otherwise truthful account of his or 
her future activities. It is likely that a liar is able to draw on a wide range of 
potential scenarios to furnish such an account since the future has yet to 
happen and is arguably open to any number of changes in plan or 
direction. This suggests that contrasting veridical belief with plausible but 
not-believed events would makes a useful starting point from which to 
think about what constitutes intended behaviour. 
 
Diary studies show that speculating about the future is almost as common 
as remembering past events (D’Argembeau et al., 2010), suggesting that 
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the fluency of prospection is not overly impeded by the objective lack of 
external verification for imagined future events. People do not stop to 
specifically weigh up the likelihood of an imagined future event being 
objectively real, rather they rely on heuristics such as the extent to which a 
scenario depicting that event can be brought to mind (Kahneman & 
Tversky, 1982). The perceived plausibility of an emotional future event can 
experimentally manipulated by repetition (Szpunar & Schacter, 2013). This 
study required participants to combine familiar places and people in novel 
scenarios that varied in emotional valence. Emotional future scenarios that 
were imagined four times were seen as more plausible and detailed and 
were brought to mind with greater ease and more emotional arousal 
compared to the same event simulated only once. Using this method 
conferred the advantage of removing any effect of prior experience on 
estimates that an event could occur in the future but as noted by the 
authors (p 324), the cues employed were not designed to tap into existing 
belief; instead participants were asked to rate how plausible the events 
were. Thus the results cannot be interpreted as synonymous with belief 
and are not necessarily generalizable to understanding prospection for 
events that are truly believed to be going to occur for that person. 
Tversky & Kahneman (1973) suggest that the availability of a 
representation is critical for the judgement of likelihood. When events are 
perceived as so unique that no exemplar in memory can furnish details of 
the event, the next step is to generate a scenario, defined as a story that 
leads from the present situation to the target event. The ease of 
construction and the plausibility of the scenario are heuristics used to 
decide how likely it is to happen. If no scenario comes to mind, the event 
is deemed impossible or highly unlikely. Conversely, if a range of 
simulations are available or a single scenario is particularly salient, the 
event in question will be deemed likely and even probable. Thus the 
availability of scenarios is likely to be another variable that should be 
considered in this type of research. Although not much is known about 
true belief in the occurrence of a future event, the literature reviewed so far 
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would suggest that personal importance, plausibility, familiarity and 
rehearsal of cue events (Ernst & D’Argembeau, 2017) and the ease with 
which events can be imagined (Kahneman & Tversky, 1982) would be 
likely to be variables of interest. 
Where events are so frequently experienced as to be script-like, 
investigating the difference between events that were experienced or are 
truly believed to be going to occur and similar events that can be 
described but are not believed may shed light on the processes by which 
people are able to say that events represent a continuing autobiographical 
narrative of the self across time. One account of how past, future and 
present goal-related thoughts are integrated and readily available is 
proposed in a model described as the remembering–imagining system 
(Conway et al., 2016). As noted by Conway (2009, p.2307), memory 
facilitates the subjective sense of the self across time by endowing a 
sense of temporal order and supporting our sense of beforeness, 
afterness, newness and anticipation of the future. The heightened salience 
of events in a three-day window around the present acts allows the 
interplay of the recently experienced past and imminently anticipated 
future to enhance and facilitate goal related behaviour in the present 
moment. Temporally-close events are more vivid but tend to be rated as 
less personally important than more distant events (Spreng & Levine, 
2006). Simulating temporally-close events leads to higher ratings for 
sensory variables and autonoesis (D’Argembeau & Van der Linden 2004). 
For example, a formal event invitation might be in your diary months 
ahead of time. At a distance of several months away, your behavioural 
commitment to this future event might only extend as far as replying to the 
invitation. When the event is only days away, semantic and episodic 
knowledge of the contingencies associated with attending the event, say a 
wedding, are switched on. The accessibility of a representation of the 
future event allows fine grain planning that makes the future experience 
both more navigable and more rewarding. I have booked my train tickets, I 
know where I am staying, I’ve Googled the weather and I know what I am 
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going to wear, friend X has booked a taxi for us to get from the church to 
the reception. Being asked if a temporally close event is believed to be 
true when it is close to the present is likely to be a much easier question to 
answer than if the event is set six months ahead. By constraining events 
to a two-week boundary around the present, as in study 1, personal 
importance would be unlikely to be very high with the advantage of 
increased vividness and the ability to generate a process simulation of 
what, where, when, and how the event will unfold (Gerlach, Spreng, 
Madore & Schacter, 2014).  
 
Study 1(b) was designed to investigate veridical belief in recent past and 
future events. The decision on how close to the present events should be 
set was somewhat constrained by the types of event that participants 
would be asked to imagine. The predominant area of interest was how 
episodic memory and episodic future thinking might vary on the basis of 
personal belief in occurrence. Ernst & D’Argembeau (2017) measured 
belief in occurrence as a continuous variable without manipulating the 
salience of events. By contrast, in study 1(b) of this thesis, participants 
were explicitly instructed to select event cues on the basis that they did or 
did not believe the event to be something they had done (past condition), 
or intended to do (future condition) at a distance of two weeks around the 
present. The objective was to constrain simulations to two levels of 
veracity: 1. Believed events that represented true past experience or a 
future event that was believed to be going to take place at a specific time 
and date in the near future. 2. Not-believed events were merely imagined 
at a specific moment in the past or the future, without any accompanying 
belief that the event had or would take place. In contrast to Ernst & 
D’Argembeau, 2017, in which word cues were used to examine belief in 
occurrence of past and future events, study 1(b) investigated belief in 
occurrence in a within participants 2 (self-selected believed events, self-





Previous research has used everyday event stimuli to compare true and 
fabricated memories (Justice, Morrison & Conway, 2012; 2018). In these 
studies, memories were cued by 16 events taken from literature that 
explored knowledge structures within autobiographical memory in which 
the frequency with which events tended to be experienced was not a 
variable of interest (Bower, Black, & Turner, 1979; Reiser, Black, & 
Abelson, 1985; Trafimow & Wyer, 1993). Some cues were items that might 
be daily occurrences, such as getting up in the morning; grocery shopping; 
getting a bus; or getting a train. Other items could be described as more 
likely to occur once or twice a year, such as going on holiday and doing an 
exam. Some items may be very infrequently experienced (e.g. taking a 
drive; or going to the bank) or could be more salient as familiar scripts to 
older rather than younger participants. Since frequency of experience of 
an event may affect the vividness of simulation, the present study sought 
to identify and control frequency of experience within a selection of cues. 
 
A pilot study was conducted to generate a list of cues for use in study 1(b). 
The list would be used to enable participants in the main experiment to 
select two cues for prospection (one salient, one not-salient) and two cues 
for retrospection (one salient, one not-salient). To clarify the use of the 
term salience: a salient event would be one that a person had carried out 
in the last two weeks (past) or intended to carry out in the next two weeks 
(future). In the main experiment, participants were told a salient event 
should be already in the diary or they should have an existing verbal or 
written arrangement to carry out that activity. A not-salient event would be 
personally plausible and frequently experienced but just happened to be 
something that person was as sure as they could be at that moment in 
time they would not be doing for the next two weeks, or if possible for even 
longer. The same list of events was presented to each participant for each 
trial.  Thus the list needed to comprise a menu from which four personally-
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plausible and frequently-experienced events could be chosen purely on 
the basis of experience (1 past experienced, 1 past fictitious) or 
anticipation (1 future anticipated, 1 future fictitious).  
 
In order to control extraneous variables such as lack of familiarity, 
personal implausibilty, or differences in the imageability of events, the 
choice of stimuli used in study 1(b) was constrained by specific 
requirements. First, each event on the list should be endorsed as 
plausible, frequently-experienced and easy to picture in the mind’s eye by 
young adults aged 20–30. The age restriction matched the age of 
participants in the main experiment. Limiting participation to younger 
adults conferred the advantage of avoiding age effects on the amount of 
episodic content that might be provided in the main experiment (Cole, 
Morrison & Conway, 2013). Secondly, events on the list should provide a 
range from which items that were salient and not-salient events in both 
temporal directions could be selected. There may be any number of 
events that would be suitable for use as stimuli. The purpose of study 1a 
was to obtain a short list that would be fit for purpose.  
 
Other researchers have considered the importance of personal plausibility 
and previous experience when comparing memories to prospection, for 
example Cordonnier, Barnier & Sutton (2016) looked at planning and 
experience for camping trips to familiar and unfamiliar locations in the past 
and future. Participants had planned a camping trip but the issue as to 
whether they also had the intention to go camping in the future was not 
investigated. Previous experience of camping was the baseline for 
comparison but if participants happened to have a pre-existing intention to 
go camping in the future, this might have made the future condition more 
salient. The extent to which having an intention to carry out an activity 
confers similar features to prospection as past experience lends to recall 
was the primary interest in the design of this study.  
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Generating self-relevant future events has been posited to rely on scene 
construction, self-connection and familiarity processes (Hassabis & 
Maguire, 2009). Evidence for this was obtained by asking patients with 
hippocampal amnesia and matched controls to generate future scenarios 
(Hassabis et al., 2007). A second study used the same stimuli to contrast 
prospection with memories in neurotypical individuals (Hassabis, Kumaran 
& Maguire, 2007). Cues were described as a range of commonplace 
scenarios from manmade to natural and from busy to isolated. The aim 
was to generate simulations that were unique future events (not based on 
memories) and which did not require creative input, (which may be more 
difficult for the neurologically atypical participants). Seven cues were used 
to generate fictitious future scenarios and 3 items were intended to cue 
self-referential, truly anticipated future events. Fictitious cues were a 
beach, museum, pub, port, market, forest and castle. Each item was 
framed in a sentence so that the participant imagined one specific 
instance, for example: imagine you are lying on a white sandy beach in a 
beautiful tropical bay or imagine that you are standing in the main hall of a 
museum containing many exhibits. Anticipated event cues were possible 
Christmas event, possible event over next weekend, possible future 
meeting with a friend. In this study, fictitious and intended events yielded 
similar results so that vividness and detail data for the two event types 
were collapsed within the reported results. The means by which event 
cues were selected and participants’ ratings of belief in occurrence for 
these events are not reported.  
 
The aim of study 1(a) was to generate a list of events that would be used 
as cues in study 1(b). Suitable events needed to be plausible, frequently-
experienced and easy-to-imagine but not so frequently-experienced that it 
would not be possible for participants to select items that had not been 
experienced in the last two weeks or were not intended to be experienced 
in the coming fortnight. Suitable cue items would be used to populate a list 
presented in study 1(b), where 4 cues set in a two-week boundary around 
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the present could be chosen on the basis that two events would be 
believed to be true and thus were salient (1 past, 1 future) and two events 




The pilot was carried out in two phases. Phase 1 was a descriptive survey 
conducted to collect examples of typical activities anticipated to take place 
in the next two weeks from a UK-based cohort of 20-30 year olds. Phase 2 
was an online questionnaire with two components. First participants 
provided lists of 5–10 activities that had been carried out in the preceding 
two weeks. These enabled verification that items nominated in Phase 1 as 
future events were also recently experienced past events. After 
nominating recent events, 24 events from Phase 1 were rated on 3 
dimensions: frequency of experience (in any two-week period), personal 
plausibility, and ease of mental imagery. Items that appeared on both past 
and future event lists and were endorsed by judges at or above the 
midpoint (≥3) for frequency, plausibility and imageability were selected for 
use as event cue stimuli in study 1(b).  
 
Participants 
Phase 1 participants were 26 students or graduates (13 males) from 
England and Scotland who were recruited through personal contacts and 
asked to provide lists of up to 10 events anticipated to take place in the 
following two weeks. Twenty respondents (9 males, M age = 23.39, SD = 
3.24, range 19–30) completed the first phase of the study. In Phase 2, a 
second group of 50 participants (21 males) aged 20-30 were recruited 
through personal contacts and student message boards and invited to 
take part in an online questionnaire. No participants in either phase of the 
pilot study also took part in study 1(b) 
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Materials and Procedure  
Phase 1: A request was sent by email asking for nominations of everyday 
activities. Instructions requested a list of 5–10 events anticipated to take 
place in next two weeks. Appropriate activities were described as: 
Specific activities that are in your diary and that you have actively 
planned to do during the next 14 days. Each event should be 
something lasts for over one hour but less than a day, so going 
home to see your parents would not count if that would be a visit of 
over 24 hours duration.  
Suitable examples were stated as: going to a club with friends; having a 
meeting with your boss; going shopping with a friend. Participants were 
not constrained by event type, so if going to the pub was a planned activity 
that would take place on five separate occasions in the immediate future, 
all events on this theme generated by one participant would be included in 
the data set. Further detail on the procedure for coding events is described 
in the Results section. 
 
Phase 2: 24 specific events generated in Phase 1 were entered into an 
online questionnaire presented on Survey Monkey software 
(www.surveymonkey.com). Participants received an email link to the 
study. After reading an information sheet and indicating consent to 
participate, participants were asked to nominate 5–10 examples of specific 
events that had taken place over the last two weeks. Instructions mirrored 
those given to Phase 1 participants when providing near future events but 
amended to reflect the recent past. Next 24 events from Phase 1 were 
presented one event per page of the questionnaire. Each event was 
framed by the question In the next two weeks how likely are you to…? and 
followed by three questions: It is plausible (i.e. not impossible) that I would 
do this in the next two weeks, I frequently do this activity in any two-week 
period, If I close my eyes, I can easily generate a mental image of myself 
doing this. Agreement was indicated on a five-point scale (definitely agree, 
slightly agree, neither agree nor disagree, slightly disagree, definitely 
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disagree). After the events had been rated, demographic information on 
age, gender and English language fluency was collected. Participants 
were thanked and debriefed. 
 
3.4 Results  
Phase 1: 186 events anticipated to be carried out in the next two weeks 
were nominated. Items were sorted on the basis that the content could be 
generated as a memory or future event in response to that category being 
presented as a cue. The majority of categories generated in this way 
related to leisure (n = 15) with the rest split between occupation (work or 
university, n = 5) and life management (n = 5). Themes, categories and 
frequencies are summarised in Table 3.1. A second coder reviewed and 
sorted the events into the same categories and agreed on 86% of items. 
The remaining twenty-five items was resolved by discussion. 
 
Table 3.1  
Study 1(a) 186 Future Events by Theme and Frequency of Nominations 
Theme (n)  Events (n) 
Leisure 
(125) 
 Sports (17), Shopping (13), Pub (13), Cinema (11), 
Staying in (11), Eating out (10), Club (9), Seeing family 
(8), Travel (8), Going to a friend’s house (5), Party (5), 
Meeting for a coffee (5), Live music (3), Museums and 




 Meeting (study or work) (11), Working (9), Studying (8), 





 Domestic chores (8), Grooming and healthcare (7), Event 
planning (4), Financial chores (4), Flat hunting (2) 
 
Item descriptions that did not contain markers of specific instances and 
might lead to less specific prospection or recall were not presented for 
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further rating, for example: working: 11–5 work at Greggs; domestic 
chores: vacuum whole house). The Travel category was an example 
where items were often specific but was not rated further since cued 
events might extend to longer than one day, for example: a trip to the 
Malverns for boyfriend's photography project; I am going to Amsterdam on 
the 5th of February and Zurich a week after that). In the main experiment 
(study 1b) data collection was planned for the first semester of the 
academic year with a mixed student and non-student population. Further 
exclusions were made on the basis that items would be difficult to 
generalize to one or other occupation or would be salient only at certain 
times of the year (e.g. event planning: booking festival tickets).  
 
After exclusions, 24 events were selected for rating in Phase 2. The 
description of each event was adapted from the examples given by Phase 
1 participants but was aimed to be broad in the extent to which it could 
encompass a range of exemplars of that category. Two events were 
thematically related to life management, one each from the most 
frequently-nominated categories: attending a medical appointment; going 
shopping for a specific item e.g. a computer. Four items related to the 
three most nominated categories in the Occupation theme: attending a 
progress meeting, doing voluntary work, going to a job interview, and 
giving a presentation. Eighteen items related to leisure activities: going to 
a friend's house to watch a film, going to the theatre, inviting someone 
round for dinner, meeting a friend for coffee, meeting a friend in a pub or 
bar, staying in with someone to share pizza and a movie, taking part in a 
pub quiz, attending a club night or event, a roller disco, a cinema trip, a 
party, baking a cake, going for a run, going to the gym or a fitness class, a 
kickboxing class, attending a burlesque night, trying out a new recipe, and 
visiting a car boot sale.  
 
Phase 2: 24 event cues generated in Phase 1 were rated for plausibility, 
frequency of experience and ease of mental imagery by 50 participants. 
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The aim of the pilot study was to identify items that could be selected by 
participants as cues for either a salient or not-salient event in a two-week 
time boundary around the present. Thus items receiving mean ratings of 1 
slightly disagree or 2 strongly disagree on any variable would not be 
suitable for use as cues for salient trials. Endorsements of strongly and 
slightly at each end of the scale were collapsed to form three levels of 
agreement on each variable for every item (agree, neutral, disagree). 
Where mean endorsements were 3 (neither agree nor disagree) the item 
was labelled neutral. Items receiving a mean disagree rating on any 
variable were discarded (n = 14). Eight items derived from leisure 
categories and one occupation item received agree ratings on all three 
variables. One further item from the life management category (try a new 
recipe) was rated agree for plausibility and imageability and neutral for 
frequency. Since this would not preclude the item for use as either a 
salient or not salient cue in terms of frequency, this event was also 
selected for further validation. 
 
The next step in validating the 10 events was to confirm that each item 
had also been nominated by Phase 2 participants as a memory from the 
last two weeks. All ten items appeared among nominations made by 
Phase 2 participants. Verbatim near future events from Phase 1 and 
recent past events generated in Phase 2 are presented in Appendix A. No 
further analyses were conducted on recent past events but see the 
Discussion section for further comments on how recent memories differed 
from near future plans. The number of nominations by category in Phase 1 
and Phase 2 is presented in Table 3.3.  
 
As a final step in validating the 10 items selected for use as cues, a mean 
was calculated for each rating variable (plausibility, frequency, 
imageability) for each event on the basis that 1 = strongly disagree and 5 
= strongly agree. A global score for each event was then computed from 
the means of the three ratings. An independent sample t-test showed that 
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the 10 items selected for use in the main experiment received higher 
ratings for the combined variables (M = 3.95, SD = .35) compared to the 
14 items that were not selected (M = 2.62, SD = .53), t(21.88) = 7.51, p = 
.001. Means for the 10 events selected for use as cues in study 1(b) are 
presented in Table 3.2.  
Table 3.2.  
Mean Scores for Highly Plausible, Frequent and Imageable Events 
Description  Means * 
  Plausibility Frequency Imagery Global 
Meet a friend for coffee  4.58 4.32 4.8 4.57 
Meet a friend in a pub or bar  4.46 4.14 4.6 4.4 
Stay in for pizza and a movie  4.38 4.08 3.8 4.09 
Go to the cinema  4.1 3.28 4.72 4.03 
Watch a film at a friend’s house   3.92 3.42 4.52 3.95 
Go to a club   3.68 3.52 4.44 3.88 
Invite someone round for dinner   3.9 3.36 4.32 3.86 
Attend a progress meeting  3.9 3.32 4.12 3.75 
Try making a new recipe  3.5 3.02 4.06 3.53 
Visit a gym or fitness class    3.34 3.04 4.02 3.47 
Note: Raters, n = 50 
 
Discussion 
The aim of the study was to find a short list of stimuli that could be used to 
cue recent memories and future plans in a study in which belief in 
occurrence would vary. Keeping the list short was intended to minimise 
any extraneous effects of variance in the salience of events. Ten event 
cues were endorsed as plausible, frequently experienced and easily 
imagined by 20-30 year olds when thinking about the recent past and near 
future. 
Phase 1 and 2 events. Since instructions had stipulated that suitable 
activities would already be in each person’s diary or calendar, some 
Phase 1 responses included an estimate of time and date. This 
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information provided additional confirmation that items were real future 
plans. The where and when aspects of future plans were often made clear 
within the written content of Phase 1 nominations. By contrast, some of 
the past events were described in terms of personal salience rather than 
the physical location such as: Met my ex boyfriend, last time I saw him 
was 1.5 years ago. This memory might potentially be elicited by cues such 
meeting for coffee or going to a pub or bar but as the location was not 
mentioned, this item was categorised as Other going out. Many of the past 
events contained spontaneous activities or idiosyncratic information that 
could feasibly happen in the future but would be unlikely to be planned to 
occur. For example, going for a walk was suggested once in Phase 1. This 
might not be an event that is often put in the diary but if the weather 
outside looks inviting, you might decide to go for a walk on the spur of the 
moment as a way of enjoying the day. Phase 2 participants nominated this 
event on 9 occasions in a range of contexts from walking to the pub, 
walking home from work with a colleague, walking a friend’s dog and short 
excursions to local landmarks. These were distributed across categories 
(the majority were placed in Travel or in Other going out). This example 
highlights the difficulty of aligning prediction with real experience. An 
agreement to go to the pub with a friend might well become a walk to the 
pub with a friend if the weather turns out fine. Future plans tend to be 
moderated by unanticipated factors when they come to be acted upon.  
 
Some Phase 2 events highlighted the idiosyncratic nature of memories in 
contrast to the schematic nature of plans. Six items were not generalizable 
to the future condition, for example: went to unlock my car door and the 
locks had frozen; spoke to a really old man on the phone who claimed he 
knew John Lennon; was excited to find half a bag of Malteasers in my bag; 
and got presents from my friends for my birthday. Two of these 
idiosyncratic events might be described as hobby projects: spent almost 
an entire day drawing and started stripping an old tractor. However 
comparable projects were not cited as existing plans among Phase 1 
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future events and so, although people may frequently spend time on their 
hobbies, this was not a category validated by nominations from both the 
recent past and the near future within these data. Conversely, there were 
two categories that were nominated as plans in Phase 1 but were not cited 
as recent memories in Phase 2: theatre and exam activities. In the case of 
exams, it is likely this is an artefact of the time of year that data were 
collected. If items were limited to only one temporal condition they were 
not suitable for use as cues.  
 
It is worth noting that the list of events did not have to be definitive. Other 
cues might also be suitable for use, for example eating out or shopping for 
a specific item. The cues that were selected approximated the proportion 
of themes nominated by participants in Phase 1 and Phase 2  (the ratio 
was 1 occupation: 1 life management: 6 leisure). The final list comprised 
one item each from life management (try making a new recipe) and 
occupation (progress meeting) themes. The other 8 items were leisure 
activities with 3 items themed on staying in, 4 items themed on going out 
and 1 other leisure (working out at the gym or a fitness class). On the 
basis that the list was representative of some of the concrete activities 
experienced by 20-30 year olds in any two-week period and items were 
endorsed as plausible, frequent and imageable, the 10 items shown in 
Table 3.2 were used as experimental stimuli in study 1(b). 
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Table 3.3. 
N Event Nominations from Phase 1 and Phase 2 





1.  Occupation    
1.1a  Meeting (study or work)* 11 10 21 
1.1b Working 9 9 18 
1.1c Job hunting 2 8 10 
1.2a Studying 8 12 20 
1.2b Exam related 6 0 - 
 Subtotal 36 39 69 
2.  Leisure    
2.1  Going out    
2.1a Coffee* 5 4 9 
2.1b Pub or bar* 13 19 32 
2.1c Eating out 10 27 37 
2.1d Go to a club* 9 9 18 
2.1e Live music* 3 3 6 
2.1f Cinema* 11 13 24 
2.1g Party 5 4 9 
2.1h Theatre 3 0 - 
2.1i Museums & Galleries 2 2 4 
2.1j Other going out 2 9 11 
 Subtotal 63 90 150 
2.2  Staying in    
2.2a  Going to a friend's house* 5 7 12 
2.2b Staying in* 11 19 30 
 Subtotal 16 26 42 
2.3  Other Leisure    
2.3a Sports* 17 18 35 
2.3b Shopping 13 17 30 
2.3c Travel & day trips 8 21 29 
2.3d Seeing family 8 10 18 
 Subtotal 46 66 112 
 Total leisure 125 182 304 
3.  Life Management    
3.1 Flat hunting 2 4 6 
3.2 Domestic chores* 8 11 19 
3.3 Financial chores 4 3 7 
3.4 Grooming & healthcare 7 9 16 
3.5 Event planning 4 2 6 
 Subtotal 25 29 54 
4. Idiosyncratic  – 6 - 
TOTAL 186 256 427 




Travelling in time: future intentions and past acts 
 
3.5 Introduction 
Episodic future thinking is the process by which representations of the 
personal future can be subjectively experienced. It is possible to think 
about the future in personal and non-personal contexts, for example the 
question is it likely that Sydney will have a Disneyland in 50 years? taps 
into semantic knowledge about the world but does not require self 
projection (Abraham, Schubotz & Von Cramon, 2008). Abraham and 
colleagues elicited episodic future thinking in this study by asking (young 
participants) the question is it likely that you will still go clubbing at the age 
of 40? Contrasting these two questions neatly illustrates the difference 
between episodic and semantic prospection. While both involve thinking 
about a hypothetical future scenario, only the episodic question requires 
the simulation of a subjective sense of what it will be like to be you in the 
future. 
 
Given that episodic future thinking involves the generation of hypothetical 
future scenarios, it is surprising how little attention has been paid to the 
distinction between self-projection to truly anticipated events and the same 
process when future events are imagined at a specific moment in time but 
are not, in reality, really expected to take place. In the forensic literature, 
reality monitoring criteria distinguish experienced from invented memories 
by a greater amount of sensory and contextual detail (Johnson, 1988). 
Reality monitoring criteria applied to witness statements has led to the 
hypothesis that true statements are richer in contextual, temporal and 
auditory detail than fabricated accounts (Memon et al., 2010). Similarly, 
describing a specific event that is truly anticipated to take place in the 
future may differ from a description of a specific future event that is based 
on imagination. The believed event may have components that are 
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missing from a representation of an event that is not really anticipated to 
take place. Here the two types of prospection are still episodic yet one 
might be expected to differ from the other in the extent to which pre-
experiencing the event feels veridical or true. 
 
Recent research shows that people can identify and describe future 
experiences that they believe will really happen to them in the future (Ernst 
& D’Argembeau, 2017). Given that research comparing memories with 
future thinking is intended to map out the processes by which the 
extended self is subjectively perceived across time, it is surprising how 
rarely research has attempted to drill down to future representations that 
are believed by that person to represent real events on the personal 
horizon.The aim of study 1(b) was to present a menu of events from which 
participants would select cues that matched their own belief in occurrence, 
whether this was in the past or future. The subjective characteristics of 
future and past events were constrained by specificity (Anderson & 
Dewhurst, 2009) and were examined in a two week boundary around the 
present, since temporally close events are more likely to contain concrete 
details, sensory and contextual information (D’Argembeau, Renaud & Van 
der Linden, 2011). As described in study 1(a), event cues were validated 
by participants aged 20–30 years who endorsed ten specific items as 




Design and Participants 
True and false intentions in memory and future episodic thinking were 
investigated in a 2 (episodic memory/episodic future thinking) x 2 
(believed, not believed) within participants design. Dependent variables for 
past and future scenarios generated in response to believed and not-
believed event cues were self-reported phenomenological ratings of 
simulating the remembered/imagined events, mean latencies in seconds 
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to generate each scenario and word count to describe the 
remembered/imagined simulations. 
 
Participants were 63 undergraduate students who took part in exchange 
for course credits. All indicated that they were fluent English speakers. 
Previous research has indicated age differences in the specificity of 
episodic memory and future thinking (Devitt, Addis & Schacter, 2017). To 
control any extraneous effects of age or cue salience and provide an 
approximate ceiling for cognitive ageing effects, participation was limited 
to students and graduates under the age of 30.  
 
Materials  
Event stimuli.  Ten events generated in study 1(a) were selected for use 
as experimental stimuli. These were personally plausible, frequent (in any 
2-week period) and deemed imageable to participants aged 18-30.  
 
Measures.   Phenomenological Characteristics Questionnaire 
This is a 20-item scale originally based on memory characteristics 
research (Johnson, et al, 1988) adapted for use in episodic memory and 
future thinking research (Bertnsen & Bohn, 2010; D’Argembeau & Van der 
Linden, 2004; 2006; D'Argembeau, Ortoleva, Jumentier & Van der Linden, 
2010). Participants self-rated the phenomenological characteristics of 
each scenario on a 7-point Likert scale from 1 (low) to 7 (high). The first 
two questions measured (p)re-experiencing the event and the perception 
that this involved subjective mental time travel. The mean of these scores 
is typically used as a measure of autnoesis in this type of research. Six 
questions related to sensory details (visual, auditory and 
olfactory/gustatory) or spatial context (location, the spatial arrangement of 
objects and spatial arrangement of people). Two questions probed time: 
the clarity of the time of day (temporal) and the distance in days from the 
present (days). Two questions examined affect: emotional p/re-
experiencing (emotion) and how positive or negative these emotions were, 
 74 
(valence). Further questions relate to personal importance, desirability, 
visual perspective (field/observer), the extent to which the story comes in 
words and the coherence of the story. Finally, questions were posed to 
obtain ratings for task difficulty and the self-rated veracity of the memory 
(past trials) or likelihood of the event occurring (future trials). A copy of the 
questionnaire is presented in Appendix B. 
 
The Beck Depression Inventory (BDI) is a 21-item, self-report inventory of 
current depressed mood (Beck, Ward, Mendelson, Mock & Erbaugh, 
1961). Responses are made on a scale of four graduated responses 
indicating different levels of depression from 0, (I do not feel sad) to 4, (I 
am so sad or unhappy that I can’t stand it), range 0–63. The BDI is not a 
diagnostic tool but scores over ten are taken to indicate depression above 
a general response to life’s ups and downs, scores of 17–20 represent 
borderline clinical depression, 21–30 indicate moderate depression, 31–40 
severe depression and scores over 40 denote extreme depression. 
Previous research has demonstrated that depression is associated with 
reduced specificity in autobiographical memory retrieval (Goddard, et al., 
1996; Williams & Broadbent, 1986) and future thinking (Bjarehed et al., 
2010; MacLeod & Byrne, 1996) and to mediate a link between 
autobiographical memory and poor social problem solving: a task that 
involves generating and pre-experiencing future scenarios (Goddard et al., 
1996; 1997). The measure was included to see if reduced specificity of 
future or past events in this sample was related to depression. 
 
The Creative Experiences Questionnaire (CEQ) is a 25-item, self-report 
measure of fantasy proneness (Merckelbach, Horselenberg & Muris, 
2001), a personality trait that is highly correlated with schizotypy 
(Merckelbach, Rassin & Muris, 2000). Responses on the CEQ are 
dichotomous. Yes answers are summed to obtain a total score (range: 0–
25) with higher scores indicating more fantasy proneness. Merckelbach et 
al. (2001) report a mean score from a student population of 8.3 (SD = 3.9). 
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Previous research has indicated that fantasy proneness may contribute to 
vulnerability to pseudomemories (Hyman & Billings, 1998). Individuals who 
attain high scores on a measure of divergent thinking generate richer, 
more detailed representations of future but not past events (Addis, Pan, 
Musicaro & Schacter, 2016). Schizotypy is associated with greater 
autonoetic consciousness and olfactory/gustatory experiences during 
mental time travel (Winfield & Kamboj, 2010). The measure was included 
as an exploratory means by which to investigate individual differences in 
fantasy proneness and the fluency or verbosity of mental time travel. 
 
Simulation variables. Previous research has shown that closing eyes 
during memory retrieval increases the number of visual and auditory 
details recalled (Perfect et al., 2008). Thus before each practice and 
experimental trial, participants were instructed to carry out the simulation 
with closed eyes and wore a pair of Sennheiser headphones, which were 
used to keep ambient auditory interference to a minimum. The relative 
difficulty of accessing a representation of the past or future can be 
measured by the amount of time taken to simulate the event, a method 
used in previous research (Anderson, Dewhurst & Nash, 2012). Time in 
seconds to generate each scenario was measured using a Robic SC-606 
stopwatch. Immediately after each practice and experimental simulation, 
participants described the event. The length of statements can be used to 
index the richness and detail of representations. Audio recordings were 
made on a Sony ICD-UX80 MP3 Stereo recorder. Recordings were 
transcribed using literal verbatim transcription. A computer-based count of 
the number of words uttered (less fillers such as er and erm) was 
obtained.  
Procedure.  Participants were tested individually in a quiet room. Detailed 
written instructions were given and discussed to ensure participants fully 
understood the differences between episodic memory, imagining and 
future episodic thinking (the protocol is shown in Appendix C). Once the 
participant had understood the instructions, two practice trials were run 
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using the cues going out for a meal with family or friends and shopping for 
a specific item. Participants were free to choose which event to practice as 
a memory and which to use for a future simulation.  
 
In the experimental trials, written instructions were presented explaining 
that a list of ten everyday events would be shown and from this list, four 
target events should be selected. This cued recall technique is standard 
practice in literature on episodic future thinking (D’Argembeau et al., 2004; 
2006). The choice of events was made according to strictly delineated 
criteria: one event should be something that the participant had not carried 
out in the last two weeks (fictitious past); one event should be something 
that the participant had carried out in the last two weeks (believed past); 
one event should be something that the participant anticipated carrying out 
in the next two weeks (believed future); one event that the participant had 
no existing plans to do in the next two weeks or for the foreseeable future 
(fictitious future). Participants were cautioned that at no time should they 
reveal to the experimenter which of the events they had chosen were true 
and which were false.   
 
The order in which trials were completed was randomised by the 
participant choosing a sealed set of instructions from an array that 
included three sets of 24 possible permutations for the four conditions 
(believed past, believed future, fictitious past, fictitious future). Using the 
instructions as guidance, participants followed the experimental order but 
did not inform the experimenter whether or not each event was believed. 
The participant indicated at the start of each trial if instructions should be 
past or future oriented. Thus the experiment was run in the order set out 
on the instruction slip and the experimenter was blind to belief (believed, 
fictitious) but not to temporal direction (past, future).  
 
The experimental trials followed the same procedure as the practice trials. 
After simulating and describing the event (audio recorded), participants 
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completed the phenomenological measure and placed the completed 
questionnaire inside an envelope. When all four simulations, verbal 
descriptions and questionnaires had been completed, participants sealed 
the second page of each questionnaire (which showed a numerical 
descriptor of belief and time condition: belief) in a second envelope, which 
was stored in a secure place to which the experimenter had no access. 
The experimenter was unaware of which experimental condition was 
denoted by the numerical code until recordings had been transcribed and 
analyses were carried out.  
 
Finally each participant completed the Beck Depression Inventory and the 
Creative Experiences Questionnaire. Participants were thanked, debriefed 






Where data cannot be assumed to be independent, for example in 
autobiographical memory research where individual differences may 
impact on performance, multilevel modelling is more suitable for analysis 
than traditional ANOVAs (Wright, 1998). Compared to an ANOVA, this 
method adds an extra error term, which constitutes the error between 
participants. To test the significant of main effects and interactions, one 
effect is added at a time and the models are then compared. A significant 
change in model fit as measured by χ² indicates a significant effect.  
 
Manipulation checks 
Belief.  Believed events (M = 6.44, SD = .86) were believed to be more 
likely to occur than not-believed events (M = 1.84, SD = 1.31), χ²(1, n= 
240) = 402.69, p = .0001. R² = .81. There was no main effect of time, 
indicating that the manipulation worked: participants sincerely believed in 
the likelihood of occurrence of the believed future and past events and that 
the fictitious events had not or would not occur.  
Distance from present.   Participants were restricted to events occurring 
or imagined within 14 days from the present. There was no main effect of 
time, χ²(1) = 3.09, p = .08 or truth, χ²(1) = 2.70, p = .10 on the number of 
days from the present that an event was estimated to have occurred. 
However, since the interaction term was almost significant, χ²(1) = 3.45, p 
= .06, exploratory post hoc comparisons were carried out and related to 
believed future events. In line with research indicating that temporally 
close future events tend to be more vivid, believed events in the future 
were more imminent (M = 4.88, SD = 3.70) than the point in time chosen 
for fictitious future events (M = 6.53, SD = 3.52), χ²(1) = 6.2, p = .01. 
Believed future events were also set closer to the present than believed 
memories (M = 6.61, SD = 4.07), χ²(1) = 5.79, p = .016. There were no 
differences between fictitious past and future events, which were set at a 
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similar distance from the present, χ²(1) = .003, p = .96, ns and this pattern 
also held for believed and not-believed memories, χ²(1) = .02, p = .88, ns.  
Summary of results.  The subjective experience of remembering or pre-
experiencing believed compared to fictitious events was richer on multiple 
dimensions. There was a main effect of belief (believed events > fictitious 
events) for autonoetic, visual, auditory, location, the spatial location of 
objects and people, temporal, emotional intensity and valence. Believed 
events were more likely to be seen from a first person visual perspective. 
This pattern of main effects was also found in ratings for coherence, 
importance, desirability and the number of words spoken, all of which were 
greater for believed vs. fictitious events. There were main effects of time 
for location and word count (past > future). Autonoetic, visual, location, 
spatial location of people, temporal and feeling emotions variables 
produced significant interaction terms. Planned post hoc comparisons 
were conducted to examine differences in more detail, which are now 
reported. Descriptive statistics and main effects are presented in Table 
3.4.   
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Table 3.4. Means and Multilevel Modelling Statistics on the Phenomenology of Events by Time and Veracity 
 Time  Veracity  Main Effects 
Past  Future  Believed  Fictitious  B vs. F  F vs. P 
M SD  M SD  M SD  M SD  χ² R²  χ² R² 
Phenomenological ◊                 
Autonoetic  4.96 1.63  4.95 1.38  5.58 1.15  4.33 1.57  81.52*** .17  .01 0 
Visual  5.93 1.31  5.84 1.26  6.18 1.05  5.59 1.42  20.27*** .05  .46 0 
Auditory 4.23 2.01  4.06 1.98  4.70 1.88  3.58 1.98  30.26*** .08  .62 0 
Olfactory/gustatory 3.99 2.07  3.73 2.08  4.01 2.09  3.71 2.06   2.23 0  1.76 0 
Location 5.99 1.41  5.50 1.68  6.23 1.09  5.27 1.80  27.94*** .09  6.94** .02 
Spatial obj. 5.23 1.73  5.03 1.87  5.53 1.52  4.73 1.97  18.96*** .05  1.13 0 
Spatial people. 5.23 1.67  5.05 1.68  5.53 1.51  4.75 1.75  18.64*** .05  .91 0 
Temporal 5.40 1.78  5.13 1.82  5.95 1.45  4.58 1.85  66.83*** .15  2.25 0 
Visual perspective 3.26 2.37  3.18 2.29  2.85 2.22  3.59 2.38  10.43** .03  .11 0 
Emotionality 4.50 1.80  4.38 1.74  5.08 1.51  3.79 1.78  52.88** .13  .43 0 
Valence 4.68 1.37  4. 76 1.53  5.04 1.40  4.39 1.42  13.41** .05  .21 0 
Story ◊                  
Coherence  4.81 1.79  4.68 1.66  5.19 1.48  4.30 1.83  24.79*** .07  .46 0 
Importance 3.09 1.68  3.17 1.83  3.73 1.78  2.52 1.51  44.54*** .12  .16 0 
Desirability 4.68 1.60  4.72 1.87  5.20 1.61  4.19 1.71  21.98*** .09  .04 0 
Word count 255.40 164.37  220.17 127.15  260.29 169.22  215.28 118.97  18.32*** .02    11** .01 
Note: ◊ = (1 = low; 7 = high);  * p ≤ .05;  ** p ≤ .01;  *** p ≤ .0001; For all χ² statistics, df = 1, N = 240; Word count range 51–1120 
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Figure. 3.1. Mean ratings for autonoetic consciousness.  
 
Following a method commonly used in episodic future thinking and 
memory research, a variable for autonoesis was calculated from the mean 
of scores for mental time travel and pre-living or reliving (D’Argembeau et 
al., 2004; 2006). Figure 3.1 shows the mean ratings for autonoetic 
consciousness during past and future believed and not-believed (fictitious) 
event simulations. Planned comparisons explored significantly greater 
ratings for autonoetic consciousness, a defining characteristic of episodic 
future thinking, when events were believed to be true. In past trials, 
believed memories (M = 5.77, SD = 1.17) received higher self-ratings for 
autnoesis than fictitious memories (M = 4.16, SD=1.65), χ²(1) = 49.48, 
p<.0001, R² = .24. This pattern also found held for believed events that 
were set in the future (M = 5.40, SD = 1.12) compared to fictitious future 
scenarios (M = 4.50, SD = 1.49), χ²(1) = 20.78, p <.0001, R² = .11.  
 
Visual.  Mean scores for visual detail by condition showed that all 
simulations were self-rated as rich in visual imagery (Ms 5.5–6.37) and 
these varied on the basis of belief in occurrence. Believed memories 
contained more visual details (M = 6.37, SD = 0.84) than fictitious 
memories (M = 5.50, SD = 1.53), χ²(1, 60) = 18.48, p < .0001, R² = 0.11. 































6.00, SD =1.19) compared to fictitious events (M = 5.68, SD = 1.31), χ²(1) 
= 3.76, p < .052, R² = 0.12. 
 
Spatial.  The interaction term for location analyses was approaching 
significance χ²(1, n= 240) = .29, p = .06. Planned comparisons revealed 
that sense of location was stronger in believed memories (M = 6.52, SD = 
.72) than fictitious memories (M = 5.47, SD = 1.70), χ²(1) = 20.24, p < 
.0001, R²  = .14. The same pattern was found for future events: sense of 
location was greater for believed events (M  = 5.93, SD = 1.30) compared 
to fictitious events (M  = 5.07, SD = 1.89), χ²(1)  = 8.70, p = .003, R² = .01. 
When events were believed, sense of location was greater in the past (M  
= 6.52, SD = .72) than in the future (M  = 5.93, SD = 1.30), χ²(1) = 10.17, p 
= .001. R² = .07. When events were set in the past, the spatial 
arrangement of people was clearer when events were believed (M  = 5.83, 
SD = 1.33) compared to fictitious memories (M  = 4.62, SD = 1.76), χ²(1) = 
21.67, p < .0001, R² = .13. 
 
Temporal.  The clarity of the time of day was less clear for fictitious 
memories (M = 4.50, SD = 1.64) compared to believed memories (M  = 
6.30, SD = 1.15), χ²(1) = 40.16, p < .0001, R² = .26. However, in future 
trials the clarity of time of day was also less clear for fictitious events (M  = 
4.65, SD = 1.88) compared to believed events (M  = 5.60, SD = 1.64), 
χ²(1) = 17.79, p < .0001, R² = .07. 
 
Feeling emotions.  The interaction term was approaching significance, 
χ²(1) = 7.36, p = .007. Planned comparisons revealed the emotions 
associated with each event were subjectively re-experienced to a greater 
extent when memories were believed (M  = 5.37, SD = 1.37) in 
comparison to fictitious memories (M  = 3.63, SD = 1.78), χ²(1) = 44.93, p 
< .001, R² = .23. This difference also extended to future trials, where the 
emotions that would be associated with the event were subjectively pre-
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experienced more intensely for events believed to be likely to occur (M  = 
4.80, SD = 1.60) compared to fictitious future events (M  = 3.95, SD = 
1.78), χ²(1) = 9.20, p = .002, R² = .06. There was a main effect of belief on 
emotional valence, which was more positive for believed than fictitious 
events but this did not vary by time.  
 
Story.  Differences in story coherence, story comes in words, importance 
and desirability of events were related solely to veracity, with believed 
events receiving higher ratings than fictitious events. It took less time to 
generate representations of future events (M = 63.73, SD = 31.30) than 
past events (M = 69.21, SD = 34.55), χ²(1) = 7.12, p = .008, R²= .01). 
Belief in occurrence did not impact on the length of time taken to simulate 
events (χ²(1) = .04, p = .85, R² = 0). Figure 3.2 shows the mean number of 
words used to describe simulations. Believed memories were described in 
more words (M = 290.38, SD = 192.35) than fictitious memories (M = 
220.42, SD = 122.51), χ² (1) = 14.23, p = .0002, R² = .05. In future trials, 
believed events were also described in more words (M = 230.20, SD = 
137.55) than fictitious future events (M = 210.13, SD = 116.13), χ² (1) = 
14.23, p = .03, R² = .01. 
 
 



























Fantasy proneness and depression.  Depression scores obtained using 
the BDI (Beck et al., 1961) ranged from 0–47, (M = 8.86, SD = 8.21). Nine 
participants scored 11–16 (depression above the normal range). Ten 
participants scored 17 or more (the cut off for borderline clinical 
depression). In total, 10% of participants endorsed items suggesting they 
were experiencing depression above a typical response to life’s ups and 
downs. Since depression is associated with reduced specificity of memory 
and future thinking, scores on the BDI were entered into the model for 
analyses anticipated to be affected by the specificity of event 
representations: autonoetic consciousness, visual details, feeling 
emotions, emotional valence, coherence of story and number of words. 
However there were no differences to the pattern of main effects, 
interactions or model fit on any of these variables.  
 
Fantasy proneness scores ranged from 3–19 (M = 10.73, SD = 3.69). 
Fantasy proneness and depression scores were correlated (r = .31, p < 
.01) in this sample. Since schizotypy is associated with increased 
autonoetic awareness and higher olfactory details in episodic memory and 
future thinking when events are set 6 months–1 year from the present 
(Winfield & Kamboj, 2010), CEQ scores were added to the model to see if 
this changed the pattern of results for these analyses. Autonoetic 
consciousness results did not differ in the direction or pattern of 
significance other than there was a slight improvement to model fit for the 
comparison between past true and past false events (R² increased from 
.24 to .27). Many of the events involved eating and drinking and these 
details appeared within transcripts of events quite frequently. Co-varying 
fantasy proneness made no difference to results for olfactory/gustatory 






In study 1(b), prospection and memory were cued by frequently-
experienced, personally plausible and imageable events set in the recent 
past or future. Belief in occurrence had a highly similar impact on the 
phenomenology of mental time travel whether the event was set in the 
past or future. Results indicated that for these types of everyday activities, 
believed events were simulated with similar vividness and were described 
in the same number of words regardless of whether they had been 
experienced (past) or were not experienced but truly anticipated (future). It 
is not surprising that believed compared to fictitious past events were 
more intense, more vivid and were experienced with a greater sense of 
subjective recall. It is more remarkable that this pattern held when events 
were believed to be going to occur compared to merely imagined in a 
specific spatio-temporal context in the near future. Exceptions to this 
pattern of results that varied by belief and not by time was the physical 
location of each event, which was less clear in future trials. Believed future 
events were also set closer to the present than believed memories but 
there were no difference in time from the present between fictitious past 
and future events or believed and not-believed memories. This is in line 
with previous research that has shown that when past and future events 
are generated without temporal restrictions, future events are set closer to 
the present (Anderson, Dewhurst & Nash, 2012). Simulating future events 
also took less time than generating past events. This is in line with 
research demonstrating that elaboration of future compared to past events 
can occur with relative ease (Anderson et al., 2012; Anderson, Peters, 
Dewhurst, 2015).  
 
Believed events were p/reexperienced with a more positive valence than 
fictitious events. Since future thinking is typically characterised by positive 
valence, the lack of difference between past and future trials is surprising. 
It could be that the extent to which events were set close in time, were 
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frequently experienced, easy to imagine and plausible reduced the 
positive valence that is typically reported when people think about the 
future. For example, Liberman and colleagues report an unpublished 
earlier study in which the distant future event expressing friendliness 
became dialling a friend’s number, when represented closer in time: an 
action that is comparatively emotionally neutral (Liberman, Sagristano & 
Trope, 2002, p.524.) Another view is that the experience of imagining 
carrying out fictitious events in the future was more negative and this 
acted as a counterbalance to the rosy future effect. The Undeutsch 
hypothesis suggests that events that have not been experienced are 
described with more ambivalence, more negative statements and are less 
embedded in context (Undeutsch, 1967; 1989). This means of verifying 
differences between experienced and imagined events forms the basis of 
many contemporary approaches to statement validity assessment 
(Amado, Arce, Fariña & Vilariño, 2016). It is possible that fictitious events 
in the present study reflected this general tendency for imagined and not 
experienced events to be characterised by a less positive valence.  
 
Returning to belief in occurrence in the present study, participants were 
not asked to conceal the truth when simulating and describing fictitious 
events. The scenarios that participants described varied on the basis that 
they were believed to have occurred (past) or were going to happen as 
described (future). Nevertheless, it was of interest to compare the results 
of simulating believed and fictitious (but not lied about) events with data 
collected from individuals who told the truth or deliberately lied about 
future intentions and past activities. Granhag & Knieps (2011) compared 
mental representations of cover stories set in the near future with true 
plans. There was no past condition in their study, but similar measures 
from the adapted memory characteristics questionnaire were used to 
capture the phenomenology of simulating an intended or fictitious event. 
True and false plans were differentiated by higher ratings among truth 
tellers for statement length, autonoesis, temporal information and the 
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spatial location of other people. No differences were found for visual, 
auditory, olfactory/gustatory or spatial location of objects. Contrasting 
these findings with near future results from study 1(b) shows considerably 
more variance between believed and fictitious (but not deliberately lied 
about) events.  
 
Previous research has showed that judges rated deceptive statements 
about intentions for future activities to be less plausible, and deceptive 
statements about past events as both less plausible and less detailed (Vrij, 
Leal et al 2011). Another study reports that 74% of deceptive accounts 
and 72% of truthful accounts of future actions could be discriminated on 
the basis of perceived plausibility (Vrij, Granhag et al., 2011). When giving 
a cover story about a future event, individuals may be quite likely to 
choose frequently experienced events to hide their true intent. To see if 
differences in the vividness of transcripts were evident to external raters, a 
further study was conducted to assess the content of transcripts.  
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3.7 Study 1(c)  
 
Interim summary 
In study 1(a), a range of everyday events were validated by participants as 
plausible, easy to imagine and frequently experienced. Study 1(b) 
employed these as experimental cues for simulations of believed and 
imagined events set in the recent past or future. Believed events (M = 
6.44) were validated as events that were believed to have happened 
(past) or to be going to happen in the future, compared to fictitious events 
(M = 1.84). Believed events led to longer statements and higher self-
ratings for autonoesis, sensory, contextual and emotional details. In study 
1(c), descriptions of these events were rated by judges on the basis of 




The gap between intentions and ensuing behaviour has, over many years, 
drawn considerable attention from researchers in the field of psychology. 
A recent review of a literature base that spans decades of research 
suggests that only 53% of intentions result in enacted behaviour (Sheeran 
& Webb, 2018). Similarly, the literature on deception detection going back 
decades has consistently shown that lies are detected with reliability at 
just above chance: the figure most cited is 54% (Bond & DePaulo, 2006; 
Vrij, 2008). The vast majority of deception studies have focused on past 
events. While the detection of deception for criminal activities set in the 
future has clear utility, the notion that future intentions are reliable 
predictors of behaviour is demonstrably unlikely. Early indicators that 
deception about events set in the future can be detected with accuracy of 
70% are clearly of interest to the research community. The need to learn 
more about how suspects and witnesses communicate information that 
has not been personally experienced but which is not being deliberately 
concealed or lied about has been highlighted in recent research (Mac 
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Giolla, Granhag & Ask, 2017, p. 682). The salient condition from study 
1(b) could be described as analogous to a truth teller condition in a 
deception study. Participants believed they were describing a true event, 
whether past or future. In the not-salient condition, events were not lied 
about but nor were they believed to be true. Thus results from study 1(c) 
potentially speak to researchers interested in the nuances between 
imagination, belief in occurrence and deliberate deception. The present 
study is exploratory in nature but makes a significant contribution to this 
emerging area of study. 
 
Belief that an event really belongs to the personal future is related to a 
broader autobiographical context in which personal plausibility, personal 
importance and temporality (a sense of when the event will occur) are 
strong markers of salience (Ernst & D’Argembeau, 2017). The extent to 
which belief in occurrence may be apparent to judges on the basis of 
reading transcripts of simulation descriptions is not known. Considering 
next the notion of plausibility, Tversky & Kahneman (1973) suggested that 
the plausibility of a scenario is used as a basis for the judgement of 
likelihood. When events do not cue recall of a similar experience in the 
past, a hypothetical representation is elicited and used to compare with 
the target event. The plausibility of the scenario or the ease with which it 
was generated is then evaluated in order to decide how likely the event is. 
However very little is known about how plausibility is assessed in other 
people’s statements.  
 
It is easy to see how the application of an interview protocol to detect 
hallmarks of sincere intent would be desirable. Such a measure could be 
applied in a range of contexts, from professional to interpersonal. 
Assessment of other peoples’ intentions are made all the time, from 
deciding if a romantic partner is really going to change, measuring the 
likelihood that a patient will adhere to a treatment regime, or interviewing a 
suspect in a legal case. Increasingly such decisions are automated in 
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professional contexts yet the evidence for the reliability of intentions as 
hallmarks of behaviour is little understood. Research shows that 
professional experience does not equate to expertise in deception 
detection (Vrij & Mann, 2001; Meissner & Kassin, 2002). The reliability of 
laypeople and professionals’ judgements of veracity are roughly in line 
with accuracy if established by tossing a coin. A layperson will typically 
employ a truth bias when making credibility assessments on truthful and 
deceptive material (for a review, see Vrij, 2008, pp.163–164). A truth bias 
will impact on the likelihood of accurately detecting true statements in two 
ways. If all material is rated as true, more truths are correctly captured by 
positive ratings. The cost of this overall bias is that more lies are also 
inaccurately judged to be true. Thus a truth bias enhances detection for 
truth and reduces the detection of lies. By contrast, individual differences 
in suspiciousness are associated with holding a lie bias, which leads to a 
greater likelihood of correctly detecting lies but at the cost of misjudging 
truths also to be lies (Levine & McCornack, 1992; Bond & DePaulo, 2006). 
Thus a bias in either direction would impact on the accuracy of raters’ 
assessments. 
 
Exploratory research has employed plausibility as a marker to discriminate 
truthful and deceptive statements about recent past or near future 
activities (Vrij, Granhag et al., 2011; Vrij, Leal et al., 2011). Accuracy rates 
of up to 70% have been reported on the basis of using plausibility 
judgements to discriminate true from false descriptions of other people’s 
future plans. As discussed in the literature review, extant literature on 
plausibility focuses on internal processes by which people judge their own 
memories. The means by which plausibility judgements are made about 
other people’s statements are far from clear. When asking if someone 
else’s utterance or narrative is plausible, the question being asked is what 
is the possibility of this being true? (Scoboria, personal correspondence). 
The extent to which this judgement can be made may be constrained by 
the amount of common knowledge or experience that exists between the 
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rater and the individual whose message is being rated (the sender). If you 
describe to me your journey to work today, the extent to which I might 
evaluate the plausibility of your description is most likely constrained by 
my knowledge of you or of our shared environment (my familiarity with 
your typical commute). Results of study 1(b) indicated that the subjective 
experience of remembering and imagining events set two weeks around 
the present moment significantly varied by belief in occurrence rather than 
temporal direction. Studies 1(c) and (d) were designed to capitalise on 
these verified (self-rated) believed and not-believed event descriptions. 
Judges were students at the same university and had shared knowledge 
of the environment and campus culture described in transcripts but were 
unaware that events varied by belief. Further, judges were not given 
definitions of likelihood or plausibility but were asked to note down what 
informed these ratings during each questionnaire.  
 
Two recent studies reported by Nahari (2017) show the extent to which 
judge’s prior knowledge about material influences judgements of the 
veracity of content. The material under examination in these studies 
consisted of short autobiographical stories (e.g. a diving trip, experiencing 
two motorcycle accidents on one day) that were validated by the story 
authors to be either 100% true or between 65–100% fabricated. In pre-
tests, untrained judges were unable to distinguish the veracity of the 
stories. In the first experiment, all participants were trained in interpersonal 
reality monitoring criteria. Participants either knew the real purpose of 
reality monitoring and used their training to assess the veracity of the 
stories, or were misled to believe that reality monitoring is a literary 
criticism technique and that the task was to judge the stories for their 
literary appeal. A control group assessed the stories for reality monitoring 
criteria with no context for the task. Group differences were limited to the 
false stories, which received lowest reality monitoring ratings from the 
forensic assessors, showing that top down processes of employing 
veracity criteria led to a bias to identify variance on that basis.  
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In Experiment 2 (Nahari, 2017), the design was repeated to manipulate 
overall bias. Reality monitoring criteria were pared down to the four criteria 
that had been most diagnostic in the previous experiment; perceptual 
information, spatial information, temporal information and affect. This sub 
set is posited to encapsulate reality monitoring criteria (Nahari & Ben-
Shakar, 2013) and has been employed in previous research (Mann et al., 
2013; Nahari, Vrij & Fisher, 2014: Vrij, Mann, Jundi, Hillman & Hope, 
2014). Two-thirds of participants were aware that reality monitoring criteria 
can operate as a lie-detection tool and were misled to believe either that 
all stories were true (biased-for-truth) or that all stories were false (biased-
for-lies). One third of participants knew nothing about the purposes of 
reality monitoring criteria and were effectively a control group. All three 
groups rated true more than deceptive stories as richer in detail (mean of 
the four criteria) but the biased-for-truth group made significantly higher 
ratings for perceptual, contextual, and emotional details compared to the 
biased-for-lies and control groups.  
 
These results demonstrate that training judges to use evidence-based 
protocols does not eliminate truth bias, adding to an existing literature on 
the robustness of this phenomenon (Burgoon, Blair & Strom 2008; Levine, 
Kim, Park & Hughes, 2006; Levine, Park & McCornack, 1999). 
Judgement criteria cannot and should not be applied without clear 
evidence that these are relevant to the judgement being made (Nahari, 
2017, p.240). Since there is little literature on how plausibility of other 
people’s autobiographical stories is assessed, least of all when these 
accounts are set in the future, the first phase of assessments were 
exploratory. Events described were typical of student life experienced at 
the university attended by the two judges. Thus judges had some prior 
common experience with statement senders. To reduce any potential for 
judgements to be subject to a bias to make equal numbers of high and low 
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ratings (Colwell, 2005), statements were presented in packages of uneven 
quantities of believed and not believed events.  
 
It was of interest to investigate to what extent judges’ ratings for likelihood 
and plausibility indexed transcript authors’ ratings for belief in occurrence. 
A belief bias would manifest in high plausibility and likelihood ratings for all 
events. As an exploratory analysis, ratings were used to assign events to 
likely and unlikely, plausible and not plausible groups for each judge (see 
Method section). On the basis of evidence from deception detection 
literature, it was anticipated that this analysis would indicate a bias for 
judges to find all items likely or plausible. This exploratory analysis should 
be interpreted with caution since judges were not asked to make 
categorical ratings. 
 
To summarise study 1(c), judges viewed and rated transcripts about past 
and future events that were either believed or fictitious in origin. Judges 
were told the events described were about things people had done in the 
past or would do in the future. Judges were not made aware that events 
varied in belief in occurrence. Analyses centred on the extent to which 
judges showed a bias to rate events as plausible and likely. A further 
question centred on whether each judge’s plausibility and likelihood scales 
correlated (did plausibility relate to likelihood?) Where intra class 
correlations indicated reliability, mean scores for plausibility and likelihood 
judgements could be used to examine whether these measures could 
discriminate events that had previously been verified as believed from 
fictitious (but not lied about) events in the past or future. As an exploratory 
aside, raters were asked to log their thoughts on what made events seem 




Design and Participants 
Study 1(c) was designed to obtain plausibility and likelihood ratings for 
verbal descriptions of personal events from the recent past and near 
future. Participants were two undergraduate research assistants (1 male, 1 
female) who were in the third year of studies at the same university as 
transcript senders. Transcript senders and judges were not in the same 
year of academic study. Judges were unaware that events varied on the 
basis of belief in occurrence. 
 
Materials and procedure 
Interviews from study 1(b) were transcribed (n = 252). Proper nouns were 
changed to protect the privacy of transcript senders. Hesitations, fillers, 
pauses and hedges (e.g. er, erm, like) may be seen as markers of 
disfluency but there is little evidence to suggest that this is an indication of 
credibility (Arciuli, Mallard & Villas, 2010; Vrij, 2008). Literal verbatim 
transcripts were presented with hesitations, laughter, and long pauses 
intact and indicated in the text as [erm], [laugh], [pause]. 
 
Four questionnaires were designed on Survey Gizmo software 
(www.surveygizmo.com). Transcript order was randomised within each 
temporal direction (past, future). A random number generator was used to 
determine the number of transcripts presented in each  questionnaire. The 
intention was to prevent participants from developing a sense that they 
were being asked to make equal numbers of high and low ratings on each 
dimension. A table displaying the quantity, veracity and temporal order of 
transcripts presented in each session can be seen in Appendix E. 
 
Testing took place in a quiet laboratory at Royal Holloway, University of 
London. The questionnaires were presented over four sessions, with a 
one-week interval between session 1 and 2 and again between session 3 
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and 4. The shortest questionnaires (2 & 3) were presented in the morning 
and afternoon of the same day. Participants sat at personal computers on 
opposite sides of the room. Written instructions explained that each judge 
should work in silence (should not confer) and that the survey was 
designed so they would not be able to go back to change answers but 
could be saved in order to take a break when desired.  
 
Each questionnaire was preceded with the following text, items in 
parentheses were amended according to the temporal context (past, 
Surveys 1 and 2; future, Surveys 3 and 4):  
You are going to be shown a series of transcripts where the sender 
is talking about an event that he or she (experienced in the recent 
past) (anticipates happening in the near future). Please read each 
transcript then answer the two questions that follow it.  
 
Transcripts were presented on single pages followed by two questions, 
which were rated on Likert scales:  
How likely is it that the event (occurred) (will occur)?  
1, definitely (did not happen) (will not happen); 10, definitely (did 
happen) (will happen) 
How plausible is the event? 1 (not at all plausible); 10 (highly 
plausible) 
 
Across each questionnaire, three comment boxes were randomly 
presented. Instruction text asked participants to comment on what made 
events sound: (more likely), (less likely), (more plausible), (less plausible).  
 
In session one and a week later in the morning of session two, 126 
transcripts of autobiographical events from the recent past were rated. In 
the afternoon of session two and a week later in session three, 126 





Inter-rater reliability  
Intra-class correlation (ICC) showed poor agreement between the two 
judges. Alphas were calculated for the overall reliability of ratings when 
past and future events were combined and for past and future ratings 
separately. Overall reliablity was very low for likelihood (r = .31) and 
plausibility (r = .19). When rating past transcripts, ICCs were low for 
likelihood (r = .24) and almost at floor level for plausibility (r = .05). 
Agreement marginally improved when events were set in the future: 
likelihood (r = .38), plausibility (r = .29). However the reliability of judges’ 
ratings was substantially below a level that would support performing 
further analyses on the basis of combined ratings.  
 
Bias  
To explore whether each judge had a bias to rate events as likely or 
plausible, ratings were recoded to create dichotomous variables. Items 
rated 1-5 for likelihood were recoded as unlikely, items rated 6-10 were 
recoded as likely. Items rated 1-5 for plausibility were recoded as not 
plausible, items rated 6-10 were recoded as plausible. On this basis, 
judges showed a bias for likelihood and plausibility in  both temporal 
directions. Table 3.5 displays the overall positive bias (in %) shown by 
each judge and the accuracy with which believed and fictitious past and 
future transcripts were discriminated on the basis of plausibility and 





Study 1(c) Bias and Accuracy for Plausibility and Likelihood of Events  
 Judge Past  Future 
  %  % 
Measure  Bias Accuracy  Bias Accuracy 
   Believed 
 
Fictitious   Believed 
 
Fictitious 
Likelihood  1 58 51 35  65 67 40 
 2 66 70 38  72 57 43 
Plausibility 1 66 65 33  64 59 30 
 2 75 75 25  76 76 24 
Note: Believed shows the % of  study 1(b) believed transcripts rated > 5 for likelihood, 
Fictitious shows the % of  study 1(b) not-believed transcripts rated ≤ 5 for likelihood  
 
Accuracy 
Both judges demonstrated a bias to rate believed past and future events 
as likely to occur or have occurred. Together with the low number of 
fictitious events correctly discriminated as unlikely, these results indicate a 
positive likelihood bias in both judges. Identification of fictitious events as 
unlikely was more accurate in future than past trials but across both 
temporal directions, accuracy was below the 54% typical in deception 
detection literature, a figure that represents accuracy at chance.  
 
Correlations  
Each judge’s ratings for the plausibility and likelihood of past transcripts 
were moderately correlated (Judge 1: r = .67, p <.01; Judge 2: r = .63, p 
<.01). This was also true when rating future event transcripts (Judge 1: r = 
.77, p <.01; Judge 2: r = .61, p <.01). This suggests that the perceived 
plausibility of events was closely related to judgements that the same 
events were likely or true. Raters’ comments on what informed ratings can 






Two judges rated transcripts of believed and imagined scenarios set in the 
past and future that had been cued by plausible, frequent and easily 
imageable event cues for plausibility and likelihood. Judges were unaware 
of the variance in belief that existed in the authors of the scenarios but 
were aware of the temporal direction (past, future). Results of reliability 
analyses showed that there was very low agreement on what constituted a 
likely or plausible event in either temporal direction. Agreement was closer 
when events were set in the future but in neither temporal direction would 
alphas support further analyses. Although judges and raters shared 
experience about the culture of life on campus at that university, this did 
not seem to have conferred any advantage to recognising hallmarks of 
plausibility in statements about everyday events.   
 
Previous research has suggested that plausibility can differentiate true and 
deceptive descriptions of future events with 70% accuracy (Vrij, Granhag, 
Mann & Leal, 2011; Vrij, Leal, Mann & Granhag, 2011). In study 1(b) 
participants were not deliberately perpetrating a deception. Fictitious 
events were imagined in a specific spatiotemporal context in a frequently 
experienced place but the event had not been experienced (past trials) or 
was not intended to take place (future trials). On the basis of these results, 
the difference in plausibility and perceived likelihood of events was not 
apparent. However these results cannot be said to be conclusive since 
reliability was very low. 
 
Very little contextualising information was made available to judges. Since 
inter-rater reliability was low, this lack of agreement could have been an 
interesting finding had raters been able to agree on at least one dimension 
in these data. If this had been the case, low agreement for plausibility and 
likelihood would be contextualised as more likely to relate to the constructs 
being measured. A second rating study was planned in which two content 
variables taken from reality monitoring criteria would be rated alongside 
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plausibility and likelihood: emotion and visual detail. If raters could agree 
on the extent to which these phenomenological measures were evident in 
transcripts, these findings would provide an external measure of self -rated 
belief in occurrence and would provide context to the null results for 
plausibility and likelihood.  Results could establish whether the poor 
agreement between raters was limited to the constructs of plausibility and 




3.9 Study 1(d) 
Introduction 
Study 1(d) reports a second rating task conducted on transcripts obtained 
from study 1(b). Judges were aware that the events differed on the basis 
of transcript senders’ belief in occurrence. Judges were not given 
definitions of plausibility or likelihood but made notes on what informed 
these ratings. In addition, study 1(d) judges assessed two other aspects of 
transcripts: visual detail and emotional content.  
 
When judging the content of your own memories, recollection 
accompanied by heightened awareness, sensory elements and detail is 
more likely to be believed to be true and accurate (Foley, 2018; Johnson 
et al., 1988; Johnson & Raye, 1981). When examining how judgements 
are made on the credibility of other people’s statements, these self -
memory evaluations have been applied to judge the source of other 
people’s memories, a process called interpersonal reality monitoring 
(Johnson, Bush & Mitchell, 1998). Sensory vividness and clarity are seen 
as hallmarks of credibility (Colwell et al., 2007; Memon et al., 2010).  
 
Recent research has experimentally manipulated the contributions of 
emotion and detail to credibility judgements made about other people’s 
recollections (Justice & Smith, 2018). In this study, judges saw witness 
statements that were high or low in detail and emotion and were asked to 
assess how believable the statements were and separately, how reliable 
the content was perceived to be. Judges were told that these statements 
were Police evidence, thus they took the task seriously. Results showed 
that the extent to which statements were believed to be true did not vary 
as a function of detail or emotion (although the perceived credibility of 
witnesses was related to shorter statements). In other words, the level of 
detail in a statement can make a witness sound more reliable but not more 
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believable. Statement length was the best predictor of belief, with shorter 
statements the most believed.  
 
In study 1(b), believed events in the past and future were described in 
more words, leading to longer transcripts. On the basis of Justice & 
Smith’s findings, judges might misattribute credibility on the basis of 
statement length. However the finding that judges evaluated detail and 
emotion as separate constructs to belief in occurrence might suggest that 
examining statements for detail and emotion would not impact on judge’s 
perception of the likelihood and plausibility of events rated in study 1(d). 
Certainly these aspects of statements have been shown to be easy to 
assess by judges in previous research (Vrij, 2008). 
 
Nahari, (2017) showed that the application of reality monitoring criteria in a 
forensic assessment led to lower ratings for detail and emotion compared 
to the same criteria applied to a different construct (how good a story was) 
and a control condition (no context). In the present study, transcripts 
described simulations that had been validated as subjectively richer in 
visual detail and emotion when events were believed. In study 1(d), 
Judges 3 and 4 were told that events varied by time and also by belief 
(believed, fictitious). Judges rated four features: likelihood, plausibility, 
visual detail and emotionality. On the basis of reality monitoring criteria 
(Johnson et al. 1988; Rubin et al., 2003), it might be expected that past 
events containing more sensory vividness would be more likely to be 
judged as plausible or likely. That is, the degree to which narratives set in 
the past contained visual details and emotional content, the more likely 
they would be judged as likely to have occurred. Less is known about 
applying reality monitoring criteria to believed future events. It was of 
interest to see if judges could agree on any of the 4 dimensions when 
applied to past and future events. If ratings formed reliable scales, it would 
be of interest to see if these could differentiate believed from not-believed 
events. In study 1(c), a bias to rate items as plausible and likely was 
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evident. The accuracy and overall bias for each judge in the present study 
was also calculated.   
 
Method 
Design and Participants  
Judges were asked to rate the plausibility and likelihood of transcripts 
knowing that events varied in the extent to which they were believed to be 
true. Where intra-class correlations indicated reliability, mean scores for 
plausibility, likelihood, visual detail and emotion were calculated and used 
to contrast ratings for believed and not believed events in the future and 
past. Accuracy and bias on the basis of plausibility and likelihood were 
also calculated. Ratings were carried out by two female undergraduate 
research assistants aged 21 and 25 who were in the second year of 
studies at the same university as transcript senders.  
 
Materials and procedure  
Transcripts were prepared and presented on Survey Gizmo software 
(www.surveygizmo.com) using the same procedure and questionnaire 
design described in study 1(c) but with additional contextual information 
and two new questions, so that four ratings were made on each transcript. 
Testing was carried out in four sessions in the design described in study 
1(c). Participants received an email link to each questionnaire in which 
background information about the study from which the transcripts had 
been generated was stated. The same form of words was presented 
before each questionnaire. For clarity, the instruction text presented here 
shows the text amended for past or future questionnaires in parentheses. 
The text was: 
The transcripts you are going to be rating were generated in an 
earlier study where participants were given a list of 10 everyday 
events that are typical and frequently experienced by students in 
their first year at a UK university. Each participant was told to 
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choose one event from a list that was something they (had done) 
(would do) in the (last) (next) two weeks. They also chose another 
event from the list that was something that they were certain they 
(had not done) (would not do) in the (last) (next) two weeks.  
For each event, the participant closed his or her eyes and travelled 
(back) (forward) in time to run through what happened. Thus they 
were either mentally sampling (a real memory) (a real future event) 
or they were being asked to imagine themselves doing something 
at a specific place and time in the (last) (next) two weeks. In other 
words, for some trials, they were imagining a fictitious event, in 
others they were sampling real (memories) (future event 
representations). 
 
Next, participants described the simulation out loud. In the present 
study, you are rating these verbal descriptions of imagined or 
(remembered) (anticipated) events. Please note that all names and 
place names have been changed. Otherwise these are literal 
verbatim (word for word) transcriptions of what each participant 
said.  
 
To recap, some of the transcripts are events that the participant 
genuinely (experienced) (intended to carry out). Some are events 
that they have only imagined – they (did not actually take place) 
(did not expect to do the activity). In this questionnaire you are not 
being presented with equal numbers of genuinely (experienced) 
(anticipated) and imagined events. Therefore you should take care 
to consider each transcript on its own merits. You would be wrong if 
you tried to assume that half the events presented are real and half 
are imagined. Please take care to rate each transcript carefully on 
each of four dimensions, presented as four questions. 
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Introductory text in each questionnaire was based on similar text in study 
1(c), with an additional reminder that each transcript varied by belief in 
occurrence. Text in parentheses varied by temporal orientation of the 
transcripts. The instructions stated: 
Some of these transcripts represent genuinely (experienced) 
(anticipated) autobiographical events. Others do not. The order of 
presentation has been randomised and you are not viewing equal 
numbers of (experienced) (anticipated) and (not experienced) (not 
anticipated) events. You are being asked to rate each transcript 
independently on four dimensions. 
 
The likelihood question was phrased:  
How likely do you think it is that the person speaking actually 
(experienced) (will experience) this event, as described, at that time 
and place? 
The rating was made on a Likert scale, with the text:  
How likely is it that the event (occurred) (would occur)? 1, (definitely 
did not happen) (definitely would not happen); 10, (definitely did 
happen) (definitely would happen) 
 
The plausibility question was phrased:  
Does the overall narrative sound plausible to you? What is the 
possibility that this story is something that really happened? Could it 
have happened, as described, in that specific moment in time and 
place? 
The rating was made on a Likert scale, with the text:  
How plausible is the event? 1, (not at all plausible); 10 (highly 
plausible) 
 
The visual detail question was worded: 
To what extent does the speaker mention details that allow you to 
picture the scene? 
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The rating was made on a Likert scale with the text:  
The participant's description of this event involves visual detail : 1, 
(little or none); 10, (highly detailed) 
 
The question on emotion was framed with the text: 
To what extent does emotion play a part in this transcript? Do you 
think that the speaker was feeling strong emotions during this 
event? The emotions could be positive or negative, you are only 
being asked to rate the emotional intensity experienced by the 
speaker at the event in his or her recent past. 
The rating was made on a Likert scale with the text:  
Within the description of this event, the participant's feelings were: 
1, (not intense); 10, (highly intense) 
 
3.10 Results 
Inter-rater reliability  
Intra-class correlation showed poor agreement between the two judges on 
what constituted plausibility in both temporal directions but this was 
particularly low when events were set in the future. Emotion and likelihood 
ratings showed moderate agreement for past but not future events. When 
rating the level of visual detail in transcripts, judges showed an acceptable 
level of agreement in both temporal directions.  
 
Table 3.6 
Study 1(d) Intra-class Correlations  
Measure ICC 
 Overall Past Future 
Visual .77 .79 .76 
Emotion .56 .68 .51 
Likelihood .55 .66 .52 
Plausibility  .32 .48 .06 
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Since reliability for the visual detail scale was acceptable, the mean score 
of the two judges’ ratings was used to examine visual detail. Independent 
samples t-tests showed that when rating events set in the past, transcripts 
describing believed events (M = 4.48, SD = 1.77) were seen as richer in 
references to visual detail than transcripts describing fictitious events (M = 
3.87, SD = 1.74), t(124) = 1.98, p = .05. This pattern did not hold for future 
events, visual details were similar between believed (M = 3.97, SD = 1.65) 
and fictitious transcripts (M = 3.78, SD = 1.72), t(124) = .64, p = .53.  
 
Reliability of judges’ ratings for emotions and likelihood showed 
agreement bordering acceptable levels for past but not future events. On 
this basis, judges’ ratings for emotion and likelihood were examined for 
past events only. An independent samples t-test showed that believed 
events set in the past (M = 6.92, SD = 1.82) were seen as more likely to 
have occurred than fictitious events (M = 5.87, SD = 2.01), t(124) = 3.09, p 
= .002. Emotional content was similar in past believed (M = 3.86, SD = 
.21) and fictitious events (M = 3.53, SD = 1.50), t(124) = 1.79, p = .08. 
 
Bias and accuracy 
To explore the extent to which judges showed a bias to rate all events as 
likely or plausible, ratings were recoded to create dichotomous variables. 
Items rated 1-5 for likelihood were recoded as unlikely, items rated 6-10 
were recoded as likely. Items rated 1-5 for plausibility were recoded as not 
plausible, items rated 6-10 were recoded as plausible. When believed and 
fictitious events were compared, judges showed a bias for likelihood and 
plausibility in both temporal directions that exceeded levels in study 1(c). 
Table 3.7 displays the overall positive bias (in %) and accuracy with which 
ratings discriminated believed (real) and fictitious (imagined) past and 






Study 1(d) Bias and Accuracy for Plausibility and Likelihood of Events 
 Judge Past  Future 
  %  % 
Measure  Bias Accuracy  Bias Accuracy 
   Believed 
 
Fictitious   Believed 
 
Fictitious 
Likelihood  J3 67 76 41  90 90 11 
 J4 72 81 37  61 62 40 
Plausibility J3 98 95 0  100 100 0 
 J4 87 90 17  83 83 16 
Note: Real shows the % of  Study 1(b) believed transcripts rated > 5 for likelihood, 
Imagined shows the % of  Study 1(b) not-believed transcripts rated ≤ 5 for likelihood  
 
Both raters showed a more striking positive bias for plausibility compared 
to likelihood. Judge 3 saw all future events as highly likely and the positive 
bias for plausibility was almost at ceiling level for both past and future 
transcripts. Judge 4 showed less bias but this was more pronounced when 
rating past compared to future transcripts. Results suggest that when 
raters were aware that events varied on the basis of belief in occurrence, 
this enhanced the bias to see all events as likely and plausible.  
 
Correlations  
Correlations between the rating measures are shown in Table 3.8. 
Likelihood estimates correlated with plausibility, visual and emotion 
measures for both judges in all events. Visual and emotion ratings were 
correlated for both judges in all events. Judge 4’s plausibility ratings 
correlated with other measures, in Judge 3 they did not. This pattern of 
results could be the product of the two judges using different criteria to 
assess plausibility, although this is speculation and cannot be ruled in or 




Study 1(d) Judges 3 & 4 Correlations between Measures  
 Past events 
 Judge 3  Judge 4 
 Plausibility Visual Emotions  Plausibility Visual Emotions 
Likelihood .450**   .594**   .526**  .594** .613** .608** 
Plausibility - .146 .142   .259** .360** 
Visual  -    .687**    .599** 
 Future events 
 Judge 3  Judge 4 
 Plausibility Visual Emotions  Plausibility Visual Emotions 
Likelihood .320** .233**   .321**  .672** .502** .621** 
Plausibility  .179* .021   .269** .395** 
Visual     .560**    .691** 






Study 1(c, d) compared judges’ evaluations of believed and fictitious 
events generated in study 1(b). Transcripts contained verbal descriptions 
of believed and fictitious events. Fictitious events were not lies but were 
merely imagined scenarios set at a specific spatio-temporal location in the 
recent past or future. Results showed that when raters were not aware 
that events varied on the basis of belief in occurrence – as was the case in 
study 1(c) – ratings for plausibility or likelihood did not form reliable scales. 
Study 1(d) showed that when raters knew that some events were real and 
others imagined, ratings for visual detail compared to plausibility, 
likelihood or emotional content were the most reliable. Visual detail was 
rated as richer in transcripts that described real past events but not richer 
in transcripts that described truly anticipated events set in the future. 
Likelihood and emotion ratings were at the low end of acceptable reliability 
for past events and were not reliable for future events. Analyses on past 
events showed that transcripts describing real past events were seen as 
more likely to have occurred but were not seen as more emotional than 
fictitious past transcripts.  
 
While these results seem to suggest that visual detail indexed variation  in 
the extent to which transcripts described believed events, other analyses 
showed that judges had a bias to judge all events as likely (and plausible). 
Table 3.9 shows how contextual information about the origin of the 
transcripts being evaluated (temporal, temporal + belief) influenced the 




Table 3.9.  
Studies 1(c, d): Proportion of Events Discriminated By Likelihood Ratings  
 Judge Believed *  Fictitious** 
Context  Past Future  Past Future 
Temporal information  1 51 67  35 40 
 2 70 57  38 43 
Temporal + Belief  3 76 90  41 11 
 4 81 62  37 40 
Note: * = % of  Believed transcripts correctly rated > 5 for likelihood ** = % of  Fictitious 
transcripts correctly rated ≤ 5 for likelihood 
 
 
Describing something that happened in the past and intending to do 
something in the future are epistemologically quite different. In a sense, 
future intentions are not as objectively "true" as past events. In this study, 
believed and not believed events were seen as highly similar and judges 
used the information made available to them to make likelihood 
judgments. When emotion and visual details were rated alongside 
likelihood and plausibility, these measures were correlated with each 
other. Correlations between all four measures could suggest that raters 
used plausibility, visual detail and plausibility as components when 
deciding on the likelihood of events. Table 3.9 shows that believed events 
received high ratings at the cost of discrimination of fictitious events, which 
also received high ratings, in line with previous literature showing the 





Study 2(a, b, c, d, e) 
The Future as a Mnemonic  
 
4.1 General Introduction 
The constructive episodic simulation hypothesis proposes that episodic 
future thinking is a constructive process of repurposing traces from 
episodic memory to generate hypothetical future scenarios (Schacter & 
Addis, 2007). For example, Szpunar showed that the contents of episodic 
memory can implicitly prime episodic future thoughts (2010b). Participants 
were asked to complete scrambled sentence tasks where content was on 
either a social or academic theme. Later, apparently as another of a series 
of general ability tasks, participants were asked to generate a future 
thought. The content of these future thoughts matched the primed theme, 
indicating that memory (scrambled sentences task) had implicitly shaped 
the content of future episode thoughts. 
 
This priming relationship appears to be bidirectional.  Episodic future 
thinking has also been shown to operate as an effective encoding tool for 
memory. In a between-participants design Watanabe (2005) asked one 
group to imagine carrying out prospective memory tasks at certain times of 
day. A second group were instructed to learn the plans and times by rote. 
Those who had used foresight to actively plan carrying out the tasks 
remembered more of the times and more specific plans. Results here are 
likely to be related to a well-documented aspect of prospection and 
memory known as the intention superiority effect. Recall for intended 
actions is faster and more accurate compared to recall for events that will 
not be enacted (Goschke & Kuhl, 1993). In the first of several studies 
documenting intention superiority, participants first learned pairs of short 
scripts for small actions such as clearing a messy desk. Having learned 
both scripts, one was highlighted as something that participant would later 
 112 
be asked to carry out. Participants were told that the other script would be 
carried out by the experimenter while they watched. When tested for 
recognition memory, items in the intended scripts were recognised faster 
and more accurately compared to those related to the not intended scripts. 
This superiority reverses once actions have been carried out. Recall for 
events that were intended but are now completed is slower than for never-
intended (to be actioned) events (Marsh, Hicks & Bink, 1998; Marsh, Hicks 
& Bryan, 1999). Taken together, these results suggest that using episodic 
future thinking to pre-experience a prospective event is likely to increase 
recall for intended plans, a pattern supported by recent research (Neroni, 
Gamboz & Brandimonte, 2014). 
 
The evolution of episodic future thinking has been characterised as an 
adaptive function such that memory enables foresight, which in turn 
promotes human survival (Klein, Cosmides, Tooby & Chance, 2002; 
Suddendorf & Corballis, 2007). Testing the idea that memory is primed for 
evolutionary fitness and should be particularly efficient when information 
relates to personal survival, a salient scenario (being stranded in the 
grasslands of a foreign country) was found to improve recall on a 
subsequent memory test (Nairne et al., 2007). Over several studies, a 
survival scenario has been shown to enhance recall when compared to 
tasks that lack survival relevance (Nairne & Pandeirada, 2008; Nairne, 
Pandeirada & Thompson, 2008) and this survival-processing advantage 
has been extensively extended and replicated with multiple comparison 
conditions and encoding scenarios (Scofield, Buchanan & Kostic, 2018). 
The survival effect has been most reliable when tested using free recall or 
recognition measures but when these methods were compared to an 
implicit measure (a sentence completion task), there was no advantage of 
survival processing (Tse & Altarriba, 2010; McBride, Thomas & 
Zimmerman, 2013). There is evidence that when less elaborate survival 
scenarios are used for encoding, the memorial advantage is diminished 
(Kroneisen & Erdfelder, 2011). If the survival processing effect is an 
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evolutionary adaptation, a reproductive scenario might also be expected to 
confer a memorial advantage on the basis of evolutionary fitness but 
across three recent experiments, no evidence was found to support this 
view (Derringer, Scofield & Kostic, 2017). Taken together, these studies 
have led some researchers to question whether some other factor lies 
behind the survival processing effect. 
 
Klein, Robertson & Delton (2010) proposed that the survival processing 
advantage might be related to the elaborated processing effect of planning 
rather than the survival element per se. Although planning had been 
included as an experimental condition in previous research (Nairne et al., 
2007: 2008; Nairne & Pandeirada 2008;), the precise scenario used 
differed between conditions. To see if survival processing conferred an 
advantage when a single scenario was used in all conditions, a between 
participants experiment was designed in which one theme (being in the 
woods) was presented in 4 temporal conditions. 
Past (recall a specific episode of camping) 
Future (plan a future camping trip) 
Atemporal (use semantic knowledge of camping) 
Survival (imagine a survival scenario in the woods) 
All participants considered the same list of 30 words in the context of a 
single camping in the woods scenario followed by a distracter task and 
free recall of the words that had been rated. Words encoded in the future 
planning condition were best remembered. There were no differences in 
recall between the past and atemporal conditions, the survival group 
showed a non-significant trend to recall more items (p = .07).  
 
In the real world, many people have experience of going camping in the 
woods but far fewer would have personal experience of a survival scenario 
or anticipate finding themselves in such a situation in the future. Thus one 
possible interpretation of this result might be that the survival condition 
was simply less salient to participants. A second experiment investigated 
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the planning vs. survival aspects of this paradigm in closer detail (Klein, 
Robertson & Delton, 2011). Tasks that involved planning (i.e., survival with 
planning and planning without survival) led to greater recall than tasks that 
encouraged survival but not planning (i.e., survival without planning). 
These results suggest that planning is an important component of the 
survival processing effect.  
 
Planning necessitates engaging in a simulation of the self, which might 
prompt more elaborate encoding of stimuli. In order to decide if an item is 
relevant to a plan, a future-oriented appraisal might involve self-referential 
processing to a greater extent than looking at an item and seeing if a 
memory pops up (McDonough & Gallo, 2010). In a series of studies, 
Dewhurst and colleagues used personality words (nouns and adjectives) 
as stimuli, which were rated with reference to the self, to a scenario about 
moving house and to a survival scenario of being stranded in grasslands 
in a foreign country (Dewhurst, Anderson, Grace & Boland, 2017). Results 
showed that self-reference led to greater free recall and recognition 
memory compared to the survival or moving house encoding scenarios. 
On the basis of these results, self-referential processing seems to be a 
more powerful mnemonic than survival processing. A related question not 
examined in these studies is the extent to which having existing plans to 
carry out an activity in the future might confer a greater memorial 
advantage. 
 
Klein et al. (2010) showed that rating words for relevance to planning a 
future scenario led to superior retention relative to the same scenario set 
in the past, in atemporal or survival scenarios. Lifespan camping 
experience was equivalent across conditions but existing plans to go 
camping in the future were not asked about, so the extent to which these 
might have impacted on recall for plan-salient stimuli is not known. Study 2 
of this thesis examined a single temporal orientation (future) in the context 
of which participants rated whether items would form part of their plans in 
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an imagined future scenario. Each experiment used a between -
participants design in which participants were assigned to experimental 
condition on the basis of whether or not they had a pre-existing intention to 
carry out the scenario in the near future (2 months). The hypothesis was 
that having existing plans to carry out a future scenario might engage 
greater self-referential processing and lead to superior recall of associated 
words. Two pilot studies were conducted to identify a suitable scenario 
and associated stimuli and control words. 
 
Overview of the studies  
A series of two pilots and three experiments were designed to investigate 
whether the richer phenomenology and autonoesis associated with 
intended events in study 1(b) could be replicated by other means, for 
example, if intention could be shown to act as a mnemonic. In study 1(b), 
participants were asked to simulate then describe themselves carrying out 
events for which they had existing plans or that they had recently 
experienced. Participants repeated the procedure for imagined events set 
in the recent past and future. Results showed that believed events felt 
subjectively richer and more detailed compared to fictional events, 
whether set in the past or future. Thus believed-in future plans were rated 
as subjectively similar to experienced past events. Chapter 4 of this thesis 
presents experimental studies in which believed events set in the future at 
a distance of two months are used as encoding scenarios for learning a 
list of related words. 
 
A series of two pre-tests and three between-participants experiments were 
conducted to investigate the impact of intention on recall with groups who 
either i) intended or ii) did not intend to carry out the encoding scenario. In 
each experiment, words were processed in the context of a future event 
that was anticipated or not anticipated within 60 days. In the first instance, 
two pilot studies were run to identify a suitable scenario on which to base 
the first experiment and to establish reliability for the associated word list 
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stimuli. All five studies were reviewed and approved by the Ethics 




4.2 Study 2(a) Cinema Scenario 
Introduction 
A pilot study was run to identify a suitable scenario for use in study 2(c) 
and objects associated with this scenario, which would be the 
experimental stimuli for the recall task. In study 1(b), participants were 
required to choose 1 truly anticipated and 1 unanticipated future scenario 
from a list of 10 everyday events that are frequently experienced by 
university students. Participants imagined carrying out each activity and 
provided a verbal description of the simulation. In study 2(c), the 
experimental design required identification of a single scenario that would 
reliably yield two levels of intention. The event needed to be something 
that was anticipated or not anticipated to take place in the near future by 
approximately equal numbers of participants in a random sample of  
college students at that time of year (November).  
 
The aim of the first pre-test was to identify a suitable scenario and also to 
find associated stimuli. When thinking about objects encountered in daily 
life, people organise items into categories that are seen to belong 
together, for example fruit or tools. Some categories are stable and 
enduring but people can also form ad hoc categories that are shaped by 
the drive to carry out a goal, such as things to take on a camping trip 
(Barsalou, 1983). The pilot study sought to identify a scenario that was a 
distinctive discrete future episode in which a range of objects could be 
presented for consideration. The salience of category membership for the 
experimental word items needed to be clearly differentiated when thought 
about in the context of this single event scenario.  
 
The frequency with which events had been selected for use as cues in the 
future conditions in study 1(b) was examined to identify events that had 
been chosen with similar frequency as both a believed and not-believed 
event. Event frequency data from study 1(b) are presented in Table 4.1. 
The event most frequently chosen for both categories was a trip to the 
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cinema, which was chosen as a cue in nine future, believed trials and in 
seven future, not-believed trials. On this basis, a future cinema trip was 
selected for pre testing as the experimental scenario in study 2(c).  
Table 4.1  
Believed and Not-believed Event Selection in Future Trials in Study 1(b) 
Event Count   Event Count 
Pub 10  Gym 15 
Club  9  Dinner   8 
Cinema  9  Cinema   7 
Pizza & movie  8  Try new recipe   6 
Coffee  7  Friend’s house   6 
Progress meeting 7  Progress meeting   6 
Gym  6  Club   5 
Try new recipe  3  Coffee   5 
Dinner  2  Pizza & movie   4 
Go to a friend’s house 2  Pub   1 
 
Method  
Design and Participants. An online questionnaire was used to obtain 
ratings for 30 items on the basis of cinema scenario-relatedness. 
Participants were an opportunity sample of 17 staff and postgraduates (8 
males) at Royal Holloway, University of London who responded to an 
email request. The age range was 18-54 (M = 24.1, SD = 6.76).  
 
Materials and Procedure. A list of 15 words representing portable 
physical objects was taken from the control word list used in previous 
research (Klein et al., 2010). One item (couch) was reworded to sofa. 
Another item (drapes) might be associated with a trip to a cinema and was 
replaced with towel, taken from McDonough & Gallo (2009). Thus 15 
words were selected on the basis that they were portable objects not 
obviously associated with a trip to the cinema. A further 15 objects thought 
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likely to be encountered on a cinema trip were suggested by Royal 
Holloway Department of Psychology Eyewitness Laboratory Group 
members. The first pilot study was carried out to obtain ratings for salience 
to a cinema scenario for these 30 words.  
 
An online questionnaire was created on Survey Gizmo software 
(www.surveygizmo.com). The first questions collected demographic 
information and asked participants to rate the frequency with wh ich they 
visited the cinema per annum (less than once, 1-5, 6-10, 11-15, more than 
15 trips). The body of the survey consisted of two parts. In Phase 1, 
participants were asked to imagine planning to visit a cinema in the near 
future and to suggest physical objects that might be seen or used on a 
cinema trip. Instructions were given to type the first 5-10 items that came 
to mind. This question was included to obtain potential substitute cinema 
words, which could be validated in a second pilot should the current pilot 
not yield 15 sufficiently cinema-related words.  
 
Phase 2 of the questionnaire followed the pre-test procedure used by 
Klein et al. (2010). Ratings for scenario-salience were made on a 5-point 
scale (1, very unlikely; 5, very likely). List thresholds were were reported 
as Ms >3.8 for experimental words and Ms < 2.2 for control words (not 
associated with spending time in the woods) In Phase 2, 30 portable 
physical objects (15 cinema-related, 15 control) were presented for rating. 
Participants were asked to indicate how likely it would be that each item 
would form part of a future cinema trip scenario on a 5-point scale (1 = 
very unlikely, 5 = very likely). 
 
Results and Discussion 
Experience. Participants were experienced cinemagoers. When rating the 
number of cinema visits made per annum: 53% made 1-5 trips, 29% made 
6-10 trips. One participant indicated less than one visit a year, one 
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indicated 11-15 trips per year and one indicated more than 15 trips per 
year.  
New cinema words. Each participant generated examples of objects that 
they anticipated they might encounter during a cinema visit. A total of 71 
suggestions were made, after removing duplicates, 44 items remained. 
Ten of these were among the cinema words rated in Phase 2 of this pilot 
study. The remaining 34 items were not portable physical objects. New 
cinema words are presented in Table 4.2. 
 
Table 4.2  
Study 2(a) New, Duplicate or Unsuitable Cinema Item Suggestions  








Ice cream (2) 
Curtain, 
Desk, Screen, 





Queue (3), Movie (2), Bright, 
Comedy, Credits, Freezing, 
Horror, Orange Wednesday, 
Prebook, Theme song, Thriller, 
Trailers, Surround sound, Walk, 





Taxi (3), Escalator (2), Bus (2), 
Actor, Complex, Elevator, Friend, 
Listings board, Odeon, Pizza 
Hut, Restaurant, Row, Shopping 
centre, Staines, Station, Ten-pin, 
Ticket machine, Vue 
Note: Numbers in parentheses indicate the f requency of  mentions per item 
Cinema salience. Mean ratings for salience to the cinema scenario for 15 
control words indicated that these objects were seen as unlikely to be part 
of an imagined future cinema trip (Ms < 2.2, range 1–2.17). Words 
anticipated to be associated with a cinema scenario showed more 
variance (range 2.4–5), with only 9 items validated as Ms >3.8, in line with 
scenario-salient stimuli selected by Klein et al. (2010). Words and mean 




Study 2(a) Mean Salience for Items to a Cinema Scenario 
List Cinema    Control  
  M     M  
 Seat 5.00   Desk 2.17 
 Ticket 5.00   Painting 1.53 
 Screen 4.88   Sofa 1.53 
 Popcorn 4.53   Rug 1.41 
 Wallet 4.53   Television 1.33 
 Sweets 4.29   Towel 1.24 
 Drink 4.18   Microwave 1.24 
 Mobile 4.12   Bookcase 1.18 
 Poster 3.94   Puppet 1.18 
 Projector 3.88   Modem 1.12 
 Credit card 3.71   Vacuum 1.12 
 Ice cream 3.33   Lawn mower 1.00 
 Curtain 3.11   Treadmill 1.00 
 3D Glasses 2.94   Dresser 1.00 
 NUS card 2.37   Stapler 1.00 
 M = 3.99, SD = .78   M = 1.27, SD = .31 
Note: N = 17 
 
Discussion. The pilot study was conducted to validate portable physical 
objects in terms of their association with a cinema scenario. Mean ratings 
were obtained in line with Klein et al., (2010). Results indicated that 15 
items were suitable for use as control words in a cinema scenario (M < 
2.2, range 1–2.17). None of the new item cinema items suggested in 
Phase 1 were moveable, physical objects, e.g. film, ticket machine, cup 
holder and so they were not suitable for further testing. Since there were 
no new suggestions available for further pre-testing the cinema scenario 
was rejected for use in the main experiment study 2(c).  
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4.3 Study 2(b) Flying Scenario 
Introduction 
A second pilot study was conducted to find a suitable scenario and 
associated word list for use in study 2(c). Data collection for study 2(c) 
was planned to be carried out in November, shortly before the end of the 
semester, which was close to a time when some student participants 
might be planning to fly overseas. The pilot study was carried out to pre-
test an aeroplane flight for use as a possible scenario and to obtain ratings 
for flight scenario-relatedness of portable physical objects, which would be 
used as stimuli in the main experiment.  
 
Design and Participants. Study 2(b) was a pilot used to select 
experimental stimuli for use in study 2(c). A total of 73 students (24 males) 
at the University of Manchester and the University of Glasgow took part in 
one of two online questionnaires: Superfly (N = 36) and Flight Club (N = 
37). Participants were recruited through posters, social media and 
personal contacts and invited to participate via an email link. In both 
questionnaires, participants indicated their age by selecting a 
demographic bracket with ranges from 18–24 (N = 48), 25–34 (N = 9) or 
35–54 (N = 16). 
 
Materials and Procedure. The study was carried out in two parts. In total, 
66 words were rated for salience to a flight scenario (44 flight words, 22 
control words).  
In Phase 1, a questionnaire (titled Superfly) was created using Survey 
Gizmo software. The design was identical to the online questionnaire used 
in study 2(a). Control words were 22 non-flying related portable items 
taken from previous research (Klein et al., 2010; McDonough & Gallo, 
2010). Flying words were 22 portable objects likely to be taken on a flight 
in hand luggage, suggested by Royal Holloway Eyewitness Laboratory 
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Group members and Department of Psychology postgraduate students at 
Royal Holloway, University of London.  
In Phase 2, a second questionnaire (titled Flight Club) was created on 
Survey Gizmo software and used to pre-test 22 new items suggested by 
participants in Phase 1. 
 
Phase 1. Participants were sent an email with a link to the online study. 
The procedure was identical to study 2(a). After answering demographic 
questions, participants generated examples of flight-related objects. 
Instructions stated:  
Take a moment to imagine that you are planning an aeroplane trip 
in the near future. What items might you want to take in your hand 
luggage? Imagine that you are packing for your journey. Please 
write down 5-10 items you will take with you. These are things you 
are planning to use on the flight. 
 
Next a randomised list of 44 items was presented for rating. Participants 
were instructed:  
You will now see lists of words representing physical objects. We 
would like you to rate how likely it is that these objects would be 
part of your future plane trip scenario. For some objects, it may be 
very likely that you would plan to take them with you, for others it 
may be very unlikely. It is up to you to decide. 
 
Words were grouped in blocks of five on each screen with the 
accompanying text: Please rate whether you would plan to take each item 
on the flight. Ratings were made on a 5-point Likert scale (1= Very 
unlikely, 5 = Very likely). Finally participants rated their flying experience 
by indicating the number of trips they made by plane per annum where a 
return flight = two trips, on a 5-point scale where values were: (Fewer than 
1), (1–2), (3–6), (7–10), (more than 10). 
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Phase 2. New items (n = 22) suggested by participants in Phase 1 
(Superfly) were entered into a second survey (Flight Club). The design 
and procedure was identical to the word rating procedure in the first 
survey (Superfly), including the flight frequency question. Flight-
relatedness ratings for the new words were obtained from 37 participants. 
 
Results 
Experience. Participants reported a range of flying experience: 88% of 
participants were distributed equally between 1–2 or 3–6 trips per annum. 
Five participants flew less than once a year, 4 took 7–10 flights and 2 took 
more than 10 flights. 
Flight salience.  Mean ratings for flight-relatedness for 66 words were 
calculated. Items receiving the highest ratings for salience to a plane 
scenario (n = 15, Ms ≥ 3.83) were selected for use as flight-salient stimuli. 
The 15 items rated least likely to be taken on a plane (Ms ≤ 1.29) were 
selected for use as control words. Means for items on both lists are 
presented in Table X. An independent samples t-test indicated that means 
for flying-relatedness were higher for experimental words (M = 4.29, SD  = 
.27) compared to control words (M = 1.21, SD = .05), t(28) = 44.08, p ≥ 
.001. 
Discussion. Study 2(b) was used to obtain and validate words for use 
with a flying scenario. A further pre-test (not reported in this thesis) with 10 
participants was carried out using these stimuli. Results indicated that 
participants with a pre-existing intention to fly remembered more flying 
words than participants with no existing plans to fly. On this basis, a future 
flight was selected for use as the main scenario in study 2(c) using 30 
rated words generated in study 2(b) as stimuli.
 125 
Table 4.4 
Study 2(b) Mean Salience for Items in a Flying Scenario 
List Flying   Control 
  Item M   Item M 
  Passport 4.69   Trashcan 1.12 
  Phone 4.56   Plant 1.12 
  Ticket 4.57   Vacuum 1.14 
  Pen 4.57   Dresser 1.16 
  Money  4.53   Painting 1.21 
  Earphones 4.51   Microwave 1.22 
  MP3 Player 4.28   Stapler 1.22 
  Novel 4.28   Television 1.22 
  Jacket 4.24   Sofa 1.22 
  Magazine 4.13   Lawn mower 1.22 
  Jumper 4.11   Candle 1.24 
  Camera 4.11   Puppet 1.25 
  Water 4.00   Carrot 1.25 
  Keys  3.97   Matches 1.28 
  Snack 3.83   Desk 1.29 




4.4 Experimental Study 2(c) Flying 1 
 
Introduction 
Study 2(c) was designed to extend previous research which showed a 
temporal advantage to recall of words encoded in the context of a future event 
(Klein et al., 2010). The aim was to investigate whether holding a veridical 
intention to carry out a future action would enhance recall of words that were 
semantically related to that activity. A time boundary of two months was 
chosen to constrain experimental group membership for theoretical and 
practical reasons. Temporally close events are more likely to be vivid, 
accessible and to take the form of concrete plans (D’Argembeau & Van der 
Linden 2004, 2006; Trope & Liberman, 2010). The encoding scenario needed 
to be something that participants could confidently predict was or was not 
going to happen to them. At the time of data collection, two months ahead 
encompassed a college holiday when it might be expected that a number of 
students would have plans to travel by plane. Thus a future flight was chosen 
as the encoding scenario with a two-month future time limit employed to 
constrain experimental group membership.  
Method 
Design. A between-group experimental design was used. A group of 
participants with plans to fly within 2 months was compared to a group of 
participants who did not intend to fly in the same time frame. The 
experimental hypothesis was that participants using an intended scenario to 
learn a word list would exhibit superior recall for scenario-related stimuli 
compared to participants using for whom the scenario was not one they 
anticipated carrying out in the next 60 days. Intention to fly was the 
independent variable with two levels (intention to fly within 2 months, no 
intention to fly within 2 months). The dependent variable was the number of 
words recalled. The sample size was calculated to give a power of .80 with an 
alpha level of p < .05 and a medium effect size for an independent-samples t-
test. This required a sample of 102.  
 127 
 
Participants. Students and staff at Royal Holloway, University of London 
were recruited via the Department of Psychology’s online experiment 
management system. Additional participants with an intention to fly in the next 
two months were recruited by announcements made in  undergraduate 
criminology and psychology lectures. In total, 126 participants (28 males) took 
part in the study. Data were discarded from 10 participants who did not follow 
experimental instructions, for example recalling anagrams instead of word 
stimuli during the free recall phase. The difference in age between flyers (M = 
22.22, SD = 6.6) and non-flyers (M = 20.30, SD = 3.04) was approaching 
significance t(106) = -1.05, p = .06. Two non-flyers aged 45 and 53 were 
outliers to the predominant age range in  this sample (18–37). However there 
was no change to the pattern of results when these participants were 
removed or when age was co-varied with the analyses and so results are 
based on 116 cases (58 flyers, 58 non-flyers, age range 18–53). Participation 
was in exchange for course credits or payment of £2. 
 
Materials and procedure.  The design of study 2(c) was based on a pen and 
paper experiment carried out in a college lecture (Klein et al., 2010). The 
present study was presented on ASP.NET software using a Microsoft Access 
database. This eliminated any possibility that participants could refer back to 
earlier pages of a booklet during the recall phase. On the basis of the results 
of study 2(b), flying on a plane was selected for use as the encoding scenario. 
Stimuli were the flying and control words lists generated in study 2(b) (see 
Table 4.4). A distractor task was created using Excel software to generate 56 
anagrams ranging between 4 and 7 letters in length. Anagrams were 
presented in ascending word length order.  The study received approval from 
the Department of Psychology Ethics Committee at Royal Holloway, 
University of London. 
Groups of up to 10 participants sat at personal computers in a research 
laboratory at Royal Holloway, University of London. Each workspace had 
privacy screens on 3 sides. The procedure was based on previous research 
 128 
(Klein et al., 2010). After entering a unique ID code, participants saw written 
instructions on the screen stating  
Please take a few moments to imagine planning a trip by aeroplane in 
the future  
Orientation to the next screen was decided by choosing one of two 
statements:   
If you have existing plans to make a plane trip in the next two months, 
click here 
 If you do not have existing plans to make a plane trip in the next two 
months, click here  
On the next screen, participants with plans to fly were given the instructions:  
We would like you to travel forward in time and imagine yourself getting 
ready for the next flight you plan to take in the future. What items do 
you associate with this scenario?  
You will be shown a sequence of words describing physical objects. 
For each, we would like you to rate how likely it is that you would plan 
to take this object on board your future flight. For some objects, it may 
be very likely that you take it with you. For others it may be very 
unlikely. It is up to you to decide.  
You have up to 30 seconds to rate each word. When you are ready, 
click on 'Continue' to move to the next screen 
Participants with no plans to fly received the same instructions except that the 
first sentence cued an imaginary (not intended) future scenario: 
Imagine that you are planning to take a flight in the future.  
All participants were then presented with the word-rating task. Each word 
appeared on a single page (30s per word). The software randomised the 
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order of presentation for each participant. The instruction  on each page 
stated: 
Please rate whether you would plan to take this item on your flight.   
Answers were made on a 5-point Likert scale from 1 (very unlikely) to 5 (very 
likely). 
After rating 30 words, participants were presented with a distractor task:  
You now have three minutes to solve some anagrams. Please try to do 
as many as you can. You might not finish them all.  
A countdown clock was visible. A list of 56 anagrams was shown on one 
screen in a single column arranged in increasing word length. A response box 
was presented next to each anagram. Response order was unconstrained so 
that participants could choose to solve anagrams from anywhere on the list. 
After three minutes the task timed out and a new screen presented recall 
instructions:   
We would now like you to try to recall the words that you rated in the 
first part of the study. NOT the anagrams that you solved.  Please write 
the words, one per line, in the spaces provided below, in any order in 
which they come to mind. You have three minutes. 
After three minutes, experience and anticipation questions were presented 
over two screens. Annual flying experience was rated on a 5-point scale 
representing the number of flights taken in the previous year (a return flight = 
2 trips). The scale ranged from 1 (none), 2 (1–2 flights), 3 (3–6 flights), 4 (7–
10 flights), to 5 (more than 10 flights). Participants were asked to estimate the 
date of the last flight taken, with a separate response option for those with no 
flying experience. Three questions centred on future plans. Participants gave 
the date of their next booked flight and also rated the imminence of any future 
intentions to fly on a 5-point scale: 1 (in the next two months), 2 (in the next 
six months), 3 (in the next 12 months), 4 (no current plans), 5 (I am 
determined not to fly in the future). Confidence that the plans indicated would 
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not change was made on a 5-point scale: 1(very unlikely to change), 5 (very 
likely to change).  
Testing time was 25 minutes. Many participants completed the study in 15–20 
minutes since only the distraction and recall phases constrained participants 
to make use of the full time allocated to each task. 
4.5 Results 
Experience. An independent samples t-test was performed on the number of 
flights taken per annum. Flyers (M = 3.10, SD = 1.02) were more frequent 
flyers than non-flyers (M = 1.81, SD = .63), t(95.29) = -8.20, p = .01. To 
investigate the recency of past flying experience, the distance in months 
between the test date and each participant’s last flight was calculated, with 
low numbers indicating proximity to the present: 1 = (up to 31 days in the 
past), 2 = (1 calendar month–2 calendar months) etc. (range: 1–79). An 
independent samples t-test showed that flyers (M = 4.40, SD = .63) took a 
flight more recently than non-flyers (M = 12.50, SD = 14.32), t(64.86) = 4.10, p 
<.001. Flight recency and flying experience were correlated, r(114) = -.53, p 
<.001. However there was no correlation between recall for flying words and 
the amount of time since participants last took a flight, r(114) = -.04, p = .70. 
Similarly, there was no correlation between recall for flying words and flying 
experience, r(114) = .07, p = .44. Thus these data do not contradict the finding 
that future planning and past experience engage separate mechanisms when 
rating/encoding items based on their salience to a scenario (Klein et al., 
2010). 
 
Future plans.  Confidence that flying plans would not change in the next two 
months did not differ between flyers (M = 2.14, SD = 1.25) and non-flyers (M 
= 2.22, SD = 1.33), t(114) =.36, p = .72. Results from the future intentions 
scale showed that 78 participants (39 flyers, 39 non-flyers) had a future flight 
booked. Where participants had a flight booked, the imminence of this event 
was calculated on the basis of the interval between the testing date and 
nominated future flight date (range 2 days–10 months). Exploratory analyses 
were also conducted on the basis of participants’ future flying plans. The 
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impact of having flying plans beyond the two-month boundary could be 
examined by recoding participants to flight booked and no flight booked 
groups. An independent samples t-test indicated that participants with a flight 
booked (up to 10 months ahead) were more confident in their future plans (M 
= 1.99, SD = 1.30) than those with no flight booked (M = 2.58, SD = 1.15), 
t(114) = 2.38, p = .02. To examine whether having plans to fly within 10 
months (without having received the specificity instruction to think about the 
next flight during encoding) had any impact on recall, a list type (flying words, 
control words) x condition (flight booked, no flight booked) mixed model 
ANOVA was conducted on recall. There was no difference to the pattern of 
results found in the main analysis. 
 
Recall. A word type (flying vs. control) x condition (flying plans, no flying 
plans) mixed model ANOVA was conducted on recall. There was a main 
effect of list type so that flying words were better remembered (M = 10.30, SD 
= 2.18) compared to non-flying words (M = 4.72, SD = 1.75), F(1,14) = 
564.95, p <.001. There was no main effect of having plans to fly on the 
number of words recalled between flyers (M = 15.33, SD = 2.95) and non 
flyers (M = 14.71, SD = 3.13), F(1, 114) = 1.21, p = .27. Thus having the 
intention to fly had no impact on recall in these data. Figure 4.1 shows recall 
by word list type.  
 
 


























Stimuli salience. During the encoding phase of the experiment, word stimuli 
were rated on the basis of whether each item was relevant to a future flying 
scenario. Means and standard deviations for the two word lists when rated 
during the encoding phase are presented in Table 4.5 
 
Since recall did not differ on the basis of intention to fly, the salience of the 
stimuli during the rating phase was examined in more detail. Mean scores for 
the flying scenario salience of each word list (flying, control) were calculated 
for each participant on the basis of ratings made during the encoding phase.  
A list type (flying salient vs. not flying salient) x condition (flying plans, no 
flying plans) mixed model ANOVA was conducted on mean salience ratings. 
There was a main effect of list type with flying words (M = 4.44, SD = .38) 
receiving higher ratings for flight salience compared to non-flying words (M = 
1.13, SD = .20), F(1, 114) = 7313.2, p <.001. There was a main effect of 
condition (F(1, 114) = 5.23,  p = .02. This was qualified with an interaction 
between list type and condition (F(1,114) = 5.61, p = .02) indicating that word 
list salience ratings differed between the two intention groups. Post hoc t-tests 
compared mean salience ratings for the two words lists between flyers and 
non-flyers. Results lay in the opposite direction to what might have been 
expected. Participants who had no plans to fly in the near future rated flying 
words as more salient to a flying scenario (M = 4.53, SD = .32) compared to 
those participants who planned to fly within the next few months (M = 4.35, 
SD = .41), t(114) = 2.67, p = .01. There was no difference in flight-salience 
ratings for control words between flyers (M = 1.14, SD = .22) and non-flyers 




Study 2(c) Mean Salience for Items in a Flying Scenario  
List  Flying    Control  
  M SD  M SD 
 Ticket 4.96 .38 Matches 1.40 .79 
 Money 4.93 .41 Carrot 1.25 .60 
 Passport 4.92 .53 Painting 1.23 .58 
 Phone 4.8 .66 Dresser 1.21 .63 
 MP3 Player 4.58 .90 Candle 1.19 .53 
 Earphones 4.55 .82 Puppet 1.18 .55 
 Camera 4.52 .92 Stapler 1.18 .47 
 Jacket 4.43 .79 Television 1.16 .55 
 Keys 4.37 1.08 Plant 1.08 .35 
 Jumper 4.28 .84 Lawn mower 1.06 .30 
 Water 4.13 1.15 Trashcan 1.05 .22 
 Novel 4.12 1.10 Vacuum 1.02 .13 
 Pen 4.09   .96 Sofa 1.01 .09 
 Snack 3.97 1.11 Desk 1.01 .09 
 Magazine 3.89 1.08 Microwave 1 0 





Study 2(c) found no evidence that having the intention to fly led to greater 
recall of flying related words when encoded using a future scenario. Flying 
words were preferentially recalled over non-flying words but this did not vary 
between participants who intended to fly in the next two months and those 
who did not. Flying experience (either per annum or when measured in 
months from the present moment) was more extensive among flyers but was 
not correlated with recall, so that on the basis of these data, neither past 
experience of flying nor having the intention to fly (on a named date) in the 
near future made flying words more salient.  
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There was a significant group difference in ratings for the salience of flying but 
not control words during the encoding phase. Non-flyers rated flying words as 
more salient to a flying scenario than participants with existing plans to take a 
flight in the near future. This result was in the opposite direction to the 
hypothesised relationship between intention and scenario-related word 
salience. The higher ratings might explain why both groups recalled more 
flying words at similar levels: any small advantage to the salience of items 
afforded by having the intention to carry out the activity could have been 
eclipsed by the higher salience of the flying words to non -flyers, particularly if 
this came about as a result of some type of more effortful elaboration. A 
possible explanation is that the encoding task was easier for participants who 
were pre-experiencing an intended scenario where they were packing for the 
upcoming flight. Deciding if each item was going in the bag may have been an 
easier decision in the context of a truly intended future event. By contrast, 
non-flyers may have had to work harder to generate an imagined scenario in 
which no such automaticity was available. Non-flyers may have engaged in 
more effortful thinking about each item, leading to higher salience ratings for 
flight-related items. Including a measure of task difficulty would make it 
possible to assess if there were group differences in the automaticity of the 
task. Other possible explanations for the null results may have been due to 
methodological issues, which will now be summarised.  
 
First, it was possible that computer presentation of the experiment gave 
participants less favourable conditions under which to engage in the pre-
experiencing future simulation task before beginning the word-rating phase. 
The original experimental design used by Klein et al. (2010) was conducted 
as a pen and paper study in a university lecture theatre. Perhaps this less 
constrained environment enhanced the efficacy of the pre-rating simulation in 
some unforeseen way. Study 2(c) was presented on a screen and the 
simulation phase was unconstrained. It may be that the participants were 
keen to progress at speed and did not fully engage with or follow the 
simulation instructions.   
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The salience of flying words may have been affected by recruitment. 
Participants were asked whether they had plans to fly before they signed up 
for the experiment, which may have had an extraneous priming effect. Flying 
words were made salient to both experimental groups. Since this would have 
been constant across both groups, it might explain why recall for flying words 
was significantly higher than recall for control words.  
 
A third issue concerns the control words. The flying words were best-
remembered by all participants and this may have been because they 
semantically linked to a narrative about going on a flight, showing evidence of 
semantic clustering effects (Nairne, Cogdill & Lehan, 2017, experiment 2).  
Flying words may have benefitted from enhanced relational processing 
(Burns, Burns & Hwang, 2011), so that magazine prompted snack and ticket 
led to passport. Although control words were physical objects, they did not 
belong to any obvious schema, ad hoc or otherwise (Black & Bern, 1981). A 
further study 2(d) was designed to address these issues by using a flying 
scenario to encode flying words and control words that were related to a 
camping scenario.  
4.5 Experimental Study 2(d) Flying 2 
 
Introduction 
Study 2(d) was designed to extend and improve the design of study 2(c), with 
which it shared the same aim and hypothesis. The aim was to investigate 
projecting forward in time to a specific event that is believed to be going to 
happen within two months and using this scenario to encode a list of related 
words. The hypothesis was that this would enhance recall compared to using 
a generic (merely imagined) simulation of the same event set in the future. 
Study 2(d) aimed to address some of the methodological issues that may 
have led to null results in study 2(c), which will now be outlined. 
 
In study 2(c), the experimental induction and rating/encoding phases were 
delivered on screen as a computer-based task. Participants read the induction 
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instructions then clicked through to the rating task. The minimum amount of 
time to generate the flying scenario and to rate/encode each word for salience 
to that scenario were not constrained by survey settings. After rating each 
item, the next word appeared for rating. By repeating the experiment in a 
group-testing paradigm with participants receiving experimenter-controlled 
instructions and time constraints, better control of this aspect of the study 
could be achieved. Study 2(d) more closely followed the between-group 
design employed by Klein et al. (2010) in which data was collected in a 
university lecture theatre. Data collection for study 2(d) was carried out in a 
criminology lecture at Royal Holloway, University of London shortly before the 
end of the spring semester, when many students might be planning to fly 
during the holidays.  
 
A second issue related to a lack of parity between control and experimental 
word lists in terms of cueing effects. In study 2a the control items were less 
obviously schematically-related compared to the experimental words, which 
had all been previously rated as salient to a flying scenario. This difference 
may have led to an advantage for experimental words to be better 
remembered through relational processing or semantic clustering effects. In 
study 2(d) the experimental words related to a flying scenario and the control 
words related to a camping scenario, which extended any advantage of serial 
recall to both word lists. The camping word list was the experimental word list 
from Klein et al., (2010). Further, the camping relatedness of control words 
might be more salient at some times of year than others in terms of future 
thoughts.  Data collection took place in spring so that a future camping trip 
two months ahead was feasible or at least not implausible. Thus in study 2(d), 
both camping and flying word lists were related to plausible future activities. 
Although both lists were encoded in the context of flying and not camping, 
participants were asked about prior experience and fu ture plans for both flying 
and camping on the experimental consent form. It was hoped that this would 
extend any extraneous priming effects of asking about future plans to both 
scenarios. This also enabled exploratory analyses on the relationship 
between recall performance and experience or plans for flying and camping. 
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A final modification to the experimental design was to add a question on task 
difficulty to the procedure. The question was posed immediately after the 
rating/encoding task. Previous research using a single scenario to encode 
words in 4 temporal perspectives found no group differences in task difficulty 
(Klein et al., 2010). The measure was included since the perceived difficulty of 
rating words in the context of a scenario that is anticipated to be enacted in 
the near future vs. merely imagined in the future might be related to between 
group differences in elaborative encoding and recall.  
 
The experimental hypothesis was unchanged from study 2c. Participants who 
were intending to fly within two months (and followed instructions to think of 
the next intended occasion when rating/encoding) were hypothesised to recall 
more items than those participants with no plans to fly within 2 months and 
who used a generic-future flying scenario during the rating/encoding phase.  
Method 
Design 
The experiment was a mixed design with intention to fly within 2 months as 
the between groups factor with two levels (intention to fly in 2 months, no 
intention to fly in 2 months) and word list type the within participants factor 
(flying, control). The dependent variable was the number of words recalled 
from each list. 
 
Participants 
81 undergraduate students participating in a criminology lecture close to the 
end of the semester were asked if they were willing to take part in a study 
looking at future plans. On the basis of the frequency with which a student 
population was found to have plans to fly at the end of the previous semester 
(study 1c), it was anticipated that many students within the group would also 
have plans to fly in the near future. Data from four participants were 
discarded: 3 recalled anagrams, 1 received a booklet with missing pages and 
was not able to follow the procedure. The final sample for analyses comprised 
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77 participants (22 males) aged 18–37. Flyers (M = 21.33, SD = 2.99) did not 
differ in age from non flyers (M = 21.68, SD = 2.57), t(75) = .44, p = .66. 
 
Materials and Procedure 
Participants completed a consent form by supplying a unique identity code, 
giving demographic information and signing consent to take part in the study. 
The second section of the form asked for the dates of any existing plans to go 
camping and/or any existing plans to take a plane trip. The flying question 
was later used to validate experimental group membership, which was self -
selected in this design. The camping question was included as a means to 
hold constant any unintended priming effect of asking about flying before the 
experiment began by extending this salience to camping as well as flying 
scenarios. 
 
At the start of the experiment, consent forms were collected in and a 5-page 
booklet containing the experimental material was handed to participants. An 
announcement was made that anyone with plans to fly in the next two months 
should raise his or her hand. Participants who raised their hands were given 
written instructions that stated:  
Instructions if you have existing plans to fly before 31 May 2011 
Take a moment to consider your next flight. Travel forward in time and 
imagine yourself packing your hand luggage. What items do you 
associate with this scenario? You will be shown a sequence of words 
describing physical objects. For each, please rate how likely it is that 
you would plan to take this object on board your future flight. For some 
objects, it may be very likely that you take it with you. For others it may 
be very unlikely. It is up to you to decide.  
 
Participants who had not raised their hands were handed a sheet of 
instructions printed on paper, which stated:  
Instructions if you have no existing plans to fly before 31 May 2011 
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Imagine yourself getting ready for a flight in the near future. Imagine 
you are packing your hand luggage. What items do you associate with 
this scenario? You will be shown a sequence of words describing 
physical objects. For each, please rate how likely it is that you would 
plan to take this object on board your future flight. For some objects, it 
may be very likely that you take it with you. For others it may be very 
unlikely. It is up to you to decide. 
 
Time to complete the rating/encoding task was constrained to 3 minutes, in 
line with study 2(c) and Klein et al. (2010). The experimental stimuli were 14 
flying-related words taken from study 2(b, c). The control stimuli were 14 
camping-related words from the experimental word list employed by Klein et 
al. (2010). One item (water) had appeared on both source lists and was 
discarded leaving 28 items to be rated for flying-scenario relatedness. Words 
were presented in random order, one item per line accompanied by a five-
point Likert scale with anchors from 1 (very unlikely) to 5 (very likely). At then 
end of the rating/encoding task, instructions stated that participants should 
wait to be told to turn the page of the booklet. 
 
After 3 minutes participants were told to turn the page to the next question. 
Written instructions stated: 
Please use the scale below to indicate how hard you found the rating 
task. 
 
The scale ranged from 1 (very hard) to 5 (very easy). After rating the difficulty 
of the rating/encoding phase, participants were verbally directed to the next 
page of the booklet. Here the anagram puzzles used in study 2(c) were 
presented on the left page, one anagram per line. The right page was blank. 
Written instructions stated: 
You now have 3 minutes to solve some anagrams. Please try to do as 
many as you can. You might not finish them all. 
 
After 3 minutes had elapsed, participants were told to stop and turn the page 
with a verbal instruction:  
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We would now like you to try to recall the words you rated in the first 
part of the study. Please write the words on the blank page. You may 
recall the words in any order in which they come to mind. You have 3 
minutes. 
 
The final pages of the booklet contained plans and experience questions 
which were posed for both flying and camping. First participants gave details 
of their plans by writing in the date(s) of the next occasion when they would i) 
fly on a plane, and ii) go camping or to any event involving sleeping in a tent. 
Confidence that these future plans would not change was indicated on a five-
point scale (1 = very unlikely to change, 5 = highly likely to change). Two 
questions probed past events. Experience for each scenario was rated on the 
basis of the number of i) trips by plane and ii) camping trips taken over the 
previous 12 months. Ratings were made on scales from 1 (none), 2 (1–2 
trips), 3 (3–6 trips), 4 (7–10 trips), to 5 (more than 10 trips). Finally 
participants were asked to estimate the recency of flying and camping 
experience by writing in the date of i) the last flight taken and ii) the last 
camping trip taken, with separate response options for those with no flying or 
no camping experience. 
 
4.7 Results 
An independent samples t-test on the self-rated difficulty of carrying out the 
rating/encoding task indicated that there were no group differences between 
flyers (M = 4.77, SD = .44) and non flyers (M = 4.66, SD = .66), t(74) = -.61, p 
= .54. However, the belief that a reasonable distribution of flyers and non 
flyers might be found when carrying out data collection during a single lecture 
was not confirmed by these data. Results showed that 18 participants had 
existing plans to fly within two months. The majority of participants (n = 59) 
did not have plans to fly within two months. Analyses examining the extent to 
which participants had past experience and current plans beyond two months 
are now reported.  
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Past experience and future plans   
The distances between the date of testing and past (recency) or future (plans) 
for flying and camping were calculated in months (scale: 1 = up to 31 days; 2 
= 1 calendar month–2 calendar months). Low numbers on the scale indicate 
closer proximity to the present. Trip recency (past events) ranged from 1–120 
months for flying, and 4–168 months for camping trips. Trip plans (future 
events) ranged 1–11 months for flying, and 1–5 months for camping trips. 
Means, standard deviations and results of independent samples t-tests on 
experimental group differences in past experience and future plans for flying 
and camping are presented in Table 4.6. Flyers’ group membership was 
somewhat confirmed in that they had flying plans that were more imminent 
and about which they were more confident compared to non-flyers. Flyers 
were also more experienced but did not have more recent past experience 
than non flyers. There were no differences in experience or plans for camping 
between flyers and non flyers except that flyers were more con fident that their 
existing plans with regard to camping in the future would not change.  
 
Pearson correlations were carried out to investigate if having recent 
experience or future plans to fly were related to recall for flying words. As an 
exploratory investigation, the same correlations were conducted on 
experience and plans for camping and recall of camping words. Pearson 
correlation matrices are presented in Tables 4.7 and 4.8. None of the 
measures used to capture past experience or future plans for flying showed 
any relationship to recall for the experimental word list (flying). Results of the 
exploratory analyses on camping experience and future plans for camping 
found no correlations between these measures and recall of items on the 





Study 2(d) Means and Statistics for Past Experience and Future Plans 
   Flyers  Non Flyers  Statistic 
Variable  n M  (SD)  n M  (SD)  t p 
Experience*            
 Fly   18 2.94  (1.16)  59 2.15  (.76)  -2.72 .01 
 Camp  14 1.71  (.83)  51 1.33  (.59)  -1.62 .12 
Recency**            
 Fly  18 5.28   (5.29)  57 13.32  (20.09)  1.67 .1 
 Camp  12 29.17  (34.6)  32  51.50  (34.6)  1.66 .11 
Plans**             
 Fly  18 1.78  (.73)  37 4.3  (1.89)  7.11 .001 
 Camp  4 3.50  (.58)  16 3.06  (1.29)  -.65 .52 
Confidence            
 Fly   17 1.82  (1.29)  59 2.78  (1.49)  2.40 .02 
 Camp  15 2.80  (1.61)  54 1.83  (1.16)  -2.61 .01 




Study 2(d) Correlations for Flying Recall, Experience and Plans  
 Plans Confidence Experience Recency 
Flying words -.1 -.03 -.11  .03 
Plans  .2   -.36**  .04 
Confidence    -.25* -.05 
Experience         -.45** 





Study 2(d) Correlations for Camping Recall, Experience and Plans 
 Plans Confidence Experience  Recency 
Camping words .25 .19 -.10 -.18 
Plans  .25 -.19 -.08 
Confidence     .45**  -.58* 
Experience        -.61** 
**p < 0.01 (2-tailed) *p<.05 (2-tailed) 
 
On the basis of the plans and experience information supplied by participants, 
it was possible to investigate recall on the basis of stated plans for list-related 
activities (flying, camping). However these results were not derived from the 
experimental induction that directed participants to think of a specific imminent 
future event during the rating phase and should be interpreted with caution. 
To investigate whether having a named flight date in a greater time bound 
was associated with recall of flying words, participants were recoded to 
groups on the basis of having plans to fly within 6 months of testing (n = 45) 
or no plans to fly within 6 months (n = 32). A list type (flying related vs. not 
flying related) x condition (future flight within 6 months, no future flight within 6 
months) mixed model ANOVA was conducted on recall. The pattern of results 
found when intention was constrained to 2 months still held at a distance of 6 
months. There was a main effect of list type showing that flying words were 
better remembered (M = 10.44, SD = 2.12) compared to non-flying words (M 
= 5.27, SD = 1.77), F(1,75) = 296.62, p <.001. There was no effect of having 
plans to take a flight within 6 months on recall (F(1, 75) = 1.62, p = .21) and 
no interaction (F(1,75) = 1.05, p = .31. Thus, whether or not participants 
followed the correct induction to match dates of their future flying plans, these 




Word recall   
A word list type (flying related vs. not flying related) x condition (flight in 2 
months, no flight in 2 months) mixed model ANOVA was conducted on recall 
(flyers, n = 18; non flyers n = 59). There was a main effect of list type showing 
that flying words were better remembered (M = 10.44, SD = 2.12) compared 
to non-flying words (M = 5.27, SD = 1.77), F(1,75) = 218.22, p <.001. There 
was no main effect of using a specific flight within 2 months when rating items 
in the encoding phase on the number of words recalled by flyers (M = 16.56, 
SD = 3.29) and non flyers (M = 15.54, SD = 2.9), F(1, 75) =.88, p = .35. Thus 
having the intention to fly within 2 months had no impact on recall in study 
2(d). Figure 4.2 shows recall by word list type. 
 
 
Figure 4.2: Study 2(d) recall by word list type.  
 
Stimuli salience. During the encoding phase of the experiment, word stimuli 
were rated on the basis of whether each item was relevant to a future flying 
scenario. Ratings for flying words ranged from 3.71–4.94. Ratings for camping 
words ranged from 1.05–2.01. Mean ratings for flying and camping word lists 
are presented in Table 4.9.  
 
Study 2(c) results showed that non flyers compared to flyers rated flying word 
list stimuli as more salient to a flying scenario. Mean scores for the flying 


























participant on the basis of ratings made during the encoding phase of study 
2(d). A list type (flying salient vs. not flying salient) x condition (flying plans, no 
flying plans) mixed model ANOVA was conducted on mean list salience 
ratings. There was a main effect of list type with flying words (M = 2.43, SD = 
.49) receiving higher ratings for flying salience compared to camping words 
(M = 1, SD = 1.32), F(1, 75) = 874.95, p <.001. There was no main effect of 
condition and no interaction (Fs <1, ps >.05) indicating that word list salience 
ratings did not differ between flyers and non-flyers.  
 
Table 4.9 
Study 2(d) Mean Salience for Items in a Flying Scenario (Experiment 2) 
List  Flying    Camping  
  M SD  M SD 
 Passport 4.94 0.45 Batteries 2.01 1.23 
 Ticket 4.93 0.49 Bug repellent 1.95 1.19 
 Phone 4.89 0.64 First-aid kit 1.88 1.06 
 Money 4.85 0.55 Grill 1.86 0.46 
 Earphones 4.53 1.11 Flashlight 1.43 0.84 
 MP3 Player 4.54 1.05 Bread 1.31 0.82 
 Camera 4.30 1.04 Binoculars 1.26 0.88 
 Snack 4.19 1.05 Garbage bags 1.19 0.66 
 Pen 4.14 0.96 Matches 1.16 0.46 
 Keys 4.05 1.23 Tent 1.16 0.46 
 Novel 3.95 1.17 Bowls 1.09 0.36 
 Jacket 3.89 1.35 Rope 1.08 0.49 
 Jumper 3.79 1.28 Can opener 1.07 0.47 
 Magazine 3.71 1.33 Knife 1.05 0.44 
 M = 4.33, SD = .49 M = 1.32, SD = .45 
Note: N = 77 
Discussion 
Study 2(d) compared recall performance when a specific vs. generic future 
flight scenario within two months was used to rate/encode flying and camping 
words for salience to the scenario. Results showed that flying words were 
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better remembered by both groups. Flyers were more experienced than non-
flyers and experimental group membership was confirmed in that flyers were 
also more likely to have future plans set closer in time. However correlations 
showed no relationship between measures of past experience or future plans 
and recall for flying or camping word lists. The experimental word list was 
validated by receiving higher salience ratings than the camping word list and 
unlike study 2(c), there were no group differences in these ratings. An 
independent samples t-test showed that groups did not report any difference 
in the difficulty of carrying out the rating/encoding task.  
 
The study aimed to refine the design of study 2(c) by using a pen and paper 
design to improve the control exerted over the induction and rating/encoding 
phases. Although this control was afforded by the design, the study had very 
low power. Only 18 participants stated that they had plans to fly before 31 
May 2011. The means by which group membership was validated had relied 
on the assumption that participants would closely follow instructions. When 
preparing data for analyses, the dates of future flying plans given on the 
consent form and in the final questions of the experiment were used to assign 
participants to flyer and non flyer groups. During data collection, research 
assistants handed experimental induction instructions to participants who 
signalled that they had plans to fly before a certain date but no count was 
performed on how many participants self selected to receive this experimental 
induction. Thus it is possible that some participants may have been coded as 
flyers but in fact received non flyer instructions. Conversely, wording of the 
non flyer instructions was relatively ambiguous and did not eliminate the 
possibility that participants in this group may have chosen to think forward to 
the next occasion on which they would be flying during the rating/encoding 
phase. For example, 7 participants stated the next flight they would take 
would be on 1 June, one day beyond the cut off date of 31 May 2011.  
 
The design of the study had been modified so that control words related to a 
single scenario (camping). This extended any advantage of serial recall to 
both experimental and control word lists however results showed that flying 
words were still better remembered than camping words. Since participants 
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had given details of camping plans, it was possible to run  exploratory 
analyses to see if having the intention to go camping had any impact on 
recall. Participants were recoded into those who had named specific dates to 
go camping in the future (n = 18) and those who had no plans to go camping 
(n = 59). Again, the pattern of results did not change from the main results: 
flying words were better remembered than non-flying words (F(1,75) = 
195.98, p <.001) but there was no effect of camping plans on recall (F<1) and 
no interaction (F(1,75) = 1.81, p = .18). 
 
One general observation of Studies 2(c, d) that might have affected results 
was a lack of stringency in the measurement of English language proficiency, 
which may have varied as an artefact of experimental group selection (flying 
in a college holiday vs. no plans to fly). All participants indicated on consent 
forms that they were fluent English language speakers but this measure may 
have been insufficient to assess the impact of fluency on these data.  
 
A third experiment was designed to extend study 2(d) by replacing flying with 
the camping scenario and word lists employed by Klein et al. (2010). Any 
difficulties with using a future flight scenario would be eliminated. Additionally, 
this scenario and both experimental and control word lists had been validated 
by previous research. The study was conducted in late spring and early 
summer, when many people in the UK would be planning a camping trip 








The experiment was a mixed design with intention to camp within 2 months as 
the between groups factor with two levels (intention to camp in 2 months, no 
intention to camp in 2 months) and word list type the within participants factor 
(camping, control). The dependent variable was the number of words recalled 
from each list. 
 
Participants 
Participants were individuals with an active interest in camping or attending 
music festivals recruited through web forums and social networking web sites: 
DontStayIn (dontstayin.com), eFestivals (www.efestivals.co.uk), Facebook 
(www.facebook.com), Glastonbury Forum (www.glastonburyforum.com), 
Twitter (www.twitter.com), and UK Campsite (www.ukcampsite.com). 
 
Before exclusions, the full data set consisted of 296 complete responses. 
Campers (n = 208) had plans to camp at a weekend music festival within 60 
days. Non-campers (n = 88) indicated that they no existing plans to go 
camping but they did have plans to attend a day music festival (with no 
camping facility) in the next 60 days. Exclusions were made on the basis of 
failing to follow experimental instructions (e.g. choosing an experimental 
induction that did not match stated camping plans, recalling anagrams instead 
of words or duplicate entries from the same IP address), missing data on age 
or missing an identity code (so that data could not be matched to a consent 
form). Participants in the final analysis were 94 campers (41 males) and 56 
non-campers (11 males) aged 18–40 who were undergraduates or educated 
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to at least Bachelor degree level. Campers (M = 27.63) and non-campers (M 
= 26.11) did not differ in age, t(148) = -1.52, p = .13. 
 
Materials and procedure 
A consent form was designed on Survey Gizmo software 
(www.surveygizmo.com). The survey settings limited access to participants 
with IP addresses located within the United Kingdom. The main experiment 
was described as a planning study that would take 15–20 minutes to 
complete. Demographic questions on age, gender, English language fluency 
and educational attainment were presented. Educational attainment was 
denoted by choosing the highest qualification held from (GCSE or O-Levels), 
(A-Levels), (Trade & technical qualification), (Undergraduate), (Bachelor 
degree), (Masters degree), (PhD), (Law degree) or (Medical degree). Two 
questions related to future plans: first the date of any plans to go camping in 
the next six months was entered. This information was used as a baseline 
from which to check that participants had chosen the appropriate scenario 
induction (Route A or B). The same question was then repeated for flying 
plans, which served to inhibit further thoughts of camping by turning attention 
to a different type of scenario. The consent process ended with a reminder 
that the main experiment should be carried out in a quiet room with mobi le 
phone switched off and should take place when the participant was certain 
that they would not be disturbed for 15 minutes. After indicating consent, 
participants clicked on a link to proceed to the main experiment. 
 
The main experiment was designed on ASP.net software linked to a Microsoft 
Access Database. After entering the unique ID code to match the consent 
form, two options were presented on screen. Participants with no plans to go 
camping within 60 days selected Route A and saw instructions based on the 
future scenario instructions in the camping study conducted by Klein et al. 
(2010), adapted for screen presentation:  
Imagine that you are making plans to take a camping trip in the future. 
What items would you plan to take with you? You will be shown a 
sequence of words describing physical objects. I would like you to rate 
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how likely it is that you would take each of the objects on the list as you 
plan your camping trip. For some objects, it may be very likely that you 
take them. For others, it may be unlikely. It is up to you to decide. 
 
Participants who had existing plans to go camping in the next 60 days 
selected Route B and were referred to the next camping trip they would be 
taking with the instructions:  
I would like you to travel forward in time and imagine yourself getting 
ready for the next camping trip that you plan to take in the future. What 
items would you plan to take with you? You will be shown a sequence of 
words describing physical objects. I would like you to rate how likely it is 
that you would take each of the objects on the list as you plan your 
camping trip. For some objects, it may be very likely that you take them. 
For others, it may be unlikely. It is up to you to decide.  
 
In the rating/encoding phase 30 words were randomized for each participant 
and presented for rating one at a time. Stimuli were taken from Klein et al. 
(2010), with two items changed to UK English (drapes, couch). Half the words 
were camping-related: batteries, binoculars, bowls, bread, bug repellent, can 
opener, first-aid kit, flashlight, garbage bags, grill, knife, matches, rope, tent, 
water. Half the items were objects that might be found in a home: bookcase, 
curtains, desk, dresser, lawn mower, microwave, modem, painting, puppet, 
rug, sofa, stapler, television, treadmill, vacuum . For each item, the rating was 
made on a Likert scale from 1 (very unlikely) to 5 (very likely). A small clock 
face in the corner of the screen displayed a countdown from 30s. After each 
rating was made the next item appeared and the timer reset to 30s. 
Immediately after all 30 words had been rated, task difficulty was indicated on 
a Likert scale that ranged from 1 (very hard) to 5 (very easy).  The distraction 
phase was an anagram-solving task (taken from Studies 2c and d). 
Participants were told to solve as many anagrams they could in 3 minutes. 
Following the distraction task, participants saw instructions to recall as many 
items as could be remembered from the word-rating task (not the anagrams). 
Words were typed in, one per line, in any order. The recall phase was 
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constrained to 3 minutes, which was displayed on the screen in the form of 
small clock face showing the count down.  
 
The final screens of the study presented planning and experience questions. 
First participants typed in the date of the next occasion that they planned to 
go camping (or to any event involving sleeping in a tent), with a separate 
response option for those with no camping plans. Confidence that plans would 
not change was indicated on a 5-point scale: 1 (very unlikely to change), 5 
(very likely to change). Two questions probed past experience. Participants 
rated the number of camping trips made each year from 1 (none), 2 (1–2 
trips), 3 (3–6 trips), 4 (7–10 trips), to 5 (more than 10 trips). Finally 
participants were asked to estimate the date of the last time they went 





Participants were assigned to experimental groups on the basis of the 
experimental induction route that had been taken (Route A or B). Participants’ 
stated plans for camping (next trip date) were used to verify that the 
experimental induction route chosen by the participant matched camping 
plans at a distance of 2 months ahead. An independent samples t-test on the 
self-rated difficulty of carrying out the rating/encoding task indicated that there 
was no difference on this measure between campers (M = 4.77, SD = .54) 
and non campers (M = 4.82, SD = .43), t(148) = .66, p = .51.  
 
Stimuli Salience 
Mean ratings for the camping salience of words made during the 
rating/encoding task indicated that items on the control word list were seen as 
unlikely to be taken on a camping trip (M = 1.12, SD = .24, range 1–1.99). 
There was more variance among the experimental words (M = 3.64, SD = .85, 
range 1.95–4.95). In contrast with previous research (Klein et al., 2010), two 
items (grill, binoculars) received ratings below the midpoint. Binoculars was 
rated within the range of the non-camping word list. Means and standard 
deviations for camping and control word stimuli are presented in Table 4.10.  
 
A list type (camping vs. control) x condition (camping plans in 2 months, no 
camping plans in 2 months) mixed model ANOVA was conducted on list 
salience ratings. There was a main effect of list type with camping words (M = 
3.64, SD = .63) receiving higher ratings for camping scenario salience 
compared to control words (M = 1.13, SD = .19), F(1, 148) = 3146.48, p 
<.001. There was a main effect of condition (F(1, 148) = 38.07,  p <.001. This 
was qualified with an interaction between list type and condition (F(1,148) = 
5.62, p <.001) indicating that word list salience ratings differed between the 
two intention groups. Post hoc t-tests compared mean salience ratings for the 
two words lists between campers and non campers. Participants who had no 
plans to camp in 2 months rated camping words as more salient to a camping 
scenario (M = 4.02, SD = 1.94) compared to those participants who had plans 
to camp within months (M = 3.41, SD = .60), t(135.42) = 6.84, p <.001, 2-
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tailed. There was no difference in camping salience ratings for control words 
between campers (M = 1.11, SD = .15) and non campers (M = 1.15, SD = 
.23), t(148) = 1.42, p = .16. 
 
Table 4.10  
Study 2(e) Mean Salience for Items to a Camping Scenario  
List Camping  Control 
  M SD  M SD 
 Tent 4.95 0.36 Rug 1.99 1.39 
 Flashlight 4.81 0.57 Puppet 1.17 0.65 
 Water 4.34 1.21 Painting 1.13 0.55 
 Garbage bags 4.22 1.05 Modem 1.11 0.54 
 Batteries 4.11 1.08 Curtains 1.10 0.58 
 First-aid kit 4.00 1.09 Dresser 1.07 0.42 
 Knife 3.98 1.32 Sofa 1.07 0.30 
 Matches 3.71 1.38 Television 1.06 0.26 
 Bread 3.51 1.4 Microwave 1.05 0.33 
 Can opener 3.39 1.55 Desk 1.03 0.2 
 Bug repellent 3.33 1.33 Stapler 1.03 0.16 
 Bowls 3.13 1.51 Treadmill 1.03 0.24 
 Rope 2.64 1.25 Vacuum 1.03 0.27 
 Grill 2.50 1.45 Bookcase 1.01 0.08 
 Binoculars 1.93 1.17 Lawn mower 1 0 
 M = 3.64, SD = .85  M = 1.12, SD = .24 
Note: N = 150 
Recall 
A word type (camping vs. control) x condition (camping plans within 2 months, 
no camping plans within 2 months) mixed model ANOVA was conducted on 
recall. There was a main effect of list type showing that camping words were 
better remembered (M = 7.29, SD = 1.83) compared to control words (M = 
4.92, SD = 1.71), F(1,148) = 141.96, p <.001. There was no main effect of 
having plans to camp in 2 months on the number of words recalled between 
campers (M = 11.99, SD = 2.58) and non campers (M = 12.46, SD = 2.88), 
F(1, 148) = 1.98, p = .16 and no interaction (F<1, p = .84). Thus having the 
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intention to camp in 2 months had no impact on recall on the basis of these 
data. Figure 4.3 shows recall by word list type.  
 
 
Figure 4.3: Study 2(e) recall by word list type. 
 
Camping Experience and Future Plans   
Past experience was indexed by the annual frequency of experience and 
recency on the basis of the date that participants went camping. Future 
orientation to camping was indexed by the imminence of the next planned trip 
and confidence that plans would not change. The temporal distance of past 
experience (recency) and future (plans) for camping were calculated on the 
basis of the interval between the dates nominated by participants in each 
temporal direction and the date of testing (scale: 1 = up to 31 days; 2 = 1 
calendar month–2 calendar months; Ranges: past 1–133; future 1–5 months). 
Means, standard deviations and results of independent samples t-tests on 
group differences on variables of past experience and future plans for 
camping are presented in Table 4.11.  
Campers were more experienced and had been on a camping trip more 
recently compared to non campers. Only 4 non campers had future plans to 
camp (all more than 2 months ahead). Campers’ future plans validated group 
membership in that they were more imminent and campers were also more 
confident that these plans would not change. Thus campers and non campers 
clearly differed in the extent to which a future camping scenario (at any 

























In order to investigate whether past experience or future plans to camp were 
related to recall for camping words, Pearson product moment correlations 
were run on these variables. Results showed that participants who went on 
more camping trips per annum had been camping more recently and were 
more confident that future camping plans would not change. None of the 
experience or plans variables were correlated with recall. A Pearson 
correlation matrix is presented in Table 4.12. 
 
Table 4.11 
Study 2(e) Means and Statistics for Past Experience and Future Plans 
Variable  Campers   Non 
Campers 
  Statistic 
  n M (SD)  n M (SD)  t p 
Experience*  94 2.32  (.69)  56 1.32  (.47)  -9.55 .001 
Recency**  92 10.42  (7.59)  40 38.65  (38.83)  4.56 .001 
Plans**  94 1.36  (.80)  4 3.00  (.82)  4.0 .001 
Confidence  94 1.4  (.9)  56 2.48  (1.19)  5.86 .001 
* Scale: n trips per annum; **Scale: Time in months f rom the present 
 
Table 4.12 
Study 2(e) Correlations Between Camping Recall, Experience and Plans 
 Plans Confidence Experience  Recency 
Camping words  .1 .15 -.06 -.09 
Plans  .40* -.02 -.04 
Confidence     .30* .15 
Experience      -.52* 
*p < .01 (2-tailed)  
 
Discussion 
Two items on the camping words list were rated below the midpoint yet 
camping words were preferentially recalled by all participants, regardless of 
this lack of clear discrimination between experimental and control stimuli. 
Independent samples t-tests on past experience and future plans for camping 
 156 
revealed group differences on all four of these variables, showing that 
campers were both more experienced and also more likely to be holding 
current plans to go camping. Analyses of stimuli salience showed that 
camping words (but not control words) were seen as more camping related by 
non campers compared to campers.  
 
In addition to the lack of evidence for the experimental hypothesis, the results 
of study 2(e) also suggest that neither past experience nor future intention 
facilitated recall of camping words. Within this context, it is difficult to interpret 
how non campers rated experimental stimuli as stronger exemplars of 
camping-related items but there were no group differences in recall or self -
rated task difficulty. A recent review paper highlighted evidence from eight 
studies showing that semantic knowledge is sometimes employed to 
embellish episodically impoverished events (Devitt, Addis, Schacter, 2017). A 
related and tentative explanation for these results is that participants with no 
intention to go camping used semantic framing or contextualisation during the 
encoding task, which led to an encoding enhancement so that group 
differences in recall for scenario-related words were eliminated. Were this 
paradigm to be replicated, it would be interesting to examine the episodic and 
semantic contributions to the encoding scenario in more detail, perhaps by 
having participants write a description of the encoding scenario at the end of 
the task, which could be coded for episodic and semantic content. These 
comments notwithstanding, the third in this series of experiments replicated 
the finding that having the intention to carry out a specific activity in the future 





4.10 General Discussion Mnemonic Studies 
Previous research investigating the memorial advantage of survival 
processing showed that using a future planning scenario led to greater recall 
for a list of scenario-related portable physical objects compared to the same 
scenario used to encode items in past, atemporal or survival contexts (Klein et 
al., 2010). The scenario employed by Klein had been camping in the woods. A 
series of two pre-tests and three experiments were conducted to extend this 
advantage of future planning. The aim was to see whether having the 
intention to carry out an event and using that specific instance in the future to 
encode a list of portable physical objects could be shown to enhance recall for 
scenario related items. To choose a suitable scenario for encoding, results of 
study 1(b) were examined and a cinema scenario was identified as an event 
chosen with equal frequency as something intended and not intended to be 
carried out in the near future. Thus a cinema scenario was selected for use as 
a jumping off point for study 2. Pilot study 2(a) did not yield reliable 
experimental stimuli that were portable objects salient to a cinema scenario. 
Pilot study 2(b) was carried out to find stimuli suitable for an alternative 
scenario based on flying. This scenario, set at a distance of two months in the 
future, was used as the encoding scenario in study 2(c). Results showed that 
there was no difference between flyers and non-flyers in recall for scenario-
related stimuli, although flying words were better remembered by all 
participants, leading to the hypothesis that control words should also be 
schematically linked.  
 
Results of study 2(c) also showed that individuals who did not intend to fly in 
the near future rated flying words as more strongly associated with an 
imagined flight scenario compared to the experimental group, who rated the 
words in the context of a real flight anticipated on a named date in the near 
future but saw flying words as less salient to the scenario. This may have 
been an artefact of comparatively more effortful processing when a future 
scenario is imagined rather than intended. It could be that flyers were able to 
make faster or easier decisions on whether or not each item would be taken 
on board in hand luggage. If an item was not seen as something that would 
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be taken on the flight, it may have received a rating that was downgraded in 
line with personal intention, even though the item was still rated as more 
flight-related than control word items by both groups. It is possible that the 
more elaborated task of imagining a not-intended future event and then 
making judgements on which items were more or less relevant to that 
scenario led to deeper processing, cancelling out any benefit of self -reference 
in the experimental group during the encoding task. There was no difference 
in recall between flyers and non-flyers in study 2(c) and a second study was 
designed to bring the method closer to the study run by Klein et al., (2010).  
 
In study 2(d) a future flight was re-employed as the encoding scenario. 
Experimental words were related to a flying scenario. Control words were 
semantically related to a camping scenario. Since both lists related to different 
themes, this was anticipated to make both word lists more amenable to serial 
recall effects. The method was based more closely on Klein et al. (2010) in 
that data collection took place in a lecture theatre using pen and paper as 
opposed to computer based presentation and a question on task difficulty was 
posed in order to see if there were group difference in the perceived effort of 
encoding. Results showed that fewer flyers than had been anticipated were 
found in the sample so the study lacked power. There were no group 
differences in ratings of scenario-salience for either word list or for difficulty in 
carrying out the rating/encoding task. Experience and plans measures for 
flying and camping were used to run exploratory analyses. Results did not 
indicate that past experience or future plans facilitated recall . Flying-related 
words were preferentially recalled by all participants compared to control 
(camping) words. 
 
Both flying studies drew on populations where there may have been intention 
group differences in English language fluency. In order to eliminate this 
potential confound and test the hypothesis with more power, a third study in 
the series was designed. In study 2(e) camping replaced flying as the 
encoding scenario. The same pattern of results was found. Participants 
remembered camping words whether they had encoded the list in the context 
of a real (planned) or imagined future camping trip. Stimuli salience ratings 
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differed between groups. Participants who had no plans to camp rated the 
camping stimuli as more camping-related than the experimental group. 
Results from two of three experimental studies seem to indicate that not 
having the intention to carry out the action in the future led to higher salience 
ratings for experimental words. Plans and experience differentiated the 
groups: the experimental group held more imminent camping plans and were 
also more experienced campers.  
 
All participants preferentially recalled experimental word lists, whether these 
were flying related (study 2c, d) or camping related (study 2e). In all three 
experimental studies, scenario-related words were preferentially recalled 
whether or not they were encoded in the context of an intended future 
scenario and whether or not raters held a high degree of past experience 
and/or current plans for such scenarios. In two of the studies, participants 
rated scenario words as more salient to the scenario if they did not hold an 
intention to carry out that activity within two months. Had study 2(d) not lacked 
power, results may also have followed the same pattern. Although plans and 
experience did not appear to enhance recall, future research using this 
paradigm would do well to better control these variables. The results of these 
studies do not eliminate the possibility that the (less experienced) group with 
no specific future plans rated word salience in a manner that facilitated 
encoding and led to a memorial advantage at recall, in the opposite direction 
to the hypothesis, eliminating group differences.  
 
It is worth pointing out that the camping word list preferentially recalled in 
study 2(e) had been previously employed as the control word list in study 2(d), 
where fewer camping than flying words were recalled. This suggests that 
scenario-relatedness is what led to preferential recall, irrespective of 
specificity instructions (intended, not intended) and irrespective of word list. 
Specifically, mere relatedness to a single scenario did not lead to a memorial 
advantage (study 2d control words). It was the relatedness of the word list to 




The procedure by which participants accessed representations of specific 
events in the past and future in study 1(b) was more immersive than the 
procedure employed in study 2 experiments. For example, study 1(b) 
participants were tested individually, and were read extensive instructions that 
carefully qualified definitions of episodic prospection and memory. The 
simulation phase for each event was conducted with closed eyes and while 
wearing headphones to reduce intrusions and enhance engagement with the 
subjective experience of mental time travel. The simulation instructions in the 
studies reported in this chapter were considerably briefer and were far less 
detailed across the three studies, whether presented on screen in the 
laboratory or within a booklet handed out in a lecture theatre. It is possible 
that this less immersive induction may have led to less engagement with the 
anticipated scenario in participants with existing plans. An alternative 
hypothesis is that temporal distance was a factor. It could be that imagining 
an anticipated event two months in the future is too temporally distant to make 
specific relatedness to the encoding scenario salient to those with matching 
plans. Alternatively, participants with no pre-existing plans may have found 
that consideration of the word list caused them to devote more thought to 
planning, enhancing the elaboration during encoding and reducing any group 
differences. All of these hypothetical explanations for null results signpost a 
clear methodological limitation to this series of studies, which was the 
absence of a control condition. While any or all of these factors may help 
explain the lack of expected findings, it is not possible to draw definitive 
conclusions on these points since there was no past or atemporal comparison 
group. In addition, an emerging literature has suggested an interesting new 
direction for this research. 
 
Despite careful attention to the design, the series of experiments reported in 
this chapter may well have lacked power. The original research published by 
Klein and colleagues (2010) reported the finding that the future condition 
facilitated recall in comparison to past, survival and atemporal encoding 
conditions with a small to medium effect size (d = .43). A power analysis 
reported by other researchers who have also not replicated the Klein findings 
showed that 85 participants per condition would be needed to replicate this 
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effect (Dewhurst, Anderson, Grace and Howe, 2019, p.27). Not only does this 
suggest that all three experiments in study 2 lacked power but it further 
highlights the importance of including a control condition in the design of the 
study. Without a control condition to contrast with the future-oriented, salient 
and not-salient conditions, it was not possible to replicate the findings of Klein 
et al. (2010). Nor was it possible to eliminate the possibility that the memorial 
advantage of future thinking was at ceiling already (if it even exists).  
 
These results do not support the idea that salience is guiding retrieval 
however they do potentially feed into an emerging literature with two important 
features. Firstly, the facilitative effect of scenario-related stimuli in a future 
encoding condition vs. past, atemporal and survival has not been replicated in 
six studies that used a very similar design (Dewhurst, Anderson, Grace & van 
Esch, 2016; Dewhurst et al., 2019). This might suggest that any facilitation of 
salience to correct recall during future thinking would be highly elusive, if it 
exists at all. Secondly, the primary finding of these studies was that using 
future thinking (with or without a planning induction) to encode a scenario-
related word list led to more false memories in comparison with past and 
control encoding conditions (Dewhurst et al., 2016; 2019). This effect was 
elicited using the Deese/Roediger-McDermott (DRM) method (Deese, 1959; 
Roediger & McDermott, 1995) and was extended and replicated using the 
scenario-relatedness rating procedure (Klein et al., 2010). Results showed 
significantly more false memories in the future compared to past or control 
encoding conditions, whether tested by recognition memory or free recall. 
 
As discussed in the introduction, one adaptive function of mental time travel 
that has been suggested is the ability to draw on memory to engage in 
effective planning (Klein, Cosmides, Tooby & Chance, 2002; Klein, Robertson 
& Delton, 2011). There is also evidence that when future thinking is used for 
planning rather than simulation, it is more effective than thinking about the 
past for eliciting detailed plans (Cordonnier, Barnier & Sutton, 2016). 
Susceptibility to the generation of false memories in future contexts in 
response to critical lures has been explained to be a mechanism of 
associative activation (see Otgaar, Howe, Muris & Merckelbach, 2019 for a 
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recent summary). This association between future thinking and false 
memories provides evidence that more associative and creative processes 
are engaged when considering the future compared to the past (Dewhurst et 
al., 2016) and this may have adaptive benefits (Schacter, Guerin & St 
Jacques, 2011). Were the research in this chapter to be extended, it could be 
hypothesised that a veridical intention to carry out the activity used to encode 
the word list might enhance the vividness of the scene and lead to more 
associative thinking, with veridical plans enhancing susceptibility to lures. 
Alternatively, participants with no plans might be shown to be more 
susceptible to lures, since the generation of an entirely novel (not anticipated) 
scene might promote more associative processing than sampling an already-
anticipated scene. To extend the research presented in this chapter, it would 
be interesting to examine both false memory and accurate recall in future 
(intended), future (not intended), past and atemporal conditions. If correct 
recall did not differ between participants with and without plans, this would 
confirm the null hypothesis that there is no facilitative effect of personal 
salience, in line with the pattern of results suggested by studies 2(c, d, e). 
This design would also permit an attempt to replicate the findings of Klein et 
al. (2010), who showed that thinking about events in the future led to better 
recall compared to survival, past and atemporal conditions, although this was 
not replicated in other more recent research (Dewhurst et al., 2016; 2019).  
 
Returning to broader themes of the research in this thesis, one aim is to 
examine the evidence that truly intended plans have a corollary in observable 
behaviour. This could open avenues through which intended vs. not intended 
behaviour might be reliably detected by third parties. This is an active area of 
interest in psycho-legal research despite the lack of theoretical or evidential 
support from the wider field of cognitive psychology. Further consideration of 
what the null findings of study 2 add to this picture forms part of the Overall 
Discussion of the thesis presented in Chapter 8. 
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Chapter 5 – Experimental – Fast Forward (Study 3) 
 
5.1 General Introduction 
 
In study 1(b) events anticipated to take place in the next two weeks received 
higher ratings for autonoetic consciousness and sensory detail compared to 
events for which there was no pre-existing intention to carry out the activity. In 
Study 3, this apparent salience conferred by intention was contrasted at a 
greater temporal distance by investigating salient goals and current plans at a 
distance of two weeks and one year into the future. Within the remit of this 
thesis, intention in future thinking is examined. In doing so, evidence from 
areas of psychology that do not typically speak to each other is presented. An 
example of this comes in the form of recent forensic research in which goals 
have been suggested to provide a framework that might be used to 
distinguish statements that are based on true and false intent (Mac Giolla, 
Granhag & Ask, 2017).  
 
It has been suggested that elucidating the processes of goal pursuit might 
yield markers that could distinguish true from fictitious accounts of future 
activities (Mac Giolla, Granhag & Ask, 2017). Goals are defined as desired 
end states. Intentions in this model are defined as active goals that one is 
committed to carrying out. The proposed model posits that intention is a 
process by which latent goals become activated as a result of reasoning and 
commitment. The goal activation process is described as a multidirectional 
interplay between episodic future thoughts, spontaneous thoughts, planning, 
attention, memory and evaluative judgements. The suggestion is that truly-
intended activities differ from not-intended activities by the absence of active 
goal-related processing. The authors note that more research is needed to 
determine the extent to which intention can be directly mapped to having an 
active goal and that this is particularly problematic when studying the intention 
to deceive.  
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A true intention to carry out an activity might be thought of as an active goal. It 
is not clear how a not-intended scenario employed to deflect attention from 
true intention would fit the proposed architecture. If a deceiver is suitably 
motivated, he or she holds an active goal that the cover story must be 
believed. The authors have called for research comparing holding a true 
intention, a false intention and having no intention at all. The present study 
described in this chapter goes some way to answering this call by examining 
goal-related prospection for events that have been selected by participants on 
the basis that these scenarios vary on the basis of personal belief in future 
occurrence, whether are set in the near and distant future.  
 
Previous research outside of the psycho-legal context has examined the 
interplay of goals, planning, and episodic mental time travel and suggests that 
the phenomenological richness of prospection is related to distance from the 
present. According to construal theory, attributions about distant future 
behaviour (one year ahead) are based on relatively more abstract information 
but are made with more certainty compared to near future plans, which are 
anticipated to be more vulnerable to situational variance that will impact on 
performance (Nussbaum, Liberman, Trope, 2006). Typical events are seen as 
more likely to occur and atypical events less likely to occur at a distance of 
one year ahead (Henderson, Fujita, Trope & Liberman, 2006). As noted by 
Liberman, Trope, & Stephan (2007) this effect of distance is even 
demonstrated in some of the words people use to describe likely and unlikely 
events, for example, an unlikely event is sometimes referred to as a “remote 
possibility” and a likely event can be called a “near certain ty”. However 
temporal distance does not necessarily mean that specific events cannot be 
generated when set far away in time. Participants have been asked to write as 
many events as they can think of that will take place at a distance of one day 
and one year in the future. Results showed no effect of time on the number of 
events generated (n = 9) or self-ratings of how realistic these events were, 
which could be seen as analogous to belief in occurrence (Study 2, Liberman, 
Sagristano & Trope, 2002). 
 
Goal-related prospection has been shown to vary by distance so that event 
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clusters up to one month in the future are rated as less important and less 
goal-related compared to event clusters set 1–5 years ahead (D’Argembeau & 
Demblon, 2012). As noted by these authors, it is important for future research 
to identify the organizational principles other than personal goals that 
structure the temporal distance of prospective thoughts (p.166). When goal-
related events are temporally close, personal plans are the designs we 
construct to guide our attempts to reach a goal in a given environment 
(D’Argembeau, Renaud & Van der Linden, 2009; Kofsky, Scholnick & 
Friedman, 1993). Based on the literature reviewed in Chapters 1 and 2, 
vividness of prospection for a goal might be expected to drop as temporal 
distance increases. The present study sought to examine the extent to which 
goals vary on the basis of belief and temporal distance. Close cues were self -
chosen scenarios for which participants either did or did not hold curren t plans 
at a distance of two weeks in the future. The method for obtaining distant cues 
was taken from previous research which has examined the difference 
between own and other-generated goals (Lehner & D’Argembeau, 2016)  
 
Lehner & D’Argembeau  looked at goal-related future events vs. experimenter-
provided (goal neutral) events vs. atemporal events and found similar levels of 
detail and vividness but stronger autonoetic experience in own goal-related 
trials. Further, autonoetic experience was strongly predicted by the 
importance of imagined events for personal goals. Not only do goals tend to 
be seen as important but also more desirable. The desirability of events 
influences scene construction in episodic future thinking. Desirable events are 
easier to envisage, are more associated with life scripts, contain more internal 
details and are clearer in terms of sensory and spatial components (de Vito et 
al., 2015). The evidence that contextual information is a more important cue 
compared to the richness of accompanying perceptual information when 
people rate belief in their own memories is a long-established feature of 
memory characteristics (Johnson et al., 1988). However, contrasting the 
contextual and perceptual features of believed and not believed future even ts 
set close and distant in time may not have the same relationship to belief in 
occurrence of a memory. On this basis, it could be predicted that events set 
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one year ahead might differ on sensory and contextual variables compared to 
events set within the next two weeks. However de Vito et al. found that 
experimenter-generated contrasted with self-generated events led to highly 
similar proportions of events set one year ahead (26%) and on the same day 
(28%). All self-generated events were more self-relevant (although not more 
detailed).  
 
In the present study, cues were derived from participants’ current plans for 
events at a distance of two weeks and one year. The study set out to see if 
the salience of intended future events at a distance of two weeks found in 
study 1(b) could be replicated at a distance of one year into the future. Thus 
the phenomenology of salient and not-personally salient future events at two 
distances from the present was examined. The method for temporally close 
events was taken from study 1(b). The next step was to identify suitable 





5.2 Study 3(a)  
 
Introduction  
A suggested taxonomy of future thinking is that it is the means by which 
individuals can identify goals, make predictions, simulate options and create 
or adjust personal plans (Szpunar, Spreng & Schacter, 2014). The capacity to 
access a subjective sense of the self in the future allows the sampling of a 
range of scenarios in order to align planned behaviour with current goals 
(Baumeister, Vohs & Oettingen, 2016). The ability to generate such plans may 
be hampered by a tendency to overgeneral future thinking and in depressed 
individuals, a difficulty in accessing positive events in the future (Anderson & 
Evans, 2015; MacLeod & Byrne, 1996). Where such difficulties are not 
experienced, the remembering-imagining system enables us to live in the 
present moment with a heightened sense of vividness and accessibility for 
temporally-close events, particularly when these are allied to current goals 
(Conway, Loveday & Cole, 2016).  
 
Even at a distance of 2-5 years, whether cued directly or by involuntary 
means, thoughts that are related to current goals are more vivid, more 
emotionally intense, are seen as more important to one’s life story, have the 
capacity to improve current mood, and are also more rehearsed than thoughts 
that are not related to current concerns (Cole & Berntsen, 2016). MacLeod 
(2017) defines goals in this context as sitting in a hierarchy suggested by 
Emmons (1986). Specific behaviours, plans and goals are slave to higher-
level values and needs. Current concerns are synonymous with goals but 
these sit within a top down architecture that is effectively an operating system 
to align fine grain sized plans and behaviour with higher order values and 
needs. 
 
Autobiographical memory is the repository for the experienced past (Conway, 
2005; 2009). When thinking about the future, from an early age, expectancies 
about what the future holds tend to be arranged around significant anticipated 
milestones described as cultural life scripts (Rubin, Berntsen & Hutson, 2009; 
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Bohn & Berntsen, 2013). Key life events such as graduation, career, marriage 
and family will be nominated and rated as important and generally positive but 
are typically represented with a low level of detail. There is strong evidence 
that future goals impact on the vividness of mental time travel but the exact 
nature of the heightened subjectivity of thinking about events that are really 
believed to occur has been less examined and is less understood. 
 
When asked to access and describe personal goals, people call up a 
representation of the future that will be a synthesis of self-knowledge, event 
knowledge and expectancies. At the level of cognition, this has been 
hypothesised as prospection contextualised within a framework shaped by 
semantic and schematic knowledge (D’Argembeau, 2016). The autonoetic 
component that confers a sense of realness and belonging in this vision of the 
future is less well understood (D’Argembeau, 2016; Klein, 2013; 2016). 
Autonoesis has been suggested to be a meta-cognitive judgement not related 
to belief in occurrence when these self-ratings are made about events set in 
the past (Rubin et al., 2003). In their study, Rubin and colleagues examined 
the qualities of belief in occurrence on three strict criterion: would the 
participant be willing to testify in court that a memory was true (testify), would 
another witness with a different memory be able to sway that belief 
(persuade), and to what extent the participant rated the accuracy of their own 
memory (accuracy). While admirably precise, this type of psycho-legal meta 
judgement would be difficult to apply to future events. In the present study, all 
cues were plausible events but believed events were self-selected on the 
basis the participant believed they were going to occur. In the near future, 
they should already be in the person’s diary or calendar. Distant future 
believed events were events the person was already working towards and 
saw themselves carrying out in one year’s time. The type of events referred to 
as goals in psycho-legal research tend to set close in time and the use of the 
term goal seems to relate more to achievement of a task (Mac Giolla, 
Granhag & Ask, 2017). In episodic memory and future thinking research, 
goals are less detailed but more important events and fit into a hierarchy in 
which they are worked towards from the present in the form of realising 
related plans. In study 3, events were plausible and salient representations of 
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the self at two time points: two weeks and one year forward in time and these 
were self-rated in order to show how the perceptual and contextual 
characteristics of personal events varied on the basis of salience and 
temporal distance.  
 
Experimenter-derived goal cue categories confer the advantage of better 
control of stimuli, analyses and results but at the potential cost that 
methodologies may not tap into personal salience. For example, Knez (2017) 
investigated goal-related mental time travel with participants in their 20s who 
were grouped by developmental maturity (Arnett, 2000): conceptualised as 
emerging adulthood (M = 22, range 19–25) and entering adulthood (M = 28, 
range = 26–32). Both groups were asked to generate as many past and future 
personal goals as possible at a distance of 1 year and 5–10 years into the 
past and future. Goal cue categories were taken from previous research: 
home, work/education, money, social life, close relationships, health/fitness, 
and emotions/feelings (Rapp, 1998; Vincent, Boddana & MacLeod, 2004). 
Results indicated that health and fitness was the most important goal at a 
distance of one year into the past or future. At a distance of five years into the 
past, both age groups rated education as their most important goal but there 
were no differences between longer-term future goal categories when thinking 
5–10 years ahead.  
 
This lack of difference in longer-term goal orientation may have been an 
artefact of task difficulty, which was not explicitly measured in this study. 
Goals 1 year versus 5 years ahead were rated as more probable and easier 
to imagine and represent. Older compared to younger participants gave 
higher ratings for pre-experiencing future life goals, which was explained as 
evidence that individuals going through entering as opposed to emerging 
adulthood are more involved in mental monitoring of their personal future. It 
was suggested that this could be explained by group differences in maturation 
of frontal lobe structures, which are responsible for reasoning and planning 
(Dahl, 2004). These results might suggest that goals related to health and 
fitness are the most available to individuals in their 20s and memories for past 
educational attainment were the most available previous achievements but 
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the results say less about the constituent components of representations of 
salient and not salient goals. 
A pilot study was carried out to investigate items suitable for use as stimuli in 
the not salient, distant future condition in study 3. For study 3(b) a range of 
cue items were required that represented feasible but not currently salient 
personal goals. The pilot was designed to collect non-salient goal stimuli by 
two methods. The first method obtained a sample of self-generated personal 
goals from UK first year undergraduate students; the second method 
assessed whether a list of goals generated by US students in previous 
research was salient for students based in the United Kingdom (Gerlach, 




Twenty-six current or prospective undergraduate students were approached 
through personal contacts. Fourteen participants (3 males) aged 17-22 (M = 
19.2, SD = 1.7) completed the full study. Three were current undergraduates 
at UK universities and 11 planned to go to university within one year. None of 
the participants in the pilot study also took part in the main experiment. 
 
Materials and Procedure 
The study was presented on Survey Gizmo software 
(www.surveygizmo.com). After reading an information sheet about the study, 
participants indicated consent to participate by moving forward from the first 
page.  The next section required five personal goals to be nominated, defining 
goals as things that were personally important projects that you frequently 
think about, that you make plans for and work to achieve (Emmons, 1986; 
Little, 1983). Instructions were taken from previous research in which 
participants provided their own goal cues (Lehner & D’Argembeau, 2016). 
Personal goals could relate to any area of life including college or university; 
work; family; intimate relationships; material goods; and leisure activities but 
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should not be habitual activities, or significant milestones such as marriage or 
graduation.  After nominating each goal, participants gave four examples of 
steps by which the goal might be realised and four examples of events that 
might come about as a result of having attained that goal. An estimate for 
when each goal might be achieved was made in weeks/months. Personal 
importance and desirability of the goal were indicated on a Likert scale using 
a vertical slider (scale: 1 = low, 100 = high).  
 
The second part of the study was a rating task for goals taken from previous 
research. A list of 96 goals that had been generated by students in the United 
States was first edited for salience (Gerlach et al., 2014). Modifications 
included 11 items reworded to UK English; for example, keeping a journal was 
changed to keeping a diary. Seven items were excluded, as they were 
culturally specific to life in the United States, e.g. watching the New Year’s 
Eve balldrop in New York City and cooking a Thanksgiving turkey. Other 
exclusions included 11 items that were seasonally specific and thus not 
generalizable as cues for events set one year in the future from the planned 
time of testing (e.g. going apple picking) or represented a potential confound 
with temporally close cues to be used in the main experiment. For example, 
baking a cake (potential distant cue) was similar to cooking a new recipe 
(close cue). The remaining 78 goals were presented in four blocks of five. 
First each item was rated for personal salience (this is a goal for me). 
Instructions defined goals as events that you actively work towards and which 
are plausible (i.e. not impossible), based on where you are in your life right 
now and your existing plans. The same blocks were then re-presented for 
rating on ease of mental imagery (When I close my eyes it is easy for me to 
generate a mental image of myself doing this). Agreement in both cases was 
indicated on a five-point Likert scale (strongly disagree, slightly disagree, 
neither agree nor disagree, slightly agree, strongly agree). Finally, four 
demographic questions on age, gender, ethnicity, and level of educational 
attainment were presented, along with an opportunity for participants to leave 
contact details in order to enter a prize draw to win a £100 Amazon voucher. 
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Results and Discussion  
Own goals. A total of 64 goals were provided by 14 participants. Items were 
discarded where fewer than four steps to realise the goal or fewer than four 
events associated with having attained the goal had been provided. Further 
exclusions were made on the basis of temporal distance, where the 
attainment date lay outside the 12-18 months constraint for distant future cues 
in the main experiment. In four cases this was unspecified (e.g. a long time). 
The majority of goals exceeded 18 months, (n = 25, range: 22 months–70 
years). Others were too close, (n = 16, range: 2–10 months). The list of goals 
before exclusions is presented with goal attainment estimates, importance 
and desirability ratings in Appendix G. After exclusions, 12 items remained 
and are presented in Table 5.1 
 
Table 5.1  
Study 3(a) Personal Goals Expected Attainable in 12–18 Months with 
Importance and Desirability Ratings  
Description Impb Desc 
Have a successful relationship with my current partner 100 89 
Try to be happier and be less hard on myself  100 86 
Go travelling after I finish my Art Foundation Diploma  100 100 
Keep fit - get fitter 89 89 
Run a half marathon and get physically fitter 76 60 
Convert to being a vegan 88 85 
Gain enough confidence to perform at least once in front of an 
audience 
60 85 
Become more motivated about my degree course 89 70 
Make and sell more earrings  68 61 
Get a promotion within the next year 91 100 
Complete my law degree and get a good grade  81 87 
Be able to pay the bills and have savings 90 94 
 Note: b Personal importance; c Desirability; Scales: 1–100  
 
Other goals.  Mean ratings for goal salience and imageability were calculated 
from participants’ ratings. Items receiving mean scores below the mid point for 
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either measure were excluded. Goals receiving mean scores for salience and 
imageability above the mid point of the scale are presented in Table 5.2. 
 
Discussion 
Most of the own goals generated did not meet the constraints of attainment in 
12–18 months and the 4-step validation criteria for goal evidence and goal 
attainment. The final list comprised 12 items. Many of these items were 
desirable to the extent that it seemed unlikely they could be chosen as not-
current goals by a student population (e.g. getting fitter, going travelling, 
becoming more motivated or more successful in work or studies). The l ist did 
not constitute a sufficiently large pool to be suitable for use as a source for 
not-currently salient, one-year distant cue in study 3(b).  
 
In some ways, the opposite distinction was true of the goals taken from 
previous research. This list was long and contained many items that would be 
unlikely to be planned for at a distance of one year ahead (e.g. having a picnic 
in a park). Using this list could lead to variance in the extent to which cues 
were imageable and plausible when compared to own goals set one year 
ahead. The range of events was somewhat schematic, event-based and did 
not reflect the range of idiosyncratic and idealized items that had been 
nominated as own goals (e.g. be able to pay the bills and have savings, 
convert to being a vegan). To reiterate, the aim of study 3(a) was to find items 
that could populate a menu from which every participant could select a goal 
that was personally plausible and potentially vivid when thought about from a 
current vantage point to a distance of one year ahead but which was not 
currently salient as a personal goal. The goals that participants would 
generate for themselves in study 3(b) were anticipated to incorporate difficult-
to-capture elements that reflected the culture of this group of individuals at 
this university at this moment in time. An alternative means by which to 
generate plausible, not-current goals would be to identify typical current goals 
within the population from which the sample would be drawn. On this basis, 
goals generated by other participants in the same study was considered as a 
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means by which to generate suitable cues. This observation led to a re-
evaluation of the planned method for study 3(b). 
 
The decision was taken to reject both lists generated in study 3(a) on the 
basis that a more controlled method by which to control the plausibility and 
imageability of goals in study 3(b) would be to use real goals generated by 
other people taking part in the same study. Using this method would provide a 
range of goals that would not exclude the idiosyncratic (e.g. make and sell 
more earrings) nor more idealised items (e.g. get a promotion), without 
sacrificing plausibility. These were validated as current and plausible by the 
fact of their genesis as salient goals suggested by others in the same 
experiment. This allowed more direct comparison of salient and not-salient, 
one-year distant simulations.  Thus the decision was taken to use goals 
nominated by participants in the first phase of study 3(b) as a menu to be 
offered to other participants, from which they could choose items that were 
not-current goals for themselves. When presented with a list of possible cues, 
the first item to be rated as 1 or 2 in salience (not a goal for me) was used as 




Table 5.2.  
Study 3(a) Salience and Imageability of Goals Generated in Previous 
Research  
 Salience   Imageability 
Goals M  M 
Acing an upcoming exam 4.14  3.93 
Adopting a pet 4.07  3.86 
Applying for jobs after graduation 4.00  3.93 
Becoming a better swimmer 3.21  3.71 
Being at a friend's wedding 4.29  4.14 
Being present at a friend's important event 4.64  4.57 
Cleaning out your room 4.29  4.14 
Creating a blog 3.21  3.07 
Donating some blood 4.00  4.14 
Eating healthier food 4.71  4.43 
Finding a cosy flat 4.43  4.14 
Finding a great roommate 4.36  3.64 
Finding new music you like 4.29  4.07 
Getting an internship 3.50  3.57 
Going camping in the forest 4.29  4.57 
Going hiking in the mountains 4.29  4.29 
Going ice skating 3.00  3.36 
Going on a date 3.86  3.79 
Going on a family holiday 4.14  4.43 
Going on a road trip 3.93  4.43 
Going to an amusement park 3.21  3.57 
Growing a garden 3.79  3.57 
Having a better sleep cycle 4.71  3.79 
Having a bonfire 4.14  4.29 
Having a picnic in a park 3.93  4.50 
Helping a stranger 4.29  4.36 
Helping as a volunteer 4.00  3.50 
Improving your skin 4.00  3.57 
Improving your wardrobe 4.21  4.29 
Investing your money 3.79  3.29 
Joining a student club 3.64  3.43 
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Keeping a diary 3.64  3.79 
Keeping in touch with a relative 4.50  4.00 
Keeping up with the news 4.29  4.14 
Learning a musical instrument 4.00  3.64 
Learning how to paint 3.93  4.21 
Learning to do yoga 4.43  4.36 
Learning to perform CPR 3.64  3.57 
Losing a few pounds 3.14  3.64 
Making a photo album 3.57  4.14 
Making new friends 4.79  4.29 
Managing your money better 4.43  3.79 
Reading for pleasure 3.86  4.43 
Seeing a West End show 3.57  4.00 
Sorting out old clothes 4.14  4.64 
Throwing a surprise party 3.57  3.71 
Traveling to a foreign country 4.86  4.64 
Traveling to Paris 3.21  3.43 
Visiting a museum 4.14  4.64 
Visiting family in a different part of the country 4.36  4.14 
Visiting your secondary school teachers 3.14  3.43 
Voting in an election 4.50  4.71 
Walking/ running for charity 3.43  3.29 
Writing a short story 3.29  3.50 




5.3 Study 3(b)   
 Method 
Design  
The personal salience of future episodic thinking was investigated in a 2 (near 
future, distant future) x 2 (salient, not salient) within participants design. 
Stimuli were adapted from previous research (Study 1b; MacLeod & Conway, 
2007; Lehner & D’Argembeau, 2016). The experiment took place in two 
sessions. An online task required participants to nominate personal goals for 
themselves and others. These items were used to generate cues for the 
second phase of the study. One day to one week later, participants came to 
the laboratory where they simulated, described and recorded four future 
events: 2 temporally-close (salient, not salient) and 2 temporally-distant 
(salient, not salient). After each simulation, a questionnaire on the 
phenomenological qualities of the simulation was completed. Measures of 
ease of mental imagery and current mood were also taken.  
 
Participants 
The sample consisted of 34 undergraduate students (six males) with a mean 
age of 19.18 (SD = 1.91). Goal-related cues lead to more vivid mental time 
travel in younger compared to older participants (Lapp & Spaniol, 2017). To 
control age effects and to constrain the salience of distant cue stimuli, 
participation was limited to first year undergraduates at Royal Holloway, 
University of London. Testing was carried out over one month during the first 
semester of the academic year, thus future events set at a distance of one 
year would take place when the full cohort would expect to be entering their 
second year of study. Participation was in exchange for course credits. One 
participant reached the ceiling for credits halfway through testing and received 
payment of £10 in lieu. 
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All participants were fluent English speakers, 10 reported that they spoke a 
different language before the age of five years. Ethnicity was self-identified as 
Asian (14) or white (20). One participant did not follow instructions during the 
experiment and was excluded from all analyses (N = 33). One participant with 
missing data was excluded from analyses of mental time travel and overall 
autonoetic consciousness (n = 32). A second participant with missing data 
was excluded from analyses of simulation time (n = 32).  
 
Materials and equipment 
Temporally distant event stimuli. The procedure for generating temporally 
distant cue items was adapted from previous research (Lehner & 
D’Argembeau, 2016). A questionnaire was designed on Survey Gizmo 
software (www.surveygizmo.com). After viewing an information sheet and 
answering questions on age and gender, a set of instructions outlined the 
criteria for choosing five personal goals: 
 
In this study, we are interested in things that really matter to you and 
that you see yourself moving towards over the next year. We want you 
to write five of these down, in no particular order. Think of things that 
are important to you now and that you want in place by this time next 
year, rather than major life events that are further ahead such as 
graduation or getting married. We are interested in knowing about 
things that you really hope to make happen in the next year or so, no 
matter how important or trivial these could sound to other people. 
These goals can relate to any area of your life, not just your education 
but your hobbies, your family, your health, your relationship or anything 
else.  
 
For each item, participants provided a short description, elaborated on the 
next step towards achieving the goal, rated importance and desirability on 7-
point Likert scales: 1 (not at all), 7 (extremely) and provided an estimate of 
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when the goal might be achieved goal might be attained (6 months), (12 
months), (18 months), (other  - write in).  
 
Next, participants were asked to list five goals that other people who had also 
taken part in the task might nominate under the same criteria. Importance and 
desirability ratings for each hypothetical other person’s goal were made on 7-
point Likert scales. Estimates for the time when the goal might be attained (by 
the other person) were made. The final phase of the online questionnaire 
presented a short version of the VVIQ (Marks, 1973). 
  
The personal goal receiving the highest rating (at least ≥ 6) was used as the 
salient, distant cue in the main experiment. The other-person’s goal that 
received the lowest rating (at least ≤ 2) was selected for use as the not-
salient, distant cue in the main experiment. In cases where all the hypothetical 
other people’s goals were also personally important to the participant (ratings 
>3), an alternative procedure was followed. In the second phase of the 
experiment, a list of personal goals that had been nominated by other 
participants in the same experiment was presented to that individual. The first 
item to be rated as low in personal importance (≤ 2) was used as the cue in 
the not salient, distant condition. The list was randomised between 
participants and was replenished by new other people’s goals over the weeks 
of data collection. 
 
Temporally close event stimuli.  Cues where chosen from a list of events 
controlled for personal plausibility, frequency (in any two-week period) and 
ease of mental imagery among UK students aged 18-30 (Study 1A, Pilot 
Study 4). The list consisted of 10 items:  
Invite someone round and cook dinner for them; Attend a progress meeting at 
work/college; Meet a friend for coffee; Meet a friend in a pub or bar; Go to the 
cinema; Attend a specific club night or event; Go to a friend’s house to watch 
a film; Stay in with a friend/partner/family member and share pizza and a 
movie; Work out in a gym or at a fitness class; Try making a new recipe that 
you have never cooked before. 
 180 
Participants chose one event that they had existing plans to carry out in the 
next two weeks (salient, close); and one event that the participant had no 
existing plans to undertake in the next two weeks or for the foreseeable future 
(not-salient, close). For a more detailed description of the method, see the 
method section of study 1(b).  
 
Phenomenological Characteristics Questionnaire. This is a 24-item scale 
based on a measure used in recent research on prospection (Lehner & 
D’Argembeau, 2016, Study 1b). The scale was originally adapted from the 
Emotion Regulation Questionnaire (ERQ) (Gross & John, 2003), Memory 
Characteristics Questionnaire (Johnson, Foley, Suengas & Raye, 1988), 
Vividness of Visual Imagery Questionnaire (VVIQ) (Marks, 1973), and the 
Autobiographical Memory Questionnaire (Rubin, Schrauf & Greenberg, 2003). 
 
The characteristics of each scenario were rated on a Likert scale: 1 (low), 7 
(high). Two questions asked about clarity: one centred on the overall clarity of 
the representation, the second asked about the clarity of the location where 
the event would take place. Six questions probed the richness of the 
representation: visual details, sounds, smells, taste and/or touch and spatial 
arrangement of people and objects. Two questions centred on autonoetic 
experience: the sense of pre-experiencing the event and the degree to which 
a sense of mental time travel was experienced. Three questions related to 
more general properties of the event: prior experience of a similar event, 
familiarity of the location, and familiarity of people and objects. Five questions 
centred on self-narrative: personal importance, rehearsal (I have thought 
about this event before), emotional valence, the extent to which other specific 
events came to mind at the same time and personal plausibility, (this event 
could plausibly happen to me). Four questions served as manipulation 
checks: global plausibility of the event (could plausibly happen to anyone), 
desirability, task difficulty and the self-rated likelihood that the event would 
occur in the future. The full measure is reproduced in Appendix I. 
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PHQ-9 Depression Scale (2001). The Patient Health Questionnaire (PHQ-9) 
is a nine-item, self-report inventory of low mood (Kroenke, Spitzer and 
Williams, 2001). Depression severity is calculated by assigning scores of 0, 1, 
2, and 3, to four response categories (not at all, several days, more than half 
the days and nearly every day). Scores for the nine items are summed, giving 
a range from 0 to 27. Scores of 5, 10, 15, and 20 are cut offs for mild, 
moderate, moderately severe and severe depression, respectively (Kroenke & 
Spitzer, 2002).  
 
Vividness of Visual Imagery Questionnaire (VVIQ) (Marks, 1973; Zeman, 
Dewar & Della Salla, 2015). People who find it easier to see pictures in the 
mind’s eye also report more vivid experiences of prospection. Individual 
differences in the ability to generate visual imagery can lead to variation in 
spatial representation, emotional intensity and sense of mental time in 
memories and future thoughts (D’Argembeau & Van der Linden, 2006). 
Individual difference in mental imagery capacity may impact on the subjective 
experience of simulating intended and not-intended future events (Knieps et 
al., 2013). To investigate the ease with which mental imagery can be 
generated and its relationship to the phenomenology of prospection  to the 
close and distant future, participants were asked to complete a 16-item, self-
report measure of ease of mental imagery (Zeman, Dewar & Della Salla, 
2015). Mental imagery is generated and refined in response to four scenarios. 
For example:  
Visualise a rising sun and look carefully at the details of that mental 
picture; how clearly do you see that sun rising above the horizon in a 
hazy sky?  
Imagine the sky clearing and surrounding the sun with blueness, how 
vivid is that image?  
Clouds appear in your sky and a lightning storm erupts - how well can 
you see it?  
A rainbow appears in your sky, how clearly can you make it out?  
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Answers are made on a scale from 1 (as vivid as real life) to 5 (no image at 
all). Scores are summed giving a range from 1 to 80, with lower scores 
indicating more detailed mental imagery. The direction of the scoring 
procedure is consistent with the original VVIQ (Marks, 1973) but is the reverse 
of the scoring procedure for the VVIQ2 (Marks, 1995) and other research 
employing short forms of this measure, (D’Argembeau et al, 2006; Zeman et 
al, 2015).  
 
Simulation properties. Previous research has shown that closing eyes 
during memory retrieval increases the number of visual and auditory details 
recalled (Perfect et al., 2008). Thus participants were instructed to close their 
eyes and wore Sennheiser HD-201 headphones to reduce ambient noise 
during each simulation. Latencies to generate each scenario were measured 
using a Robic SC-606 stopwatch. Verbal descriptions of simulations were 
recorded on an Olympus WS-852 Digital Voice Recorder. Each participant 
generated four recordings, to which literal verbatim transcription was applied. 
A computer-based count was made of the number of words uttered and the 




The study was submitted and approved under the ethical procedure in place 
at Royal Holloway, University of London. Participants were invited to sign up 
via the University’s internal Experiment Management System. In the first 
phase, an invitation was sent to complete the online phase of the experiment. 
On completion, participants received two course credits and an invitation code 
by which they were able to book a slot to take part in the second phase of the 
study, one to seven days later (M = 4.53 days, SD = 1.56). 
 
The second phase of the experiment took place in a quiet office within the 
Department of Clinical Psychology at Royal Holloway, University of London. 
Detailed instructions were given and discussed to ensure that each participant 
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fully understood the term episodic future thinking and the difference between 
this and episodic memory: 
 
The scenario you generate should be something that has not 
happened to you before. We want it to be a unique imagined future 
event rather than a memory recast in the future. You can be creative, 
but you cannot be totally unrealistic, so you can’t tell me about going to 
the moon, for example. 
 
Practice trials were run for temporally distant and temporarily close future 
events cued by two sample events: attending a birthday party, lying on a 
sunny beach. When participants indicated that they understood the 
procedure, the experimental trials began. The following instructions were read 
to the participant at the beginning of each trial. 
 
I would like you to travel forward in time to simulate a specific occasion 
that comes to mind when you think about this cue and that will last over 
an hour and under one day, in the next two weeks/a year from now. 
Close your eyes and try to experience the event in your mind. Notice 
the setting, the way things happen, any people and objects present, 
any sensory details. Try to explore what it will be like to be there in as 
much detail as you can. Take as long as you need. When you have 
thoroughly explored the scenario and you are ready to stop, just open 
your eyes and say finished. 
 
Time to simulate was not constrained. Latencies were recorded in m/s using a 
stopwatch. Participants wore Sennheiser headphones during simulations to 
reduce any ambient noise. Immediately after each simulation, participants 
described the event in as much detail as possible (audio-recorded). When 
descriptions were short, participants were given one prompt  
Is there anything else you can tell me about the simulation? 
 
The experimental running order was randomised. After each verbal 
description of the event was recorded, participants completed a 
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Phenomenological Characteristics Questionnaire. When all four simulations, 
verbal descriptions and questionnaires had been completed each participant 
completed the PHQ-9 inventory. Participants were thanked, debriefed and 
allowed to leave. Total testing time was 60-75 minutes.  
 
5.4 Results 
Analyses were carried out using multilevel modelling using the nlme package 
in R (Pinheiro, Bates, DebRoy, Sarkar and R Core Team, 2017). In episodic 
memory and prospection research, data cannot be assumed to be 
independent. Multilevel modelling adds an extra error term, which constitutes 
the error between participants (Wright, 1998). To test the significant of main 
effects and interactions, one effect is added at a time and the models are 
compared. A significant change in model fit as measured by χ² indicates a 
significant effect. The R squared statistic gives an indication of effect size 
(Wright and London, 2009).  
 
The protocol for the experiment is presented in Appendix H. An overview of 
the variables with the accompanying questionnaire text for each question is 
presented in Appendix I. Means by experimental condition, standard 
deviations and interactions are presented in Table 5.3. A summary with the 
means for main effects and statistics for planned comparisons follows. 
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Table 5.3 
Study 3b: Descriptive & MLM Statistics for Phenomenological Measures by Salience and Distance 
 Two Weeks Future  One Year Future  Main effects & Interactions 
 Salient  Not Salient  Salient  Not salient  S vs. NS  C vs. D  Interact. 
Measures M (SD)  M (SD)  M (SD)  M (SD)  χ² R²  χ² R²  χ² 
Autonoetic 
Pre-experiencing 5.67 (1.27)  4.52 (1.48)  5.52 (1.54)  4.52 (1.54)  18.62*** .12  .08 0  .10 
Mental time travel 6.13 (.87)  3.19 (1.91)  5.72 (1.35)  3.22 (2.06)  72.65*** .42  .26  0  .70 
Autonoetic (M) 5.92 (.90)  3.82 (1.37)  5.66 (1.23)  3.83 (1.50)  61.06*** .37  .15 0  .55 
Phenomenological 
Clarity 5.97 (.98)  4.55 (1.39)  5.45 (1.39)  4.39 (1.78)  27.89*** .02  1.77 .01  .71 
Location  6.33 (1.14)  5.21 (1.75)  5.79 (1.41)  4.55 (1.94)  20.40*** .12  4.97* .03  .09 
Spatial  5.79 (1.41)  4.79 (1.71)  5.30 (1.31)  4.12 (1.93)  16.96*** .10  4.44* .03  .06 
Visual 6.03 (1.19)  5.61 (1.39)  5.85 (1.09)  5.64 (1.41)  4.01* .02  .22 0  .46 
Auditory 5.39 (1.68)  4.46 (1.86)  4.18 (2.21)  3.49 (1.89)  7.19** .04  13.16** .07  .19 
Olfactory 4.42 (1.97)  4.30 (1.91)  3.15 (2.06)  2.52 (1.82)  1.26 .01  22.93*** .14  .75 
Gustatory/tactile 4.12 (2.25)  3.33 (1.85)  3.33 (2.03)  2.88 (1.80)  4.93* .02  4.93* .10  .38 
Overall Sensory  5.44 (1.03)  4.61 (1.12)  4.72 (1.19)  3.94 (1.25)  20.31*** .11  14.41*** .08  .02 
Event properties                
Prior experience 5.36 (1.64)  3.36 (2.07)  3.76 (2.09)  2.09 (1.59)  29.08*** .18  16.90*** .11  .55 
Location familiar.  5.94 (1.58)  4.39 (2.56)  5.33 (1.98)  3.58 (2.39)  19.28*** .13  3.31 .02  .09 
People/Obj. fam. 5.79 (1.80)  4.27 (2.10)  5.18 (1.99)  4.09 (2.26)  15.06*** .09  1.29 .01  .44 
*p ≤ .05   **p ≤ .001     *** p ≤ .0001;    For all χ² statistics, df = 1, n = 132 except Autonoetic and Mental time travel, df = 1, n = 128. 
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 Table 5.3 
Study 3b: Descriptive & MLM Statistics for Phenomenological Measures by Salience and Distance  
 Two Weeks Future  One Year Future   Main effects & Interactions 
 Salient  Not Salient  Salient  Not Salient  S vs. NS  C vs. D  Interact. 
Measures M (SD)  M (SD)  M (SD)  M (SD)  χ² R²  χ² R²  χ² 
Self-Narrative 
Importance 4.61 (1.75)  2.00 (1.50)  6.30 (.95)  2.15 (1.70)  99.69*** .53  5.30* .04  9.91** 
Emo. Valence 5.79 (1.43)  3.76 (1.66)  5.58 (1.56)  3.85 (1.46)  43.43*** .28  .04 0  .35 
Cued Recall 4.64 (1.75)  3.33 (1.96)  3.88 (1.93)  2.79 (2.07)  15.95*** .09  4.46* .03  .14 
Life in General 3.09 (1.97)  2.30 (1.33)  3.91 (2.01)  2.46 (1.60)  17.89*** .09  3.11 .02  1.82 
Pers. Plausibility 6.42 (1.03)  3.91 (1.89)  6.00 (1.15)  3.18 (2.13)  71.02*** .40  2.51 .02  .35 
Content 
Simulation Time  
(Range: 7.60–263.03) 
67.24  72.15  80.56  75.11  .01 0  4.36* .01  1.82 
Word count  
(Range: 33–468) 
169.76  158.02  166.06  163.09  .88 0  .01 0  .31 




Manipulation checks.  Some of the variables were effectively checks for 
the manipulation of personal salience. Salient events were believed to be 
more likely to take place (M = 6, SD = 1.22) compared to non-salient 
events (M = 1.88, SD = 1.46). There was a significant interaction between 
salience and distance. Planned comparisons showed that when events 
were set in the next two weeks, salient events were rated as more likely to 
take place than not-salient events, χ²(1, N = 66) = 121.93, p < .0001, R² = 
.84. Not-salient events close in time did not differ in belief from not-salient 
distant events, χ²(1, N = 66) = .98, p = .32, R² = .01. At a distance of two 
weeks, salient events were judged more likely to take place compared to 
salient events one year in the future, χ²(1, N = 66) = 15.82, p < .0001, R² = 
.18. 
 
Events set closer in time were seen as more globally plausible (M = 5.76, 
SD = 1.23) compared to distant events (M = 5.20, SD = 1.77. There was 
no difference in global plausibility between salient (M = 5.70, SD = 1.46) 
and not-salient events (M = 5.26, SD = 1.60) and there was no interaction. 
By contrast, salient events were significantly more personally plausible, (M 
= 6.21, SD = 1.10) than non-salient events (M = 3.55, SD = 2.03. There 
was no difference in personal plausibility as a function of time: close 
events (M = 5.17, SD = 1.97) were no more personally plausible than 
distant events (M = 4.59, SD = 2.21). The contrast between global and 
personal plausibility suggests that events were not fantastical.  
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Figure 5.1. Study 3(b) autonoetic consciousness by salience and distance. 
 
An overall score for autonoetic consciousness was calculated from the 
means for mental time travel and feeling of experiencing (Lehner & 
D’Argembeau, 2016). The correlation between mental time travel and 
feeling of experiencing was moderate but significant, Pearson’s r(128) = 
.51, p ≤.001, 1-tailed. Figure 5.1 shows mean ratings for autonoetic 
consciousness during close and distant true and false trials. Salient events 
(M = 5.79, SD = 1.43) were associated with more autonoetic 
consciousness than not-salient events (M = 3.85, SD = 1.43. There was 
no effect of temporal distance and no interaction. This pattern of results 
was true for separate analyses of the two components of autonoetic 
consciousness: the feeling of really being there at the event and the sense 
of going into the future and finding the self at the time the event would 
happen. For both questions, there was a main effect of salience but no 






















Figure 5.2. Subjective vividness by salience and distance. 
 
A single index of overall subjective vividness was calculated from the 
mean of the variables clarity, visual, location, sounds, smells, taste/touch 
and spatial, (Cronbach’s Alpha = .83). Overall sensory ratings were higher 
for salient events (M = 5.08, SD = 1.16) than not-salient events (M = 4.27, 
SD = 1.22. Overall sensory ratings were also higher for events two weeks 
in the future (M = 5.02, SD = 1.14) than for events one year in the future 
(M = 4.33, SD = 1.27). There was no interaction.  
 
Following the analysis of the combined vividness score, individual 
vividness ratings were analysed separately. Salient events, relative to non-
salient events were rated higher for clarity, visual details, location, 
auditory, gustatory-tactile and spatial elements. Salient and non-salient 
events did not differ on olfactory ratings. Near and distant events did not 
differ on indices of event vividness, with the exceptions that near events 
showed a stronger sense of location and more olfactory elements than 
distant events. There were no significant interactions between salience 
and distance on any of the individual subjective vividness variables. 
 
Event Properties.  Salient events were associated with more familiar 
























experienced before. Close events were also more likely to have been 
experienced in the past.  There were no interactions between salience and 
distance on any of these variables.  
 
Self-narrative.  Salient events were significantly more positive in 
emotional valence, more important and personally plausible and were 
more connected to thoughts about life in general. Close events were less 
important than distant events. There was a significant interaction between 
time and salience in personal importance.  
 
Simulation properties.  Events close to the present took less time to 
simulate in milliseconds (M = 69.69, SD = 36.38) than distant events (M = 
77.84, SD = 47.48) but did not differ by salience. There was no difference 
in the number of words spoken in the description of each simulation , 
suggesting that the overall amount of detail given by participants did not 
vary by condition.  
 
Depression and Vividness of Mental Imagery.  Depression measured 
by the PHQ-9 was mild to moderate (range: 1-25, M = 7.73, SD = 5.29). 
Four scores were ≥ 15, signifying moderately severe or severe 
depression. Scores on the VVIQ (Marks, 1973) fell in the range of 15-60, 
(M = 37.52, SD = 9.45). PHQ9 and VVIQ scores were covaried with 





This study took the thesis away from the memory/future thinking contrast 
to examine the impact of belief in occurrence on goals and plans by 
contrasting these with plausible but not intended goals and plans. Results 
of sensory self-ratings indicated that salient events differed by intention 
but not by temporal distance in terms of clarity, visual details, location, and 
spatial elements. Close and distant events did not differ on indices of 
event vividness, except that near events showed a stronger sense of 
location and more olfactory elements than distant events. Salient events 
were associated with more familiarity in terms of locations, people and 
objects and were more likely to have been experienced before. Close 
events were also more related to past experience. Salient events were 
more positive in emotional valence, more important and personally 
plausible and more connected to thoughts about life in general. Close 
events were less important than distant events and were seen as more 
globally plausible than distant events whether or not they were truly 
anticipated. By contrast, salient events were more personally plausible 
than imagined events, whether at a distance of two weeks or one year. 
The contrast between global and personal plausibility suggests that all the 
events were credible, whether or not they chosen for the salient 
conditions. 
 
The results of this experiment are unexpected. The goal-relatedness of 
prospection means that successful goal-striving not only brings goal 
attainment closer but also shapes and maintains a subjective sense of self 
across time, enabling a coherent narrative that extends from what was 
important in the past to what will be important in the future (Conway, 2005; 
D’Argembeau, 2016; Demblon & D’Argembeau, 2017; Rathbone et al., 
2011). In particular, the literature has shown that there is a heightened 
salience for the just experienced and imminently anticipated, conceived as 
the remembering-imagining system (Conway et al., 2016). Within this 
framework, spontaneous future thoughts close to the present tend to 
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centre on specific personal planning whereas temporally distant thoughts 
are more related to cultural life scripts about what other people like us do 
across the lifespan (Berntsen & Bohn, 2009) or higher order goals such as 
autonomy, competence and relatedness (Ryan & Deci, 2000; 2017). Thus 
the finding that a salient personal goal at a distance of one year is 
subjectively experienced similarly to a personal plan within two weeks is 
somewhat at odds with recent literature in the field.  
 
Construal theory suggests that anticipation of behaviour set further away 
in time is less detailed but is accompanied by a greater sense of certainty 
compared to near future plans (Nussbaum et al., 2006). Examining study 4 
findings in light of construal theory, ratings of the event properties showed 
main effects of belief. Salient events were set in more familiar locations, 
were less novel and represented interactions with more familiar people 
and objects. There was also a main effect of temporal distance on novelty 
so that close events were less novel compared to distant events. This is 
not in line with previous findings that suggest atypical scenarios are less 
anticipated when events are set further ahead in time compared to close in 
time (Henderson et al., 2006). However study 4 does confirm earlier 
research showing that people can easily generate similar numbers of 
realistic personal events whether these are set close or distant in time 
(Liberman et al., 2002).  
 
Previous research has suggested that events set one month ahead are 
less-goal related compared to event clusters set 1–5 years ahead 
(D’Argembeau & Demblon, 2012). Results of study 3 showed that intention 
can be extended from two weeks to map onto personal goals at a distance 
of one year. The sense of autnoesis for intended future events was 
elevated in prospection for salient events in the short-term future and for 
salient events set one year ahead. This finding that salience led to similar 
levels of autonoesis at both time points may have been related to the 
instruction that goals should be personal plans that were already being 
 193 
moved towards in the current moment, a definition taken from literature 
emphasising the nature of personal striving (Emmons, 1986). Using this 
definition of a goal may have enhanced the orientation of prospection, 
making salient the connection between current plans and goals in the form 
of desired end states (Austin & Vancouver, 1996) at a distance of one year 
ahead.  
 
The results of study 3 could suggest that indexing belief in occurrence led 
participants to perceive a link between short-term plans and longer-term 
desired end states. This may cue experiential dimensions of mental time 
travel, lending vividness to the subjective experience of temporally-close 
plans and temporally-distant desired end states (Mac Giolla et al., 2017b). 
Results showed that in salient trials, imminent events were more believed 
to be going to occur than distant events. Given that people have more 
contextualising information available to judge the likelihood that things will 
happen in the next two weeks compared to next year, this variance in 
belief makes sense. However on the basis of previous literature, this 
difference in levels of belief in occurrence of salient events might also be 
expected to have impacted on the autonoetic component of mental time 
travel between close and distant salient future events, which was not 
found in these data. Previous research has identified that autonoesis is 
predicted by the importance of events for current goals (Lehner & 
D’Argembeau, 2016). Study 4 confirmed this finding in that personal 
importance correlated with the combined autonoesis variable r = .43, p = 
.01. Looking in detail, this pattern held in the salient close condition, r = 
.44, p = .01 and the salient distant condition, r = .35, p = .05. There was no 
correlation between personal importance and autonoesis in not-salient 
conditions, whether close or distant. This pattern of results confirms that 
goal relatedness had a similar impact on the subjective experience of 
these events, regardless of temporal distance. The impact of belief in 
occurrence on autonoesis in the studies of this thesis is discussed further 
in Chapter 8.3i and 8.3ii. 
 194 
 
The finding that belief in the occurrence of not-salient events did not 
create variance between close and distant events in the subjective 
phenomenological ratings is also an interesting result. It might have been 
expected that imagining a not-anticipated event close in time compared to 
more distantly in time would result in a stronger sense of autonoesis, but 
this was not the case. This might be a floor effect or it could be taken as 
evidence to suggest that in not-salient trials, participants were engaging in 
a mode of prospection that draws more on semantic than episodic 
knowledge to furnish the representation. Further investigation could be 
carried out by coding the content of transcripts for internal and external 
details to see whether these differ between close and distant, salient and 
not-salient events. This might be also be examined in an fMRI study to 
examine neural correlates of these processes. For example, recent 
research has found neural evidence of prospection that supports construal 
theory (Stillman, Lee, Deng, Unnava, Cunningham & Fujita, 2017). 
 
In the context that holding a veridical intention to carry out an activity can 
be thought of as holding a goal for a desired end-state, it has been 
suggested that research contrasting prospection for goals and non -goals 
could help to extend psycho-legal research into the detection of deception 
about future events (Mac Giolla et al., 2017). Study 4b has shown that the 
vividness of prospection is changed by the extent to which the event being 
sampled maps onto believed goals. In particular, non-goal prospection 
elicited lower levels of autonoesis, regardless of temporal distance. In 
terms of sensory phenomenology, non-goals attracted lower self-ratings 
for clarity and visual details compared to goal-related prospection. In terms 
of the properties of the scenarios, non-goals were associated with less 
familiar locations and less familiar people and objects. This could be 
relevant to scenarios in which events were not anticipated but also not 
directly lied about. However, in most applied settings, the judgement being 
made is concerned with discriminating a lie from a truthful account. It could 
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be argued that a liar also holds a desired end-state goal (to be believed), 
making the potential application of the current findings less clear. In study 
5 of this thesis, a deception paradigm is reported which may shed light on 
the extent to which the findings of the present study can be mapped onto a 
truth/lie design.  
 
Episodic future thinking has been suggested to be intimately related to the 
maintenance and support of goals (Cole & Berntsen, 2016; D’Argembeau, 
2016; Lapp & Spaniol, 2017; Lehner & D’Argembeau, 2016). Study 4 has 
supported this view by demonstrating the subjective differences between 
thinking about goal-related events and plausible but not goal-related 
events. To extend this research, it would be interesting to investigate how 
this varies in clinical and non-clinical depression. Depression may lead to 
difficulties in conceiving and maintaining links to a sense of the personal 
future (MacLeod & Byrne, 1996; MacLeod & O’Connor, 2018; Vincent et 
al, 2004). The regulation of current mood and its relationship to goal-
directed future thinking is an ongoing area of research that draws on 
multiple aspects of cognition (MacLeod, 2017; MacLeod & Conway, 2007; 
Seligman et al., 2013). One possible direction for the findings from this 
study would be to see if simulating future events cued by personal 
salience differs in depression. Including non-depressed controls would 
also provide an opportunity to examine whether the pattern of results 
found in study 3 can be replicated. Individuals who experience intrusive 
thoughts about the future and the vividness with which salient cues might 
engage processes of mental time travel could shed light on cognitive 
mechanisms in anxious, depressed and other patient groups.  
 
Another direction for this research might be to look retrospectively at 
personally important events set one year and two weeks in the past. 
Results of study 1d showed that transcripts of believed memories were 
rated by judges as more detailed than not believed events. Results of 
study 3 suggest a clear impact of personal salience on prospection but it 
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would be interesting to directly compare this to previous experience. In 
such a study, own vs. other peoples’ events migh t be used as believed/not 
believed event cues at both temporal distances to cue plausible but not-
salient goals and plans. Contrasting believed events at a distance of one 
year and two weeks in the past and future would allow direct comparison 
of variance between mechanisms of goal-directed mental time travel.  
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Chapter 6 Experimental Travelling in Time Too (Study 4) 
6.1 Introduction 
Interim summary 
Autonoetic consciousness is the subjective sense of p/re-living a memory 
or anticipated event as vividly as if it were occurring in the present moment 
(Tulving, 1985). Study 1(b) in this thesis showed that mentally sampling an 
activity anticipated to take place in the next two weeks, or that had been 
experienced in the preceding fortnight, was characterized by a greater 
sense of autonoetic consciousness than could be elicited by merely 
imagining a temporally-matched, equally-frequently experienced activity. 
Having the intention to do something and believing that it will occur in the 
future makes that event qualitatively different to something that can be 
imagined but is not intended or believed to be going to occur.  
 
Study 3 confirmed previous research that has shown that when set one 
year ahead, imagining an activity related to your personal goals is 
accompanied by a greater sense of autonoetic consciousness than 
visualising a similar event that does not have personal salience (Lehner & 
D’Argembeau, 2016). Study 3 demonstrated that events related to strong 
personal goals anticipated one year ahead are subjectively experienced 
as vividly as real plans set within two weeks, when measured by 
phenomenological self-ratings. These studies suggest a pattern of self-
ratings showing subjective differences in veridical intention. In study 4, the 
salience of events in the near future and recent past was explored through 
phenomenological ratings and also asking participants to make drawings 
of believed and imagined events. In doing so, an attempt was made to 
create stimuli that could be presented for rating by judges. In study 4(c), 
judges with shared experience to participants who had made the drawings 
(hereafter called senders) viewed and rated the drawings. Measures were 
taken from psycho-legal research in which drawings of true and lied-about 
events have been compared. Ratings were obtained to see if the personal 
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salience of future events differentiated imagined from believed 




One avenue for recent research in future thinking and memory has been 
the extent to which episodic memory processes specifically support spatial 
elements of mental representations when thinking about the future 
(Hassabis, Kumaran, Vann & Maguire, 2007; Hassabis & Maguire, 2009; 
Maguire & Hassabis, 2011; Maguire, Intraub & Mullally, 2016; Maguire & 
Mullally, 2013). Another view is that episodic future thinking is more 
broadly related to a conceptual sense of the self across time in which 
semantic knowledge forms a framework within which memory for lived 
experienced is flexibly recombined to generate representations of the self 
in the future (Eichenbaum & Cohen, 2014, Schacter, 2012, Schacter & 
Addis, 2007). A recent distinction within future thinking literature has been 
to consider differences in mental time travel for believed and fictitious 
events (D’Argembeau & Demblon, 2012; de Vito, Gamboz & Brandimonte, 
2012). The present study compares representations of the future drawings 
and phenomenological self-ratings for believed and fictitious events set in 
the recent past and near future. Interviews and self-ratings are frequently 
used to investigate mental time travel but such methods may miss spatial 
or conceptual aspects of autonoetic experience. Study 4 was based on the 
method from study 1(b) but in a novel application of the drawing method 
sometimes employed in deception detection research  (MacGiolla et al., 
2017), this study required participants to make sketches of the 
intended/experienced and imagined past and future scenarios. 
 
Drawings have made sporadic appearances as dependent variables in a 
range of contexts over the years. Reality monitoring theory was developed 
in line with differences in seen vs. imagined drawings (Johnson, Raye, 
Foley & Kim, 1982). Drawings have long been used in projective tests or 
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for exploratory studies. For example, Aaronson (1966) reports a series of 
experiments using hypnosis to induce belief that there was no past, no 
present or no future or that the past or future had been expanded. Some 
examples of drawings made in these hypnotic states are reproduced in 
Appendix K. As this example shows, drawings have a mixed history, with 
dubious benefit in projective tests but can be useful as a means to capture 
information that is difficult to articulate or when interviewing children 
(Imuta, Scarf, Pharo & Hayne, 2013). Encoding information that is 
depicted in drawings leads to superior recall in comparison to encoding by 
reading or visualising to-be-learned material and this effect can be 
replicated in mass testing, for example in university lecture halls 
(Wammes, Meade & Fernandes, 2016). Drawing can reduce mind 
wandering: doodling while on the phone leads to enhanced recall for 
spoken information (Andrade, 2009). Drawing while being interviewed has 
been shown to lead to more information from honest participants in 
interpreter-based interviews (Vrij et al., 2017) and more inconsistencies in 
liars (Leins, Fisher & Vrij, 2012). The use of drawings as dependent 
variables opens up the possibility of an objective measure of self -rated 
visual perspective, which is often examined in the context of mental time 
travel (McDermott et al., 2015; Rice & Rubin, 2011).  
 
A specific function of episodic future thinking is posited to be spatial 
navigation, (Schacter et al., 2017). The use of drawings in such research 
could be a novel way to capture differences between future thinking for 
scenes (e.g. a beach) vs. whole scenarios (e.g. a family meal) and for 
imagery ability, distinctions that has been highlighted in recent research 
(Sheldon & El Asmar, 2018). Asking participants to make drawings is 
quick, involves minimal contamination through interviewing style, 
overcomes variance in language fluency, can be used where language 
proficiency may be an issue and enables access to a participant’s 




Drawings have been used as a means to distinguish real from fictious 
events in psycho-legal research (MacGiolla, Granhag & Vernham, 2017). 
In these studies, the gap between experience and imagination is 
anticipated to uncover differences between drawings of real and lied-about 
destinations. Spatial layout, the presence or absence of incidental figures 
within the composition, the level of detail of sketches and of incidental 
figures (bystanders) within the sketches have been evaluated alongside 
more general appraisals of how plausible the image is, where plausibility is 
defined as being able to imagine the person in the drawing really standing 
there (Vrij et al., 2010; Vrij et al., 2012, Mac Giolla et al., 2017).  Vrij et al. 
(2012) found that real events were more likely to be drawn with bystanders 
present and from a visual perspective over the shoulder (as opposed to 
from above, like a map).  
 
The extent to which these findings generalise to future events has not 
been established. The extent to which these findings vary by belief that an 
event will occur in the recent past or future has not been investigated. In 
study 4, participants were asked to simulate events that varied by belief in 
occurrence (believed, fictitious) set two weeks around the present. Testing 
was carried out in small groups. Participants closed their eyes and wore 
earplugs while imagining each event. After each simulation, participants 
made drawings of the events they had simulated. These drawings were 
presented for rating by age-matched judges on the basis of plausibility, 
detail and visual perspective. Two new judges rated the drawings for 
bystanders. In the first part of the study, event cues were validated. 
  
 201 
6.2 Study 4(a) 
Introduction 
Study 4 was designed to investigate prospection and memory at a 
distance of two weeks around the present with a sample of sixth form 
pupils who were attending a University taster day. Participants were 16-18 
year olds. At the time of data collection, teenagers were obliged by law to 
attend school or training until the age of 18 (Department of Education, 
2013). As such, it was anticipated that the majority of study 4(b) 
participants would be living at home, where daily activities would be 
subject to age-specific constraints such as school commitments, parental 
consent, budgetary restriction and for many, not being of age to visit clubs 
and bars. Studies 1(a, b), and 4(a, b) were conducted with 18-30 year old 
students and staff at UK universities and stimuli. It seemed unlikely that 
the event stimuli used in these studies could be assumed to be salient to a 
younger cohort. A pilot study 4(a) was designed to generate a list of 10 
events to be used as stimuli in study 4(b).  
 
The aim of study 4(a) was to generate a range of events that would be 
personally plausible, similarly frequently experienced, and easy to picture 
in the mind’s eye for a 16-18 year old cohort. To be fit for purpose, items 
needed to constitute a range from which each participant could select both 
salient and not-salient events. Two events would be set in the past weeks 
immediately preceding testing. Two events would be set in the two weeks 
immediately following testing. Thus the event list needed to yield a range 
that would make it possible to select something genuinely experienced 
(past) and a second item truly anticipated (future). Two further items would 
be selected on the basis that while both were personally plausible, one 
had not been experienced in the previous two weeks and the other was 
not anticipated to take place in the next two weeks. Thus the most 
frequently experienced events for this cohort may not be suitable as these 
would not be options for the not-salient conditions. The aim was to identify 
a list of ten events that were controlled to be similarly frequently 
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experienced, personally plausible and easy to picture in the mind’s eye for 




Sixty five prospective university students aged 16–18 were recruited 
through personal contacts and via Facebook. After exclusions (see 
Results section), the final sample consisted of 33 native English speakers 
(22 females, one person selected gender as Other) with a mean age of 
aged 16.58 (SD = .79).  
 
Materials and procedure  
An online questionnaire was presented on Survey Gizmo software 
(www.surveygizmo.com). The study was presented in two parts. Phase 1 
was used to obtain plausibility, frequency and imageability ratings for 14 
events based on stimuli obtained in earlier pilot studies presented in this 
thesis: 1(a) and 4(a). Four additional items were generated through 
discussion with personal contacts, who were parents of 16-18 year olds. 
Phase 2 of the questionnaire asked for 5 examples of events that were 
frequently experienced in every day life by each participant. 
 
The first screen of the questionnaire was an information sheet explaining 
that the study was designed to gather information about everyday events 
that are relevant to 16–18 year olds in the UK. Survey settings prevented 
participants located outside the UK to proceed beyond the first page. 
 
After answering questions on age, gender, educational attainment and 
plans to go to university, 14 events were presented for rating. Instructions 
stated:  
You will now be presented with a series of everyday events. We 
want you to think about whether or not these are things you are 
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likely to do in any two-week period. Think about what you did in the 
previous two weeks and what you know you will be doing in the 
next two weeks to answer these questions. 
 
Responses were made on a Likert scale from 1 (Definitely disagree) to 7 
(Definitely agree). For each event, three questions were answered: It is 
plausible (not impossible) that I would do this in any two-week period, I 
frequently do this activity within any two-week period and, If I close my 
eyes I can easily generate a mental image of myself doing this. A reminder 
of the experimental instructions was presented after each block of six 
questions. 
 
Following the rating task, participants gave five examples of salient events 
from their own lives. Instructions stated:  
These should be things you have done over the last two weeks and 
things you plan to do in the next two weeks.  
Examples of appropriate events were given: Go to a tutor session, play a 
specific sport, band practice, play rehearsal, make a vlog post. 
 
6.3 Study 4(a) Results and Discussion  
Data were excluded where the questionnaire had been partially completed 
(N = 21) or information was missing in respect to age, intention to go to 
university, or speaking English as a first language (N = 11).  
 
Event rating. A global score each of the 14 events 
presented for rating in the first phase of the study was created from mean 
scores for plausibility, frequency and imageability for each item. Eight 
participants were missing data for at least one cell of the rating task. 
Excluding these participants would reduce the sample to 25, so means 
were based on samples ranging in size from 29-33. A table showing 
sample sizes, ratings for plausibility, frequency and ease of imagery, mean 
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scores and Cronbach’s Alphas is presented in Appendix L1.  
 
New events. The second phase of the questionnaire 
collected examples of new every day events. An overview of the events 
suggested by theme and suitability for use as salient and not salient cues 
is presented in Appendix L2. Several items matched events presented in 
Phase 1: Stay in with a friend/partner/family member and share pizza and 
a movie (5), Volunteer (4), Meal out (3), Meet friend for hot drink (3), 
Shopping (3), Cinema (2), New recipe (2), Friend's House film (1).  
After eliminating these items, 154 new events were sorted into event 
themes (study and practice; home and leisure; creative; specific; and 
fitness) and then considered on the basis of suitability for use as both 
salient and not salient past and future stimuli in study 4(b). Each item 
needed to be suitable for use in all four experimental trials. This made 
some events unsuitable. For example, the category receiving most 
nominations was study and practice, which consisted of school lessons, 
revision and exam practice (n = 42). The ubiquity of this exemplar would 
make it unlikely to be selected as a not-experienced or unanticipated 
event in the main experiment. Items collated under the category home and 
leisure included events that could be generated in response to cues 
already rated in Phase 1. For example socialising with friends/partner 
could be generated by several of the cues in Table 5.1. Items categorized 
as creative and specific were low in frequency (n mentions) and some 
were highly specific. For either of these reasons, such events would be 
unlikely to be generalizable as salient cues, e.g. maintain motorcycle. For 
both of these broader groups, further piloting would be required to 
establish validity for frequency, plausibility and ease of mental imagery. 
The decision was taken to reject items falling into these categories for use 
as cues in study 4(b). A third category emerged from the new events data 
that suggested that the exemplar that had been rated did not capture the 
interest in fitness within the cohort.  
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Participants mentioned physical exercise frequently in Phase 2. A range of 
events were nominated: rugby, swimming, football, dance, gym, running, 
badminton, basketball, circuits, exercise, fencing, netball, skating, tennis, 
trampolining and yoga were mentioned at least once. Many of these forms 
of sport or fitness were not captured by the phrasing of the item work out 
in a gym or at a fitness class that had been rated in the earlier phase of 
the study. The decision was taken to reword this event cue to a broader 
definition: do some fitness or exercise.  Thus the final list of event stimuli 
used in study 4(b) comprised nine items that received the highest global 
scores for frequency, plausibility and ease of imagery in Phase 1 and a 
fitness item rephrased as do some fitness or exercise. The list of stimuli 




Study 4(a) Event Scenario Ratings for Study 4(b) Stimuli 
  Rating  
Event n Plausible Frequent Image Global  
Stay in with a friend, partner 
or family member and share 
pizza and a movie  
31 5.81 4.68 6 5.5 .76 
Go on a shopping trip to buy 
a specific item (e.g. clothes, 
shoes, equipment) 
33 5.64 4.79 5.76 5.4 .88 
Meet up with a friend for 
coffee/ hot chocolate  
32 5.19 4.09 5.44 4.91 .89 
Friend’s house to watch a 
film 
33 5.3 3.85 5.33 4.83 .81 
Go to the cinema  33 4.94 3.39 5.27 4.53 .78 
Go out for a meal  33 4.79 3.45 5.3 4.51 .74 
Do some voluntary work 
(e.g. work experience, giving 
up time without being paid)  
32 4.53 3.34 4.97 4.28 .87 
Attend a party or some sort 
of celebration 
29 4.79 3.31 4.52 4.21 .85 
Make a new recipe that you 
have never cooked before 
32 4.28 3.38 4.78 4.15 .91 
Work out in a gym or at a 
fitness class * 
31 4.1 3.23 4.03 3.79 .87 
Note * 31 nominations for other types of  f itness were made in Phase 2. Thus this item 




6.4 Study 4 (b) 
 
Method 
Design and Participants 
Study 4 was a behavioural experiment in wh ich subjects were asked to 
imagine, describe and then draw four specific events: two set in the past, 
two set in the future, all at a distance of within two weeks. The study 
employed a 2 (intended/experienced, not intended/not experienced) by 2 
(past, future) within participants design. Participants were 90 sixth form 
students (11 males, 6 did not supply gender information) who were 
attending a taster day held in the Department of Psychology at Royal 
Holloway, University of London. The mean age was 16.94, SD = 1.37. All 
participants gave informed consent to take part in the study and the study 
received approval by the Ethics Committee at Royal Holloway, University 
of London. 
 
Materials and procedure 
Participants were attending one of two undergraduate taster days held in 
the Department of Psychology at Royal Holloway, University of London. A 
number of psychology studies were conducted over the course of each 
day and participation was open to school visitors as part of an opportunity 
to try out the university experience. Participants chose to sign up for a 
Travelling in Time Study, which was advertised in posters and leaflets 
given to those attending on the day. Data collection was carried out in one 
lecture theatre with multiple sessions over three dates. The number tested 
in each session varied, range: 3–30 participants. Stimuli were adapted 




Instructions were presented in PowerPoint software on a whiteboard. 
Alternate chairs were removed from desks so that participants were 
separated by the space of one empty seat. Each workspace was equipped 
with a consent form, an A4 sized booklet, black biro pen and a pair of 
Howard Leight Laser Lite Earplugs in sealed packaging. Two sets of 
booklets were created in order to counterbalance the temporal order in 
which events were presented (future first, past first).  
 
On entering the lecture theatre, instructions were given to switch off 
mobile telephones, work in silence but to raise a hand if help was required. 
The experiment began with slides clarifying the terms episodic memory, 
episodic future thinking, and the distinctions between episodic and 
semantic remembering and prospection. Further salience to the slides 
came from an example of episodic future thinking, which was given in the 
form of the question: 
Will you want to go clubbing on your 40th birthday?  
 
The example for semantic future thinking was:  
Will Egham have a Disneyland in 2050? 
  
After clarifying the episodic nature of recollection and prospection under 
investigation, participants were told that they should constrain events 
thought of in the experiment to a two-week time frame around the present 
moment. 
 
To ensure that only one event was selected for each experimental trial, an 
overview of the procedure for choosing events preceded the event 
selection process. The overview was depicted in a table displayed on the 
whiteboard, with the list of of ten possible event stimuli generated in study 
4(a) displayed in the first column. The second column displayed the four 
experimental conditions, which were described as: 
Past true (something that happened in the last two weeks) 
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Past made up (something that did not happen in the last two 
weeks) 
Future true (something in your diary to happen in the next two 
weeks) 
Future made up (something that will not happen to you in the next 
two weeks) 
 
Participants were told they would be asked to choose four events, one for 
each condition, on the basis that each event was clearly distinguishable as 
belonging exclusively to the category for which it had been selected. A 
suitable event would also be specific: i.e. a one time event that lasted (or 
would last) over one hour and under one day.  
 
After the overview of the task, participants were taken through the decision 
process again, one trial at a time, one screen per trial. For each of the 4 
event selection decisions, participants saw the same list at the top of the 
screen with the selection criteria pertaining to the condition displayed at 
the bottom of the screen. Instructions for the true past condition were: 
Choose an event from this list that is something you have done in 
the last two weeks. When you have chosen the event, write it in the 
box at the top of page 3 of your booklet then close the booklet.  
 
The invented past instructions were:  
Choose another event from this list but this one should be 
something you have NOT done in the last two weeks. Ideally for 
even longer. When you have chosen the event, write it in the box at 
the top of page 7 of your booklet. When you have chosen the event, 
write it in the box at the top of page 3... 
 
The true future instructions were: 
Choose a third event from the list: something you plan to do in the 
next two weeks. It should be in your calendar or diary or you have 
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already arranged this with someone. When you have chosen the 
event, write it in the box at the top of page 11… 
 
The invented future instructions were: 
Choose a different event from this list. This time it should be 
something that you have no plans to do in the next two weeks and 
ideally for even longer. When you have chosen the event, write it in 
the box at the top of page 15… 
 
Half of participants received these instructions with the future conditions 
presented first. After 4 events had been selected and written into the 
booklet on the corresponding pages, the experimental trials began. 
Participants were instructed to check the event stimulus at the start of 
each experimental trial. For example: 
Turn to page 3 in your booklet. Remind yourself which event 
stimulus you have chosen for the true past event (written in the box 
at the top of the page). Close your booklet again.  
 
Participants were reminded to listen carefully to the verbal instructions 
(which were shown on the whiteboard as well as read out loud), to be 
ready to insert earplugs and to commence the simulation phase on 
hearing the word go.  
 
For true and imagined past trials, instructions were: 
You are being asked to think about a past event. 
I would like you to travel back in time to remember or simulate a 
specific occasion that matches this description and lasted over an 
hour and under one day within the past two weeks.  
When I say “go” I want you to close your eyes and try to experience 
the event in your mind. Notice the setting, the way things happened, 
any people and objects present, any sensory details. Try to explore 
what it is like to be there in as much detail as you can. 
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The simulation instructions for true and imagined future events stated: 
You are being asked to think about a future event. I would like you 
to project yourself forward in time and imagine a specific occasion 
that matches this description and will last over an hour and under 
one day in the next two weeks.  
When I say “go” I want you to close your eyes and try to experience 
the event in your mind. Notice the setting, the way things happen, 
people and objects present, any sensory details. Try to explore 
what it feels like to be there in as much detail as you can.  
 
For all trials the instructions ended with the words: 
You have one minute. I will tell you when to stop. Now put the 
earplugs in, close your eyes, go!  
 
After one minute, participants were given verbal instructions to open their 
eyes, remove the earplugs and turn to a specific page in the booklet. For 
each trial a drawing was then made in response to the instructions: 
Using the black pen provided, please make a detailed drawing of 
the event that you imagined on page X of your booklet. You have 
three minutes. 
 
After 3 minutes had elapsed, participants were told to open a specific page 
in the booklet (the page number determined by the experimental condition). 
Written instructions directed participants to answer questions about the 
qualities of the simulation they had just carried out.  
Thinking about the simulation you just did about a recent [past] 
[future] event, please complete questions 1–8. 
 
The first question asked for a brief description of the content of the 
simulation in 2–3 sentences. Seven questions related to subjective 
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feelings and event features, which were rated on 7-point Likert scales from 
1 (not at all), to 7 (completely).  
 
Two questions related to the sense of autonoesis or mental time travel:  
While imagining the event, I feel as though I am really there 
experiencing it  
While imagining the event, I had the impression of going into the 
past and finding myself at the time that the event was occurring 
 
Two questions centred on location: 
My representation for the location where the event takes place is 
clear  
The relative spatial arrangement of people and objects in my 
representation for the event is clear 
 
One question centred on visual details:  
My representation for this event involves visual details 
 
One question related to event novelty, measured on a scale from 1 
(never), to 7 (very often): 
 I have already experienced the same or a similar event 
 
One question operated as a manipulation check and asked for ratings on 
belief in occurrence, which was indicated on a scale from 1 (100% 
fantasy) to 7 (100% real).  
 
For past events, the question was worded: 
The event that I simulated really took place in the past two weeks  
For future events the question was  
Right now, I believe that the event I simulated will really take place 
in the next two weeks 
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After each of the first three experimental trials, participants were presented 
with a one-minute distractor task. Two were anagram-solving puzzles, one 
was a backward counting task. Answers to the tasks were written into the 
booklet on specific pages for each trial. After all four trials had been 
completed; participants were thanked, debriefed and dismissed.  
 
6.5 Results 
Simulation descriptions were used to verify that event cue chosen for each 
trial was taken from the list of ten events presented as stimuli. Simulation 
descriptions were also used to check that drawing content appeared to 
match the stated cue. These checks showed that 6 participants had not 
followed experimental instructions. Three had not completed the 
phenomenological qualities for all four trials, one appeared to have 
transposed drawings between conditions and two had used self -chosen 
(non-experimental) cues for all 4 trials. Data from these participants were 
excluded from the final analyses, which were based on 84 participants. 
 
Data were analysed using linear and nonlinear mixed effects models 
(nlme) in R (Pinheiro, Bates, DebRoy, Sarkar & R Core Team, 2017). The 
method for the analyses is described in the results section of study 1(b) 
(Wright, 2008; Wright & London, 2009). Means, standard deviations, main 
effects and interactions are presented in Table 6.2.  
 
Manipulation check 
Participants rated the extent to which each event was believed likely to 
have occurred (past) or to be going to occur (future). This measure was 
effectively a manipulation check and showed that the events varied on the 
basis of belief that they had or would occur. Analyses revealed main 
effects of time and also of belief and these were qualified by an 
interaction. Post hoc analyses showed that believed past events were 
more believed to have occurred (M = 6.83, SD .64) than fictitious events 
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set in the past (M = 1.48, SD = 1.28), χ²(1, n = 84) = 350.01, p <  . 0001, 
R2 = .88. This pattern was also true for future events, believed (M = 5.96, 
SD = 1.17) vs. fictitious (M = 1.68, SD = 1.11), χ²(1, n = 84) = 255.81, p < . 
0001, R2 = .78. There was no difference between fictitious events set in 
the past or future (p = .27) but believed events in the past were more 
believed than believed events in the future, χ²(1, n = 84) = 36.27, p < . 
0001, R2 = .18. Fictitious events were rated as more novel compared to 
experienced and anticipated events. There was a main effect of temporal 
direction showing that future events were more novel than past, with no 
interaction between these main effects. 
 
Phenomenological measures 
Results of the phenomenological analyses showed significant main effects 
of belief on the phenomenology of simulations. Results of autonoetic 
analyses showed that believed events in the past and future were 
experienced with a greater sense of mental time travel and p/re-
experiencing. There were also a main effect of time on pre-experiencing 
and a small but significant interaction. Planned comparisons showed that 
the sense of p/re-experiencing fictitious past and future events was similar, 
χ²(1, n = 84) = .39, p = .53, R2 = .0 but believed past events (M = 5.12, SD 
= 1.64) resulted in a greater sense of re-experiencing compared to 
believed future events (M = 4.42, SD = 1.50), χ²(1, n = 84) = 11.61, p < . 
0007, R2 = .05. The impact of belief and temporal direction on the two 
measures of autonoesis can be seen in figures 6.1 and 6.2. Spatial and 
visual measures showed main effects of time and smaller effects of 
temporal direction. Believed events received higher ratings for location, 
spatial location of people and objects and visual detail compared to 
fictitious events and these were more pronounced for experienced 
compared to anticipated events.  
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Table 6.2  
Study 4(b) Descriptive and MLM Statistics for Phenomenological Characteristics of MTT as a Function of Belief and Time  
 Past  Future  Main effects and Interaction 
 Believed  Fictitious  Believed  Fictitious  B vs. F   F vs. P   Interact. 
Measure M (SD)  M (SD)  M (SD)  M (SD)  χ² R²  χ² R²  χ² 
Autonoetic 5.15 (1.59)  3.52 (1.48)  4.66 (1.25)  3.49 (1.66)  85.55*** .18  2.63 0  2.80 
P/Re-experiencing 5.21 (1.64)  3.70 (1.53)  4.42 (1.5)  3.57 (1.76)  50.70*** .11  6.31** .01  3.72* 
Mental time travel 5.18 (1.74)  3.35 (1.73)  4.89 (1.44)  3.41 (1.79)  90.37*** .2    .35 0  1.18 
Location  6.06 (1.19)  4.89 (1.76)  5.35 (1.72)  4.79 (1.88)  24.99*** .06  5.45* .01  3.35 
Spatial people/objects 5.45 (1.38)  4.51 (1.96)  4.82 (1.79)  4.26 (1.92)  18.33*** .04  6.17** .02  1.26 
Visual detail 5.86 (1.18)  4.89 (1.65)  5.58 (1.48)  4.57 (1.85)  49.31*** .09  4.1* .01  .03 
Event Novelty 5.89 (1.55)  4.31 (1.96)  5.58 (1.45)  3.63 (2.01)  81.28*** .2  5.49* .02  1.08 
Likelihood (belief) 6.83 (.64)  1.49 (1.29)  5.96 (1.17)  1.68 (1.11)  581.69** .82  1.38 0   19.93*** 




Figure 6.1. P/re-experiencing by time and salience 
 
 
Figure 6.2. Mental time travel by time and salience 
 
Discussion 
Results indicated that the manipulation was successful. Fictitious events 
were validated as significantly more novel and less believed to have 
occurred or to be going to occur. Phenomenological measures indicated 
that participants subjectively experienced their simulations of events with a 
stronger sense of visual and spatial components as indexed by self -




















































6.6 Study 4(c) 
 
Introduction 
A study was designed to look at the content of drawings from study 4(b) 
and obtain judgements for variables taken from previous research in the 
detection of deception in drawing and sketches: plausibility, detail, visual 
perspective, presence of bystanders, detail of bystanders (Mac Giolla et 
al., 2017; Vrij et al., 2012). Examples of drawings that were examined can 




Plausibility, detail and visual perspective judgements were carried out by 
two A Level Psychology students. Both were females aged 17 who 
attended different schools in London and were not known to each other. 
This meant that the judges were of similar age to drawings senders. 
Participants were tested individually and did not meet in the course of 
carrying out the rating task. Bystander coding was carried out by two 
female undergraduates aged 18 and 20, who were studying psychology at 
different UK universities and were recruited through personal contacts. It 
was anticipated that some experience of psychological research methods 
would be useful should the task require agreement through discussion.  All 
judges and coders were blind to the experimental design and hypotheses 
of both studies 4(b) and 4(c).  
 
Materials and procedure 
Five sets of drawings made by participants who had failed to follow the 
experimental procedure in study 4(b) were excluded from all ratings task. 
Plausibility, detail, visual perspective, bystander presence and detail 
ratings were carried out on 340 drawings.  
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Plausibility, Detail and Visual perspective.  Two questionnaires were 
created on Qualtrics software. In order to limit fatigue or other extraneous 
effect of making numerous consecutive judgements, judges rated the 
sketches in two sessions held one week apart. The first questionnaire 
contained 168 jpegs of drawings from study 4(b), the second 
questionnaire contained the remaining 172 jpegs of drawings from study 
4(b). The design and instructional text were identical in both 
questionnaires but the order in which the stimuli were presented for each 
participant was randomised. Participants were tested individually in a quiet 
room, working on a Macbook Air 11” laptop. Time to view was not 
constrained but both participants completed the rating task for each 
questionnaire in 90 minutes. 
 
Both questionnaires were accessed through pages in which a unique 
password was submitted. A numeric identity code, age and gender 
information were entered on the first screen. The next screen presented 
general instructions for the rating task, which stated: 
You are going to be shown a series of drawings where the sender 
(the person who made the drawing) has sketched a scene of him or 
herself that matches the caption above each drawing.  
 
Please look carefully at each drawing and then answer the 
questions that follow it.  
 
You must answer each question in order to proceed through the 
questionnaire. You will not be able to go back and change your 
answers to previous questions.  
 
Each page of the survey was titled with an event caption: the cue chosen 
by the person who had made the drawing who had made the drawing in 
the main experiment study 4(b). Drawing creators will be referred to as 
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senders hereafter. Drawings were presented so that the proportion of 
drawing to blank page was clear. The page could be scrolled or enlarged 
as required. Judgements were indicated directly below each drawing. Two 
questions were presented in a matrix table: How detailed is the drawing? 
and Plausibility: I can imagine the sender being in this place. Responses 
to each question were made on a Likert scale from 1 (not at all) to 7 
(completely). The third question text was framed as a binary choice: 
Viewpoint: the picture is drawn as if I am looking at the scene… 
Participants responded by selecting: over the shoulder or from above. 
 
Bystander Rating.   Two questionnaires were created in Qualtrics 
software. The presentation of drawings followed the method that was used 
to obtain plausibility, detail and visual perspective ratings, described in the 
previous section. After each caption and drawing, judges recorded the 
number of people other than the drawing sender that could be seen in the 
picture. A slider was used to indicate the level of detail in which any 
bystanders were depicted on a Likert scale from 1 (low) to 7 (high). Since 
the instructions in study 4(b) had been to draw autobiographical events, 
real or imagined, set in the past or future, a single figure in each drawing 
was assumed to depict the sender. Drawings containing more than one 
figure were coded as bystanders present. Figures within television or 
cinema screens or in paintings on a wall were not counted as bystanders. 
Animals were not counted as bystanders. Where bystanders were present, 
the level of detail in which bystander figures were drawn was rated on a 
Likert scale from 1 (very low) to 7 (very high).  
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6.7 Results and Discussion   
Plausibility, detail and viewpoint 
Judges’ ratings for plausibility, detail and viewpoint were examined for 
reliability. Intra-class correlation between the judges did not reach 
acceptable levels for plausibility (r = .54.) or the level of detail in each 
drawing (r = .58). Correlations within and between raters are presented in 
Table X. The strongest correlation found was between Rater 2 detail and 
Rater 2 plausibility, r =.78, suggesting that there may have been some 
overlap in these judgements.  
 
Table 6.3 
Study 4(c) Correlations Between Plausibility and Detail  








.42** .78** .45** 
Rater 2 
Plausibility 
_ .35** .62** 
Rater 1 
Detail 
 _ .42** 
** Correlation is signif icant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
 
Data were categorical and Cohen’s Kappa was used to assess inter-rater 
reliability for visual perspective (over the shoulder, from above). Judges’ 
agreement was not sufficient for further analyses (Kappa = 0.61). Since 
none of these variables proved to be sufficiently reliable, no further 
analyses on plausibility, detail or visual perspective between drawings of 
past and future, salient and not salient events were carried out. 
Bystander Ratings 
Raters initially agreed on the presence or absence of bystanders in all but 
12 drawings. After further discussion, complete agreement was reached. 
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Bystanders were present in 253 drawings and absent from 87 drawings. 
Table 6.4 shows the frequency with which bystanders were absent or 
present by study 2(b) experimental conditions (time, belief in occurrence). 
Chi-square tests of independence there were no differences in the number 
of bystanders depicted in drawings by belief, whether these were set in the 
past, χ²(1) = 1.79, p = .18  or the future, χ²(1) = 2.60, p = .11. The intra 
class correlation coefficient for bystander detail was .54. Since judges’ 
agreement was only moderate, no further analyses were carried out on the 
level of detail in which bystanders had been depicted. 
 
Table 6.4 
Study 4(c) Bystanders by Condition 
 Bystander Absent  Bystander Present 
 Past Future Total  Past Future Total 
Believed 23 26 49  62 59 121 






Study 4(c) was conducted to obtain ratings on 340 drawings depicting 
believed and imagined events from the recent past and near future. Self -
ratings made by drawing senders in study 4(b) indicated that the location, 
spatial layout of people and objects and visual detail of believed events 
had been subjectively experienced as more vivid compared to fictitious 
events. These self-ratings were higher for past compared to future events 
but believed and fictitious events had the largest effect. In study 4(c) two 
judges assessed the drawings for plausibility, detail and the visual 
perspective from which the events were drawn. The number of bystanders 
and the level of detail in which bystanders were depicted. In contrast to 
previous research showing fewer bystanders in not-experienced (and 
deliberately deceptive) sketches, there was no difference in the number of 
bystanders in experienced or anticipated compared to fictitious drawings  
(Vrij, Leal et al, 2010).  
 
As regards the first set of ratings, the poor reliability of age-matched 
judges’ ratings for the plausibility of the drawings (.54), the level of detail in 
which they were drawn (.58) and the visual perspective (.61) prevented 
further analyses of the extent to which these ratings varied by temporal 
direction and belief in occurrence. Judges were not trained in what might 
constitute plausibility but responded to a question posed in previous 
research which was I can image the sender being in this place (Vrij, Leal 
et al., 2010). Training and feedback on this measure would be difficult to 
achieve without inadvertently leading judges to rate an ill -defined 
construct. An exploratory study with multiple age-matched raters would be 
an interesting avenue for further research. Calderon et al. (2018) recently 
reported a study in which 117 raters were recruited via Amazon’s 
Mechanical Turk. Raters received training as part of the study then viewed 
and rated 57 drawings by answering a single question about the construal 
level of the scenes depicted. Reliability was excellent (r = .94). As an 
 223 
exploratory study, this method might be used to collect further ratings from 
an age-matched sample to see if a larger data set leads to a clearer 
pattern of agreement on what constitutes plausibility in these drawings. It 
is worth noting that reliability of the plausibility measure in the study 
reported by Vrij, Leal et al. (2010, p. 590) was .48. The authors support 
the use of the scale by stating that reliability scores of .4–.6 are not 
unusual when lie detection coding is conducted on verbal data.  
 
The reliability of raters’ assessments of detail was similarly low, which was 
more surprising given that the level of detail in which drawings are made is 
a less abstract, more concrete judgement that has been reported to have 
good reliability in previous research (Vrij, Leal et al., 2010; Vrij et al., 
2012). Similarly, the question of viewpoint (over the shoulder, from above) 
was not agreed on in these drawings. This may be related to the events 
being depicted. In previous research in which these judgements have 
been made, drawings were of mock crime scenes. For example, Vrij, Leal 
and colleagues gave an instruction to draw the scene where participants 
had earlier received a package from another agent (2010). The authors’ 
state that drawing senders only have two options for visual perspective: 
over the shoulder or from above. Recent research on visual perspective of 
simulating scenarios – seeing in the mind’s eye – suggest that multiple 
perspectives emerge when a range of events are presented (McDermott et 
al., 2016; Rice & Rubin, 2011).   
 
The level of detail in which bystanders were depicted in drawings was 
assessed by two new judges. These ratings also showed low reliability 
and were not analysed further. The number of bystanders in drawings did 
not differ. One limitation of this measure is highlighted by comments made 
by judges on the instructions they received, which explained how the 
sender should be identified within each image but gave judges less 
guidance on how to restrict detail ratings exclusively to bystanders. After 
rating the drawings, judges comments suggest that both raters included 
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sender figures in the overall bystander rating, at least some of the time. 
Judge 1 explained the processes used to identify and exclude the sender 
in the rating task. On the basis of Judge 2’s comments this rater may have 
included the sender figure in most ratings.   
 
Judge 1: Sometimes it was obvious who the sender and who the 
bystanders were. For example, some included labels saying who 
each person was and others had the sender completing the specific 
action (so the others I presumed were bystanders). In this case I 
only rated who I thought were bystanders for detail. In other 
pictures it was not so clear who was the sender and who were the 
bystanders (for example they were all doing the same action). In 
this case I just took into account every person in the drawing in the 
detail rating. 
 
Judge 2: I usually thought the person with the most detail, the 
biggest figure or the figure at the centre of the page was the 
sender. The figure with the most detail I viewed as the most 
important, then the size of the figures next and the last thing that 
helped me was the positioning of them on the page. I did try to 
include all the figures when making a detail rating, if there were two 
main detailed figures and others that were not detailed then this 
would even out as a 4 rating. 
 
The two judges came to agreement so that this finding is most likely 
reliable, however these comments highlight the importance of training and 
feedback between judges when rating made on the content of other 
people’s drawings. These comments show that reliable ratings are not 
easily obtained and highlight possible limitations of their application. In 
deception detection contexts, such methods cannot yet be said to be 
reliable indicators of experience or anticipation.  
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Chapter 7  
Study 5(a, b) On a Mission 
 
7.1 General Introduction 
The two studies in this chapter form a departure from the research 
presented in the rest of the thesis. In studies 1–4, future intention has 
been examined at a distance of two weeks, two months, and one year. In 
the experimental studies reported in Chapter 7, the future event that 
participants planned to undertake was considerably more imminent. The 
event was due to take place one hour ahead. In contrast to the previous 
experiments in this thesis, intention in study 5 was not veridical. In studies 
1–4, experimental participants had a pre-existing belief that an event in the 
future was going to occur or was not likely to occur. In study 5(a) 
participants were randomly assigned to one of two conditions and given 
instructions to plan an activity that would be carried out within the hour. 
These instructions were intended to manipulate intention to carry out a 
future act. One group openly disclosed these plans while the other 
deliberately concealed their intentions from the experimenter. In contrast 
to studies 1–4, which examined true intention vs. no intention, the 
comparison in study 5 was true intention vs. fictitious intention. By 
examining the extent to which measures known to vary in episodic future 
thinking differ between these groups, a contribution is also made to 
understanding how future thinking varies on the basis of belief in 
occurrence. The experimental group in study 5 did not believe that critical 
aspects of the event they were describing would really occur. 
 
Study 5(a) extends recent psycho-legal research, which has investigated 
plans for truly-intended vs. not-intended future events using a mock crime, 
design known as the Gothenburg method (Granhag & Knieps, 2011). In 
study 5(a), participants described their plans in forward and reverse 
chronological order. A novel feature of the study was that dependent 
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variables were drawings, interviews and phenomenological ratings of 
future plans. In study 5(b) 3 judges viewed 72 drawings and made ratings 
on plausibility, detail, visual perspective, presence of bystanders and the 
presence or absence of a critical item within each sketch . Where judge’s 
scores formed reliable scales, these variables were examined to see if 
they could be used to discriminate true from deceptive drawings. To my 
knowledge, this is the first study to have been carried out in which 
drawings of deceptive future activities have been obtained using the 
Gothenburg method and evaluated by judges for group differences in 
content and detail. 
 
Introduction Study 5(a) 
 
The majority of literature on the detection of deception has focused on 
past events (Vrij, 2008). In the last decade a novel avenue of research has 
emerged in response to increasing demand for methods by which 
credibility can be established when suspects are questioned about their 
future plans (Granhag, 2010). The primary focus of such research has 
been to investigate how people communicate truly-intended future events 
and whether there are discernible differences when communication is 
intended to mask true intentions, for example, if someone is using a cover 
story (Clemens et al., 2011; Granhag, 2010; Vrij, Leal, et al., 2011). While 
some approaches to strategic interviewing increase the amount of 
information that can be obtained from witnesses and suspects, overall 
reliability and discriminant function of any one method to detect deception 
has yet to be established (Vrij, 2015). Promising results from the first few 
deception detection experiments which examined lying about future events 
somewhat preceded theoretical understanding. While episodic future 
thinking is a separate psychological construct to prospective memory, both 
have been cited as potential sources for methods by which truthful and 
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deceptive statements about future events might be discriminable (Granhag 
& Knieps, 2011; Granhag & Mac Giolla, 2014). 
 
In terms of temporal distance from the present, research on prospective 
memory often employs a design where the target of recall is an event due 
to be carried out later the same day. Psycho-legal research on deception 
detection also typically uses temporally-close designs for mock crime in 
which future intentions can be examined. Both the Gothenburg method 
and the Portsmouth method are examples where the intended activity is in 
the immediate future, usually within the hour. There is some evidence that 
deceptive accounts of future plans contain less evidence of good planning 
behaviour and fewer implementation intention-related utterances (Mac 
Giolla et al., 2013). Implementation intentions are if/when-then plans 
(Gollwitzer, 1993; 1999). Given that the Gothenburg method requires both 
experimental groups to make a plan that they intend to execute, arguably 
both groups would have reason to use implementation intentions for their 
plans. Furthermore in a mock crime experiment liars must plan both the 
mock crime (intended) and a cover story (not intended but planned and 
rehearsed). These concurrent demands require foresight to anticipate 
potential pitfalls, problem solving and evaluation to generate a plan that 
best accommodates every consideration both in achieving the mock crime 
and in denying the true intention if/when questioned. By comparison, a 
truth teller’s task is to plan a single action and then follow that plan. On 
this basis it could be posited that liars more than truth tellers might be 
expected to use implementation intentions when planning a task. Besides 
this consideration, speech-related differences in how the planning phase 
was carried out may not be evident in the interview phase of the study 
depending on what liars choose to reveal and what they choose to 
conceal.  
 
Intention in the deception detection context has been defined as an actor’s 
mental state preceding a corresponding action (Malle, Moses & Baldwin, 
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2001). Granhag (2010) cites and extends this definition saying that 
intention goes beyond mere desires. Intentions have three distinct 
features: they are centred on the person’s own actions, they contain 
strong commitment and they involve planning. This definition is difficult to 
apply to all types of intention, particularly if there is a delay between 
forming the intention and carrying out the activity when the intention 
becomes more akin to a prospective memory task, which may be forgotten 
or overwritten by more imminent demands. To give an example, recently I 
booked and paid for a fitness class a week in advance. On the day, 
something came up and I did not go. By booking the place, I had made a 
plan to take that course of action and demonstrated a financial 
commitment to do so but as the event came closer in time, I changed the 
plan in line with a change in my own priorities. Were I now to be 
interviewed and required to talk about the class I no longer intend to go to, 
I have a representation of the class that I could report on in detail because 
I had simulated that hypothetical experience when fine-tuning my plans. If 
on the other hand, I was asked to generate a cover story for a future 
action themed on something that had never been part of my future, for 
example, a theme that an experimenter instructed me to imagine and 
describe, it is plausible that my description of an experimenter-cued event 
would be less detailed, with less spatial, sensory or autonoetic information 
than the description I could give of a class that I had at one time planned 
to attend. The point here is that plans instigated by an experimenter may 
not be an analogue of real plans (Neroni, Gamboz, de Vito & Brandimonte, 
2016). In the real world, if forced to give a deceptive account of future 
plans, it seems likely that many people would employ the strategy of 
embedding lies in otherwise true accounts of the future activity.  
 
One technique that has received research attention as a means by which 
to make a liar’s task harder is to ask people to describe an event in 
reverse chronological order. The individual starts where the story ends 
and describes what happened, one scene at a time, working backwards to 
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the start of the episode. This method is taken from the Cognitive Interview, 
a strategic interviewing protocol that has been shown to help witnesses 
remember more detail (Fisher & Geiselman, 1984; Memon, Meissner & 
Fraser, 2010). The extra cognitive load induced by this technique is 
thought to make the task particularly difficult when the event being recalled 
was never experienced (Vrij, Mann, Fisher, Leal, Milne & Bull, 2008; Vrij, 
Leal, Mann & Fisher, 2012). Chronological order has been examined in 
the context of the elaboration processes of mental time travel by asking 
participants to describe memories in forward and backward chronological 
order, using free recall or organised by order of interest (Anderson and 
Conway, 1993). Results showed that forward and free recall instructions 
led to faster recall and a second experiment showed that elaboration was 
shaped by a proportion of the story coming in one chunk followed by more 
details. When this design was extended with the addition of a future 
condition, production rates did not differ between past and future but when 
events were likely or not likely to occur, elaboration was faster in future 
trials (Anderson, Peters & Dewhurst, 2015). The extent to which the order 
of retrieval impacts on true vs. deceptive accounts of future events has 
received little attention with the exception of one recent study (Fenn et al., 
2015), published after data collection in the present study in which being 
interviewed in reverse chronological order did not lead to group 
differences between liars and truth tellers. 
 
Episodic future thinking has been used in psycho-legal research as a 
potential source of group difference when people are lying or teling the 
truth about future plans. In this context, participants are asked whether or 
not they formed a mental image of the scene during the planning phase 
and rate sensory and spatial aspects of the planning phase. On this basis, 
Granhag & Knieps (2011) tested and supported six hypotheses. Truth 
tellers (34 of 35) were more likely to have formed and activated a mental 
image during the planning phase compared to liars (23 of 35). This mental 
image was described in more words by truth tellers compared to liars. The 
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planning phase was more likely to have involved the forming of mental 
images in general among truth tellers and the sense of having pre-
experienced the planning was greater for truth tellers. Truth tellers made 
higher ratings for the phenomenological experience of the planning phase. 
Liars perceived the question on whether they had formed a mental image 
during planning as more cognitively demanding to answer, which was 
explained by evidence that lying in general is more cognitively demanding 
than telling the truth (Vrij, Fisher, Mann & Leal, 2006).  
 
When the Gothenburg method was extended with a second interview after 
a one-week delay (Knieps, Granhag & Vrij, 2013), results were more 
difficult to interpret. Truth tellers were more likely to report having formed a 
mental image in the second but not the first interview. The authors note 
that it is possible that differences in the qualities of the planning phase 
may have failed to reach significance in the first interview because 7 liars 
later claimed in a post-interview questionnaire that they had lied about 
having formed a mental image. In other words, some liars did not tell the 
truth when they were required to rate features of their planning. There 
were no differences on the self-reported phenomenology of the planning 
phase except for one variable; sense of location  was greater for truth 
tellers compared to liars. Granhag & Knieps (2011) used an index of word 
count to show that truth tellers said more than liars when interviewed, but 
this result was not replicated by Knieps et al. (2013).  
 
The familiarity of the location in which a future event will take place has 
been experimentally manipulated using the Gothenburg method (Knieps et 
al., 2014). Truth tellers planned a trip to a library to find out about a 
course; liars planned a mock crime to pass illicit material to a confederate 
and a cover story about visiting a library to find out about a course. 
Ratings for familiarity with the libraries were obtained in advance so that 
liars and truth tellers planned to visit familiar or unfamiliar libraries in a 2 x 
 231 
2 between-group design. Both groups were given a photograph of a 
person who would be available to give task assistance in the library (truth 
tellers), or would be the secret agent to whom illicit material should be 
passed (liars). Thus both groups were primed to look out for a specific 
individual. Results showed that liars rated the task as more difficult and 
more stimulating than truth tellers when the location was familiar but not 
when it was unfamiliar. In this study, when asked explicitly, 93% of truth 
tellers and 69% of liars stated that they had formed a mental image during 
planning and a chi square analysis showed that this group difference was 
significant. However self-ratings on a question asking How clearly did you 
pre-experience the future event/your cover story showed no difference in 
episodic thinking between truth tellers and liars. Three other sensory 
variables differentiated the experimental groups: truth tellers experienced 
more visual and olfactory qualities during the planning phase. Liars were 
more aware of the location of people/objects during the planning phase. 
This was explained as evidence that liars planned to look out for the agent 
in the library more than truth tellers had planned to seek assistance with 
their task. These results suggest that forming a mental image during 
planning may denote differences between liars and truth tellers but does 
not index the autonoetic dimension of episodic future thinking. 
 
As noted by one of the authors, one limitation of this particular strand of 
research is the limited ecological validity (Knieps, 2013 pp 28–29). 
Participants were supplied with a goal and constrained to attain this goal in 
a specific place and at a specific time. The processes of episodic future 
thinking may be rather different when an event draws upon veridical 
features of episodic future thinking, such as was found in studies 1, 4 and 
5. One of the challenges of creating a reliable method by which intention 
might be detected in forensic contexts is the lack of evidence about how 
people naturally behave when they do or do not have the intention to carry 
out a particular task. This lack of grounding in existing psychological 
theory has been highlighted as a specific challenge to the detection of 
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deception (Granhag, 2010; Granhag & Mac Giolla, 2014). Some of the 
research presented in this thesis goes some way to answering this call. 
 
Previous research has indicated that near future events are more likely to 
be imagined in familiar locations and that the familiarity of the location 
impacts on the clarity with which the location is imagined (Arnold, 
McDermott, Szpunar, 2011; Szpunar & McDermott, 2008). In studies 1, 3 
and 4 of this thesis, participants selected the cues used to simulate mental 
time travel. One potential disadvantage of this was the lack of control over 
the location, which may have led to disparity in location familiarity between 
conditions. However previous research using the Gothenburg method in 
which familiarity with location was manipulated reported no group 
differences between truth tellers and liars for variables measuring episodic 
future thinking (Knieps et al., 2014). This may be due to the use of 
schematic representations, in this study the familiar and unfamiliar 
locations were libraries and although the occupation of participants is not 
stated in the method section, it seems likely that at least some were 
academics or students, so semantic information about what a library is like 
would have been available to them whether or not they were familiar with 
the precise location. Nevertheless, not being familiar with a location would 
make it difficult to form a mental image of that place. Thus it would be 
important to ensure that participants had similar levels of experience of the 
target location. In the present study, all participants were in their first three 
months of working or studying at the same university. Participants gave 
estimates of how frequently they had visited the location in the past. In this 
way it was possible to compare familiarity between groups as a 
manipulation check. Participants were also equipped with maps of the 
campus and of the shop to assist their planning. 
 
In previous research using the Gothenburg method, participants were 
asked to report on the mental image they had formed during the planning 
phase (Granhag & Knieps, 2011, Knieps et al., 2013), or were strategically 
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interviewed (Sooniste et al., 2014; Warmelink et al., 2013) to reveal 
variance in the richness of planning representations between truth tellers 
and liars. Recent research has highlighted the distinction between thinking 
forward to a novel future event and recalling a memory of having 
previously thought forward to the future, or having a memory of the future 
(Ingvar, 1985; Jeunehomme & D’Argembeau, 2016; Szpunar, Addis, 
McLelland & Schacter, 2013). From the methods described in the studies 
cited, it is possible that participants were rating memories of the future. To 
attempt to better control this aspect of the design, in the present study 5(a) 
participants were intercepted en route to complete the task and took 
instruction from the letter they had been handed by the previous 
experimenter. The contents of the letter varied by experimental condition 
(tell the truth, tell the cover story). The overt instruction from the second 
interviewer was to report on the scenario that the participant anticipated 
would take place next. This instruction was anticipated to elicit sensory 
and phenomenological aspects of the anticipated future event rather than 
referring participants back to the planning phase of the study. Descriptions 
of truly intended scenarios set in the immediate future were hypothesised 
to receive higher ratings for subjective phenomenology, would be 
described in more words and would be depicted in drawings containing 
more detail. By contrast, liars might do their best to perform convincingly 
when delivering the cover story but the process of being interviewed about 
their plans and asked to describe these in forward chronological and 
reverse chronological order, making a drawing and rating the 
phenomenology of the future event could be hypothesised to be more 
demanding and might lead to lower ratings for subjective richness, less 
detailed drawings and shorter verbal descriptions of the planned activity. 
However, since future thinking was not being indexed by asking 
participants to think back to the planning phase, the extent to which 




Previous research has suggested that personality may be related to the 
capacity to project the self into the future to pre-experience events. For 
example, individuals inclined to greater openness to experiencing feelings 
rate the autonoetic component of prospection as more vivid (D’Argembeau 
& Van der Linden, 2006). Individuals who worry more tend to use an 
observer visual perspective when remembering (past) or imagining (future) 
autobiographical events (Finnbogadottir & Berntsen, 2014). There is some 
evidence that extraverts make better liars (Riggio, Salinas & Tucker, 
1988). The Machiavellian liar is a caricature of a highly confident and 
manipulative individual who lies for instrumental reasons but the 
relationship between extraversion and deceptive traits in personality is not 
necessarily pathological (Vrij, 2008). Individuals who are socially adroit 
tend to be convincing liars (Kashy & DePaulo, 1996) and are more 
persistent when perpetrating a deception (Vrij and Holland, 1998). As a 
minor exploratory aside, participants completed a 46-item Big Five 
Inventory, the BFI-46-A (John, Donahue & Kentle, 1991, John, Nauman & 
Soto, 2008, Benet-Martinez & John, 1998).  
 
7.2 Method 
Design and Participants  
The experiment was a between-group design in which half of participants 
were asked to plan a mock crime and to prepare a cover story to be used 
if they were asked about their intended activity, henceforth referred to as 
liars. Half of the participants planned a trip to the College shop to buy a 
gift, henceforth referred to as truth tellers. The dependent variables were 
scores on measures of autonoetic, sensory, spatial, emotional and 
narrative aspects of planning the activity and the number of words used to 
describe these plans. 
 
Participants were 74 undergraduates or staff (18 males) recruited through 
the Department of Psychology experiment management system. The 
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experiment was advertised as a study about planning and actions in which 
participants would be asked to plan a trip from one building to another to 
carry out a specific task. Participants received course credits or a cash 
payment of £7. The study was approved by the internal ethics committee 
at Royal Holloway, University of London. The first consent form did not 
make mention that some participants would be required to conceal 
information from the experimenter. Thus after participating and receiving a 
full debrief, participants signed a second consent form indicating that the 
design and purpose of the study had been clearly explained and giving 
fully informed consent for their participation. 
 
All participants indicated that they were fluent English language speakers. 
In line with previous research using this design, no age restrictions were 
imposed, the mean age was 19.31, (range 17–38). Familiarity with the 
component parts of an imagined future scenario (persons, location, 
objects) predicts the richness of a future simulation (McLelland, Devitt, 
Schacter & Addis, 2015). In order to control any advantages conferred by 
experience of the environment in which the planned activity would be 
carried out, all participants were in their first three months of study or work 
at the university. Data from two participants who did not follow the 
procedure were excluded from analyses, which were carried out on a 
sample of 72 participants. Participants were tested individually in two 
rooms in the same building in an annexe of the Department of Psychology 
at Royal Holloway, University of London. 
 
Materials and Procedure 
Planning phase. On arriving at the laboratory, participants were greeted 
by a research assistant, randomly assigned to experimental condition and 
signed the first consent form in which the study was described in the 
following way: 
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You will be asked to think about a specific scenario and plan how to 
undertake this scenario. You will then be asked to carry out the 
activity you planned.  
This instruction was given as part of the experimental induction to ensure 
that participants believed they were making plans for an activity to be 
carried out in the next hour. However it is important to note that in reality, 
no participants went to the college shop. All participants were intercepted 
and interviewed before they left the building.  
 
In the first phase of the study, participants completed a questionnaire by 
giving demographic information, reporting the number of weeks that they 
had been working or studying at the university, stating whether they had 
visited the college shop and giving an estimate of how many visits they 
made to the shop each week. Experience was measured on a scale from 
1 (Daily), 2 (2–3 times a week), 3 (Once a week), 4 (Once per month), 5 
(Less than once a month). There was only one shop on the university 
campus, thus all participants were thinking of the same location when 
answering these questions. Next participants completed the BFI-46-A 
(John et al., 1991; John et al., 2008; Benet-Martinez & John, 1998). 
Responses to 46 questions are made on a Likert scale from 1 (disagree 
strongly) to 5 (agree strongly). Mean scores for each dimension are used 
to create a profile of the big five personality factors: extraversion, 
agreeableness, conscientiousness, neuroticism and openness. 
 
After completing the questionnaires, participants were taken through the 
instructions for the planning phase using a structured protocol read out by 
the first research assistant. Instructions clarified that there would be no 
practice phase and only one opportunity to carry out the task, which 
should be completed within 30 minutes of leaving the building. All 
participants were given a pen, a map of the college campus and a map of 
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the internal layout of the college shop (presented in Appendix N). Liars 
were told: 
Today you are going on a mission to visit the college shop. First of 
all you need to carefully plan how you are going to carry this out. 
The mission is to leave this building and go directly to the college 
shop to put a memory stick on the Asian foods shelf. You must 
place it at the back of the bottom right shelf (on that aisle). You also 
need to plan a cover story to tell in case anyone asks what you are 
doing. Your cover story should be that you are in the shop to buy an 
item for yourself and a gift for someone else. The University has 
approved the experiment and we will give you a letter to show in the 
shop so they know that you are taking part in this study. You won’t 
need to spend any money. To help you, you have a map of the 
campus and the map of the college shop to plan your route. You 
have 10 minutes to plan your mission. You don’t have to tell me, 
just plan it in your head. While you are planning it is crucial to really 
pre-experience carrying out this activity. Notice the sights, smells 
and sounds you encounter both on the way and in the shop. Think 
about what you will see on your way there. Picture yourself walking 
around the shop. Think carefully about what you want to buy and 
imagine yourself carrying out the mission in detail. 
 
Truth tellers were told: 
Today you are going on a mission to visit the college shop. First of 
all you need to carefully plan how you are going to carry this out. 
The mission is to buy an item for yourself and a gift for someone 
else. The University has approved the experiment and we will give 
you a letter to show in the shop so they know that you are taking 
part in this study. You won’t need to spend any money. To help 
you, you have a map of the campus and the map of the college 
shop to plan your route. You have 10 minutes to plan your mission. 
You don’t have to tell me, just plan it in your head. While you are 
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planning it is crucial to really pre-experience carrying out this 
activity. Notice the sights, smells and sounds you encounter both 
on the way and in the shop. Think about what you will see on your 
way there. Picture yourself walking around the shop. Think carefully 
about what you want to buy and imagine yourself carrying out the 
mission in detail. 
 
Immediately following the planning phase, a manipulation check was 
posed in the form of the question what are you going to do now? After 
confirming that the immediate destination was the college shop, each 
participant was given a letter in a sealed envelope which they understood 
should be handed over in lieu of money when at the till. Liars were also 
given a memory stick and told to conceal this in a bag or pocket in front of 
the research assistant, before leaving the room. All participants were 
thanked and told to report immediately to a second room in the same 
building, where there was a telephone and a second researcher waiting. 
Verbal instructions made it clear that each person should wait in the 
second room from where a call would be placed to the college shop to 
alert staff that the participant was due to leave.  
 
Interception. Participants were intercepted by a second researcher (the 
author) before they had a chance to execute their planned actions. The 
second researcher was blind to experimental condition. On arrival in the 
second room, the participant was told to check the contents of the letter 
they had been given in the previous room. The sealed envelope contained 
instructions pertaining to the experimental condition. Participants who had 
planned the mock crime (liars) read instructions in which they were 
reminded to use their cover story to avoid detection; that is, to deceive the 
interviewer about their intentions. Instructions stated:  
You have been intercepted. You will not be going to the College 
Shop. Instead you will now be interviewed about the mission you 
have just planned. Remember you must not reveal the true purpose 
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of your mission. You must use your cover story during the interview. 
You should report your plan as accurately as possible.  
Participants who had planned a shopping trip to the college shop (truth 
tellers) were instructed to answer the interviewer’s questions honestly: 
You have been intercepted. You will not be going to the College 
Shop. Instead you will now be interviewed about the mission you 
have just planned. You should report your plan as accurately as 
possible. 
Both groups were told to put the letter back into the envelope, then in a 
pocket or bag and not to show the contents to the researcher.  
Interviews. All participants sat at a table and were interviewed individually 
by the second researcher, who followed a structured protocol. Interviews 
were audio recorded on a Sony digital voice recorder.  Participants were 
asked to describe their intended plan in as much detail as possible, once 
in forward chronological order and a second time in reverse chronological 
order. The instructions were counterbalanced so that half of truth tellers 
and half of liars gave a forward chronological order account of their plans 
first. The instructions for the forward chronological statement were 
worded: 
I want you to tell me everything you plan to do from leaving this 
building up to where you have made your selection in the college 
shop and you are at the till, with your letter, explaining that you 
don’t need money because you are taking part in this experiment. 
Notice the sights, smells and sounds that you encounter while you 
are in the shop and on the way there. Report everything you 
planned in as much detail as possible. 
The instructions for the reverse temporal order statement were worded:  
We are going to try something that sometimes helps people 
remember in more detail. What I am going to ask you to do is to tell 
me what you will do in the shop in as much detail as possible but in 
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reverse order. Start where you are at the shelf choosing a gift for 
someone. What was the last thing you were going to do previous to 
that? What happened just before that? Start where you are at the 
shelf choosing a gift in the campus shop and end where you are 
leaving this room to go to the shop. Notice the sights, smells and 
sounds that you encounter while you are in the shop and on the 
way there. Please report everything in as much detail as possible 
After describing the plan in forward chronological and reverse 
chronological order, participants answered fixed questions about what 
they had been going to buy in the shop: Tell me all the reasons why you 
are going to visit the shop today; Who are you buying the gift for?; What is 
on the shelf immediately to the right of the shelf where you are choosing 
the gift? Responses to the fixed questions were used to identify the 
specific items planned to be purchased, in cases where these had not 
been explicitly named in the free recall statements.  
 
Immediately after the recorded interviews, participants were given a pen 
and a sheet of blank A4 paper and instructed that they had three minutes 
in which to make a drawing of themselves standing in the shop, looking at 
the shelf from which they were choosing a gift for a friend.  
 
Finally participants rated the phenomenological characteristics of their 
simulation and answered questions about the planning task using a 
questionnaire adapted from previous research, as described in study 1(b) 
(see 3.3). Question text is presented in Table 7.1. Since the experiment 
had involved deception, participants were given an extended debriefing on 
the true purpose of the study and reminded that they could withdraw their 
data at any point then or afterwards. No time limit was imposed on 
considering the implications of the debrief before signing a second 
consent form but all participants did so within a few minutes.  
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Table 7.1 
Study 5(a) Phenomenological Measures Question Text 
Measure Instruction text  
Pre-
experiencing 




While imagining the event, I feel that I travel forward to 
the time when it would happen 
Visual My representation for this event involves visual details 
Auditory My representation for this event involves sounds 
Olfactory My representation for this event involves smells/tastes 
Visual 
perspective 
I primarily see what happened from a perspective as 
seen through 1 (my own eyes), 7 (an observers eyes) 
Location The location where the event takes place is clear 
Spatial objects The relative spatial arrangement of objects in my 
representation for the event is clear 
Spatial people The relative spatial arrangement of people in my 
representation for the event is clear 
Emotionality While imagining the event, I feel the emotions I would 
feel if the event occurred  
Valence The emotions I have when I think about doing this are 1 
(extremely negative), 7 (extremely positive) 
In words While imagining the event, it comes to me in words 
Coherence While imagining the event, it comes to me as a coherent 
story and not as an isolated scene 
Importance This event is important to me.  
Desirability How desirable is this event?  
Motivation How motivated were you to perform well in this task?  
Task difficulty How difficult did you find the task?  
Time to plan Did you feel that you had adequate time to plan your 
mission in room 291?  
Told the truth Please rate the extent to which you told the truth about 
your intentions during the interview 
Note: Scale: 1 (not at all), 7 (completely) 
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7.3 Study 5(a) Results 
Manipulation checks. Participants indicated the extent to which they had 
told the truth during the experimental interview and subsequent drawing 
task. Data for this question were missing from three liars and one truth 
teller. Liars rated the veracity of their performance as significantly less 
truthful (M = 3.21, SD = 1.78) compared to truth tellers (M = 6.40, SD = 
.95), t(48.07) = -9.14, p < .001. There were no group differences on task 
factors such as desirability, motivation, difficulty or having sufficient time to 
plan, suggesting that differences in performance were not explained by 
disparity in these measures between the conditions. There were no group 
differences in time the length of time at the university or frequency with 
which the shop had been visited each week. Means, standard deviations 
and statistics for variables operating as manipulation checks are 
presented in Table 7.2.  
 
Phenomenological ratings.  Liars indicated that they found the planning 
phase more emotionally arousing (M = 4.92, SD = 1.65) than truth tellers, 
who were planning an activity that they truly intended to carry out (M = 
3.89, SD = 1.83), t(70) = 2.5, p = .02. There were no differences on any 
other phenomenological variable. Means, standard deviations and the 
results of independent samples t tests performed on the 
phenomenological variables are presented in Table 7.3. 
 
The order in which the reverse chronological instructions were presented 
(first, second) was counterbalanced across groups. To check that this 
manipulation did not impact on the phenomenology of events, multi level 
modelling analyses were run on all self-rated measures, including 
manipulation checks. There was no change to the pattern of results on any 
variable when the order of instructions was added as a factor.   
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Table 7.2 
Study 5(a) Descriptive and t-test Statistics for Manipulation Checks 
 Liars  Truth tellers  t-test 
Measure Mean SD  Mean SD  t p 
Task factors         
Importance 3.14 1.73  2.81 1.70  .82 .41 
Desirability  4.08 1.52  4.39 1.55  -.84 .40 
Motivation 5.08 1.36  5.14 1.62  -.16 .88 
Difficulty 2.83 1.48  2.78 1.51  .16 .88 
Time to plan 6.75 .50  6.61 .94  .79 .43 
Experience          
N weeks on campus 6.58 2.99  7.00 2.91  -.60 .55 
N shop visits per week  3.56 .94  3.44 .94  .50 .62 
Veracity         
Told the truth* 3.21 1.78  6.4 .95  -9.14 .001 





Study 5(a) Descriptive and t-test Statistics for Phenomenology by Veracity 
Measure Condition  
Liars Truth Tellers  
M SD M SD t p 
Autonoetic       
Pre-experiencing 4.83 1.48 4.61 1.54 .62 .53 
Mental Time Travel 4.5 1.34 3.92 1.7 1.62 .11 
Autonoetic (M) 4.67 1.24 4.26 1.44 1.28 .21 
Sensory       
Visual  5.92 1.08 5.94 1.12 -.11 .92 
Auditory 3.42 1.95 3.56 1.96 -.30 .76 
Olfactory/gustatory 3.06 1.79 2.78 1.84 .65 .52 
Visual perspective  3.00 2.46 2.11 1.89   1.70 .09 
Spatial       
Location 6.08 1.11 5.78 1.12 1.16 .25 
Spatial objects 5.25 1.34 5.50 1.32 -.80 .43 
Spatial people 4.33 1.64 4.81 1.62 -1.23 .22 
Emotions       
Feeling emotions 4.92 1.65 3.89 1.83 2.50 .02 
Emotional valence 4.47 1.13 4.94 1.31 -1.64 .11 
Narrative       
Story came in words 3.31 1.86 2.89 1.89 .94 .35 
Coherence 4.83 1.63 4.31 1.90 1.27 .21 
Note: df = 70 except where equal variances not assumed, mental time travel df 66.47, 
Visual perspective df 63.86.  
Content.  Literal verbatim transcriptions were made of the audio-recorded 
interviews. Both group tasks necessitated navigating from the laboratory to 
the college shop but only the portion of plans taking place inside the 
college shop would be expected to vary between groups. When familiarity 
of location was manipulated by Knieps et al. (2014), statements were 
coded for the extent to which utterances were related to navigating to the 
library and navigating in the library. When participants were unfamiliar with 
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the library, they said more about navigating to the library. Those who were 
familiar with the library said more about navigating in the library but there 
were no group differences between liars and truth tellers on these 
measures. Transcripts were edited to the content of each statement that 
took place while navigating in the shop (between walking in and out of the 
door). Hesitations such as er and erm were removed. Computer-based 
word counts were obtained from chronological and reverse temporal order 
statements.  
 
A 2 (Veracity: Truthful vs. Deceptive) × 2 (Chronological order: Forward 
vs. Backward) ANOVA was performed on word counts. There were 
significant main effects for Veracity (F(1, 70) = 6.04, p <.02, η2 = .59) and 
Chronological order (F(1, 70) = 16.86, p = .001, η2 = .52], and a Veracity x 
Chronological order interaction effect (F1, 70) = 7.07, p = .01, η2 = .64). 
Planned comparisons showed that the forward chronological order 
instruction led to longer statements in truth tellers (M = 132.61, SD = 
99.28) compared to liars (M = 78.97, SD = 45.11), t(48.86) = -2.95, p = 
.01). The reverse temporal order instruction did not differ between liars (M 
= 66.78, SD = 55.88) and truth tellers (M = 75.58, SD = 41.53), t(70) = -
.76, p = .45.  
 
Transcripts of the interviews were used to identify the specific item(s) that 
participant intended to buy in the College shop. Results were used to 
populate the final question for study 5(b), which asked judges whether the 
named item(s) could be identified in each drawing. There were eight 
instances where the item to be bought was referred to as a gift without 
explicitly naming an object. A Pearson Chi-Square test indicated that this 
lack of specificity in naming the item did not differ between liars and truth 
tellers, (χ2(1) = .56, p =.45). There were 11 instances where the item to be 
bought was named as Asian food or noodles. Since liars had been 
instructed to plant the memory stick on the Asian food shelf, this could be 
a cue to veracity. A Pearson Chi-Square test confirmed that liars (10 of 36) 
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were more likely than truth tellers (1 of 36) to have named the item they 
would buy as Asian food or noodles, (χ2(1) = 8.69, p = .003).  
 
Personality Correlations between personality and the phenomenological 
variables were examined but showed no obvious pattern of results.  
 
Discussion 
The study set out to experimentally-induce intention (true intention, 
deliberately concealed intention) to examine effects on word count, 
phenomenological self-ratings, and drawings (examined in study 5b). 
Participants who were thinking of a believed future event during interviews 
were anticipated to say more than those who described a cover story and 
concealed their true plans. Truth tellers said more than liars and this 
significantly differed in response to a forward chronological order 
instruction. Adding a reverse chronological order instruction did not lead to 
group differences in the amount said. Planning a mock crime led to more 
emotional arousal (but no difference in valence) compared to planning a 
truly intended task. The autonoetic, sensory, spatial, emotional and 
narrative qualities of anticipating the planned event did not vary regardless 
of whether the scenario described was truly intended or was a cover story.  
 
An immediate question to be addressed is the question of whether the 
intention induction was successful. Although results showed that the 
extent to which participants lied differed between the groups, liars’ 
deception was rated just below the mid point of the scale, (Ms truth tellers 
6.4, liars 3.21). Clearly the experimental groups differed on this variable 
but this group difference might not have been large enough to create 
variance in the phenomenology of planning. When interviewed about their 
plans, instructions constrained participants to describe their representation 
of the event from leaving the laboratory to travel to the shop up to the point 
 247 
where participants were standing at the till waiting to hand over the letter. 
In line with Knieps et al. (2014), participants’ plans can be thought of in 
terms of the portion relating to navigating to the shop and the portion 
relating to navigating in the shop. One explanation for the lack of group 
variance could be that when rating the future event, participants thought 
more about the portion of the story in which neither group were required to 
lie: navigating to the shop. The advantage of having had participants tell 
the story in forward and reverse chronological order (counterbalanced) is 
that all participants were primed to think of the plan twice: once in forward 
chronological order starting with navigating to the shop and a second time 
in reverse chronological order starting from the end of navigating within 
the shop (the critical section that differed between truth tellers and liars). 
Thus it seems unlikely that self-ratings on the phenomenology of plans 
were front-loaded by the relatively truthful component navigating to the 
shop, which was truly intended by both groups. When analyses were re-
run using multi level modelling to examine whether the chronological order 
in which participants first described the scenario impacted on 
phenomenological or manipulation check measures, there was no change 
to the pattern of results. Thus the intention manipulation appears to be 
validated as the source of task variance between liars and truth tellers. 
 
In contrast to results of studies 1, 3 and 4 of this thesis, the results of 
study 5(a) suggest that experimentally manipulating intention had no 
impact on the degree to which participants used episodic future thinking 
when describing their plans for an event set one hour into the future. 
Episodic future thinking in this study was indexed by the mean score of 
two questions: While imagining the event, I feel as though I am living/ 
experiencing it and While imagining the event, I feel that I travel forward to 
the time when it would happen. The evidence for episodic future thinking 
in previous studies using the Gothenburg method has been based on 
answers to a question on whether the participant formed a mental image 
while making the plan. This question was not asked in the present study 
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and so it is difficult to compare this result with previous research using the 
Gothenburg method but does make it possible to compare the results of 
this study with the broader field of mental time travel research, in which 
contrasts of self-ratings of the subjective experience of mental time travel 
and pre-living are widely used as measures of episodic future thinking. A 
recent distinction has been made between events and scenes (Sheldon & 
Chu, 2016; Sheldon & El-Asmar, 2018). It is possible that the mental 
image referred to in research by Kneips and colleagues was more akin to 
a scene whereas the induction of looking forward and describing the trip to 
the shop in the present study elicited processes more related to an event. 
Future research directly contrasting these two types of representation but 
emphasising the future orientation to participants would be an interesting 
extension to this design.  
 
All participants were interviewed in both forward and reverse chronological 
order. Results showed that truth tellers said more than liars in forward 
chronological order whereas the reverse instruction led to similar 
statement length whether or not the participant was telling the truth. This 
null effect with reference to the reverse chronological order instruction 
replicates results of one other study, published after data collection for 
study 5, which manipulated the chronological order instruction in a similar 
paradigm (Fenn et al., 2015). In the present study, the reverse 
chronological order alone did not lead to group differences by veracity, but 
truth tellers said more than liars when the content derived from both sets 
of instructions was combined. The content of statements was not analysed 
for the number of new details generated, so this result does not eliminate 
the possibility that more information might be generated by using both 
forward and reverse chronological order to strategically interview a witness 
or suspect. As previously discussed, using the reverse temporal order 
instruction was also useful as a manipulation check to ensure that 
participants were not primed to start the interview in the part of the story 
that did not require a lie to be told (navigating to the shop). 
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Previous research has shown that lies are often embedded in otherwise 
accurate or truthful statements. For example, in the mission study 
conducted by Vrij and colleagues (2010), false locations for meeting secret 
agents were found to be geographically very close to the real locations 
where participants had met that agent. Exploratory analysis of the content 
of transcripts indicated that the object that liars said they would be buying 
in the shop was more likely to be located in the Asian food section, which 
was the area of the shop where the liars’ mock crime (hiding a memory 
stick) was intended to be carried out. This finding could be interpreted as 
evidence that at least one third of liars were using an embedded lie 
technique: the cover story was close to the truth but avoided the critical 
phase of the mock crime (placing the memory stick on the shelf). However 
as only one third of liars employed this technique, it could not be described 
as a reliable diagnostic cue to deception in applied con texts, although 
perhaps could warrant further experimental investigation.  
 
To summarise the results of study 5, participants who were describing a 
scenario they intended to carry out in one hour did so in more words than 
participants who were concealing their true plans. Even though concealing 
true plans was a more complex planning task (true plan + cover story), 
and thoughts about this scenario were rated as more arousing, concealing 
intention did not lead to variance in autonoesis, sensory, spatial, narrative 
or valence. 
 
A second experiment study 5(b) was designed and carried out on the 
drawings that were obtained in study 5(a).  
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7.4 Study 5(b) Drawing rating task 
Introduction 
Drawings have been employed as a non-verbal tool for investigating the 
qualities of anticipated or experienced events in a handful of deception 
detection studies about past events, for a recent review see Mac Giolla et 
al. (2017). Sketches can be useful as a means to conduct information 
gathering interviews with populations in which language or communication 
barriers exist (Vrij et al., 2018). The rationale for using drawings in 
deception detection studies is based on reality monitoring criteria whereby 
experienced events are encoded and recalled with a greater degree of 
spatial and visual content, markers that help us to distinguish real from 
merely imagined experiences (Johnson & Raye, 1981; Johnson et al., 
1988). When asked to draw an event that was not experienced, a liar is 
hypothesised to find it more uncomfortable to commit detail to page 
compared to the relative ease of avoiding mentioning details in a verbal 
statement (Mac Giolla et al., 2017). While it may be relatively easy to 
fudge spatial details when describing these verbally, making a drawing 
forces the person to explicitly demonstrate how the environment was laid 
out and who or what were present or absent from the scene.  
 
Sketches of the layout of the location in which an event took place are 
sometimes used alongside verbal statements as a means by which to 
reveal inconsistencies between the two types of representation of the 
same event (Vrij, Leal, Granhag, Mann, Fisher, Hillman & Sperry, 2009). 
This method has been applied to situations where liars were drawing an 
imagined setting and truth tellers were drawing an experienced setting 
(Leins, Fisher, Vrij, Leal & Mann, 2011). Across two experiments, liars’ 
drawings and statements were compared and were found to be less 
consistent than those produced by truth tellers. Drawings can elicit more 
detail when used in conjunction with verbal interviews in interpreter-based 
interviews (Vrij et al., 2018).  
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One of the earliest experiments to investigate drawings as a method of 
detecting deception was conducted with a small sample of serving or 
retired military and police officers (Vrij, Leal et al., 2010). Participants were 
briefed to collect a package from Agent A and deliver this to Agent B and 
were assigned to lying (n = 16) or truth telling (n = 15) conditions on the 
basis of which of two answers they had been told was the expected 
response to the question Do you have the time please? In fact the 
interviewer always gave the same answer to all participants, so that truth 
tellers told the truth and liars lied when they were intercepted. During the 
interview, the first task was to visualise the location where the package 
from Agent A had been handed over and then describe this in words. A 
second task was to visualise themselves standing at the same location 
again and sketch the same scene in as much detail as possible showing 
what they saw. Interviews were transcribed: 2 pairs of coders rated the 
drawings and a third pair of coders rated the transcripts. The summary of 
coding and results reviewed here is limited to the variables of interest to 
study 3(b), namely detail, plausibility, visual perspective and bystanders.  
 
The definition for plausibility used by coders examining verbal statements 
and drawings in the study by Vrij et al. (2010 p. 590) is stated as: the 
coder could imagine the person actually standing there. For transcripts, 
the dependent variables were the number of details about the scene that 
were mentioned (in words) and statement plausibility as rated on a Likert 
scale from 1 (not plausible) to 7 (very plausible). Two new coders rated 
the drawings for detail and plausibility (1 = low, 7 = high). A third pair of 
coders assessed the visual perspective from which the sketch had been 
made. Judgements were assigned to one of two perspectives: camera-on-
the-shoulder or overhead. The same pair also rated whether the drawing 
depicted a second figure, labeled a bystander, presumably Agent A.  
 
Vrij, Leal et al. (2010) reported that judges agreed on the visual 
perspective of all but two drawings, which were resolved by discussion. 
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Results from 2 analyses were reported for the camera-on-the-shoulder 
perspective, which was present in 53% of truth tellers’ drawings and 19% 
of liars’ drawings. Drawings of true scenarios (80%) were more likely to 
include a bystander. Bystanders were absent in 87% of liars’ drawings. 
Inter-rater reliability for plausibility was low (r = .48). The authors comment 
that inter-rater reliability in a range of .4–.6 is not unusual in deception 
detection coding schemes (Vrij, 2005). Despite low reliability, scores were 
averaged between the two coders and on this basis truth tellers’ drawings 
were rated as more plausible than liars’ drawings. Further analysis found a 
significant correlation between the presence of a bystander and higher 
plausibility ratings. Although two different pairs of raters made these 
judgements, this does not discount the possibility that the presence of a 
bystander in a drawing led to a greater percept of plausibility. The low 
power of this study (n = 31) is not atypical in this type of research. 
 
Plausibility and detail were also examined in a study in which participants 
told the truth (n = 17) or lied (n = 16) about their occupation and place of 
work (Vrij, Mann, Leal & Fisher, 2012). In this study, participants were 
interviewed and made drawings about their workplace. A single coder 
rated the plausibility of the drawings by answering the question can you 
imagine the person working here? on a 7-point Likert scale. Detail was 
also rated on a 7-point scale. The number of bystanders depicted in the 
drawings was counted and the level of detail in which any bystanders 
present were represented was rated on a 7-point scale. Where bystanders 
were present, drawings were compared to transcripts on a six-point scale: 
1 (people were mentioned in the interview but were not sketched in the 
drawing) and 7 (people were sketched in specific places and specific 
details about them were given e.g. use of adjectives or actions or including 
their name). Inter-rater reliability for coding was assessed by comparing 
ratings on 33% of the drawings and is reported as: detail in the drawing, r 
= .66; plausibility, r = .72; number of bystanders, r = .95; detail of 
bystanders, r = .96. Results indicated that the level of detail, perceived 
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plausibility and the number of bystanders were all found to be significantly 
greater in truth tellers’ drawings.  
 
The exact nature of what underlies judgements of the plausibility of 
drawings is difficult to ascertain on the basis of the small number of 
published studies and the small size of data sets where this has been 
reported. Such studies have used pairs of judges or multiple judges, 
sometimes with levels of reliability that would not be acceptable in other 
areas of psychological research. Study 1(c, d) and 4(c), of this thesis 
demonstrate the problems in establishing the reliability of agreement on 
ratings of likelihood or plausibility. On the basis of study 1 results, it was of 
particular interest to see if there would be more agreement in study 5(b), 
where the material being rated was visual rather than verbal. Low 
reliability for ratings on detail and plausibility, much as was found in study 
1(d) was predicted. In the present study, visual perspective and the 
presence or absence of a critical item (to be bought in the shop) were also 
examined. Since ratings were based on drawing content, it was 
hypothesised that agreement might be reliable on at least these concrete 
aspects of the drawings.  
 
Visual perspective has been examined as a potential cue to experience or 
deception such that a true event is suggested to be more likely to have 
been seen from a first person perspective. However current thinking on 
visual perspective suggests that categorising what constitutes a third 
person perspective is more complicated than a dichotomous choice 
between field and observer views (Rice & Rubin, 2011). Furthermore, 
there may be individual differences at play such that some individuals are 
more likely to see past or future events from the third person view 
(McDermott et al., 2016). It was of interest to see if more of the liars’ 
drawings would be rated as drawn from a visual perspective as if from 
above (like a map) compared to over the shoulder, although this distinction 
taken from previous deception detection studies about meeting an agent 
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or drawing the work place might not hold in the experimental paradigm. 
Study 5(a) participants had been given a map to use for the planning 
phase, which may have primed participants to encode the shop scenario 
in a from above perspective. An additional measure was based on the 
hypothesis that truth tellers’ drawings would correspond with the verbal 
statements they had made about the future scenario. Specifically, they 
would be more likely to depict the item or items they had stated they were 
intending to buy in the shop when making the sketch.  
 
Only one other study has assessed drawings of a future (never 
experienced) scenario and these drawings were also obtained from the 
Gothenburg method (Calderon, Mac Giolla, Ask, & Granhag, 2018). 
Ratings were made by 117 judges, who viewed 56 drawings that had been 
made in an earlier study (Granhag & Knieps, 2011). Analysis of the 
drawings had not been reported before. Judges answered a single 
question about each drawing. The question centred on construal level 
theory (Trope & Liberman, 2010). Concrete representations are more 
immediate, abstract representations are higher order and represent a 
greater psychological distance. Judges were first trained with definitions of 
concrete or abstract construal level representations with the following 
definitions. Concrete drawings were defined as:  
Drawings that represent complex scenes, refer to a specific context, 
focus on surface aspects of a task, and include details that are 
irrelevant to the goal at hand (in this case purchasing a gift in a 
shopping center).  
Abstract drawings were defined as: 
Drawings that represent simple scenes, that are decontextualized, 
refer to core aspects of a task, and include details that are relevant 
to the goal at hand (in this case purchasing a gift in a shopping 
center).  
 
Results showed that liars’ drawings were perceived to be more abstract, 
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and inter-rater reliability for this single question was extremely high (r 
= .935). No other analysis on the drawings was reported in this publication. 
 
In the absence of any other literature on the use of drawings made about 
truly anticipated or deceptively represented events set in the future, the 
results of study 5(b) were difficult to predict on the basis of previous 
research. As such, study 5(b) make a useful contribution to existing 
knowledge on the validity of using drawings to detect deception and an 
entirely novel contribution to the study of drawings where deception is 
exclusively concerned with future activities. 
 
Method 
Design and Participants  
Drawings made by 72 participants in study 5(a) were assessed in two 
phases. Phase 1 judges were three males aged 20–25 who were 
members of an eyewitness memory laboratory group at Royal Holloway, 
University of London. Two of the judges were undergraduate students, the 
third was a research assistant employed by the University. In Phase 2 
drawings were coded for the presence of bystanders by the author and a 
second coder, not affiliated with the same laboratory group. Rating was 
carried out by separate groups to ensure that plausibility scores would be 
independent of bystander scores. Examples of drawings can be seen in 
Appendix O. 
 
Materials and Procedure 
Drawings of a future event that was planned to take place in the college 
shop were made in response to the instruction I would like you to draw me 
a picture of yourself standing in front of the shelf choosing the gift. The 
creators of the drawings (often referred to in the literature as senders) 
were either telling the truth (truth tellers, n = 36) or were aiming to conceal 
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the true purpose of the visit to the shop (liars, n = 36). Drawings were 
made in black pen on plain A4 paper, which  were scanned and saved as 
monochrome jpeg files. The images were not cropped so that the 
proportion of the page that had not been drawn on was clearly visible. 
Participants viewed the images on a wide screen monitor in a laboratory in 
the Department of Psychology, Royal Holloway, University of London. 
 
Phase 1: 72 jpeg images were presented one at a time. The order of 
viewing was randomised for each participant. Time to view each image 
was unconstrained. Four questions were presented for each image. The 
first two questions required detail and plausibility to be rated on Likert 
scales from 1 (not at all) to 7 (completely). The questions were taken from 
previous research (Vrij et al., 2010; Vrij et al, 2012): 
How detailed is the drawing? 
I can imagine the sender being in this place 
 
Next, judges rated the visual perspective of the drawing, which was posed 
by the question text: 
Is the picture drawn 1 (over the shoulder or 2 (from above)? 
The final question was on the presence or absence of the item(s) named 
as the target purchase from the College shop in study 3(a). Each item(s) 
was named and followed by the text: Is this item present in the drawing 
(the item that the participant stated they were going to buy in the shop)?  
 
Phase 2: Drawings were rated for the number of bystanders in the image 
and the level of detail in which any bystanders were drawn. Two judges 
viewed all 72 drawings on a Macbook Air 11” laptop. After examining each 
drawing, judges recorded the number of people seen in the picture, other 
than the drawing sender (the figure believed to represent the person who 
made the drawing). A single figure in each drawing was assumed to depict 
the sender. Drawings containing more than one figure were coded as 
bystanders present. Figures within television or cinema screens or in 
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paintings on a wall were not counted as bystanders. Animals were not 
counted as bystanders. Where bystanders were present, judges rated the 
level of detail in which bystanders were depicted on a Likert scale from 
1(very low) to 7(very high).  
 
7.5 Results  
Phase 1: Reliability. Individual ratings from the three judges were 
compared to see if these could form reliable scales for visual perspective, 
item present, plausibility and detail. Judges showed poor agreement on 
the visual perspective of drawings and on whether the named item (that 
was going to be bought in the shop) was visible in the drawing. Judges’ 
agreement on the level of detail in drawings was good. Judges’ agreement 
on plausibility was adequate. On this basis, further analyses on group 
differences between judgements on the detail and plausibility of drawings 
made by liars and truth tellers were carried out. Reliability statistics for 
drawing ratings by three judges are shown in Table 7.4. 
 
Table 7.4 
Reliability of Detail, Plausibility, Viewpoint and Item-present Judgements 
Variable Scale Statistic 
 Judges 
 1 vs.2 2 vs. 3 1 vs. 3 
Detail 1–7 ICC *  .72 .84 .76 
Plausibility 1–7  .66 .54 .70 
Viewpoint  Shoulder, above Kappa  .39 .38 .21 
Item present  Yes, no  .40 .50 .34 
Note * Intra-class correlation (average measures) 
 
Phase 1: Discrimination. The mean of the three judges ratings were 
used to compute a variable for plausibility and a variable for level of detail. 
Independent samples t-tests on details ratings showed that drawings 
made by liars were judged to be less detailed (M = 2.62, SD = .98) 
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compared to drawings made by truth tellers (M = 3.32, SD = 1.33), t(70) = 
2.53, p = .01. There was no difference in the perceived plausibility of 
drawings between liars (M = 3.06, SD = 1.23) and truth tellers (M = 3.55, 
SD = 1.39), t(70) = -1. 59, p = .12. 
 
Phase 2: Discrimination. Two judges agreed on the presence or 
absence of bystanders in all but two drawings, which were resolved by 
further discussion. The frequency with which bystanders were depicted by 
liars and truth tellers in 72 drawings is shown in Table 7.5. Two cells had 
an expected count less than 5 so that a Fisher’s Exact Test was more 
suitable than a Chi-square test to analyse these data. Results showed that 
the frequency with which bystanders were depicted in drawings did not 
differ between liars (8.33%) and truth tellers (13.88%), p = .36, 1-sided.  
 
Table 7.5 
Crosstabulation of Bystanders In 72 Drawings  
Bystanders Liars Truth tellers 
Present 3 5 
Absent 33 31 
 
Discussion 
Study 5(b) was carried out to examine the extent to which the level of 
detail, perceived plausibility, drawing perspective (over the shoulder, from 
above) and the presence of a named item could be used as cues to 
deception in drawings about future scenarios. Drawings were sketches of 
a future event that was planned but not carried out. Participants in study 
5(a) drew themselves carrying out the task they had planned. The specific 
instruction was for each person to show his or herself standing in the 
college shop at the shelf where they were choosing the item they had 
gone to the shop to buy. Drawings were depicting either real plans (truth 
tellers) or a scenario that was intended to mask the true purpose of the 
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visit to the shop (liars). Reliability of two measures:  item present and 
visual perspective could not be established. The more subjective 
measures of plausibility and detail were shown to be reliable between the 
three judges. An independent samples t-test showed that detail ratings 
differed between drawings made by truth tellers and liars. However judges’ 
did not perceive liars and truth tellers’ drawings to differ in terms of how 
plausible these were where plausibility was defined as I can imagine the 
sender being in this place. There was no difference in the extent to which 
bystanders were shown in drawings made by truth tellers or liars. 
 
The three judges’ agreement on plausibility (ICCs .54, .66, .70) was more 
reliable than previous research in which the same definition of plausibility 
was employed, e.g. Vrij et al. (2010) reported inter rater reliability of .48 
and significant results on the basis of these plausibility ratings. In this 
study the ICC was more reliable but nevertheless the plausibility did not 
differ between groups. On the basis of differing results for plausibility and 
detail, it seems likely that judges were rating these as separate constructs 
but the exact mechanisms underlying judges’ ratings for plausibility are not 
clear from the results of this experiment. If better reliability had been found 
for the item-present variable, it would have been interesting to correlate 
this with plausibility, since this was found to be significant in previous 
research (Vrij et al., 2010). However overall, results from study 3(b) 
highlight the difficulties of making plausibility decisions about other people. 
Even though judges shared some experience with senders - they attended 
the same university and were familiar with the location in which drawings 
were made - group differences in plausibility were not found.  
 
Research based on a small sample has indicated that visual perspective in 
deceptive drawings made about past events is related to a viewpoint as 
seen from above. Had there been better agreement between judges on 
visual perspective, it would have been interesting to compare the 
perceived over the shoulder, from above with self-rated own/observer 
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visual perspective ratings obtained in study 5(a). Future research would do 
well to train judges to recognise what constitutes a top down or over the 
shoulder drawing. Some degree of training with feedback may have 
improved the reliability of this measure.  
 
To my knowledge, only one other study has investigated group differences 
on drawings obtained from the experimental design employed in study 
5(a). In this design, 117 judges recruited on Mechanical Turk answered a 
single question on abstractness or concreteness based on construal level 
theory. Agreement between raters was high .935. While theoretically 
interesting, the authors note that the results may have been influenced by 
the valence of the two conditions. Positivity is linked to abstraction and 
negativity to concreteness (Eyal, Liberman, Trope & Walther, 2004). 
Although liars were more emotionally aroused in study 3(a), there were no 
group differences in self-rated emotional valence, thus it seems unlikely 
that emotional valence impacted on the drawing task in this experiment.  
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7.6 On a Mission General Discussion 
In this study it was assumed that intentions (intended, not intended) would 
map onto psycho-legal investigations of veracity (truth tellers, liars). The 
study also extends findings on intended/not intended past and future at a 
distance of two weeks (study 1b). While the design of study 5(b) provided 
a method by which to investigate a temporally-close, immediate future 
scenario using a validated paradigm, intention in this study was not 
veridical. So far as I know, no participant arrived in the laboratory with a 
pre-existing intention to visit the college shop or to successfully carry out a 
mock crime.  
 
While deception detection is not the primary interest of this thesis, the 
studies that form this PhD may go some way towards answering calls in 
the psycho-legal literature that investigations into intention would benefit 
from a clearer understanding of latent processes of holding an intention to 
carry out an act. Study 1(b), (c), (d) indicated that when participants 
sampled events that were experienced or not experienced (past) or were 
intended or not intended (future), self-rated phenomenology and number 
of words used to describe the events was differentiated by the intention to 
carry out (future) or to have carried out (experienced past) these activities.  
study 5 replicated the word count finding of Granhag and Knieps 2011 and 
extended this by manipulating the temporal order in which participants 
described the intended action (chronological, reverse). Results indicated 
that the reverse temporal order instruction did not lead to group 
differences in statement length. This finding was in line with one other 
study to have used the reverse temporal order instruction (Fenn et al., 
2015). 
 
Results showed that liars were more likely to use a cover story that was 
physically located close to the place where the mock crime was due to be 
carried out. Results supported previous research that has indicated 
statements are longer and drawings judged as more detailed when events 
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are intended. Visual perspective proved difficult to rate in this study. 
Contemporary thinking is that numerous factors can be shown to influence 
the perspective with which both memories and future thoughts are 
generated. These include the types of cues used and individual 
differences in spatial imagery. It would be interesting to see if these factors 
known to influence visual perspective in mental time travel can also be 
shown to vary in drawings of truly intended events. Training and feedback 
for judges would be essential to improve the poor reliability for two of the 
measures used to examine drawings: visual perspective and item present. 
The drawings made in study 5(b) have not been examined for differences 
in construal level and would be suitable for use in a replication of the 
recent study by Calderon and colleagues (2018) in which judges found 
liars drawings to be more abstractly represented.  
 
Since there was no evidence of phenomenological group differences, it 
could be that this paradigm did not elicit episodic future thinking. This 
seems unlikely as the autonoetic measure received ratings at the higher 
end of the scale (Ms: liars, 4.67, truth tellers, 4.26). Another explanation is 
that making a drawing of the future event in between the verbal interview 
and the rating task affected the way that the simulation was subsequently 
evaluated. Granhag & Knieps (2011; 2014) found that truth tellers were 
more likely to have formed a mental image during planning than liars. In 
this study, participants described the future event, made a drawing and 
then rated the phenomenology of the event so that autonoesis was 
measured by scales and not by asking the mental image question. It could 
be that in making the drawing, disruption was brought to bear on self -
assessment of the phenomenological variables, eliminating group 
differences in the subjective ratings that were made immediately 
afterwards. A recent study in which photographs were contrasted with 
verbal cues to generate future representations in familiar vs. unfamiliar 
locations showed that photographic cues constrained rather than 
enhanced self-reported sensory details when scenarios were in familiar 
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settings (and did not lead to enhancement of scenarios for unfamiliar 
locations) (Bays, Wellen & Greenberg, 2018). A third interpretation is that 
the manipulation was successful: all participants used episodic future 
thinking, regardless of whether or not they were concealing their intentions 
in the interviews and drawings and thus there were no group differences.  
 
One direction for future research could be to investigate temporally close 
future events set within one hour that are intended or not intended without 
the element of concealing true intention. It would be interesting to 
manipulate the scene vs. event perspectives when asking about plans. 
Another way to ascertain the extent to which episodic foresight was 
engaged would be to examine the content of statements for internal and 
external details using coding adapted from the Autobiographical Interview 







The book advances four main theoretical entities: scripts, plans, 
goals and themes. Each of the four is somewhat less well defined 
than its immediate predecessor. We feel we really understand 
scripts, are pretty sure about plans, somewhat less certain about 
goals and completely uncertain what lies beyond that. Nonetheless, 
we feel strongly that our ideas are significant enough to warrant 
publication. We hope that the reader will allow for the imperfections 
of work that is still in its infancy. 
From the introduction to Scripts, Goals, Plans and Understanding (Schank 
& Abelson, 1977)  
 
The aim of the research presented in this thesis is to tap into processes of 
veridicality in mental time travel. In doing so, careful attempts have been 
made to identify stimuli that can be used to prompt both salient and not 
salient events in the recent past and near and more distant future. The 
argument that the autonoetic component of mental time travel can be 
independent of episodic future thinking has been advanced in recent 
literature. Klein (2012) has suggested that a sense of self is derived from a 
combination of faculties that reach beyond episodic or semantic memory 
and include the ability to experience continuity of personal identity through 
time. An attempt has been made to tap into such processes using novel 
methods. Research in this thesis has shown that salient events set two 
weeks and one year into the future are vividly more similar than events 
that are imagined but not truly anticipated to occur (study 3).  Events set 
two weeks around the present that varied by salience were more similar in 
their phenomenology in study 1(b) and these findings were echoed in the 
shorter measure of subjective characteristics used in study 4(b).    
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This thesis also draws on current and recent literature that has been 
interested in the absence or presence of hallmarks of intention in applied 
contexts. The need to find new innovations in deception detection means 
that researchers working in this field of psychological science are not 
afraid to try new methods, sometimes ahead of theoretical understanding. 
The application of drawings as a means to capture hallmarks of intention 
is one such new direction. In the research in this thesis, participants in 
study 4 made drawings of intended and not intended events in the past 
and future. These were viewed and rated by judges, who employed 
methods from psycho legal research to evaluate this material. Results 
added to a very small literature on drawings made of events that vary by 
the presence or absence of real intention or experience. This study also 
provides a useful comparison point for detection deception researchers 
interested in contrasting no intention with the concealment of intention. In 
study 5 an entirely novel contribution to this literature has been made. To 
my knowledge, only one other study has been published that reports 
analyses of deceptive and truthful drawings made about future events 
(Calderon et al., 2018). These authors drew on construal level theory to 
pose a single question to multiple raters. Study 5 of this thesis reports the 
results of a number of measures that are currently of interest within the 
field: detail, perceived plausibility, drawing perspective (over the shoulder, 
from above) the number of bystanders present and the presence of a 
target item. These measures have their origins in a similar literature to 
memory and future thinking science in that they draw on internal 
processes such as visual perspective or reality monitoring to understand 
the phenomenology of the self.  
 
This thesis shows that participants can simulate and describe events that 
they have not experienced or do not have any intention to carry out in 
specific spatio-temporal contexts. Comparisons between these not-
believed simulations and pre- or re-experiencing believed events are 
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striking. Belief in the occurrence of events rather than temporal direction or 
distance has been shown to significantly enhance self-ratings of the 
phenomenology of mental time travel. These studies add to the emerging 
picture that belief in occurrence is an important consideration when asking 
participants to think about the personal past and future. These studies also 
add to psycho-legal literature that has explored whether hallmarks of true 
intention can be identified by showing the phenomenology of future 
thinking where intention is absent (studies 1, 3 and 4) or concealed (study 
5). It is possible that these studies lead to more questions than they 
answer, since attempts to apply new methods of detecting deception in 
drawings proved to be unreliable for the most part. Results show how 
difficult it is to establish inter-rater reliability for measuring plausibility of 
both verbal and pictorial material. However the finding that the perceived 
level of detail could discriminate deceptive from truthful drawings is an 
entirely new contribution to this literature. 
 
8.1 Overview of research 
Key findings of each experiment are now outlined, followed by a summary 
of results (8.2), theoretical implications of the thesis (8.3), practical and 
applied implications (8.4) and avenues for future research (8.5). 
 
Study 1 The prospective experience of a future event that is seen as a 
real and expected event that will form part of a continuum of personal 
experience was shown to feel as vivid as remembering an experienced 
event in the recent past when measured by self-rated autonoesis, and 
sensory and spatial qualities. These differences were also shown in longer 
statements. Study 1(c) examined the plausibility and likelihood of 
transcripts from study 1(b) when rated by third parties. Real memories 
were seen as more detailed than descriptions of imagined but not 
experienced past events. Descriptions of future acts that were believed to 
be likely to happen were seen as similarly plausible and likely as merely 
imagined future events when evaluated by judges. No firm conclusions 
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about what informs judgements of plausibility and likelihood could be 
drawn from transcripts of verbal interviews on past and future activities 
that were examined in this study. This finding highlights the need for future 
research and theory-driven explanation of how plausibility operates in 
interpersonal judgements. 
 
Study 2 The impact of intention as a potential mnemonic was explored in 
a series of two pilot studies and three experiments. Words encoded in the 
context of the future are better remembered than atemporal or past 
scenarios (Klein et al., 2010). Study 2 extended this finding to see whether 
the salience of a believed event set two months in the future would act as 
a mnemonic. Results showed that the relatedness of word lists to an 
encoding scenario led to preferential recall regardless of belief in current 
plans. However the design lacked a control condition and may have 
lacked power. This study did not examine the impact of event salience on 
susceptibility to false memories, which would be a plausible next step for 
this research. 
 
Study 3 The salience of plans and goals was operationalized as if it were 
analogous to true intention at a distance of two weeks and one year. 
Results showing that significant differences in the vividness of episodic 
future thinking and autonoesis were related to salience more than 
temporal distance. This study also confirmed that the ability to identify 
events that are believed to represent the anticipated future can be 
extended to a distance of one year. 
 
Study 4 The application of drawings as a means to capture hallmarks of 
intention is arguably a new direction. Participants in study 4 made 
drawings of intended and not intended events in the past and future which 
were viewed and rated by judges who employed methods from psycho-
legal research to evaluate this material. Results added to a very small 
literature on drawings made of events that vary by the presence or 
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absence of real intention or experience. This study also makes a useful 
comparison point for detection deception researchers interested in 
contrasting no intention with the concealment of intention. 
 
Study 5 When someone is deliberately deceiving another person about a 
temporally-close event by using a cover story, drawings may be less 
detailed and statements relaying the chronological order of events may be 
longer but there is no evidence of any variance in episodic future thinking 
in terms of autonoesis, sensory, spatial or narrative qualities. 
 
8.2 Summary of results 
When studying episodic future thinking with younger adults aged 20–30, 
the degree to which the event is believed to be going to occur will impact 
on the quality of the simulation and description of the event. Evidence for 
this is found in higher ratings for autonoesis, sensory and spatial qualities, 
longer verbal statements and more detailed drawings and descriptions as 
rated by others. Study 1(d) showed that contextualising the judgements by 
making raters aware that events varied on the basis of belief in occurrence 
enhanced the ability of raters to detect a level of detail that had been 
previously confirmed by transcript senders. 
 
The impact of intention at two weeks also held when events were set at 
two weeks and one year but varied only by personal salience. The 
difference in believed and not believed past and future events was 
replicated with younger participants aged 16–18, who simulated then drew 
real and imagined past and future events and reported that mental time 
travel varied on the basis of belief in occurrence. However, age and 
education-matched judges were not able to agree on what constituted 
detail, plausibility or the presence of bystanders within the drawings. 
 
Having the intention to carry out an act in the future does not act as a 
mnemonic. The extent to which this paradigm engaged processes of 
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episodic future thinking during encoding is not known. Similarly, the extent 
to which participants in study 5 were using pre-experiencing is not clear 
but certainly this did not vary on the basis of intention to carry out a mock 
crime.  
 
Some of the findings of the thesis were at odds with current literature. For 
example, it was not possible to obtain reliability for judgements on the 
plausibility of past or future events when these varied on the basis of belief 
in occurrence. This measure has been reported to be able to discriminate 
true and deceptive descriptions of future events with 70% accuracy (Vrij, 
Granhag, et al., 2011; Vrij, Leal, et al., 2011). The number of bystanders 
found in deceptive (study 5) and not-intended (study 4) drawings was not 
indicative of any variance in participants. In study 4 events differed in the 
number of bystanders that might be expected to be present (for example, 
a cinema trip compared to trying a new recipe). However, care was taken 
to use raters who were age-matched to drawing senders so that 
plausibility judgements might be contextualised by shared experience. 
This did not lead to more reliable estimates of plausibility, which in itself is 
a significant finding.  
 
8.3 Theoretical implications of the thesis 
The studies in this thesis provide evidence that mental representations of 
personal events across time vary on the basis of belief in occurrence. An 
examination of the detection of hallmarks of veridical belief using methods 
taken from recent psycho-legal research has been carried out. On the 
basis of the results reported here, reliable objective hallmarks of belief in 
occurrence are elusive. This is perhaps to be expected, given that memory 
is not a faithful record of real experience but is a generative process. Very 
strong evidence would be needed to show that its corollary in prospection 
could be objectively reliable. Thinking about the future can only ever be 
imagining, since future representations have not been verified by time. 
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Thus finding that future scenarios can be differentiated in terms of 
personal belief in occurrence is surprising, and providing evidence that 
veridical belief in occurrence leads to qualitative differences in contextual 
and perceptual aspects of prospection is even more surprising. These 
results make a significant contribution to the literature on memory and 
future thinking and suggest that cues used in this type of research should 
be carefully considered in light of the extent to which will be likely to 
engage veridical belief in occurrence.   
 
8.3 i Past vs. future.  Previous research contrasting prospection with 
recollection has shown a pattern of results that suggests that past events 
are characterised by heightened perceptual and spatial vividness, 
whereas future events elicit somewhat reduced phenomenology but 
heightened significance in terms of positive valence and greater personal 
importance (Addis et al., 2007; Berntsen & Jacobson, 2008, D’Argembeau 
& Van der Linden, 2006; Ernst & D’Argembeau, 2017; McDonough & 
Gallo, 2010; Spreng & Levine, 2006). Studies 1 and 4 examined 
prospection and recollection of believed and not-believed events at a 
distance of two weeks around the present. By introducing variance in 
belief in occurrence, the results of study 1b showed a different pattern to 
that found in previous literature. Believed events were more vivid whether 
they were set two weeks in the past or two weeks in the future. This 
pattern affected perceptual features such as visual, auditory, olfactory and 
gustatory variables. Believed events were contextualised as more 
important, desirable, coherent and more positive in valence, regardless of 
whether these were recent memories or believed events set in the near 
future. Believed events were also accompanied by a greater sense of 
mental time travel whereas the second component of the autonoetic 




This pattern of main effects of belief was replicated in study 4, where 
participants completed a much shorter measure of phenomenology to 
contrast believed and not believed events, again set two weeks in the past 
and future. This time, sixth form pupils aged 16–18 rated the subjective 
features of these recent-past and near-future events. They also drew 
pictures depicting the events they had envisaged. Self-ratings of the 
subjective experience of these simulations showed that visual details, 
sense of location and awareness of the spatial location of people and 
objects were stronger during simulations of believed events, and these 
variables also showed a smaller effect of time (past > future) but no 
interaction. It is possible that this may have been an unintentional artefact 
of the drawing task, which could have made spatial aspects of events 
more salient in some way. The limitations of using drawings in research 
will be discussed later in this chapter. Taken together, the overall pattern 
found in the results of studies 1 and 4 is that belief had a larger effect than 
temporal direction on the perceptual and contextual phenomenology of 
these simulations. Furthermore, while p/re-experiencing showed main 
effects of belief and time qualified by interactions in both of these studies, 
the mental time travel component of the autonoesis measure varied only 
on the basis of belief in occurrence. 
 
It has been posited that an episodic memory is distinguishable from a 
merely imagined event on the basis that it is accompanied by autonoesis, 
defined as a subjective awareness of a prior conscious state. This denotes 
that what is being remembered must have happened before (Tulving, 
1983; 1985; Wheeler et al., 1997). Reality monitoring theory indicates re-
experiencing is an important marker of veracity when remembering the 
past (Johnson & Raye, 1981; Foley, 2018). Autonoetic featu res have 
received less examination than other aspects of episodic future thinking, 
(see D’Argembeau, 2016, for a useful summary). There is some evidence 
that different mechanisms underlie belief in accuracy, belief in occurrence 
and autonoetic experience in memory compared to future thinking (Ernst & 
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D’Argembeau, 2017). However, in Ernst & D’Argembeau’s study the two 
components of autonoesis were combined and reported as one construct, 
so that it is not possible to compare findings. The results of the studies in 
this thesis suggest there is variance in the component processes of 
autonoesis between episodic future thinking and episodic memories. The 
sense of p/reliving was stronger in believed past events compared to 
believed future (although both types of believed events elicited more p/re-
living compared to not-believed events). The sense of the second 
component of autonoesis, mental time travel, did not differ between 
believed past and believed future simulations (although, again, this was 
stronger in all believed events, irrespective of temporal direction).  
 
These findings speak to the observation that the experiential component of 
mental time travel might persist in memories because belief in occurrence 
is a separate judgement (Klein, 2016). The design of Studies 1 and 4 
essentially pits the re-experiencing of recent past events against pre-
experiencing anticipated events in the near future. Results suggest that in 
this paradigm, one component of the autonoesis measure, mental time 
travel, was particularly sensitive to the effects of belief in occurrence, 
regardless of the temporal direction of the event, past or future. It could be 
that the sense of having travelled in time, relative to the sense of p/re-
experiencing an event, was less important to establishing when an event 
took place. That would make this component of autonoesis more 
vulnerable to source confusions of the type highlighted by the Clinton 
example given in the introduction to this thesis. The scenario mistakenly 
described as a memory by Clinton may have elicited a greater sense of 
mental time travel during encoding, leading to source confusion so that, 
years later, that future simulation was recounted as a memory.  
 
The results of studies 1 and 4 suggest that the p/re-experiencing 
component that indexes a sense of re-living or pre-living at a specific 
moment in time is sensitive to belief in occurrence and also to temporal 
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direction. This suggests that the p/re-experiencing component of 
autonoesis is a more accurate orienting marker than mental time travel, 
and that it may also be less vulnerable to source confusion, at least when 
the event being thought about is set at a distance of two weeks around the 
present. Alternative explanations for the Clinton example could be related 
to self-reference and/or the survival nature of the scenario (Nairne & 
Pandeirada, 2016; Dewhurst et al., 2017) at encoding or an enhanced 
propensity for the associative nature of future thinking to lead to false 
memories (Dewhurst et al, 2016; 2019). 
 
8.3 ii Temporal distance. Studies 1 and 4 contrasted past and future 
events at two weeks with parallel findings that autonoesis and some 
contextualising phenomenology varied on the basis of belief in occurrence. 
Study 2 examined intention as a mnemonic at a distance of two months, 
using three encoding scenarios but with null results. It may be that the 
impact of psychological distance was a critical factor to the experimental 
design (Trope & Liberman, 2003; Liberman & Trope, 2014). Consider the 
phenomenon of enhanced mental clarity and elevated focus the day 
before a deadline compared to the more gist-like thinking about work to be 
completed in three weeks’ time. It may be that events set close to the 
present are more likely to impact on mnemonic processes (as might be 
suggested by the Clinton scenario).  
 
It seems likely that extending study 2 by manipulating intention at a shorter 
distance from the present and comparing intended and not intended future 
scenarios to past or control encoding conditions might make for a more 
reliable assessment of the impact of intention on recall. Another variable of 
interest might be emotional arousal or threat perception, which could lead 
to variance in mnemonic features of pre-experiencing events set close in 
time that vary on the basis of intention. However one clear avenue for 
further research is signposted by the evidence that associative features of 
future thinking lead to greater susceptibility to false lures (Dewhurst et al., 
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2016; 2019). Measuring correct and false recall in recent past and future 
events that vary on the basis of belief in occurrence scenarios could be a 
fruitful new direction were this series of studies to be extended. In such a 
study, obtaining self-ratings of the imagined scene would enable further 
examination of how autonoetic and phenomenological variables differ 
between these conditions when events are set close in time. However the 
time-consuming and effortful nature of obtaining scenarios that reliably 
index intention is made clear in the multiple pilot studies of this thesis, 
which is one drawback to this type of research. 
 
One way to access belief in occurrence is to ask participants to identify 
current plans and goals that they are already working towards in the 
present moment and can anticipate happening at a given distance in the 
future (Emmons, 1986; Lehner & D’Argembeau , 2016). This method was 
used to cue simulations of the future in study 3. Globally plausible future 
events were set two weeks and one year in the future and varied on the 
basis of how salient these were as current plans or goals. Results showed 
that perceptual features such as audition, olfaction and gustatory/tactile 
self-ratings varied on the basis of goal-relatedness. However, to a lesser 
extent they were also enhanced by temporal proximity. By contrast, clarity 
and spatial dimensions including familiarity of place, people and objects 
varied by goal-relatedness but not by temporal distance. Both components 
of autonoesis (pre-experiencing and mental time travel) varied on the 
basis of belief in occurrence but not by temporal distance. These results 
are in line with findings by Lehner and D’Argembeau (2016), who 
contrasted own goals with experimenter-generated cues (analogous to 
non-goals) without constraining temporal distance. Results showed similar 
levels of detail and vividness and the goal-relatedness of events enhanced 
ratings for autonoesis, which was strongly predicted by the importance of 
these imagined events for personal goals. Study 3 extends these findings 
to show that belief in occurrence of events up to a year ahead engages 
similar autonoetic and contextual features of prospection.  
 275 
 
The pattern of variance in contextual but not perceptual features on the 
basis of belief in the occurrence of future events is similar to the features 
of believed memories in contrast to real memories. Recollections (real 
memories) have stronger perceptual features (sensory features) and 
receive higher ratings for autonoesis. Memories can be endorsed as 
believed when they are accompanied by contextual information relating to 
the setting but the sense of re-living is absent (Johnson et al., 1988; Rubin 
et al., 2003). However the difference in these findings is that believed 
future representations in study 3 received higher ratings for both 
dimensions of the autonoetic variable: pre-living and mental time travel. 
Autobiographical memories compared to veridical future thoughts in 
studies 1 and 4 received higher ratings for p/re-living. The sense of mental 
time travel was not distinguished by temporal direction, only by veridicality. 
In study 3 both types of autonoesis were elevated by veridical anticipation 
and not affected by temporal distance. This suggests that autonoesis is an 
important factor in how episodic future thoughts vary on the basis of belief 
in occurrence and might hint at how it is that people can endorse a future 
event as ‘real’ or ‘true’. It was therefore of considerable interest to see how 
autonoesis varied between future thinking for imminent believed events in 
contrast to future thinking for events that necessitated forming a cover 
plan. This comparison informed the design of study 5. 
 
8.3iii Deception detection. The final study in the thesis addressed the 
potential application of the findings of studies 1–4 to the detection of 
deception about future events. The design reduced the temporal distance 
of the target event quite considerably. Prospection in this paradigm was 
for an event anticipated to occur within one hour. On the basis of studies 
1, 3 and 4, the sense of mental time travel for this future event might be 
expected to vary between believed and not-believed simulations of plans. 
However there were no differences in phenomenology, whether perceptual 
or contextual, other than heightened emotional arousal in liars. Self -ratings 
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also indicated no difference in autonoesis between liars and truth tel lers. 
This suggests that episodic future thinking was not engaged at all. This is 
not at odds with previous findings using the Gothenberg deception design 
(outlined in detail in the introduction to study 5a). These have not found a 
reliable thread of evidence for autonoesis in this paradigm, which will now 
be summarised.  
 
The first experiment using the Gothenberg design showed that truth tellers 
were more likely to have formed a mental image of their plan, which was 
accompanied by higher ratings for autonoetic and sensory variables 
(Granhag & Knieps, 2011). However an extension of the study in which 
questioning was repeated one week after the planning phase failed to 
replicate differences in the phenomenology between truth tellers and liars 
beyond truth tellers reporting a greater sense of location for the place in 
which they would carry out their plan (Knieps et al., 2013). A further study 
manipulated the familiarity of the location of the planned event and found 
no difference in autonoesis and little in phenomenology, except that liars 
reported a greater sense of the location of people and objects (they were 
looking out for a secret agent). Truth tellers were more likely to have 
formed a mental image and reported more visual and olfactory qualities 
within this mental image of their plans (Knieps et al., 2014). These results 
suggest that the Gothenberg method does not elicit the autonoetic 
component of simulating an event in the future or a reliable pattern of 
phenomenological differences between truthful and lied-about plans. This 
may be because of the goal-relatedness of both tasks, which engender 
similar levels of subjective characteristics, removing any discriminant 
function of self-ratings in this paradigm. One way to test this would be to 
incorporate a control condition to the design that produced a simulation of 
the future activity with no goal-related features. However an alternative 
explanation for the null findings of subjective differences in study 5 is that 
the inclusion of a drawing task carried out between simulating the plan and 
rating the features of the plan reduced the availability of the subjective 
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sense of what it had been like to think through the event in advance. This 
highlights the potential confounding effect of using drawings in research. 
The practical or applied implications of the findings of this research will 
now be discussed. 
 
8.4 Practical or applied implications of the research  
The second strand of research in this thesis was concerned with the 
extent to which other people can identify veridical intention in statements 
and drawings. This has potential real-world application in criminal 
investigations if the goal of investigators is to apprehend suspects before 
they have enacted a planned crime. If deceptive statements intended to 
conceal true intention could be reliably identified, theoretically this science 
might be applied to prevent a range of planned criminal behaviour 
(Clemens et al., 2011; Granhag & Mac Giolla, 2014). Examples include 
pre-meditated crime, financial fraud, and participation in radicalisation or 
acts of terrorism. Methods to detect intention could be incorporated into 
stop and search protocols in the street or developed for use by security 
personnel at airports. Protocols might be created in order to predict which 
patients are likely to adhere to treatments and which are not. We live in an 
age in which big data analysis is increasingly common in government, 
research and commercial settings, raising many ethical issues (Ajana, 
2015). Reliable methods to predict behaviour could improve the 
profitability of insurance businesses or be used to create medical criteria 
to assess an individual’s risk of developing certain diseases or their 
likelihood of maintaining habits that are likely to impact on health across 
the lifespan. The potential application of psychological research examining 
the predictive reliability of belief in occurrence is clear. However the 
research in this thesis does not support the hypothesis that hallmarks of 
belief or intention can be identified, let alone that intentions can reliably 
predict behaviour.  
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Protocols to make predictive judgements are already being developed and 
tested based on their suitability for use in security contexts, for example 
for use by security personnel at airports (Sooniste et al., 2016; Warmelink, 
Vrij, Mann, Leal, Forrester & Fisher, 2011) and other transport hubs (Mac 
Giolla, Ask, Granhag & Karlsson, 2019; Warmelink, Vrij, Mann, Jundi & 
Granhag, 2012). In addition to the ethical considerations raised by these 
potential applications, it has long been known by psychologists that 
intentions are poor predictors of subsequent behaviour, a phenomenon 
know as the intention-behaviour gap (see Sheeran & Webb, 2018). Even 
when plans or goals are accompanied by implementation intentions, more 
than half of intended behaviour is not enacted (Sheeran & Webb, 2016). 
Thus the findings of this thesis must be framed by strong caveats.  
 
We have long known that miscarriages of justice occur on the basis of 
unreliable eyewitness testimony and mistaken identification. We have 
evidence that memory experts and professionals whose work depends on 
the reliability of such testimony do not agree on what constitutes reliability 
of memories nor even which features suggest that memories are 
believable (Akhtar, Justice, Knott, Kibowski & Conway, 2018). It is clear 
that third-party judgments of plausibility, veracity and likelihood of 
occurrence about future events that are intended but have not yet taken 
place have an even greater potential to lead to miscarriages of justice. 
 
This thesis has addressed the question of whether believed and not-
believed events in the past and future can be accurately discriminated by 
other people, a type of interpersonal reality monitoring, (Johnson et al., 
1998). Sensory vividness and clarity are seen as hallmarks of credibility in 
statements (Colwell et al., 2007; Memon et al., 2010). However emotion 
and detail are not necessarily interpreted as hallmarks of credibility 
(Justice & Smith, 2018), especially when judges believe that they are 
being asked to make a credibility assessment (Nahari, 2017). Two types of 
rating task were examined in the thesis. The first looked at plausibility and 
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likelihood of occurrence without examining memory characteristics. In 
study 1c and 1d the content being judged was derived from verbatim 
transcripts of short descriptions of believed and fictitious (but not lied-
about) events (an example script can be seen in Appendix D). Judges had 
no contexualising information other than whether the event was set in the 
past or future. No definitions for plausibility and likelihood were given but 
judges wrote notes on what was informing their likelihood and plausibility 
ratings (presented in study 1c judges’ comments are presented in 
Appendix F1 and study 1d judges’ comments in Appendix F2). Results 
showed that it was not possible to establish inter-rater reliability for 
plausibility and likelihood ratings. Examined individually, both judges 
showed a positive bias for all events to be seen as plausible and likely. 
The second study included interpersonal reality monitoring by asking 
judges to examine visual detail and emotion alongside likelihood and 
plausibility. 
 
In study 1d judges were aware that events varied on the basis of the 
sender’s belief in occurrence, and they knew the design of the study from 
which the transcripts had been derived. Ratings for visual details proved 
reliable and showed that real memories were seen as containing more 
visual details, in line with reality monitoring criteria (Johnson et al., 1988). 
However judges saw visual details as undifferentiated in future events. 
Since these events were novel and had not been seen by the sender, 
other than in the mind’s eye, this finding seems quite reasonable. 
Similarly, there was insufficient inter-rater reliability between judges on 
emotional content or what constituted a likely or plausible event in future 
events, so no further analyses were carried out on these ratings. Since 
judges knew that these events were set in the future, they may have been 
more circumspect about making these judgements, or may have felt more 
able to make wild guesses. Reliability was acceptable for emotion and 
likelihood estimates of past events. Believed past events were seen as 
more likely to have occurred whereas emotional content was seen as 
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similar between believed and fictitious past events. Although these results 
do show some discrimination was possible for past but not future events, 
further analyses reported in 3.10 show that believed events received 
higher ratings at the cost of the correct discrimination of fictitious events, 
which also tended to be endorsed as true. Thus the layperson’s bias to 
believe events is clearly evident in these findings (Vrij, 2008). Support for 
the idea that descriptions of believed events set in the future can be 
correctly identified on the basis of plausibility is not supported on the basis 
of these results.  
 
8.4 i Drawings as a tool to detect belief or deception. Two of three 
methods of potentially finding hallmarks of belief in occurrence in future 
events have been discussed: 1. Judgements of the content of transcripts 
of descriptions of believed events compared to fictitious events (studies 1b 
and d). 2. The evidence that intention can be shown to operate as a 
mnemonic (study 2). The third method examined was the use of drawings 
(studies 4 and 5). Previous research has suggested that drawings may be 
a useful tool to detect deception or to elicit information in police interviews 
(Mac Giolla et al., 2017). These authors set out arguments to support the 
use of drawings as a complement to other methods during investigations. 
These include the observation that drawings can help to overcome 
language barriers during interviews, on the basis that they can and already 
are being used in interviews with asylum seekers and during interviews 
with sources or informants in intelligence settings (Vrij et al., 2018). Other 
advantages include the fact that drawings are convenient and easy to 
implement in research (and in the field) and that the use of drawings is 
popular with police officers.  
 
To illustrate this, two recent studies are described during which police 
were trained in ten innovative protocols for use in the detection of 
deception, one being the use of drawings (Vrij, Leal, Mann, Vernham, & 
Brankaert, 2015; Vrij, Mann, Leal, Vernham, & Vaughan, 2016). Results 
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showed that police officers preferred to use drawings over all of the nine 
other methods, although the discriminant ability of this method when used 
in these studies with mock suspects (i.e. cases in which ground truth was 
known) was not reported. Another recent study investigated methods by 
which police use statement inconsistency as a means to detect deception 
during interviews (Deep, Vrij, Hope, Mann, Granhag & Strömwall, 2018). 
When police officers were asked to explain how they had used 
inconsistency in drawings to determine whether the suspect was lying or 
not, 68% of officers said they had done so on at least one occasion. The 
reasons they gave (with percentage of respondents who endorsed each 
statement) were: correspondence between drawing and verbal statement 
(44%); correspondence between drawing and evidence (33%); improbable 
positioning of items within the drawing (14%); unwillingness/inability of the 
suspect to draw or complete the drawing (11%); other (14%). Thus 
drawings are already being used in the field and are popular with 
professionals whose job it is to obtain fair and reliable evidence. 
 
In study 4c, a range of methods taken from previous research on the use 
of drawings to detect deception was applied to drawings of real and 
fictitious (but not lied-about) events set two weeks around the present. 
These can be summarised as plausibility, detail and visual perspective, 
counts of the number of bystanders and estimates of the level of detail in 
which the bystanders are drawn (Mac Giolla et al., 2017; Vrij et al., 2012). 
The drawings derived from study 4b were of plausible personal events that 
varied only by temporal direction (past/future) and belief in occurrence 
(believed, fictitious). If these variables can distingu ish real from imagined 
events, such findings would provide evidence of hallmarks of veridical 
belief in past and future events. Note that the senders of the drawings had 
rated their subjective experience of simulating these events for one 
minute, with eyes closed. Believed events received higher self-ratings on 
indices of location, spatial layout of people and objects and visual details. 
However judgements of features found to be reliable in published research 
 282 
on the use of drawings to detect deception (about past events) were not 
valid or applicable to study 4 believed/not believed drawings (Vrij et al., 
2010).  
 
There was no difference in the number of bystanders in the drawings. 
Ratings on the level of detail in which bystanders were drawn did not form 
a reliable scale. Raters’ comments on bystander decisions showed that 
they had developed different criteria to decide which figure was the central 
actor (the sender) and which were the bystanders in each drawing. Were 
such methods to be used in applied settings, it would be important to 
establish the identity of the central figure before such judgements could be 
made. Plausibility ratings were made using a definition taken from 
previous research (I can imagine the sender being in this place). Since 
there was no reliability between raters on what constituted plausibility in 
the drawings, this suggests that this definition is not eliciting any type of 
clear judgment, let alone one that encapsulates plausibility. Reliability 
could not be established for detail or the viewpoint from which the 
drawings were depicted. It is notable that the similar experimental design 
used in study 1b, which employed comparable cues to elicit verbal (rather 
than pictorial) descriptions of similar events, yielded content in text form. In 
study 1d, detail ratings formed a reliable scale, on the basis of which detail 
was perceived by judges to be higher in believed past (but not future) 
events. This suggests that drawings are not adding a useful measure on 
which to check consistency or supplement existing methods of assessing 
veridical belief in past or future events. Nor are they verified as a useful or 
accurate tool. On this basis, it seems unlikely that drawings are a good 
addition to an investigator’s toolkit when applied to identify deceptive 
content. This was tested in study 5b. 
 
The final experiment in this thesis was the only study directly to contrast 
truth with lies about an event set in the future. Participants completed a 
range of measures during a surprise interview before the planned activity 
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could be carried out. To my knowledge, only one other study has been 
published that reports discrimination of truth tellers and liars by drawings 
made during a future-oriented deception study (Calderon et al., 2018). The 
dimensions rated related to construal theory (Trope & Liberman, 2010). 
Results showed that liars’ drawings were more abstract and truth -tellers 
were more concrete when rated by 117 judges in an online presentation of 
the material. The examination of drawings using methods employed in 
previous research, some of which were tested in study 4c, was carried out 
on drawings made in study 5. Two judges viewed all drawings and 
counted the number of bystanders present in each scene. Three new 
judges rated detail, plausibility, visual perspective and the presence or 
absence of a critical item that had been stated in an interview to be the 
object that was central to what the drawing depicted. Thus this last 
question provided an opportunity to verify consistency between the 
statement and the drawing.  
 
Judges did not agree on visual perspective and nor could they agree on 
whether the critical item was shown in the drawing. Police officers’ use of 
drawings as a means by which to clarify statement inconsistency does not 
seem to be supported by this finding. However judges did agree on what 
constituted plausibility and detail in drawings and their ratings were used 
to compute a variable that showed that truth tellers’ drawings were more 
detailed but were not more plausible. Judges agreed on the number of 
bystanders in each drawing but this did not vary between true and 
deceptive drawings.  
 
These results suggest that plausibility is not a reliable construct when 
applied to believed (real) events (study 4c). Even when plausibility 
judgments formed a reliable scale, this could not discriminate truth from 
lies in drawings (study 5b). Study 5b did show that judgements of detail in 
drawings of a future event were reliable and were higher in drawings made 
by truth tellers compared to liars. To examine this finding further, future 
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research might address the issue of whether ratings for proficiency of 
drawings can also index true or believed events from not believed or lied-
about events. Before drawings can be used as reliable estimators of the 
content of witness and suspects statements, better understanding of what 
is being rated and the impact of drawing coherence or skill should be 
addressed.   
 
Reliability of judgements in these studies was more stringently assessed 
than in some previous literature examining deception detection about 
future events. Nevertheless, the evidence that drawings are reliable 
means by which to detect hallmarks of truth is not supported by the 
research in this thesis. Nearly all measures used in previously published 
research were unreliable. Or, when they were reliable, they did not identify 
or discriminate hallmarks of real events. There were no differences in self -
rated phenomenology of prospection in study 5a. Without a control 
condition to contrast the truth and lie conditions, it is not possible 
conclusively to state that these participants were not using episodic future 
thinking. Thus comparison between this study and study 4c may not be 
supported. As participants in study 4c did report variance in mental time 
travel on the basis of belief and time, and drawings were not able to reflect 
these differences, it seems unlikely that drawings are a reliable means by 
which to index belief or truth. 
 
8.5 Avenues for future research  
Whether thinking about the past or the future, travelling in time engages 
processes that are generative, associative and easily prone to errors. 
Recently a friend was telling me about watching a kite surfer landing on a 
beach this summer before tailing off mid-sentence. He had just realised 
that the scene he had been describing was in fact a video he had seen on 
the graphic screen of a treadmill at the gym. Psychologists have long 
known that this type of error can be explained by source confusion 
(Johnson, Hashtroudi, & Lindsay, 1993). Memories and thoughts about the 
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future are integral to the maintenance of the sense of self across time, an 
important constituent of wellbeing, but are inherently error-prone systems 
(MacLeod, 2017). Determining the reliability of memory is not an innate, 
common-sense skill (Akhtar et al., 2018). The research in the thesis has 
followed two main strands to examine how individuals endorse events in 
the past and in the future on the basis of belief in occurrence.  
 
The first strand in the thesis goes some way to answering a call to 
examine the impact of belief in occurrence on the architecture of memory 
and episodic future thinking (D’Argembeau, 2016; Ernst & D’Argembeau, 
2017; Lehner & D’Argembeau, 2016). Future directions for this research 
would be to examine the relationship between belief, autonoesis, and 
perceptual and contextual components of mental time travel (Rubin et al., 
2003). There is evidence that scene construction and personal 
significance contribute to the maintenance of a sense of self and identity 
across time (D’Argembeau, 2016; D’Argembeau & Van der Linden, 2012). 
Relatively little is known about the relationship between autonoesis and 
the architecture of prospection (Klein, 2016). In particular, results in the 
thesis suggest further investigation of whether the mental time travel and 
pre-experiencing components of autonoesis are differentiated by temporal 
direction and goal-relatedness. The relative contribution of semantic and 
episodic memory to these processes could be investigated by applying 
autobiographical interview coding to transcripts. The architecture of the 
anticipated future could be examined from developmental, clinical or 
neuropsychological perspectives. 
 
Thinking about the future is essential to psychological wellbeing and goal 
attainment but this capacity is subject to variance in certain populations or 
circumstances (MacLeod, 2017). Hypothetical thinking about possible 
futures and possible selves that may never happen is part of the 
processing that enables a coherent sense of self (D’Argembeau et al., 
2012; Hamilton & Cole, 2017; Lardi et al., 2010; Markus & Nurius, 1986). It 
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would be interesting to extend this research to populations who 
experience a reduced or discontinuous experience of coherent identity 
across time. Hypothetically this might occur through a number of 
processes such as complicated grief, experience of migration, gender 
change, acquired brain injury, trauma, or illness. Perceived changes in 
identity and self direction can lead to derailment, the sense that the you 
are not living the life that you were expecting (Burrow, Hill, Ratner, & 
Fuller-Rowell, 2018). Studies 1, 3 and 4 of this thesis might be extended to 
address the relationship between derailment and cognition, expectancies, 
goals and prospection (Ratner, Mendle, Burrow & Thoemmes, 2018).  
 
Study 3 showed that prospection for goals and plans was similarly vivid, 
so that the impact of belief in occurrence made these events highly 
accessible and vivid. The example given in the introduction of Hilary 
Clinton confusing an imagined future event as an experienced memory 
shows how vivid plans might lead to errors in cognition. The associative 
nature of future thinking may lead to a liberal bias for associative thinking 
with a correspondent reduction in accuracy and this may have adaptive 
benefits (Dewhurst et al., 2016; 2018; Schacter, Guerin & St Jacques, 
2011). Extending study 2 to examine the impact of belief in occurrence on 
future-oriented encoding measured by correct recall and susceptibility to 
lures is one direction for future studies.  
 
A detailed critique of the reliability of drawings as a tool to detect true 
intention and possible means by which to test reliability has been outlined 
in this chapter. Further research to identify whether drawings are a reliable 
index of intention and belief in occurrence is needed before such tools 
should be applied. In particular, the relationship between drawing 
proficiency and coherence of the scene depicted would be a suggested 
next step. The constituent components of what constitu tes plausibility 
when judging the content of written or pictorial evidence is particularly of 
interest. The reliability of this method of interpersonal reality monitoring 
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(Johnson et al., 1998) should be established before these methods are 
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Finnbogadóttir, H. & Berntsen, D. (2014). Looking at life from different 
angles: Observer perspective during remembering and imagining distinct 
emotional events. Psychology of Consciousness: Theory, Research, and 
Practice, 1, 387–406. DOI: 10.1037/cns0000029 
 
Fisher, R. P., & Geiselman, R. E. (1992). Memory enhancing techniques 
for investigative interviewing: The cognitive interview. Springfield: Charles 
C. Thomas. 
 
Foley, M. A. (2015). Setting the records straight: Impossible memories and 
the persistence of their phenomenological qualities. Review of General 
Psychology, 19(3), 230-248. 
 
Foley, M. A. (2018). Reflecting on how we remember the personal past: 
Missing components in the study of memory appraisal and theoretical 
implications. Memory, 26(5), 634–652. DOI: 
10.1080/09658211.2017.1387667 
 
Förster, J., Friedman, R. S., & Liberman, N. (2004). Temporal Construal 
Effects on Abstract and Concrete Thinking: Consequences for Insight and 




Gerlach, K., Spreng, N., Madore, K., Schacter, D. (2014). Future planning: 
default network activity couples with frontoparietal control network and 
reward-processing regions during process and outcome simulations. 
Social Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience, 9 (12), 1942-1951.  
 
Gilbert, D. T. & Wilson, T. D. (2007). Prospection: Experiencing the future. 
Science, 317, 1351–1354. 
 
Goddard, L., Dritschel, B. & Burton, A. (1996). Role of autobiographical 
memory in social problem solving and depression. Journal of Abnormal 
Psychology, 105 (4), 609–616. 
 
Goddard, L., Dritschel, B., & Burton, A. (1997). Social problem-solving and 
autobiographical memory in non-clinical depression. British Journal of 
Clinical Psychology, 36, 449–451. 
 
Goddard, L., Dritschel, B. & Burton, A. (1996). Role of autobiographical 
memory in social problem solving and depression. Journal of Abnormal 
Psychology, 105 (4), 609–616. 
 
Goddard, L., Dritschel, B., & Burton, A. (1997). Social problem-solving and 
autobiographical memory in non-clinical depression. British Journal of 
Clinical Psychology, 36, 449–451. 
 
Goff, L. M. & Roediger, H. L., III (1998). Imagination inflation for action 
events: Repeated imaginings lead to illusory recollections. Memory & 
Cognition, 26, 20–33. 
 
 305 
Gollwitzer, P. M. (1993). Goal achievement: The role of intentions. In W. 
Stroebe & M. Hewstone (Eds.), European review of social psychology (pp. 
141–185). Chichester: Wiley. 
 
Gollwitzer, P. M. (1996). The volitional benefits of planning. In P. M. 
Gollwitzer & J. A. Bargh (Eds.), The psychology of action: Linking 
cognition and motivation to behavior (pp. 287–312). New York: Guilford 
Press. 
 
Gollwitzer, P. M. (1999). Implementation intentions. American 
Psychologist, 54, 493–503. 
 
Gollwitzer, P. M., & Crosby, C. (2018). Planning out future action, affect, 
and cognition. In G. Oettingen, A. T. Sevincer, & P. M. Gollwitzer (Eds.), 
The psychology of thinking about the future (pp. 335–361). New York: The 
Guilford Press. 
 
Gollwitzer, P., & Oettingen, G. (2013). Implementation intentions. In M. 
Gellman, & J. R. Turner (Eds.), Encyclopedia of behavioral medicine (pp. 
1043-1048). [Part 9] New York: Springer-Verlag. 
 
Goschke, T. & Kuhl, J. (1993). Representation of intentions: Persisting 
activation in memory. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning 
Memory and Cognition, 19, 1211–1226. 
 
Granhag, P. A. (2010). On the psycho–legal study of true and false 
intentions: Dangerous waters and some stepping stones. The Open 
Criminology Journal, 3, 37–43. 
 
Granhag, P. A. & Knieps, M. (2011). Episodic future thought: Illuminating 
the trademarks of forming true and false intentions. Applied Cognitive 
Psychology, 25(2), 274–280. 
 306 
 
Granhag, P. A. & Mac Giolla, E. B. (2014). Preventing Future Crimes. 
European Psychologist, 19(3), 195–206. 
 
Granhag, P. A., Vrij, A. & Verschuere, B. (2015). Detecting Deception: 
Current Challenges and Cognitive Approaches. Chichester: John Wiley & 
Sons Ltd. 
 
Gross, J., & John, O. (2003). Individual differences in two emotion 
regulation processes: Implications for affect, relationships, and well-being. 
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 85(2), 348–362. 
 
Hach, S., Tippett, L. J. & Addis, D. R. (2014). Neural changes associated 
with the generation of specific past and future events in depression. 
Neuropsychologia, 65, 41–55. 
 
Haith, M. M. (1997). The development of future thinking as essential for 
the emergence of skill in planning. In S. L. Friedman & E. K. Scholnick 
(Eds.), The developmental psychology of planning: Why, how, and when 
do we plan? (pp. 25–42). Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum. 
 
Hamilton, J. & Cole, S. N. (2017). Imagining possible selves across time: 
Characteristics of self-images. Consciousness and Cognition, 52, 9-20.  
 
Hassabis, D., Kumaran, D., & Maguire, E. (2007). Using imagination to 
understand the neural basis of episodic memory. Journal of Neuroscience, 
27, 14365–14374. 
 
Hassabis, D., Kumaran, D., Vann, D. & Maguire, E. (2007). Patients with 
hippocampal amnesia cannot imagine new experiences. Proceedings of 
the National Academy of Sciences USA, 104, 1726–1731. 
 
 307 
Hassabis, D. & Maguire, E. (2007). Deconstructing episodic memory with 
construction. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 11, 299–306. 
 
Hassabis, D. & Maguire, E. (2009). The construction system of the brain. 
Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Science, 
364, 1263–1271. 
 
Henderson, M., Fujita, K., Trope, Y., & Liberman, N. (2006). Transcending 
the “Here”: The effect of spatial distance on social judgment. Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology, 91(5), 845–56. 
 
Hirsch, M. (2008). The generation of post memory. Poetics Today, 29, 
103–128. DOI; 10.1215/03335372-2007-019 
 
Hirsch, M. (2012). The generation of post memory: Writing and visual 
culture after the Holocaust. New York: Columbia University Press. 
 
Hustvedt, S. (2012). The real story. In S. Hustvedt (Ed.), Living, thinking, 
looking: Essays. New York: Henry Holt & Co. 
 
Hyman, I., & James Billings, F. (1998). Individual differences and the 
creation of false childhood memories. Memory, 6(1), 1–20. 
 
Imuta, K., Scarf, D., Pharo, H. & Hayne, H. (2013). Drawing a close to the 
use of human figure drawings as a projective measure of intelligence. 
PLoS ONE, 8(3): e58991.  
 
Ingvar, D. H. (1979). Hyperfrontal distribution of the cerebral grey matter 
flow in resting wakefulness: On the functional anatomy of the conscious 
state. Acta Neurologica Scandinavica, 60, 12–25. 
 
 308 
Ingvar, D. H. (1985). "Memory of the future": An essay on the temporal 
organization of conscious awareness. Human Neurobiology, 4, 127–136. 
 
Irish, M., & Piguet, O. (2013). The pivotal role of semantic memory in  
remembering the past and imagining the future. Frontiers in Behavioral 
Neuroscience, 7, 27. DOI:10.3389/fnbeh.2013.00027 
 
Jeunehomme, O. & D'Argembeau, A. (2016). Accessibility and 
characteristics of memories of the future. Memory, 25(5), 1-11. DOI: 
10.1080/09658211.2016.1205096. 
 
John, O. P., Naumann, L. P., & Soto, C. J. (2008). Paradigm shift to the 
integrative big-five trait taxonomy: History, measurement, and conceptual 
issues. In O. P. John, R. W. Robins, & L. A. Pervin (Eds.), Handbook of 
personality: Theory and research (pp. 114-158). New York: Guilford Press. 
 
John, O. P., Donahue, E. M., & Kentle, R. L. (1991). The Big Five 
Inventory Versions 4a and 54. Berkeley, CA: University of California, 
Berkeley, Institute of Personality and Social Research. 
 
Johnson, M. K. (1988). Reality Monitoring: An experimental 
phenomenological approach. Journal of Experimental Psychology: 
General, 117(4), 390–394. 
 
Johnson, M.K., Bush, J.G. & Mitchell, K. J. (1998). Interpersonal reality 
monitoring: Judging the sources of other people's memories. Social 
Cognition, 16(2), 199–224. 
 
Johnson, M. K., Foley, M. A., Suengas, A. G., & Raye, C. L. (1988). 
Phenomenal characteristics of memories for perceived and imagined 
 309 
autobiographical events. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 
117, 371–376. 
 
Johnson, M. K., Hashtroudi, S., & Lindsay, D. S. (1993). Source 
Monitoring. Psychological Bulletin, 114, 3–28. 
 
Johnson, M. K. & Raye, C. L. (1981). Reality monitoring. Psychological 
Review, 88, 67–85. 
 
Johnson, M. K., Raye, C. L., Foley, M. A. & Kim, J. K. (1982). Pictures and 
images: Spatial and temporal information compared. Bulletin of the 
Psychonomic Society, 19(1), 23–26. 
 
Jumentier, S., Barsics, C., & Van Der Linden, M. (2017). Reduced 
specificity and enhanced subjective experience of future thinking in 
ageing: The influence of avoidance and emotion-regulation 
strategies. Memory, 26(1), 1–15. 
 
Jupe, L., Leal, S., Vrij, A., & Nahari, G. (2017). Applying the verifiability 
approach in an international airport setting. Psychology, Crime & 
Law, 23(8), 812–825. 
 
Justice, L. V., Morrison, C. M. & Conway, M. A. (2012). True and 
fabricated memories. The Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology, 
66, 1196–1203. DOI:10.1080/17470218.2012.734832 
 
Justice, L. V., Morrison, C. M. & Conway, M. A. (2018). Intentionally 
fabricated autobiographical memories. The Quarterly Journal of 




Justice, L. V. & Smith, H. M. J. (2018). Memory judgements: The 
contribution of detail and emotion to assessments of believability and 
reliability. Memory, 26(10), 1402–1415. DOI: 
10.1080/09658211.2018.1484142 
 
Kahneman, D., & Miller, D. T. (1986). Norm theory: Comparing reality to its 
alternatives. Psychological Review, 93, 136–153. 
 
Kahneman, D., & Tversky, A. (1982). The simulation heuristic. In D. 
Kahneman, P. Slovic & A. Tversky (Eds.), Judgment under uncertainty 
(pp. 201–208). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Kapur, N. (1999). Syndromes of retrograde amnesia: A conceptual and 
empirical analysis. Psychological Bulletin, 114, 800–825. 
 
Kashy, D. A. and De Paulo, B. M. (1996). Who Lies? Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology, 70(5) 63–79. 
 
Kleim, B., Graham, B., Filhosy, S., Stott, R. & Ehlers, A. (2015). Reduced 
specificity in episodic future thinking in post–traumatic stress disorder. 
Clinical Psychological Science, 2(2), 15–173. DOI: 
10.4135/9781473915640 
 
Klein, S. B. (2010). The self: As a construct in psychology and 
neuropsychological evidence for its multiplicity. Self and Memory, 1, 172–
183. 
 
Klein, S.B. (2012). The self and its brain. Social Cognition, 30, 474-516. 
 
Klein, S. B. (2013). The complex act of projecting oneself into the future. 
WIREs Cognitive Science, 4, 63–79. DOI:10.1002/wcs.12.10  
 
 311 
Klein, S. B. (2015). Autonoetic consciousness: Re-considering the role of 
episodic memory in future-oriented self-projection. The Quarterly Journal 
of Experimental Psychology, 69(2), 1–55. 
 
Klein, S. B., Cosmides, L., Tooby, J., & Chance, S. (2002). Decisions and 
the evolution of memory: Multiple systems, multiple functions. 
Psychological Review, 109, 306–329. 
 
Klein, S. B., Loftus, J., & Kihlstrom, J. F. (2002). Memory and temporal 
experience: The effects of episodic memory loss on an amnesic patient's 
ability to remember the past and imagine the future. Social Cognition, 20, 
353–379. 
 
Klein, S. B., Robertson, T. E., & Delton, A. W. (2010). Facing the future: 
Memory as an evolved system for planning future acts. Memory & 
Cognition, 38, 13–22. 
 
Klein, S. B., Robertson, T. E., & Delton, A. W. (2011). The future-
orientation of memory: Planning as a key component mediating the high 
levels of recall found with survival processing. Memory, 19 (2), 121–139, 
DOI: 10.1080/09658211.2010.537827 
 
Klein, S. B. and Steindam, C. (2016). The role of subjective temporality in 
future-oriented mental time travel. Seeing the Future: Theoretical 
Perspectives on Future-Oriented Mental Time Travel. Eds. K. Michaelian, 
S. B. Klein, and K. K. Szpunar. New York: Oxford University Press. 
 
Kliegel, M., Martin, M., McDaniel, M. A., Einstein, G. O., & Moor, C. 
(2007). Realizing complex delayed intentions in young and old adults: The 
role of planning aids. Memory & Cognition, 35, 1735–1746. 
 
Klinger, E. (1971). Structure and functions of fantasy. New York: Wiley. 
 312 
 
Klinger, E. & Cox, W. M. (1987). Dimensions of thought flow in everyday 
life. Imagination, Cognition and Personality, 7, 105–128. 
 
Knez, I. (2017). Life goal, self-defining life-goal memories and mental time 
travel among young women and men going through emerging versus 
entering adulthood: An exploratory study. Psychology of Consciousness: 
Theory, Research, and Practice, 4(4), 414–426. 
 
Knieps, M., Granhag, P. A. & Vrij, A. (2013a). Back to the future: Asking 
about mental images to discriminate between true and false intentions. 
The Journal of Psychology, 147(6), 619–640. DOI: 
10.1080/00223980.2012.728542 
 
Knieps, M., Granhag, P. A. & Vrij, A. (2013b). Repeated visits to the 
future: Asking about mental images to discriminate between true and false 
intentions. International Journal of Advanced Psychology, 2, 93–102. 
 
Knieps, M., Granhag, P. A. & Vrij, A. (2014). Been there before? 
Examining “familiarity” as a moderator for discriminating between true and 
false intentions. Frontiers in Psychology, 5, 677. 
 
Kofsky Scholnick, E., & Friedman, S. L. (1993). Planning in context: 
Developmental and situational considerations. International Journal of 
Behavioral Development, 16, 145–167. 
 
Kosslyn, S. M. (1994). Image and brain: The resolution of the imagery 
debate. Cambridge: MIT Press. 
 
Kroenke, K. & Spitzer, R. L. (2002). The PHQ-9: A new depression 
diagnostic and severity measure. Psychiatric Annals, 32, 509-521.  
 
 313 
Kroenke, K., Spitzer, R. L.& Williams, J. B. W. (2001). The PHQ-9: Validity 
of a brief depression severity measure. Journal of General Internal 
Medicine, 16(6), 606–613.  
 
Kroneisen, M., & Erdfelder, E. (2011). On the plasticity of the survival 
processing effect. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, 
and Cognition, 37, 1553–1562. 
 
Lam, K. C. H. & Buehler, R. (2009). Trips down memory lane: Recall 
direction affects the subjective distance of past events. Personality and 
Social Psychology Bulletin, 35(2), 230–242. 
 
Landau, J., & Gunter, B. (2009). “Don't worry; you really will get over it”: 
Methodological investigations of the fading affect bias. The American 
Journal of Psychology, 122(2), 209–217. 
 
Landsberg, A. (1997). America, the Holocaust, and the mass culture of 
memory: Toward a radical politics of empathy. New German Critique, (71), 
63–86. doi:10.2307/488559 
 
Landsberg, A. (2004). Prosthetic Memory: The Transformation of 
American Remembrance in the Age of Mass Culture. New York: Columbia 
University Press. 
 
Landsberg, A. (2009). Memory, Empathy, and the Politics of Identification. 
International Journal of Politics, Culture, and Society, 22(2), 221–229. 
 
Lapp, L. K. & Spaniol, J. (2017). Impact of age-relevant goals on future 
thinking in younger and older adults. Memory, 25(9), 1246–1259. 
 
 314 
Lardi, C., D’Argembeau, A., Chanal, J., Ghisletta, P. & Van der Linden, M. 
(2010). Further characterisation of self-defining memories in young adults: 
A study of a Swiss sample. Memory, 18, 293–309.  
 
Lehner, E. & D’Argembeau, A. (2016). The role of personal goals in 
autonoetic experience when imagining future events. Consciousness and 
Cognition (42), 267-276.  
 
Leins, D. A., Fisher, R. P. & Vrij, A. (2012). Drawing on liars’ lack of 
cognitive flexibility: Detecting deception through varying report modes. 
Applied Cognitive Psychology, 26, 601–607 
 
Leins, D., Fisher, R., Vrij, A., Leal, S. & Mann, S. (2011). Using sketch 
drawing to induce inconsistency in liars. Legal & Criminological 
Psychology, 16, 253–265. 
 
Leins, D., Fisher, R., & Ross, S. (2013). Exploring liars’ strategies for 
creating deceptive reports. Legal and Criminological Psychology, 18(1), 
141–151. 
 
Lench, H. (2009). Automatic optimism: The affective basis of judgements 
about the likelihood of future events. Journal of Experimental Psychology: 
General, 138(2), 187–200. 
 
Levine, B., Black, S. E., Cabeza, R., Sinden, M., Mcintosh, A. R. , Toth, J. 
P., Tulving, E. & Stuss, D. T. (1998). Episodic memory and the self in a 
case of isolated retrograde amnesia. Brain, 121, 1951–1973. 
 
Levine, T. R., Kim, R., Park, H. S., & Hughes, M. (2006). Deception 
detection accuracy is a predictable linear function of message veracity 
 315 
base-rate: A formal test of Park and Levine’s probability model. 
Communication Monographs, 73, 243–260. 
 
Levine, T. R. & McCornack, S. A. (1992). Linking love and lies: A formal 
test of McCornack & Park’s model of deception detection. Journal of 
Social and Personal Relationships, 9, 143–154. 
 
Levine, T. R., Park, H. S., & McCornack, S. A. (1999). Accuracy in 
detecting truths and lies: Documenting the “veracity effect”. 
Communication Monographs, 66, 125–144. 
 
Levine, B., Svoboda, E., Hay, J. F., Winocur, G. & Moscovitch, M. (2002). 
Psychology and Aging, 17(4), 677–689.   
 
Liberman, N., Sagristano, M. D. & Trope, Y. (2002). The effect of temporal 
distance on level of mental construal. Journal of Experimental Social 
Psychology, 38, 523–534. 
 
Liberman, N. & Trope, Y. (2014). Traversing psychological distance. 
Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 18(7), 364–369. 
 
Liberman, N., Trope, Y., & Stephan, E. (2007). Psychological distance. In  
A. W. Kruglanski & E. T. Higgins (Eds.), Social psychology: Handbook of 
basic principles (Vol. 2, pp. 353–383). New York: Guilford Press. 
 
Lind, S. E. & Bowler, D. M. (2010). Episodic memory and episodic future 




Linton, M. (1986). Ways of searching and the contents of memory. In D. C. 
Rubin (Ed.), Autobiographical memory (pp. 50–67). New York: Cambridge 
University Press. 
 
Locke, E. A. Long-range thinking and goal-directed acting. In G. 
Oettingen, A. T. Sevincer & P. M. Gollwitzer (Eds.), The psychology of 
thinking about the future (pp.377–391). New York: Guilford Press. 
 
Locke, E. A., & Latham, G. P. (1990). A theory of goal setting and task 
performance. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall. 
 
Locke, E. A., & Latham, G. P. (2002). Building a practically useful theory of 
goal setting and task motivation: A 35-year odyssey. American 
Psychologist, 57, 705–717.  
 
Lyons, A., Henry, J., Rendell, P., Corballis, M., Suddendorf, T. & Mayr, U. 
(2014). Episodic foresight and aging. Psychology and Aging, 29(4), 873–
884. 
 
Mac Giolla, E., Ask, K., Granhag, P. A. & Karlsson, A. (2019). Can reality 
monitoring criteria distinguish between true and false intentions? Journal 
of Applied Research in Memory and Cognition, 8(1), 92–97. 
 
Mac Giolla, E., Granhag, P. A. & Vernham, Z. (2017). Drawing-based 
deception detection techniques: A state-of-the-art review. Crime 
Psychology Review, 3(1), 23–38. 
 
 317 
Mac Giolla, E., Granhag, P. A. & Ask, K. (2017)a. Task-related 
spontaneous thought: A novel direction in the study of true and false 
intentions. Journal of Applied Research in Memory and Cognition, 6(1), 
93–103. 
 
Mac Giolla, E., Granhag, P. A. & Ask, K. (2017)b. A goal-activation 
framework of true and false intentions. Applied Cognitive Psychology, 31, 
678-684. 
 
Mac Giolla, E., Granhag, P. A. & Liu-Jönsson, M. (2013). Markers of good 
planning behavior as a cue for separating true and false intent. PsyCh 
Journal, 2(3), 183–189. DOI: 10.1002/pchj.36. 
 
Mac Giolla, E. & Granhag, P A. (2015) Detecting false intent amongst 
small cells of suspects: Single versus repeated interviews. Journal of 
Investigative Psychology and Offender Profiling, 12(2), 142–157. 
 
Mac Giolla, E., Granhag, P. A., & Vrij, A. (2015). Discriminating between 
true and false intentions. In P. A. Granhag, A. Vrij, & B. Verschuere (Eds.), 
Deception detection: Current challenges and new approaches (pp. 155–
173). Chichester: John Wiley. 
 
MacLeod, A. (2017). Prospection, well-being, and mental health. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press. 
 
MacLeod, A. K., & Byrne, A. (1996). Anxiety, depression, and the 
anticipation of future positive and negative experiences. Journal of 
Abnormal Psychology, 105, 286–289. 
 
 318 
MacLeod, A. K. & Conway, C. (2007). Well–being and positive future 
thinking for the self versus others. Cognition & Emotion, 21 (5), 1114–
1124. 
 
MacLeod, A., K. & O’Connor, R. C. (2018). Positive future-thinking. Well-
being, and mental health. In G. Oettingen, A. T. Sevincer & P. M. 
Gollwitzer (Eds.), The psychology of thinking about the future (pp.199–
213). New York: The Guilford Press. 
 
Madore, K. P., Gaesser, B., & Schacter, D. L. (2014). Constructive 
episodic simulation: Dissociable effects of a specificity induction on 
remembering, imagining, and describing in young and older adults. 
Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 
40(3), 609–622. 
 
Maguire, E. A. (2001). Neuroimaging studies of autobiographical memory. 
Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London: B, 356, 1441–
1451. 
 
Maguire, E. A., & Frith, C. D. (2003). Lateral asymmetry in the 
hippocampal response to the remoteness of autobiographical memories. 
Journal of Neuroscience, 23, 5302–5307. 
 
Maguire E. A. & Hassabis, D. 2011. Role of the hippocampus in 
imagination and future thinking. Proceedings of the National Academy of 
Sciences, A, 108, E39  
 
Maguire, E. A., Intraub, H. & Mullally, S. L. (2016). Scenes, spaces and 




Maguire E. A. & Mullally, S. L. 2013. The hippocampus: a manifesto for 
change. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 142, 1180–9. 
 
Mahr, J., & Csibra, G. (2018). Why do we remember? The communicative 
function of episodic memory. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 41, 1–93. 
 
Malle, B. F., Moses, L. J. and Baldwin, D. A. (2001). Intentions and 
intentionality. Foundations of social cognition. Cambridge: The MIT Press 
 
Mann, S., Vrij, A., Shaw, D. J., Leal, S., Ewens, S., Hillman, J., & Fisher, 
R. P. (2013). Two heads are better than one? How to effectively use two 
interviewers to elicit cues to deception. Legal and Criminological 
Psychology, 18, 324 –340. DOI:10.1111/j.2044-8333.2012.02055 
 
Markowitsch, H. J. (2003). Autonoetic consciousness. In T. Kircher & A. 
David (Eds.), The self in neuroscience and psychiatry (pp. 180–196). New 
York: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Marks, D. F. (1973). Visual imagery differences in the recall of pictures. 
British Journal of Psychology, 64, 17–24.  
 
Marks, D. F. (1995). New directions for mental imagery research. Journal 
of Mental Imagery, 19(3-4), 153-167. 
 
Markus, H., & Nurius, P. (1986). Possible selves. American Psychologist, 
41(9), 954–969. 
 
Marsh, R. L., Hicks, J. L. & Bink, M. L. (1998). Activation of completed, 
uncompleted, and partially completed intentions. Journal of Experimental 
Psychology: Learning Memory and Cognition, 24, 350–361. 
 
 320 
Marsh, R. L., Hicks, J. L. & Bryan, E. S. (1999). The activation of unrelated 
and canceled intentions. Memory and Cognition, 27, 320–327. 
 
Mather, M., & Carstensen, L. L. (2005). Aging and motivated cognition: 
The positivity effect in attention and memory. Trends in Cognitive 
Sciences, 9, 496–502. DOI: 10.1016/j.tics.2005.08.005 
 
Mazzoni, G. (2007). Did you witness demonic possession? A response 
time analysis of the relationship between event plausibility and 
autobiographical beliefs. Psychonomic Bulletin and Review, 14(2), 277–
281. 
 
Mazzoni, G. & Memon, A. (2003). Imagination can create false 
autobiographical memories. Psychological Science, 14, 186–188. 
 
McBride, D. M., Thomas, B. J. & Zimmerman, C. (2013). A test of the 
survival processing advantage in implicit and explicit memory tests. 
Memory & Cognition, 41(6), 862–871. DOI:10.3758/s13421-013-0304-y 
 
McClelland, J. L., McNaughton, B. L. & O'Reilly, R. C. (1995). Why there 
are complementary learning systems in the hippocampus and neocortex: 
Insights from successes and failures of connectionist models of learning 
and memory. Psychological Review,102, 419–457. 
 
McCrea, S., Penningroth, S., & Radakovich, M. (2014). Implementation 
intentions forge a strong cue-response link and boost prospective memory 
performance. Journal of Cognitive Psychology, 27(1), 1–15. 
 
McDaniel, M. A., & Einstein, G. O. (2007). Prospective memory: An 
overview and synthesis of an emerging field. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. 
 
 321 
McDaniel, M. A., Howard, D. C., & Butler, K. M. (2008). Implementation 
intentions facilitate prospective memory under high attention demands. 
Memory & Cognition, 36, 716–724. 
 
McDermott, K. B., Wooldridge, C. L., Rice, H. J., Berg, J. J. & Szpunar, K. 
K. (2016). Visual perspective in remembering and episodic future thought. 
The Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology, 69(2), 243–253.  
 
McDonough, I. M. & Gallo, D. A. (2010). Separating past and future 
autobiographical events in memory: Evidence for a reality monitoring 
asymmetry. Memory and Cognition, 38, 3–12. 
 
McKay, R., Tamagni, C., Palla, A., Krummenacher, P., Hegemann, S., 
Straumann, D. & Brugger, P. (2013). Vestibular stimulation attenuates 
unrealistic optimism. Cortex, 49, 2272–2275. 
 
McLelland, V., Devitt, A., Schacter, D., & Addis, D. (2015). Making the 
future memorable: The phenomenology of remembered future events. 
Memory, 23(8), 1–9. 
 
McMillan, R., Kaufman, S., & Singer, J. (2013). Ode to positive 
constructive daydreaming. Frontiers in Psychology, 4, 626. 
 
McNally, R.J., Litz, B.T., Prassas, A., Shin, L.M., & Weathers, F.W. (1994). 
Emotional priming of autobiographical memory in post-traumatic stress 




Meissner, C., & Kassin, S. (2002). “He's Guilty!”: Investigator bias in 
judgments of truth and deception. Law and Human Behavior, 26(5), 469–
480. 
 
Memon, A., Fraser, J., Colwell, K., Odinot, G. & Mastroberardino, S. 
(2010). Distinguishing truthful from invented accounts using reality 
monitoring criteria. Legal & Criminological Psychology, 15(2), 177–194. 
 
Memon, A., Meissner, C. A., & Fraser, J. (2010). The cognitive interview: 
A meta-analytic review and study space analysis of the past 25 years. 
Psychology, Public Policy, & Law, 6, 340–372. 
 
Merckelbach, H., Horselenberg, R. & Muris, P. (2001). The Creative 
Experiences Questionnaire (CEQ): a brief self–report measure of fantasy 
proneness. Personality and Individual Differences, 31, 987–995. 
 
Merckelbach, H. L., Rassin, E. G. & Muris, P. E. (2000). Dissociation, 
schizotypy and fantasy proneness in undergraduate students. Journal of 
Nervous and Mental Disease, 188, 428–431. 
 
Michaelian, K., Klein, S. B. & Szpunar, K. K. (2016). The past, the present, 
and the future of future-oriented mental time travel: Editors' introduction. In 
K. Michaelian, S. Klein & K. Szpunar (Eds.), Seeing the future: Theoretical 
Perspectives on Future-Oriented Mental Time Travel. (pp. 1–18). New 
York: Oxford University Press. 
 
Mullally, S. L., Vargha-Khadem, F., & Maguire, E. A. (2014). Scene 
construction in developmental amnesia: An FMRI study. 
Neuropsychologia, 52, 1–10.  
 
 323 
Nahari, G. (2017). Top-down processes in interpersonal reality monitoring 
assessments. Psychology, Public Policy, and Law, 23(2), 232–242. 
 
Nahari, G., & Ben-Shakhar, G. (2013). Primacy effect in credibility 
judgments: The vulnerability of verbal cues to biased interpretations. 
Applied Cognitive Psychology, 27, 247–255. DOI: 10.1002/acp.2901 
 
Nahari, G., Vrij, A., & Fisher, R. P. (2014). Exploiting liars’ verbal  
strategies by examining the verifiability of details. Legal and Criminological 
Psychology, 19, 227–239. DOI: 10.1111/j.2044-8333.2012.02069 
 
Nairne, J. S., Cogdill, M. & Lehman, M. (2017). Adaptive memory: 
Temporal, semantic, and rating-based clustering following survival 
processing. Journal of Memory and Language, 83, 204–314. 
 
Nairne, J. S., & Pandeirada, J. N. S. (2008). Adaptive memory: Is survival 
processing special? Journal of Memory and Language, 59, 377–385. DOI: 
10.1016/j.jml.2008.06.001 
 
Nairne, J. S., & Pandeirada, J. N. S. (2016). Adaptive memory: The 
evolutionary significance of survival processing. Perspectives on 
Psychological Science, 11(4), 496–511. 
 
Nairne, J. S., Pandeirada, J. N. S., & Thompson, S. R. (2008). Adaptive 
memory: The comparative value of survival processing. Psychological 
Science, 19, 176–180.  
 
Nairne, J. S., Thompson, S. R., & Pandeirada, J. N. S. (2007). Adaptive 
memory: Survival processing enhances retention. Journal of Experimental 




Naylor, E., & Clare, L. (2008). Awareness of memory functioning, 
autobiographical memory and identity in early-stage dementia. 
Neuropsychological Rehabilitation, 18(5–6), 590–606. 
 
Neroni, M. A., Gamboz, N., de Vito, S. & Brandimonte, M. A. (2016). 
Effects of self-generated versus experimenter-provided cues on the 
representation of future events. The Quarterly Journal of Experimental 
Psychology, 69(9), 1799-1811. 
 
Neroni, M. A., Gamboz, N. & Brandimonte, M. A. (2014).  Does episodic 
future thinking improve prospective remembering? Consciousness and 
Cognition, 23, 53–62. 
 
Newby-Clark, I. R., & Ross, M. (2003). Conceiving the past and future. 
Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 29, 807–818. 
 
Nigro, G., & Neisser, U. (1983). Point of view in personal memories. 
Cognitive Psychology, 15(4), 467–482. DOI: 10.1016/0010–
0285(83)90016–6 
 
Norem, J. K., & Illingworth, K. S. S. (1993). Strategy-dependent effects of 
reflecting on self and tasks: Some implications of optimism and defensive 
pessimism. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 65, 822–835. 
 
Nussbaum, S., Liberman, N. & Trope, Y. (2006). Predicting the near and 
distant future. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 135(2), 152–
161. 
 
O'Connor, R. C., Connery, H., & Cheyne, W. M. (2000). Hopelessness: the 
role of depression, future directed thinking and cognitive vulnerability. 
Psychology, Health & Medicine, 5(2), 155–161. 
 
 325 
Oettingen, G. (1996). Positive fantasy and motivation. In P. M. Gollwitzer 
& J. A. Bargh (Eds.), The psychology of action: Linking cognition and 
motivation to behavior (pp. 236–259). New York: Guilford Press. 
 
Oettingen, G., & Mayer, D. (2002). The motivating function of thinking 
about the future: Expectations versus fantasies. Journal of Personality and 
Social Psychology, 83, 1198–1212. 
 
Okuda, J., Fujii, T., Ohtake, H., Tsukiura, T., Tanji, K., Suzuki, K., 
Kawashima, R., Fukuda, H., Itoh, M. & Yamadori, A. (2003). Thinking of 
the future and past: The roles of the frontal pole and the medial temporal 
lobes. NeuroImage, 19(4), 1369–1380. 
 
Orbell, S., Hodgkins, S., & Sheeran, P. (1997). Implementation intentions 
and the theory of planned behavior. Personality and Social Psychology 
Bulletin, 23, 945–954. 
 
Otgaar, H., Howe, M. L., Muris, P. & Merckelbach, H., 2019. Associative 
activation as a mechanism underlying false memory formation. Clinical 
Psychological Science, 7(2), 191–195. 
 
Oyserman, D., & James, L. (2011). Possible identities. In S. Schwartz, K. 
Luyckx, & V. Vignoles (Eds.) Handbook of Identity Theory and Research, 
117–145. New York: Springer-Verlag. 
 
Paivio, A. (1986). Mental representations: A dual coding approach. New 
York: Oxford University Press. 
 
Perfect, T. J., Wagstaff, G. F., Moore, D., Andrews, A., Cleveland, V., 
Newcombe, S., Brisbane K. A. & Brown, L. (2008). How can we help 
witnesses to remember more? It’s an (eyes) open and shut case. Law & 
Human Behavior, 32(4), 314–324. 
 326 
 
Pham, L. B., & Taylor, S. E. (1999). From thought to action: Effects of 
process versus outcome–based mental simulations on performance. 
Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 25, 250–260. 
 
Pillemer, D. (2003). Directive functions of autobiographical memory: The 
guiding power of the specific episode. Memory, 11, 193–202. 
 
Pinheiro J, Bates D, DebRoy S, Sarkar D and R Core Team (2017). nlme: 
Linear and Nonlinear Mixed Effects Models. R package version 3.1-131, 
https://CRAN.R-project.org/package=nlme. 
 
Preston, A. R., Shrager, Y., Dudukovic, N. M., & Gabrieli, J. D. E. (2004). 
Hippocampal contribution to the novel use of relational information in 
declarative memory. Hippocampus, 14, 148–152. 
 
Quoidbach, J., Hansenne, M., & Mottet, C. (2008). Personality and mental 
time travel: A differential approach to autonoetic consciousness. 
Consciousness and Cognition,17(4),1082–1092. 
 
Rajaram, S. (1993). Remembering and knowing: Two means of access to 
the personal past. Memory and Cognition, 21, 89–102. 
 
Rapp, C.A. (1998). The strengths model: Case management with people 
suffering from severe and persistent mental illness. New York: Oxford 
University Press. 
 
Rasmussen, K.W. & Berntsen, D. (2014). “I can see clearly now”: The 




Rathbone, C., Conway, M., & Moulin, C. (2011). Remembering and 
imagining: The role of the self. Consciousness and Cognition, 20, 1175–
1182. 
 
Ratner, K., Mendle, J., Burrow, A. L. & Thoemmes, F. (2019). Depression 
and derailment: A cyclical model of mental illness and perceived identity 
change. Clinical Psychological Science, 7(4), 735–753. 
DOI:10.1177/2F2167702619829748 
 
Reiser, B., Black, J. & Abelson, R. (1985). Knowledge structures in the 
organization and retrieval of autobiographical memories. Cognitive 
Psychology, 17, 89–137. 
 
Rendell, P. G., Bailey, P. E., Henry, J. D., Phillips, L.H., Gaskin, S. & 
Kliegel, M. (2012). Older adults have greater difficulty imagining future 
rather than atemporal experiences. Psychology and Aging, 27, 1089–
1098. DOI:10.1037/a0029748 
 
Reed, A. E., & Carstensen, L. L. (2012). The theory behind the age-related 
positivity effect. Frontiers in Psychology, 3, 339. 
DOI:10.3389/fpsyg.2012.00339 
 
Reed, A. E., Chan, L., & Mikels, J. A. (2014). Meta-analysis of the age-
related positivity effect: Age differences in preferences for positive over 
negative information. Psychology and Aging, 29, 1–15. 
DOI:10.1037/a0035194 
 
Rice, H. J., & Rubin, D. C. (2011). Remembering from any angle: The 
flexibility of visual perspective during retrieval. Consciousness and 
Cognition, 20, 568–577. DOI:10.1016/j.concog.2010.10.013 
 
 328 
Riggio, R. Salinas, C. & Tucker, J. (1988). Personality and deception 
ability. Personality and Individual Differences. 9. 189–191. 
DOI:10.1016/0191-8869(88)90050–5. 
 
Robinaugh, D. J. & McNally, R. J. (2013). Remembering the past and 
envisioning the future in bereaved adults with and without complicated 
grief. Clinical Psychological Science, 1(3), 290–300. 
 
Roediger, H. L., & McDermott, K. B. (1995). Creating false memories: 
Remembering words not presented in lists. Journal of Experimental 
Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 21, 803–814. 
 
Rubin, D. C., Berntsen, D., & Hutson, M. (2009). The normative and the 
personal life: Individual differences in life scripts and life story events 
among USA and Danish undergraduates. Memory, 17(1), 54–68. 
 
Rubin, D. C., Schrauf, R. W., & Greenberg, D. L. (2003). Belief and 
recollection of autobiographical memories. Memory & Cognition, 31, 887–
901. 
 
Ryan, R. M. & Deci, E. L. (2000). Self-determination theory and the 
facilitation of intrinsic motivation, social development and well -being. 
American Psychologist, 55(1), 58–78.  
 
Ryan, R. M. & Deci, E. L. (2017). Self-Determination Theory. New York: 
The Guilford Press. 
 
Schacter, D. L. (1999). The seven sins of memory: Insights from 




Schacter, D. L. (2001). The seven sins of memory: How the mind forgets 
and remembers. Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin. 
 
Schacter, D. L., & Addis, D. R. (2007). The cognitive neuroscience of 
constructive memory: Remembering the past and imagining the future. 
Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London: B, 362, 773–
786. 
 
Schacter, D. L., Addis, D. R., & Buckner, R. L. (2007). The prospective 
brain: Remembering the past to imagine the future. Nature Reviews 
Neuroscience, 8, 657–661. 
 
Schacter, D. L., Addis, D. R., & Buckner, R. L. (2008). Episodic simulation 
of future events: Concepts, data, and applications. Annals of the New York 
Academy of Sciences, 1124, 39–60. 
 
Schacter, D. L., Addis, D., Hassabis, D., Martin, V., Spreng, R., & 
Szpunar, K. (2012). The future of memory: Remembering, Imagining, and 
the Brain. Neuron, 76, (4), 677–694. DOI: 10.1016/j.neuron.2012.11.001.  
 
Schacter, D. L., Addis, D. R. & Szpunar, K. K. (2017). Escaping the Past: 
Contributions of the Hippocampus to Future Thinking and Imagination. In 
Hannual, D. E. & Duff, M. C. (Eds.), The Hippocampus from Cells to 
Systems: Structure, Connectivity, and Functional Contributions to Memory 
and Flexible Cognition (pp 439–465). New York: Springer.  
 
Schacter, D. L., Benoit, R. G. & Szpunar, K. K. (2017). Episodic future 
thinking: Mechanisms and Functions. Current Opinions in Behavioral 
Sciences, 17, 41–50. 
 
 330 
Schacter, D., Carpenter, A., Devitt, A., Roberts, R., & Addis, D. (2018). 
Constructive episodic simulation, flexible recombination, and memory 
errors. Behavioural and Brain Sciences 41, E32. 
 
Schacter, D. L., Gaesser, B., & Addis, D. R. (2013). Remembering the 
past and imagining the future in the elderly. Gerontology, 59, 143–151. 
DOI:10.1159/000342198 
 
Schank, R. C. & Abelson, R. P. (1977). Scripts, plans, goals and 
understanding: An inquiry into human knowledge structures. Hillsdale, NJ: 
Erlbaum. 
 
Schlagman, S., & Kvavilashvili, L. (2008). Involuntary autobiographical 
memories in and outside the laboratory: How different are they from 
voluntary autobiographical memories? Memory & Cognition, 36, 920–932.  
 
Scoboria, A., Mazzoni, G., Kirsch, I., & Relyea, M. (2004). Plausibility and 
belief in autobiographical memory. Applied Cognitive Psychology, 18, 
791–807. 
 
Scoboria, A. & Talarico, J. M. (2013). Indirect cueing elicits distinct types 
of autobiographical event representations. Consciousness and Cognition, 
22(4), 1495–1509. 
 
Scofield, J. E., Buchanan, E. M. & Kostic, B. (2018). A meta-analysis of 
the survival-processing advantage in memory. Psychonomic Bulletin 
Review, 25, 997–1012. DOI:10.3758/s13423-017-1346-0 
 
Seligman, M., Railton, P., Beaumeister, R. & Stripada, C. (2013). 
Navigating into the future or driven by the past. Perspectives on 
Psychological Science, 8(2), 119–141. 
 
 331 
Sharman, S. & Scoboria, A. (2009). Imagination equally influences false 
memories of high and low plausibility events. Applied Cognitive 
Psychology, 23, 813–827. 
 
Sharot, T., Riccardi, A. M., Raio, C. M., & Phelps, E. A. (2007). Neural 
mechanisms mediating optimism bias. Nature, 450, 102–105. 
 
Sheeran, P. & Webb, T. L. (2016). The Intention-Behaviour gap. Social 
and Personality Psychology Compass, 10(9), 503–518. 
DOI:10.1111/spc3.12265 
 
Sheeran, P. & Webb, T. L. (2018). The road to hell: An overview of 
research on the intention-behavior gap. In G. Oettingen, A. T. Sevincer & 
P. M. Gollwitzer (Eds.) The psychology of thinking about the future (pp 
473–496). New York: The Guilford Press. 
 
Sheldon, S. & El-Asmar, N. (2018). The cognitive tools that support 
mentally constructing event and scene representations. Memory, 26(6), 
858–868. 
 
Singer, J. L. (1966). Daydreaming. New York: Random House. 
 
Singer, J. L. (1975). Navigating the stream of consciousness: Research in 
daydreaming and related inner experience. American Psychologist, 30, 
727–738. 
 
Sooniste, T., Granhag, P. A., Knieps, M., & Vrij. (2013). True and false 
intentions: Asking about the past to detect lies about the future. 




Sooniste, T. & Granhag, P. A. & Strömwall, L. (2016). Training police 
investigators to interview to detect false intentions. Journal of Police and 
Criminal Psychology, 32(2), 152-162. 
 
Sooniste, T., Granhag, P. A., Strömwall, L. A., & Vrij, A. (2014). 
Discriminating between true and false intent among small cells of 
suspects. Legal Criminological Psychology, 21, 344–357. DOI: 
10.1111/lcrp.12063 
 
Spreng, R. N., & Levine, B. (2006). The temporal distribution of past and 
future autobiographical events across the lifespan. Memory and Cognition, 
34, 1644–1651. 
 
Spreng, R. N., Mar, R. A., & Kim, A. S. (2009). The common neural basis 
of autobiographical memory, prospection, navigation, theory of mind and 
the default mode: A quantitative meta–analysis. Journal of Cognitive 
Neuroscience, 21, 489–510. 
 
Stawarczyk, D., & D'Argembeau, A. (2015). Neural correlates of personal 
goal processing during episodic future thinking and mind-wandering: An 
ALE meta-analysis. Human Brain Mapping, 36(8), 2928-2947. 
DOI: 10.1002/hbm.22818 
 
Steller, M. & Kohnken, G. (1989). Criteria–based statement analysis. In C. 
Raskin (Ed.), Psychological methods in criminal investigation and 
evidence (pp. 217–245). New York: Springer.  
 
Stillman, P. E., Lee, H., Deng, X., Rao Unnava, H., Cunningham, W. A. & 
Fujita, K. (2017). Neurological evidence for the role of construal level in 
future-directed thought. Social Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience, 
12(6), 937–947. DOI: 10.1093/scan/nsx022 
 
 333 
Suddendorf, T., & Busby, J. (2005). Making decisions with the future in 
mind: Developmental and comparative identification of mental time travel. 
Learning and Motivation, 36, 110–125. 
 
Suddendorf, T., & Corballis, M. C. (1997). Mental time travel and the 
evolution of the human mind. Genetic, Social, and General Psychology 
Monographs, 123, 133–167. 
 
Suddendorf, T., & Corballis, M. C. (2007). The evolution of foresight: What 
is mental time travel, and is it unique to humans? Behavioral and Brain 
Sciences, 30, 299–313. 
 
Suddendorf, T. & Moore, C. (2011). Introduction to the special issue: The 
development of episodic foresight. Cognitive Development, 26(4), 295–
298. 
 
Svoboda, E., McKinnon, M. C., & Levine, B. (2006). The functional 
neuroanatomy of autobiographical memory: A meta-analysis. 
Neuropsychologia, 44, 2189–2208. 
 
Szpunar, K. K. (2010a). Episodic future thought: An emerging concept. 
Perspectives on Psychological Science, 5(2), 142–162. 
 
Szpunar, K. K. (2010b). Evidence for an implicit influence of memory on 
future thinking. Memory & Cognition, 38(5), 431–540. 
 
Szpunar, K., Addis, D., McLelland, V., & Schacter, D. (2013). Memories of 
the Future: New Insights into the adaptive value of episodic memory. 
Frontiers in Behavioral Neuroscience, 7, 47. 
 
 334 
Szpunar, K. K., Addis, D. R. & Schacter, D. L. (2012). Memory for 
emotional simulations: remembering a rosy future. Psychological Science, 
23(1), 24–29 
 
Szpunar, K., & Chan, J. (2018). Beyond communication: Episodic memory 
is key to the self in time. Behavioural and Brain Sciences, 41, e33. 
 
Szpunar, K. K., Chan, J. C. K., & McDermott, K. B. (2009). Contextual 
processing in episodic future thought. Cerebral Cortex, 19, 1539–1548. 
 
Szpunar, K. K., & McDermott, K. B. (2008a). Episodic future thought and 
its relation to remembering: Evidence from ratings of subjective 
experience. Consciousness and Cognition, 17, 330–334. 
 
Szpunar, K. K., & McDermott, K. B. (2008b). Episodic memory: An 
evolving concept. In D. Sweat, R. Menzel, H. Eichenbaum & H. L. 
Roediger III (Eds.), Learning and memory: A comprehensive reference 
(pp. 491–510). Oxford: Elsevier. 
 
Szpunar, K. K., & McDermott, K. B. (2008c). Episodic future thought: 
Remembering the past to imagine the future. In K. D. Markman, W. M. P. 
Klein & J. A. Suhr (Eds.), The handbook of imagination and mental 
simulation (pp. 119–129). New York: Psychology Press. 
 
Szpunar, K., & McDermott, K. (2008d). Remembering the past to imagine 
the future. In B. Glovin (Ed.), Cerebrum: Emerging Ideas in Brain Science 
(pp. 17–27). New York: Dana Press. 
 
Szpunar, K.K., & Schacter, D.L. (2013). Get real: Effects of repeated 
simulation and emotion on the perceived plausibility of future experiences. 
Journal of Experimental Psychology, 142, 323–327 
 
 335 
Szpunar, K. K. & Schacter, D. L. (2019). Memory and Future Imagining. In 
J. T. Wixted (Ed.), Stevens' handbook of experimental psychology and 
cognitive neuroscience (4th ed., Vol. 1: Learning and memory). Hoboken: 
NJ: John Wiley & Sons, Inc. DOI: 10.1002/9781119170174.epcn105 
 
Szpunar, K. K., Spreng, R. N. & Schacter, D. L. (2014). A taxonomy of 
prospections: Introducing an organizational framework of future-oriented 
cognition. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United 
States of America, 11, 18414–18421.  
 
Szpunar, K. K. & Radvanksy, G. A. (2016). Cognitive approaches to the 
study of episodic future thinking. The Quarterly Journal of Experimental 
Psychology, 69(2), 209–216. DOI: 10.1080/17470218.2015.1095213 
 
Szpunar, K. K., Watson, J. M., & McDermott, K. B. (2007). Neural 
substrates of envisioning the future. Proceedings of the National Academy 
of Sciences USA, 104, 642–647. 
 
Taylor, S. E. (1983). Adjustment to threatening events: A theory of 
cognitive adaptation. American Psychologist, 38, 1161–1173. 
 
Taylor, S. E., & Brown, J. D. (1988). Illusion and well-being: A social 
psychological perspective on mental health. Psychological Bulletin, 103, 
193–210. 
 
Taylor, S. E., & Pham, L. B. (1996). Mental simulation, motivation, and 
action. In P. M. Gollwitzer & J. A. Bargh (Eds.), The psychology of action: 




Taylor, S. E., Pham, L. B., Rivkin, I. D., & Armor, D. A. (1998). Harnessing 
the imagination: Mental simulation, self–regulation, and coping. American 
Psychologist, 53, 429–439. 
 
Taylor, S. E., & Schneider, S. K. (1989). Coping and the simulation of 
events. Social Cognition, 7, 174–194. 
 
Terrett, G., Rose, N., Henry, J., Bailey, P., Altgassen, M., Phillips, L. & 
Rendell, P. (2016). The relationship between prospective memory and 
episodic future thinking in younger and older adulthood. Quarterly Journal 
of Experimental Psychology, 69(2), 310–323. 
 
Thimm, J., Holte, A., Brennen, C. & Wang, C. E. (2013). Hope and 
expectancies for future events in depression. Frontiers in Psychology, 4, 
470. DOI: 10.3389/fpsyg.2013.00470 
 
Trafimow, D. & Wyer, R. (1993). Cognitive representation of mundane 
social events. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 64, 365–376. 
 
Trope, Y., & Liberman, N. (2003). Temporal construal. Psychological 
Review, 110, 401–421. 
 
Trope, Y., & Liberman, N. (2010). Construal–level theory of psychological 
distance. Psychological Review, 117 (2), 440–463. 
 
Tse, C. S. & Altarriba, J. (2010). Does survival processing enhance implicit 
memory? Memory & Cognition, 38, 1110–1121. 
DOI:10.3758/MC.38.8.1110 
 
Tulving, E. (1972). Episodic and semantic memory. In E. Tulving & W. 




Tulving, E. (1983). Elements of episodic memory. New York: Oxford 
University Press. 
 
Tulving, E. (1985). Memory and consciousness. Canadian Psychology, 26, 
1–12. 
 
Tulving, E. (2001). Origin of autonoesis in episodic memory. In I. H. L. 
Roediger, J. S. Nairne, I. Neath & A. M. Surprenant (Eds.), The nature of 
remembering: Essays in honor of Robert G. Crowder (pp. 17–34). 
Washington: American Psychological Association. 
 
Tulving, E. (2002a). Episodic memory: From mind to brain. Annual Review 
of Psychology, 53, 1–25. 
 
Tulving, E. (2002b). Chronesthesia: Awareness of subjective time. In D. T. 
Stuss & R. C. Knight (Eds.), Principles of Frontal Lobe Function (pp. 311–
325). New York: Oxford University Press. 
 
Tulving, E. (2005). Episodic memory and autonoesis: Uniquely human? In 
H. S. Terrace & J. Metcalfe (Eds.), The missing link in cognition: Origins of 
self reflective consciousness (pp. 3–56). New York: Oxford University 
Press. 
 
Tulving, E. and K. Szpunar (2012). Does the future exist? In B. Levine and 
J. M. Craik, (Eds.), Mind and the Frontal Lobes: Cognition, Behavior, and 
Brain Imaging (pp. 248–264). New York: Oxford University Press. 
 
Tulving, E. & Thomson, D. M. (1973). Encoding specificity and retrieval 




Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1973). Availability: A heuristic for judging 
frequency and probability. Cognitive Psychology, 5, 207–232. 
 
Undeutsch, U. (1967). Beurteilung der glaubhaftigkeit von aussagen 
[Evaluation of statement credibility/Statement validity assessment]. In U. 
Undeutsch, (Ed.), Handbuch der Psychologie (Vol. II: Forensische 
Psychologie, pp. 26–181). Goettingen: Hogrefe.  
 
Undeutsch, U. (1989). The development of statement reality analysis. In J. 
Yuille (Ed.), Credibility assessment (pp.101-119). Dordrech, Holland: 
Kluwer Academic Publishers. 
 
Van Boven, L., & Ashworth, L. (2007). Looking forward, looking back: 
Anticipation is more evocative than retrospection. Journal of Experimental 
Psychology, 136, 289–300. 
 
Van Boven, L., Kane, J. & McGraw, A. P. (2008). Temporally asymmetric 
constraints on mental simulation: retrospection is more constrained than 
prospection. In K. D. Markman, W. M. P. Klein & J. A. Suhr (Eds.), The 
Handbook of Imagination and Mental Simulation (pp. 131–149). New York: 
Psychology Press. 
 
Velakoulis, D., Wood, S. J., Wong, M. T., McGorry, P. D., Yung, A., 
Phillips, L., et al. (2006). Hippocampal and amygdala volumes according 
to psychosis stage and diagnosis: A magnetic resonance imaging study of 
chronic schizophrenia, first–episode psychosis, and ultra–high–risk 
individuals. Archives of General Psychiatry, 63, 139–149. 
 
Vincent, P. J., Boddana, P. & MacLeod, A. K. (2004). Positive Life Goals 




Vrij, A. (2004). Why professionals fail to catch liars and how they can 
improve. Legal and Criminological Psychology, 9, 159–181. 
 
Vrij, A. (2005). Criteria-Based Content Analysis: A qualitative review of the 
first 37 studies. Psychology, Public Policy, and Law, 11, 3–41. 
 
Vrij, A. (2008). Detecting lies and deceit: pitfalls and opportunities. 
Chichester: John Wiley. 
 
Vrij, A., Granhag, P. A., Mann, S. A. & Leal, S. (2011). Lying about flying: 
The first experiment to detect false intent. Psychology, Crime and Law, 
17(7), 611–620. 
 
Vrij, A., Leal, S., Fisher, R., Mann, S., Dalton, G., Eunkyung, J., Shaboltas, 
A., Khaleeva, M., Granskaya, J. & Houston, K., (2018). Sketching as a 
technique to eliciting information and cues to deceit in interpreter–based 
interviews. Journal of Applied Research in Memory and Cognition, 7(2), 
303–313. DOI:10.1016/j.jarmac.2017.11.001 
 
Vrij, A., Mann, S., Leal, S., & Fisher, R. (2012). Is anyone there? Drawings 
as a tool to detect deception in occupations interviews. Psychology, 
Crime, & Law, 18, 377–388. DOI: 10.1080/1068316X.2010.498422 
 
Vrij, A., Leal, S., Mann, S., & Fisher, R. (2012). Imposing cognitive load to 
elicit cues to deceit: Inducing the reverse order technique naturally. 
Psychology, Crime & Law, 18, 579-594. DOI: 
10.1080/10683160902776843  
 
Vrij, A., Leal, S., Mann, S. A. & Granhag, P. A. (2011). A comparison 
between lying about intentions and past activities: Verbal cues and 
detection accuracy. Applied Cognitive Psychology, 25, 212–218. 
 340 
 
Vrij, A., Leal, S., Mann, S. A., Warmelink, L., Granhag, P. A. & Fisher, R. 
P. (2010). Drawings as an innovative and successful lie detection tool. 
Applied Cognitive Psychology, 24(4), 587–594. 
 
Vrij, A., & Mann, S. (2001). Telling and detecting lies in a high ‐stake 
situation: The case of a convicted murderer. Applied Cognitive 
Psychology, 15(2), 187–203. 
 
Vrij, A., Mann, S., Fisher, R., Leal, S., Milne, B & Bull, R. (2008). 
Increasing cognitive load to facilitate lie detection: The benefit of recalling 
an event in reverse order. Law and Human Behavior, 32, 235–265. DOI: 
10.1007/s10979-007-9103-y 
 
Vrij, A., Mann, S., Jundi, S., Hillman, J., & Hope, L. (2014). Detection of  
concealment in an information-gathering interview. Applied Cognitive 
Psychology, 28, 860–866. http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/acp.3051 
 
Vrij, A., Mann, S., Leal, S., & Fisher, R. (2012). Is anyone there? Drawings 
as a tool to detect deceit in occupation interviews. Psychology, Crime & 
Law, 18, 377–388. doi: 10.1080/1068316x.2010.498422  
 
Walker, W., Skowronski, J. (2009). The Fading affect bias: but what the 
hell is it for? Applied Cognitive Psychology, 23(8), 1122–1136. 
 
Wammes, J. D., Meade, M. E. & Fernandes, M. A. (2016). The drawing 
effect: Evidence for reliable and robust memory benefits in free recall. The 




Warmelink, L., Vrij, A., Mann, S. & Granhag, P. A. (2013). Spatial and 
Temporal Details in Intentions: A Cue to Detecting Deception. Applied 
Cognitive Psychology, 27, 101–106. DOI: 10.1002/acp.2878 
 
Warmelink, L., Vrij, A., Mann, S., Jundi, S. & Granhag, P. A. (2012). The 
effect of question expectedness and experience on lying about intentions. 
Acta Psychologica, 141(2), 178–183. DOI: 10.1016/j.actpsy.2012.07.011 
 
Warmelink, L., Vrij, A., Mann, S., Leal, S., Forrester, D. & Fisher, R. P. 
(2011). Thermal imaging as a lie detection tool at airports. Law and 
Human Behavior, 35(1), 40–48. 
 
Watanabe, H. (2005). Semantic and episodic predictions of memory for 
plans. Japanese Psychological Research, 47(1), 40–45. 
 
Weinstein, N. D. (1980). Unrealistic optimism about future life events. 
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 39, 806–820. 
 
Wheeler, M. A. (2000). Episodic memory and autonoetic consciousness. 
In E. Tulving & F. I. M. Craik (Eds.), Oxford handbook of memory (pp. 
597–608). New York: Oxford University Press. 
 
Wheeler, D., Brunson, C., & Walker, W. R. (2009). Individual differences in 
time perspective predict differences in the fading affect bias. Presented at 
the 81st Annual Meeting of the Midwestern Psychological Association, 
Chicago, IL. 
 
Wheeler, M. A., & McMillan, C. T. (2001). Focal retrograde amnesia and 
the episodic–semantic distinction. Cognitive Affective and Behavioral 
Neuroscience, 1, 22–37. 
 
 342 
Wheeler, M. A., Stuss, D. T., & Tulving, E. (1997). Toward a theory of 
episodic memory: The frontal lobes and autonoetic consciousness. 
Psychological Bulletin, 121, 331–354. 
 
Williams, J. M. G. (1996). The specificity of autobiographical memory in 
depression. In D. Rubin (Ed.), Remembering our past: Studies in 
autobiographical memory (pp. 271–296). Cambridge: CambridgeUniversity 
Press. 
 
Williams, J. M. G. (2006). Capture and rumination, functional avoidance, 
and executive control (CaRFAX): Three processes that underlie 
overgeneral memory. Cognition and Emotion, 20, 139–149. 
 
Williams, J. M. G., & Broadbent, K. (1986). Autobiographical memory in 
suicide attempters. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 94, 144–149. 
 
Williams, J. M. G., & Dritschel, B. (1988). Emotional disturbance and the 
specificity of autobiographical memory. Cognition and Emotion, 2, 221– 
234. 
 
Williams, J. M., & Dritschel, B. (1992). Categoric and extended 
autobiographical memories. In M. A. Conway, D. C. Rubin, H. Spinnler & 
W. A. Wagenaar (Eds.), Theoretical perspectives on autobiographical 
memory (pp. 391–410). Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic. 
 
Williams, J. M. G., Ellis, N. C., Tyers, C., Healy, H., Rose, G., & MacLeod, 
A. K. (1996). The specificity of autobiographical memory and imaginability 
of the future. Memory and Cognition, 24(116–125).  
 
Williams, J. M. G., Barnhofer, T., Crane, C., Herman, D., Raes, F., 
Watkins, E., & Dalgleish, T. (2007). Autobiographical memory specificity 
 343 
and emotional disorder. Psychological Bulletin, 133(1), 122-148. DOI: 
10.1037/0033-2909.133.1.122 
 
Wilson, T. D., Meyers, J., & Gilbert, D. T. (2001). Lessons from the past: 
Do people learn from experience that emotional reactions are short lived? 
Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 27, 1648-1661. 
 
Winfield, H. & Kamboj, S. K. (2010). Schizotypy and mental time travel. 
Consciousness and Cognition, 19, 321–327. 
 
Wright, D. B. (1998). Modelling clustered data in autobiographical memory 
research: The multilevel approach. Applied Cognitive Psychology, 12, 
339–357. 
 
Wright, D. B. & London, K. (2009). Modern regression techniques using R: 
A practical guide for students and researchers. London: Sage 
Publications. 
 
Zeman, A., Dewar, M. & Della Salla, S. (2015). Lives without imagery, 
congenital aphantasia. Cortex, 73, 378-380. 
 
Zimbardo, P. & Boyd, J. N. (1999). Putting time in perspective: A valid, 
reliable individual–differences metric. Journal of Personality and Social 





Table A.1: Study 1(a). Events generated in Phase 1 and Phase 2 
Theme  Past (Phase 2) Future (Phase 1) 
1. Occupation    
1.1a Meeting (study 
or work)  
My internship review with my 
manager 
Society meeting  
  Had a lunch meeting with my 
Director to discuss future plans 
for the charity 
Have a meeting with my 
supervisor f rom uni 
  Had supervision and talked 
about a disagreement with a 
work colleague 
Have a meeting with my 
department 
  Had a dissertation meeting 
concerning a change in chapter 
structure 
Meeting at work due to it 
closing 
  Had a committee meeting for a 
project I volunteer for 
Lab meeting with tutor 
  Had cof fee with my colleague 
and had a meeting there 
Have an Individual 
Development Meeting with my 
boss 
  The meeting where I was told I 
was getting promoted at work 
to a full time position 
2 hour meeting about planning 
this years dance4life National 
School Workshop Tour 
  Had a meeting with a reader 
and discussed my f irst draf t of 
a novel. 
One hour fundraising task force 
meeting 
  Had six-monthly progress 
meeting at work 
Schedule meeting for work to 
discuss releases etc. 
  Had a meeting with my boss 
and he reviewed my 
performance 
Meet Sean to discuss script 
  – Doing a presentation at my 
company on the research I've 
been doing on studies into 'the 
art of  communication' - 
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methods of  communicating 
complex information in the 
most user-f riendly manner. 
1.1b Working Performed at a comedy gig in 
Aberdeen which took 3 hours 
to get to and f rom 
Going to work for 8 hours this 
week. 
 
  Went on a training course for 
how to manage volunteers 
Go to work at Druckers. 
  Took part in a video conference 
regarding asthma treatment 
Write an article for a website 
  Gave my departmental 
presentation for 2010 
11-5 work at scummy Greggs 
  Worked on new f ilm footage 
which I f ilmed at the weekend 
Volunteer at Southover Primary 
School on Monday af ternoons 
  Babysat Oliver on my road in 
the evening 
Going to work 
  Worked a night shif t with an 
extra resident in the house to 
normal 
Finish typing up Haifa piece 
  Working on QM project with 
project group 
Redraf t blog 
  Worked at the gallery in Old 
Street 
Voluntary work 
1.1c Job hunting Met my f riend's mum Caroline 
for help with my personal 
statement 
Job interview  
  Had a job interview at a charity 
organisation 
Calling the NHS recruitment to 
f ind out when my new job starts 
  Jobseeker's interview in 
Streatham 
– 
  Filled out an application for a 
vacation scheme 
 
  Had a job interview in Troon  
  Applied for a job in Germany 
and they called me for an 
interview 
 
  Applied for a job in Milan but 




  Went to a job interview at Guys 
Hospital 
 
1.2 Studying    
1.2a Studying Tried to choose my optional 
courses for the coming 
semester as part of  my MSc 
degree in Economics 
Going to the library with a 
f riend to assist in a dissertation 
 
  Spent a few hours f inishing of f  
my dissertation 
Work on IS report. 
  Attended a SIRE seminar in 
Edinburgh 
Study group in the library 
everyday 
  Did some reading on 
deprivation and antisocial 
behaviour for my course 
A lecture 
  Looked up journal articles 
related to the determinants of  
energy demand 
Group study trips to the library 
  Attended several hours of  
lectures on Microeconomics, 
Macroeconomics and 
Econometrics 
Finish coursework assignment 
  Attended Law-related 
workshops 
Going to the library to work 
  Came into college to read for 
my proposal last Monday 
Organise timetable and 
readings for next term 
  Went to the library to work on 
dissertation and essays with 
uni f riend 
– 
  Attended a one-day workshop 
in the uni 
 
  Did some reading on 
deprivation and antisocial 
behaviour for my course 
 
  Went to the British library to 
work on dissertation 
 
1.2b Exams – Have an English exam  
   Prepare for examinations. J 
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agreed  
   Do the two examinations. 
   2 exams 
   Then I have an exam next 
week 
   Then I have exam, exam exam 
in two weeks! 
2. Leisure    
2.1 Going out    
2.1a Meeting for a 
coffee 
Met up with f riends for coffee  Meeting f riends for cof fee 
(couple of  times) 
 
  Met up with housemate at a 
Turkish cafe for her to meet 
some university mates 
Going for a cof fee (twice) 
  Had cof fee and a chat with the 
girls af ter college last Thursday  
Tomorrow I am meeting a 
f riend for cof fee at Starbucks 
around lunch time 
  Met another boy for coffee – 
2.1b Meet a friend in 
a pub or bar 
Met up with my housemate and 
a f riend to go for some drinks 
at the weekend 
Going to the pub tonight to 
watch the Manchester City 
football match 
 
  Went to the pub for my f riends 
birthday and had dinner and 
drinks 
Going for drinks 
on Saturday when all of  
my housemates are back 
af ter Christmas 
  Went to a late bar and danced Dinner out at a pub 
  Gone to the pub with my 
university f riends  
Go to the pub with f riends 
  Going to Brighton to see some 
f riends for a night out (less than 
24 hours)  
Ian 7pm White Hart 
  Had drinks on Saturday night  Drinks with f riends in the pub 
  Meeting a f riend for a drink to 
celebrate his new job  
Catch up with f riends at the 
pub 
\  Met my Dad and his girlf riend 
for drinks in a wine bar and ate 
some cheese  
Going for a drink with a 
colleague af ter work 
  Went to the pub with the owner Going out for drinks with my 
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of  the pharmacy I was working 
in  
godfather 
  Went to a pub with a f riend and 
drank too many cocktails  
Meet an old work f riend for 
drink and catch up 
  Went to the pub for a few 
drinks with a f riend and did the 
pub quiz 
Going to the pub to watch 
whichever football match is on 
  Going to visit f riends in london 
(pub)  
Going to the pub with my two 
f riends Dom and Ruth 
  Met up with f riends f rom back 
home 
Go to the pub 
 
 
Went to my f riends 30th 




Going to visit f riends in london 









Went for a walk to the pub to 








2.1c Eating out Went out for meal Lunch with course mates  
  Going for dinner at international 
starters 
Going for Sunday dinner with 
my boyfriend and parents 
  Went to a Japanese restaurant 
in Soho with university f riends 
to experience it 
Have lunch with an old uni 
mate who is in London for the 
weekend 
  Had lunch with housemates on 
Park Street 
Meet my mum for dinner 
  Going to Nando’s for lunch with 
my colleagues/f riends  
Going for dinner with a f riend I 
don't like 
  Went to an African restaurant  Taking my girlf riend for dinner 
next Saturday 
  Attended my dad's 54th 
birthday at his house and ate 
Chinese takeaway  
Meeting with f riends for dinner 
(probably four times in the next 
two weeks) 
  Went to an Italian restaurant – 
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with my family 
  Had dinner - roast pork - with 




Going to Cheltenham with my 
girlf riend and going out to a 
restaurant (restaurant part was 




Had dinner with f riends for my 




Had lunch with 11 other PhD 









Met a boy I've been seeing for 




Met a f riend for lunch at the 




Went out for lunch with the new 









Going out to dinner with my 





Going for dinner with a f riend at 
Tangs sushi restaurant before 




Went to a restaurant for dinner 
with f riends  
 
  Treated my girlf riend to a meal  
 
 
Went to dinner in Wimbledon 
with a high school f riend who 




Went to dinner at an Indian 




Went to dinner at an Italian 
restaurant with my boyfriend to 
meet his family f riends for the 
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f irst time 
 
 
Eaten at Thai restaurant for 




Eaten worst meal ever at a 




Attending Burns supper at my 
f riend's parents' house 
 
 
2.1d Go to a club or 
specific event 
Attended a pop-punk night at 
Corporation, Shef f ield 
Going to a club with f riends  
  Went to a comedy club  Going to a club 
  Went on a night out in Ashby Go to a club on Thursday 
  Going out for my f riends 
birthday in Central London  
Go to a burlesque club night on 
Saturday for my f riend’s 
birthday 
  Gone to Glasgow for an epic 
night out at the West End with 
my mates  
Getting pissed/going out 
  Went dancing at a nightclub  Evening out at really lame 
student night 
  Went to a night in 
Bournemouth with f riend Bee  
Going clubbing with a f riend 
  Went out with my f riends in a 
nightclub called Chasers on 
Saturday night 
Meeting my f riend Alice in 
Manchester for drinks, food, 
dancing, cinema 
 
  Had one big gathering for a 
night out 
 
Friends f rom Ashby, Leeds and 
Preston are coming to my 
house in Shef f ield. We going to 
have a take away and go to 
few bars then clubbing in 
Shef f ield (this is going to be a 
messy night!) 
 
2.1e Live music Been to a gig in Birmingham 
with f riends 
Go to watch some live music at 
local pub with some mates 
 
  Went to a gig to see a f riends 
band 
Going to music nights (a few 
times in two weeks) 
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  Went to see a f riend's band 
playing in a pub 
Go to see Brand New at 
Wembley on the 23rd 
 
2.1f Cinema Watching Avatar 3D at the 
cinema with f riend  
Go to the cinema  
  Went to the cinema to watch 
Avatar 
Go to the cinema (iMAX) to see 
Avatar 
  Went to the cinema to see It's 
Complicated  
Going to the cinema 
  Went to the cinema to see 
Avatar 
Meal/cinema with a f riend f rom 
work in London 
  Saw a f ilm at the cinema in 
Birmingham 
Go to the movies with f riends 
  Watched No Country for Old 
Men 
Orange Wednesday f ilm night 
  Attended a screening of  The 
Quatermass Xperiment (1955) 
Saturday I am going to see 9 
with my Girlf riend 
  Watched The History Boys Cinema 
  Watched Avatar at cinema Seeing Avatar with Heather 
  Went to the movie Up in the Air 
with my boyfriend 
Going to see Avatar with my 
f riend Robin and a few other 
f riends 
  Went to cinema  Watch f ilm at IMAX 
  Watched latest Final 
Destination 3D on Blu-ray with 
useless 3D glasses 
– 
  Went to an art house cinema to 
attend a screening of  classic 
black and white horror movies: 
Nosferatu, Dracula, 




2.1g Party Been to a house party Cathryn's birthday meal  
  Went to the opening of  the 
exhibition Eberhard Haverkost: 
RETINA at the Schirn 
Kunsthalle Frankfurt. 
Go to a f riend’s birthday party 
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  Celebrated Australia Day for 
the f irst time 
Go to a roller disco for a 
f riend's birthday 
  Went to a house warming party Going to a house party 
  – Celebrate Rebecca's birthday 
2.1h Theatre _ Cheap student theatre tickets  
  LastMinute.com Theatre tickets  
  Othello with Patrick  
2.1i Museums & 
galleries 
Went to the Tate with some 
f riends 
Museums, especially f ree ones 
 
  Visited a medieval torture 
museum to do research on 
torture techniques for a script  
Museum 
2.1j Other going out Had my f irst ever visit to a 
casino 
Go to a football game 
 Walked up Carlton Hill in order 
to admire the amazing view 




Went to the football and 





Been to bingo at Mecca with 4 









Met my ex boyfriend - last time 




Walked f riend's dog across 
Wandsworth Common 
 
 Went bowling with f riends   
 Going for a walk up Arthur's 
Seat with f riend af ter class 
  
2.2 Staying in    
2.2a Going to a 
friend’s house 
Visited f riends I hadn't seen for 
a while and spent a whole 
af ternoon chatting and laughing 
even though I had an important 
deadline the next day. 
Going to a f riend's house to 
watch a f ilm 
 
  Watching The Incredibles at 
boyfriend's house 
Going over a f riends house to 
watch your favourite TV 
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programme 
  Visited a couple's new house  Go round to a f riend's for 
dinner 
  Had tea and scones with 
f riends and their new baby 
Going round to my f riend 
Nancy's house to watch a f ilm 
with her and see her family 
  Went to Milan to see f riends 
and stayed at their place for 
one night 
Going to a mates house to play 
Pro Evo Soccer (Xbox game), 
and general banter 
  Went to a f riend’s studio to help 
him pick out sculptures for a 
show. 
– 
  Been for a meal at a f riend's 
house 
 
2.2b Staying in Cooked pizza for my sister and 
her boyfriend  
Watch The Wire  
  Watched a James Bond f ilm 
while waiting for a f ridge to be 
picked up f rom my parent's 
house 
Do some DJ-ing 
  Cooked a nice meal for my 
partner 
Pizza and a movie in with my 
housemate 
  Watched Murray v. Nadal with 
my dad 
Read my book  
  Watched Manchester United 
thrash Manchester City in the 
Carling Cup Semi-Final 
Share a bottle of  wine with my 
boyfriend af ter the job interview 
  Watched Eastenders while 
starting my crochet  
Prepare a meal 
  Listening to the new Ricky 
Gervais podcast that lasted for 
50 minutes  
Browse the internet 
  Had my f riend round to my f lat 
for dinner  
Play computer games 
  Wrote and recorded a song Watch TV 
  Watched the DVD of  Star 
Wars: The Empire Strikes Back 
for the f irst time 
Watch Match of the Day on TV 
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  Watched a Leicester City 
match on TV 
_ 
  Managed to have a go on the 
XBOX without the baby waking 
up 
 
  Went on my Wii Fit  
  Watched a TV programme the 
wife wanted to watch, only she 
fell asleep f ive minutes in. 
 
  Started painting a canvas in 
readiness for it becoming 
someone's valentine's present. 
I am copying a web comic 
called xkcd 
 
  Sat in bed on my computer on 
my morning of f  work  
 
  Had a morning of f  work and 
stayed in bed until 12 
 
  Called my f riend Jessie who 
lives in Germany  
 
  Spending hours procrastinating 
on YouTube  
 
2.3 Other Leisure    
2.3a Sports Played tennis with my girlf riend  Playing cards or basketball with 
fellow students during lunch 
when in college time. 
 
  Attended a yoga class with two 
of  my house mates 
I have go karting with some 
f riends next week 
  Going for a run  Go to the gym 
  Played a game of  volleyball  Go for a walk 
  Went to a yoga class to try it 
out  
Kick boxing lessons once a 
week 
  Been swimming and done 40 
lengths 
General gyming/swimming 
every other day with 
siblings/f riends 
  Went to the gym and lif ted 
some weights and run 8k on 
the treadmill  
Going to the gym/swimming, 
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  Played a league match in a 
Sunday football league 
Fitness class 
  Went to the gym and it was 
really busy!  
Jogging with f riends 
  Going to the gym  Sports: f ive-a-side, squash, ice 
skating, swimming 
  Played a f riendly game of  5-a-
side football  
Go for a run 
  Went to the gym and went on 
the running machine, cross 
trainer and did some weights 
and sit ups 
Go to the gym 
  Went walking in the country 
with best f riend and her new 
baby 
Well without a doubt tonight I 
am going Salsa Dancing 
  Had a gym session and ran 
10km 
Playing football with f riends 
and other students at Brighton 
and Sussex. 
  Played Snooker, making a 
break of  36 
Going to the gym at the 
weekend 
  Having my gym induction I play basketball 2/3 times a 
week 
  Went to the gym for pole 
dancing class last Monday  
Go for a swim 
  Went to the gym with my f riend, 
considered joining because the 
swimming pool looked lovely 
 
– 
2.3b Shopping Spent ages trying to f ind a 
suitable gif t for my brother's 
birthday 
Take these f riends shopping in 
the centre of  Shef f ield and 
Meadowhall 
 
  Went to the market and bought 
a joint of  pork belly  
Shopping with a f riend 
  Went shopping with my mum to 
pick up my dress for the ball 
last Saturday week  
Go in to town to buy f ish for 
new f ish tank 
  Went to the shops and got a 
smoothie  
Go shopping for underwear 
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  Ordered an of f ice chair online Shopping 
  Shopping with f riends Go shopping with two of  my 
f riends tomorrow 
  Bought new glasses  Go shopping for birthday 
presents 
  Went grocery shopping  Shopping next Wednesday at 
Armani 
  Shopping in Sainsbury's for 
golden syrup to make cookies 
Going shopping with my cousin 
  Went shopping with my BF to 
buy a new extra comfy couch. 
Go buy Rebecca stuf f  for 
upcoming birthday 
  Went shopping in Kingston with 
a University f riend to look for a 
baby gif t 
Going to a second hand 
bookshop and choosing a new 
book 
  Been shopping for f riend's 
birthday present 
Car boot sale 
  Went to a supermarket in 
another city 
Visit a car boot sale 
  Went shopping for a new pair 
of  work trousers 
– 
  Been to ASDA to do a big shop  
  Went shopping and bought a 
black bag cause I needed it it 
 
  Went to the supermarket to buy 
ingredients to bake a cake  
 
2.3c Travel & day 
trips 
Went for a bike ride in the 
country  




  Visited Stephansdom 
monument in Vienna  
Get a train to Manchester 
  Went to the beach in 
Bournemouth with my f riend 
Bee  
Going home for the weekend 
af ter exams with a f riend 
  Going to Glasgow with f riends 
to visit Ashton Lane  
Flying to Portugal to visit my 
parents 
  Went to Greenwich market for 
the f irst time to get out of  the 
house at the weekend 
Then I am going Amsterdam on 
the 5th of  February (Zurich a 
week af ter that) 
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  Walked round the grounds of  
Stornoway Castle 
Getting the train back to 
Manchester 
  Took a f light to Cardif f  A trip to Southend on Sea 
  Biked home f rom Stoke 
Newington  
Train to Felixstowe af ter work 
  Day trip to Cambridge to see a 
f riend who is going travelling  
– 
  Flew back f rom Italy af ter the 
Christmas break 
 
  Went skiing near the Alpes  
  Took a Train f rom Dunlop to 
Glasgow  
 
  Took a f light to Stornoway   
  Sat in traf f ic for two hours 
trying to get home through 
snow  
 
  Waking up late and having to 
run for the train and missing it 
 
  Got the Eurostar back f rom 
Paris and enjoyed eating my 
ham and cheese sandwich 
 
  Got the train to work and was 
disheartened when I realised 
someone was sat in MY SEAT. 
 
  Drove to Birmingham with 
f riends 
 
  Tried a new route home  
  Drove my car to pick up my 
boyfriend yesterday  
 
  Walked home f rom work with 
my colleague  
 
 
2.3d Seeing family Meeting my new baby cousin 
Lois for the f irst time at my 
uncle's house  
Celebrating my grandma's 90th 
birthday at her house 
 
  Dinner at my Nan's house  Go home and see family 
  Babysat my sister Roya af ter 
school  
Meet my mum for dinner 
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  Visited my brother for his 
birthday  
Spending time with family who 
are popping down 
  Visited Nan and Grandad for 
lunch  
Visit my family 
  Visited my Grandparents, and 
saw my Gran's sister for the 
f irst time in a decade 
Visiting relatives/parents 
  Spent some time with my 
boyfriend's nephews and 
nieces last f riday  
Go to see Grandfolks 
  Walked along the canal at 
Maryhill with my dad for the 
f irst time 
– 
  Went to my aunt and uncles' 
house for a roast chicken lunch 
 
  Been for a meal at my parent's 
house 
 
3. Life Management    
3.1 Flat hunting Viewed a f lat in London  Viewing of  a f lat in North 
London  
 
  Viewed a house with my 
boyfriend  
Going to Hampstead to look in 
newsagents windows for 
places to live 
  Looking round a f lat in Brockley – 
  Went to house viewings to 
choose a f lat to move into 
 
3.2 Domestic chores Cooked Swedish meatballs 
f rom scratch 
Go food shopping  
  Vacuumed my new car for the 
f irst time 
Doing the laundry 
  Tried to perfect a new recipe 
for my famous ricotta pasta 
sauce 
Organise my iTunes 
  Done a whites wash for the f irst 
time in ages 
Vacuum whole house 
  Had a big clearout in my f lat  Drop of f trousers at tailors 
  Taken my bike to be f ixed Prepare a meal 
  Baked three loaves of  bread, Make a chicken stew for the 
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replaced the honey with sugar f irst time 
  Repaired the f inish on my 
guitar 
Sorting out my utility cupboard 
  Packed my things preparing to 
move house 
– 
  Made noodles for dinner, 
experimented with chicken 
gravy granules and sweet and 
sour sauce ... it turned out quite 
well 
 
  Had a long conversation with 
O2 about iPhone 
 
  Wiped iPod & only reloaded the 
stuf f  I actually listen to/watch 
 
3.3 Financial chores Filed my tax return for this year  Paying bills  
  Got a text f rom my bank and 
realised I had more money 
than f irst thought, have been 
trying to spend it ever since 
Going to the bank 
  – Signing on (Jobseekers' 
Allowance) 
   Phone council about tax stuf f  
3.4 Grooming and 
healthcare 
Went to the hospital to get a 
blood test done last Friday  
Arrange a doctors appointment 
about quitting smoking and 
then attend it 
 
  Set a date to quit smoking Getting my hair highlighted 
  Went to the hairdressers with a 
f riend  
Get my hair cut 
  Got my hair done in Ruben's 
Hairdressers last Saturday  
Buy a hair colour and colour 
my hair at home 
  Had a haircut on cheap trial 
deal 
Have a meeting with my GP 
  Went to see my psychologist 
and this was my last 
appointment with her 
Giving myself  a manipedi 
  Got my haircut at the 
hairdressers on my street for 
the f irst time 
Getting my hair cut 
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  Went to the massage parlour 
and accidentally ran into a 
potential new editor who was 
pretty much naked at that time. 
_ 
  Had a haircut  
3.5 Event planning Visited a Gallery where I am 
holding an event in Feb  
Organising my birthday dinner  
  Looked online at summer 
holiday destinations 
Booking festival tickets 
  – Meeting with two f riends to plan 
for some events we are starting 
   Planning for f riends to come 
round for a meal 
4. Idiosyncratic 
(past only) 
Went to unlock my car door 
and the locks had f rozen  
–  
  Started stripping an old tractor  
  Spoke to a really old man on 
the phone who claimed he 
knew John Lennon 
 
  Was excited to f ind half  a bag 
of  Malteasers in my bag 
 
  Spent almost an entire day 
drawing 
 
  Got presents f rom my f riends 










PHENOMENOLOGICAL CHARACTERISTICS QUESTIONNAIRE 
 
Participant number: Practice/Experimental Trial       1     2     3     4 Past / Future 
Instructions 
Below is a list of questions about the characteristics associated with your remembered/ 
imagined past and future events. Circle only one response. Please answer honestly. Your 
answers are confidential. Remember, at no point should you tell the experimenter which 





Please indicate how much you agree with each 
statement by choosing a response between 1 
(not at all true) and 7 (completely true) 
Response 
 Not at all    Completely 
1 
While remembering/imagining the event, I feel as 
though I am reliving/experiencing it 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
2 
While remembering/imagining the event, I feel that I 
travel back/ forward to the time when it happened/ 
would happen 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
3 
My memory/representation for this event involves 
visual details 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
4 
My memory/representation for this event involves 
sounds 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
5 
My memory/representation for this event involves 
smells/tastes 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
6 
My memory/representation for the location where the 
event takes place is clear 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
7 
The relative spatial arrangement of objects in my 
memory/representation for the event is clear 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
8 
The relative spatial arrangement of people in my 
memory/representation for the event is clear 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
9 
My memory/representation for the time of day when 
the event takes place is clear 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
10 
While remembering/imagining the event, I feel the 
emotions I felt when the event occurred/would feel if 
the event occurred 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
11 
The emotions I have when I recall the episode are 
1=extremely negative; 7=extremely positive). 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
12 
This event is important to me (it involves an 
important theme or episode in my life) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
13 
While remembering/imagining the event, it comes to 
me in words 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
14 
While remembering/imagining the event, it comes to 
me as a coherent story and not as an isolated scene 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
15 
When I recall the event, I primarily see what 
happened from a perspective as seen through (1= 
my own eyes; 7=an observer’s eyes). 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
16 
How desirable was this event? 
(1=would not want to do it at all; 7=highly desirable) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
17 
How many days from today is the event in the 
past/future? (write number of days) 
 
 










Participant number: Practice/Experimental Trial       1     2     3     4 
 Please circle one response 











An event that 
has happened 
in the last 
two weeks 
An event 
that has not 
happened to 
me in the 
last two 
weeks 








that I do not 
foresee 
happening in 
the next two 
weeks 
 
 Please indicate how much you agree with each 
statement by choosing a response between 1 and 7 
Response 
Not at all    Completely 
19 
PAST EVENTS ONLY  
I believe that the event really took place the way I 
remember it in the past two weeks and I did not 
imagine or invent anything that did not take place 
in the last two weeks 
(1 = 100% fantasy; 7 = 100% real). 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
20 
FUTURE EVENTS ONLY 
Right now, I believe that the imagined event really 
will take place as I imagined it in the next two 
weeks. I did not imagine or invent anything that I 
do not think will take place in the next two weeks.  
(1 = not at all likely; 7 = completely likely). 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
21 
How motivated were you to perform well in this 
task? 
(1 = not at all; 7 = highly motivated) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
22 
How difficult did you find the task? 
(1 = not at all; 7 = extremely difficult) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
 
Thank you for completing this questionnaire. Remember, at no point should you 
tell the experimenter which events were true or invented but please check that 
you have indicated this in your response to question 18.  
 





Study 1(b). Protocol used to clarify episodic memory, imagining and 
episodic future thinking with participants 
Clarifying Episodic Memory and Episodic Future Thinking 
Episodic memory is memory for specific events that you have personally 
experienced and which you have a feeling of re-experiencing when you 
remember them. For example, if I asked you to recall an episodic memory 
for the words ‘birthday party’ you might remember a party you went to 
recently or maybe your own last birthday celebration. These were events 
that you attended and your memory of them involves more than just facts, 
you may also remember whether the food that you ate at the party was 
nice or whether you liked what you were wearing that night – subjective 
personal details about the event that only you could have known at the 
time and which you may also be able to re-experience when you try to 
remember that event. 
To show me that you understand what I mean by episodic memory, please 
give me an example of episodic memory for the cue “going for a job 
interview” 
Episodic future thinking occurs when we project ourselves into the future 
to mentally pre-experience a specific event or experience that has yet to 
happen. You are probably familiar with the idea of episodic memory but 
less familiar with episodic future thinking. To clarify what I mean, consider 
the question: will you want to go clubbing on your 40th birthday? To 
answer this you have to imagine yourself aged 39 and you will have an 
accompanying sense that your preferences at that age will be a bit 
different to those you have now. You may even have insight into how you 
are likely to feel at 39 and whether clubbing sounds like a good night out 
to your 39-year-old self! Now consider the semantic future question: will 
Egham have a Disneyland in 2050? To answer this you are still thinking 
about the future but you do not have an accompanying subjective sense of 
personal experience.  Hopefully you can see the difference, if not, please 
ask me to clarify this. Here’s another example, do you think you will want 
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to share a hotel room with your mother on holiday this year? You are using 
future episodic thinking whenever you direct your thoughts towards events 
that may happen in the future to see how they feel and how you might 
want to better plan or organise that activity. You will most likely use any 
relevant life experience of the event or activity as well as knowledge of 
yourself, what feels right for you, to help you when you are engaging in 
future episodic thinking. 
 
To show me that you understand what I mean by episodic future thinking, 
please give me an example of EFT for the cue “attending a birthday party”. 
 
Instructions for the practice trials 
 
Episodic memory is memory for one-time events that you have personally 
experienced and which you have a feeling of re-experiencing when you 
remember them. 
 
Episodic future thinking is projecting yourself into the future to mentally 
pre-experience a one-time event that has yet to happen. 
 
Practice scenario A Going out for a meal with family or friends 
Practice scenario B Going shopping for a specific item (a certain 
ingredient, a new shirt, a birthday present for a friend: any specific item of 
your choice). 
 
1. Choose one scenario (A or B) to simulate as a past experience (you 
have done this in the last two weeks) 
 
2. Choose one scenario (A or B) to simulate as a future experience 
(you are planning to do this sometime in the next two weeks). 
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3. Let me know when you have chosen which event you are going to 







Sample of transcripts from Study 1(b), rated in Study 1(c, d) 
P26  T1 FUTURE   
Erm, I’m going to, I’m having someone over on Thursday, I think it is, to, 
we’re having dinner, I said I’d cook, not quite sure why, not very good at 
cooking, erm, think we’ll just have like lasagne or Bolognese or something, 
cause its something that I know I can make taste okay [laugh], isn’t hard to 
cook, erm, it’s Zoe who’s coming from another flat and I should think Eve 
from my flat will probably be there as well, cause she’s friends with her as 
well, makes sense [laugh] erm [pause] erm, [pause], be in my kitchen in 
halls so there will probably be other people in and out as well [pause] 
making it harder to cook, there’s eight people, don’t really need to be 
cooking for another,  [long pause] try it, [pause] Erm I haven’t arranged 
anything more to do though, about times or anything, far too organised 
[laugh]. [pause] Erm, yeah. [pause] Can’t think of anything else. 
 
P26  T2 PAST  
Last Tuesday myself and [pause], how many of us were, four girls, yeah, 
went to my friends flat in my same halls still, so I don’t have to go far, to 
watch a film.  We watched Paranormal Activity, which I’ve been wanting to 
watch for ages, I was going to go and see it at the Cinema but wussed out. 
[pause] Erm, [pause] It was, we had to sit in her room, which was nice and 
cosy, five of us, and she had the radiator on full blast and it was absolutely 
boiling anyway [short pause] Erm it watching on a tiny laptop screen 
[pause] Erm [pause] it was, it wasn’t as scary as I thought it was going to 
be, however I think we did annoy a lot of her flatmates with occasional 
screaming [pause] Erm  I had to sit on the chair, the office chair and all the 
rest were on the bed with the laptop [laugh] [pause] erm [pause] one of the 
girls that was with us was from Founders and we’re in Wedderburn, she 
had to walk back through the woods on her own, I felt quite sorry for her, 
none of us  offered to walk back with her cause we’d have to walk back on 
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our own [laugh] [pause] erm, we had ice cream as well, that was good, 
with cream, and chocolate [pause] Erm, yeah [pause].  Yeah. 
 
P26  T3 FUTURE   
At the weekend when I go home, erm, my friend [pause] who’s still living at 
home, he hasn’t, she went to university but she dropped out, is coming 
round for a coffee. Erm. She always has to do everything really early in the 
morning so she’s coming round at like nine. Probably still be in my 
pyjamas [pause] erm. [pause] Though I’m sure there’ll be other people 
wandering around my house, there generally is. There’s always other 
peop-, loads of other people, wandering round my house. [pause] Erm. 
[pause] She doesn’t drink coffee, so quite why she said she’s going to 
come round for a coffee I don’t know. She always brings disgusting tea-
bags that smell, they’re like, I call them hippy tea, I don’t know what they 
are, but they smell horrible. Erm. [long pause] Hmm. [long pause] Just 
generally, I haven’t seen her in ages, catch up, talk about nothing I should 
think for a good few hours. [laugh] Yeah. 
 
P26  T4 PAST  
Erm. At the weekend when my boyfriend was up from Cambridge, down 
from Cambridge, whatever it is, erm, went to the cinema. Can’t remember 
what we went to see ‘cause it was a film that he had to see. I didn’t really 
enjoy it that much.  Erm [pause] Erm, we had to go to Feltham instead of 
Staines because, he likes Cineworld not Vue. [pause] Erm. [pause] Which 
was good in some parts, it meant I got an ice-cream in from Burger King 
before we went in, one of their like McFlurry things, that isn’t a McFlurry 
‘cause its not McDonalds. [pause] Erm. [pause] The cinema, the queue 
was absolutely huge to get a ticket. [pause] And they don’t do student 
discount on a weekend, which upset me. [pause] Erm, we were in the 
tiniest screen though to actually watch the film, I’d never been in a screen 
that small. Erm [long pause] We arrived really early which is why I had 
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time to get my ice-cream, which was quite lucky I ‘spose cause the queue 





T1 Future, Fictitious 
T2 Past, Believed 
T3 Future, Believed 






Table E1: Study 1(c)(d). Questionnaire Design and Order of Presentation 
Session Temporal n Items 
  Believed Fictitious Total 
1 Past 38 44 82 
2  Past 26 18 44 
3  Future 24 28 52 
4 Future 38 36 74 





Table F.1 1(c) Judges 1 and 2 Comments on Likelihood And Plausibility  
Past Events 
Likelihood  Plausibility 







have been made up) 
 Consistent names 
and locations 
Incorrect information 
e.g. student discounts 
happen on weekends 
Very specif ic 
details, thoughts 
and memories 
Finishing story of f  
too quickly 
 Person asks self  
a rhetorical 
question 
Too many pauses, 
indistinguishable 
words and f illers e.g. 
erm 
Logical f low Inconsistent names 
and locations 
 Use of  reasoning 
in language 
Repetition of  events 





 Incoherent   Wrong names 
 Very brief  
descriptions (to the 
point) 
  Speaking in future 
tense 
 Unsure on details   Too long or too short 
 Repeating details   Incoherent 






(someone round for 
dinner) or unsure of  
dates 
 Events occurred 
as a result of  
previous events 
Contradiction, e.g. 
performed a novel 






self  in negative 
light 
[indistinguishable] 
indicates lack of  
conviction in what 
they’re saying 
 Things which are 




qualifying what was 
said (good laugh at the 
gym?) 




with regard to 
family members 
Disjointed story, 
vague or confusing 
facts 
 Said they can’t 
remember some 
facts (honest?) or 
portrayed self  in a 
negative light 
Inconsistencies (Small 
movie theatre with 3D 
screens, collected a 
takeaway, vegetarian 




Stating what they 
are about to say 




Very short story, lack 
of  elaboration and 
detail makes it hard to 
judge 




 Reason for a 
particular event 
occurring 
Actions not what most 
people would usually 






 Makes sense Switching or confusing 
tenses 




Likelihood  Plausibility 





Inconsistent details of  
place and names 
 Language:  
basing future 
event on past 
experiences 
Confusing tenses: 
that’s all I can 
remember 
Accurate times Too detailed about a 
future event 
 Language: 
words such as 
likely and 
probably 
Talking about future 
feelings 
Using old facts Too basic at times  Language like 
last time we did 
this 
Predicting specif ic 
reactions to events 
e.g. I will love it 
Realistic 
assumptions 
based on past 
events 
Very vague details 
and assumptions 
  Predicting exactly 
what will happen 
 Speaking in past 
tense: that’s what 
happened 
  Predicting emotions 
and atmosphere of  
places but using 
wrong names e.g. 
Madison 
 Phrases like I will be 
in regard to emotions 
  Too much detail not 
possible for a future 
event. The event 
sounds less plausible 
although it could be 
likely 
 Mixing tenses   Incoherent 
 
J2 More likely Less likely  More plausible Less plausible 
Giving a reason 





e.g. I imagine, 
probably in the 
future, probably 
tomorrow 
 Follows a logical 
structure, 
because of  XY 
this occurred 
Switching tenses 
sounds like a past 
event is being recast 
as the future 
Truthful facts 
sounds like a 
f requently 
occurring event 
Schematic - plans to 
do this but does not 
know why they want 
to 
 Knows the area 
or date, provides 
verif iable details 
How many people 
really make risottos 
weekly at this 
university? 
Positive emotions 
predicted f rom 
event 
Not that into the 
experience, would try 





Ill but still had pizza 
and alcohol? 
Knowing facts 





it already happened 
 Can’t remember 
some details 
(honesty?) 
Switching tenses e.g. 
talks about the future 
in the past tense 
Self  deprecating 
humour, easy 
going tone, not 
stilted 
Negative tone or 
experiences 
associated with a 
past event 
 Shorter (not sure 
on this one) 
Doesn’t follow a 
logical structure 
Recurring or 
regular event with 
detail 
Previously bailed on 
event – may do again 
 Related to 
several areas in 
life 
Very short and 
nondescript 
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Corrects self  Too short or unsure 
when occurring (no 
set plan) 
 Self -deprecating 
humour, emotion 
Seeks validation 
Fixed date Poor reasoning or  
ambiguity 
   
 Laughter (nervous?)    
 
Table F.2: Study 1(D) Judges 3 & 4 Comments on Likelihood And Plausibility 
Past Events 
Likelihood  Plausibility 
J3 More likely Less likely  More plausible Less plausible 
More descriptive 
and the transcript is 
longer and more 
detailed 
Sometimes events 
sound less likely if  
there is too much 
visual detail or 




 When described 
events are normal 
and expected or if  
something is not 
normal or expected. 
The event seems 
more plausible if  
the person 
comments that it 
seemed strange to 
them 
Over the top and 
exaggerated 
events. It seems 
like people are 
trying to make 
their story more 
exciting. Also 
when there is too 
little visual detail 
J4 More likely Less likely  More plausible Less plausible 
Lots of  precise 
detail 
If  they don’t 
remember something 
they probably should 




saying an event 
takes place at a 
stadium when I 
know it doesn't) 




Likelihood  Plausibility 
J3 More likely Less likely  More plausible Less plausible 
Specif ic details 
about the time and 
place of  the 
intended event and 
who will be there. If  
spoken about in a 
future tense and 
with words that 
suggest it is def inite 
for example "I will 
go" rather than "I 
might go" or 
"probably". 
Speaking in past or 
present tense. Less 
detail about specif ic 
times, places and 
people and too much 
detail on sights, 
sounds, smells 
because the event 
has not occurred yet 
so these things 
should be dif ficult to 
describe, or made up 
in too much detail. 
 If  events are 
expected or you 
have experienced 
them before and 
can relate to what 
is being described. 
Anything 
unexpected or 
out of  the 
ordinary is 
described. 
Using a future 
tense. Past or 
present tense 
makes it sound like 
the event is being 
made up instead of  
anticipated. 
Too much visual or 
emotional detail 
where it seems like 
the speaker has let 
their imagination run 
wild because they 
are making up the 
event 
 You as the reader 
can imagine 
yourself  being there 
and everything 
described is as you 
would expect it. 
Events sound 
less plausible if  
they are out of  
the ordinary. 
Speaking in a future 
tense. The event 
Lots of  pauses or 
f illers made events 
 Events sound more 




has not occurred yet 
so speaking about it 
in past or present 
tense gives the 
impression that it is 
only imagined and 
not actually 
intended. 
sound less likely 
because no def inite 
plans had been 
made for an event 
and the speaker was 
trying to make them 
up as they went 
along. These words 
allow more time to 
make up a 
reasonable story. 
are things that you 
can imagine a 
typical student 
doing such as 
going to the 




when they are 
unexpected or 
seem out of  the 
ordinary. 
Speaker talks about 
the event like it is 
def initely going to 
happen for example 
saying "we are 
going to" instead of  
using the words 
"probably" or 
"maybe". 
Pauses and f illers 
seems like they are 
trying to think up an 
imagined event as 




 Events sound more 
plausible if  you can 
imagine yourself  
doing them . 
 
Far too much 




make the story 
sound m ore 
interesting. 
More specif ic details 
about things like 
times, places and 
who will be involved 
in the event. 
  Descriptions of  
visual details and 
feelings etc. and 
the description is 
fairly brief . 
Too much visual 




J4 More likely Less likely  More plausible Less plausible 
If  it seems that the 
event is part of  
someone’s routine 
(do it every 
Wednesday)  
Events which don’t 
seem like they have 
been planned 
 It sounds like they 
have been pre 
planned rather than 
spur of  the moment  
if  the event is 
described as a 
last minute plan. 
No times or 
dates etc 
An event described 
as a routine or has 
happened before "I 
always go on the 
weight machines 
f irst before the 
treadmill"  
Using "I would go" 
(rather than I will be 
going or I am going. 
The former sounds 
like the person is 
describing an event 
that won’t happen 
 If  there is nothing 
unreasonable that 
happens in the 
event and it could 
be done by anyone  
Outrageous 
description of  
event e.g. " I will 
be made 
princess for the 
day af ter f lying to 
Paris for an hour"  
The event involves 
a plan between a 
group of  people  
Events def initely 
seemed less likely if  
there were few 
details 
 Description of  









Table G1: Study 3(a). 54 Personal Goals by Attainment in Months, Importance 
and Desirability 
Description Time a Impb Desc 
Get a f irst in my current project – 100 100 
Be more organised in my home life 1 89 100 
Be in a better habit of  going on walks and being outside more.  2 85 95 
Have a family reunion for Christmas 2 55 84 
Get a 2:1 or higher grade in my dissertation 2 96 100 
Be more conf ident and smooth in my cafe job  2 50 91 
Complete my current creative university project in a way that 
exceeds previous projects 
3 90 100 
Complete my written dissertation to a high standard  4 75 90 
Learn to cook properly and healthily 4-8 100 90 
Retake my English A level and get a B or above 6 76 73 
Aim to have more f inancial independence 6 88 88 
Lose weight and get f it 6 80 100 
Read as many books as possible 6 65 80 
Succeed on my foundation course 7 100 100 
Get regular assisting work before I graduate 8 98 100 
Get into Cambridge University to study English 10 77 89 
Have a successful relationship with my current partner 12 100 89 
Try to be happier and be less hard on myself  12 100 86 
Go travelling af ter I f inish my Art Foundation Diploma  12 100 100 
Keep f it - get f itter 12 89 89 
Run a half  marathon and get physically f itter 12 76 60 
Convert to being a vegan 12 88 85 
Gain enough conf idence to perform at least once in f ront of  an 
audience 
12 60 85 
Become more motivated about my degree course 12 89 70 
Make and sell more earrings  12 68 61 
Get a promotion within the next year 12 91 100 
Complete my law degree and get a good grade  18 81 87 
Be able to pay the bills and have savings 18 90 94 
Take part in an archaeological dig 22 56 64 
Learn to play the lute 24 53 60 
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Description Time a Impb Desc 
Move away f rom home 24 71 100 
Become f it and healthy 24 57 53 
Share a f lat with f riends 26 82 92 
Get a 2:1 or a f irst in my degree  30 77 82 
Own my home by the end of  2019 36 100 100 
Create a space or home for myself  so that I feel totally content 
and comfortable in this year 
36-48 80 80 
Have a career in the creative industries 36-48 62 100 
Create an art piece which gets hung in a gallery 48 60 100 
Actively try to combat environmental damage  48 100 100 
Have a successful career where I enjoy my job and feel happy 
about going into work every day 
48 92 100 
Be good at gardening and be able to identify plants 60 70 67 
Create a better work environment for my studio, be more 
organised  
60 50 70 
Make a dif ference in terms of  animal rights 60 99 52 
Become an artist in my own right 60+ 100 100 
Be in a position where I can af ford to do what I love, even if  my 
source of  income is not related to this (though it could be) 
84 65 77 
Be in a safe, loving relationship with someone who cares about 
what I care about 
120 88 88 
Go travelling in Asia/India 120 79 95 
Raise a family 120 95 97 
Organise a music and arts festival by the age of  29 120 100 100 
Write a novel about my life 180 17 80 
Look back on life without regrets and with memories of  huge 
and varied experiences 
840 74 97 





Be more socially secure and conf ident in group situations Long 
time 
96 100 
Be less weird about sharing money Long 
time 
80 100 
Worry less about being given less food than other people Long 
time 
85 85 




Study 3(b) Fast Forward Phase 1 Questionnaire Text 
 
[Intro] 
Thank you for signing up to take part in this study. Just to remind you, 
here is the overview of how to take part: 
 
 Complete this questionnaire. One credit granted. 
 Sign up for Fast Forward Part Two on the Royal Holloway Experiment 
Management System (EMS). You will be sent an invitation code so 
you can book a slot. This must take place between one and seven 
days after you complete this questionnaire. 
 Remaining credits granted 
 
[Consent Form] 
My name is Jess Darby. I am a PhD research student at Royal Holloway, 
University of London. I am carrying out a study on episodic future thinking 
supervised by Professor Andrew MacLeod. If you would like to discuss 
any aspect of the research, you can contact me by email at 
jess.darby.2009@live.rhul.ac.uk or Professor MacLeod at 
a.macleod@rhul.ac.uk. We very much appreciate your participation. We 
hope that this study will contribute to understanding of future thinking and 
wellbeing. 
 
The first task in this study is to complete this questionnaire. This will take 
around 20-30 minutes and can be done by you online, in a quiet place, at 
a time to suit yourself. Next you will be asked to come to the Department 
for a further one-hour session in the next seven days. You will be asked 
questions about future events and given questionnaires to complete. In 
this study your data will be identified by a number so the information is 
completely confidential.  
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You do not have to take part in this study if you don’t want to.  If you 
decide to take part you may withdraw at any time without having to give a 
reason. Your decision whether or not to take part will not affect your 
education in any way. 
 




We are interested in things that really matter to you and that you see 
yourself moving towards over the next year. We want you to write five of 
these down, in no particular order. They should not be major life events 
such as graduation or getting married. In this study, we are interested in 
knowing about things that you really hope to make happen in the next year 
or so, no matter how important or trivial these could sound to other people. 
These goals can relate to any area of your life, not just your education but 
your hobbies, your family, your health, your relationship or anything else. 
 
Q1  
Write about something that really matters to you that you see yourself 
moving towards over the next year.  
 
Q2 
What is the next step for you towards achieving this goal? 
 
Q3 
Please rate how important this is to you 
This goal is important to me personally (1=not at all; 7=extremely) 
 
Q4 
Please rate how desirable this is to you 




When do you foresee this goal being achieved?  (Drag and drop a date 
into the box or enter your own estimate) 




[repeated for five goals 
At the top of each page is the following reminder 
Reminder 
We are interested in things that:   
• really matter to you and that you see yourself moving towards over 
the next year 
• not major life events such as graduation or getting married 
• things that you really hope to make happen in the next year 
• can relate to any area of your life” 
 
Q21 I want to go back to the task you did earlier where you thought about 
things that are goals for you. Lots of other people have done this same 
task This time, I want you to give me five goals that you think other people 
might have said, so it is not about you but is an exercise in imagining the 
sorts of things that other people might have said that they see as goals. 
You should not repeat things that you have said.  
 
[participant gives five goals] 
 
Q 22 
Please rate each of these goals for how important they are to you (rather 
than to the other person you imagined when you thought of each goal.)  
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Please rate each of these goals for how desirable it is to you (not the other 
person) 
This goal is desirable to me personally (not the other person). (1=not at all; 
7=extremely) 
 
9. Here is the final question on other people’s goals. Can you imagine 
when the other person might realistically achieve this goal? When do you 
foresee this goal being achieved?  
[drag and drop a date into the box or enter your own estimate] 
6 months 12 months  18 months other (state when)__________ 
 
[Intro text] 
You will now be presented with a series of questions asking you to 
generate mental imagery. For each scenario, try to form a visual image 
and rate how vivid it is using the five-point scale below each question. 
Please note that there are no right or wrong answers to these questions 
and it is not necessarily desirable to experience imagery or, if you do, to 
have more vivid imagery. 
 
10. Conjure up an image of a friend or relative who you frequently 
see; how clearly can you see the contours of their face, head, 
shoulders and body? 
 
No image at all  
Vague and dim  
Moderately clear  
Reasonably clear  
As vivid as real life  
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11 Still imagining that friend or relative, how strongly can you see the 
characteristic poses of their head and body? 
  
No image at all  
Vague and dim  
Moderately clear  
Reasonably clear  
As vivid as real life  
 
 
12. How well can you envision the way that friend or relative walks, 
the length of their step, for example? 
 
No image at all  
Vague and dim  
Moderately clear  
Reasonably clear  
As vivid as real life  
 
 
13. Rate how vivid the colours of that person's clothes look in your 
mind? 
 
No image at all  
Vague and dim  
Moderately clear  
Reasonably clear  
As vivid as real life  
 
 
14. Visualise a rising sun and look carefully at the details of that 
mental picture; how clearly do you see that sun rising above the 
horizon in a hazy sky? 
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No image at all  
Vague and dim  
Moderately clear  
Reasonably clear  
As vivid as real life  
 
 
15. Imagine the sky clearing and surrounding the sun with blueness, 
how vivid is that image? 
 
No image at all  
Vague and dim  
Moderately clear  
Reasonably clear  
As vivid as real life  
 
 
16. Clouds appear in your sky and a lightning storm erupts - how well 
can you see it? 
 
No image at all  
Vague and dim  
Moderately clear  
Reasonably clear  
As vivid as real life  
 
17. A rainbow appears in your sky, how clearly can you make it out? 
 
No image at all  
Vague and dim  
Moderately clear  
Reasonably clear  





Thank you very much for taking part in this phase of the study. Your 
response is very important to us.  
 
Please now visit the website [link] for the RHUL Psychology Department's 
Experiment Management System and sign up for "Fast Forward Two". 
Just to remind you that this second session lasts one hour and must take 
place between one and seven days from today. 
  







Table I: S4 Variables By Category, With Questions From The PCQ
Category Variable Question text or content 
Autonoesis Pre-reliving While imagining the event, I feel as if  I am 
really there (1 = not at all, 7 = totally) 
Mental time travel While imagining the event, I have the 
impression of  going into the future and f inding 
myself  at the time that the event would happen 
(1 = not at all, 7 = totally) 
Autonoetic M of  Autonoetic 1 & 2 
Sensory Clarity My overall representation for this event is clear 
Location My representation for the location where the 
event takes place is clear 
Spatial The relative spatial arrangement of  people and 
objects in my representation for the event is 
clear 
Visual My representation for this event involves visual 
details 
Sounds My representation for this event involves 
sounds 
Smells My representation for this event involves smells 
Taste/touch My representation for this event involves tastes 
and/or touch 
Overall Sensory M of  the seven phenomenological variables  
Event 
Properties 
Event Novelty I have already experienced the same or similar 
event (1 = never, 7 = very of ten) 
Location Familiarity The location of  the event is familiar  
People/object Familiarity The people and objects in my representation 




Personal importance This event is personally important to me in 
terms of  my goals and values (1 = not at all 
important, 7 = very important) 
Emo. valence The emotions I have when I imagine the 
episode are 1=extremely negative; 7=extremely 
positive) 
Cued recall When imagining the event, other specif ic past 
or future events came spontaneously to mind (1 
= none, 7 = a lot) 
Life in General When imagining the event, I thought about my 
life in general  
(1 =  not at all, 7 = very much) 
 Personal plausibility This event could plausibly happen to me 
personally (1 = not at all, 7 = extremely) 
Manipulation 
Checks 
Global plausibility This event could plausibly happen to anyone (1 
= not at all plausible, 7 = extremely plausible) 
Previous Thoughts I have thought about this event before (1 = 
never, 7 = very of ten) 
Difficulty How dif f icult did you f ind the task? 
(1 = very easy; 7 = extremely dif f icult) 
Desirability How desirable was this event? (1 = would not 
want to do it at all, 7 = highly desirable) 
Motivation How motivated were you to perform well in this 
task? 
(1 = not at all; 7 = highly motivated) 
Belief 
 
NEAR FUTURE EVENTS ONLY 
Right now, how likely is it that the imagined 
event will take place in the next two weeks?  
(1 = not at all likely; 7 = completely likely). 
DISTANT FUTURE EVENTS ONLY 
Right now, how likely is it that the imagined 
event will take place in the next 12-18 months?  
(1 = not at all likely; 7 = completely likely). 
Simulation 
Properties 
Simulation Time Latencies to simulate each scenario, in 
seconds. 
Word Count Number of  words used to describe simulation, 
less f illers. 




Study 3(b). Examples of transcripts 
(Salient, close) Experimental cue.  Go to a friend’s house to watch a film. 
OK, I’m going to my friend’s room erm, to watch Elf the film because we 
celebrate Christmas way too early. Erm, even though we tell other people 
off for celebrating Christmas we think why not, so we think it’s quite funny 
so it makes me quite happy and I think it’s, so I start to laugh. Erm there’s 
about five of us there, erm we’re all squeezing in her single bed, which is 
really squashed up so it feels quite hot and quite stuffy but we don’t really 
care because we’re quite excited. Erm, then we try and get it up on her 
Apple computer, erm and it starts to play and it makes us really excited for 
Christmas. Erm, I can smell popcorn and they’re all eating popcorn and 
sweets. Erm, yeah.  
 
(Not salient, distant) Experimental cue: Changing the way I dress. 
OK, I’m at home erm, in one of the spare rooms where we keep all the 
winter clothes and because it’s just moving into winter now I have, er, 
opened the bed out and that’s where I store my winter clothes in the erm 
summer months. So I’m putting my summer clothes away and taking my 
winter clothes out and looking at them and deciding which ones I want to 
wear this winter. Erm, I’m feeling a bit sad because I do prefer summer to 
winter, erm but I do quite like my winter clothes and so I’m finding all the 
fluffy ones and all the really warm ones and sorting them out into piles of 
which ones need washing. Erm my dad’s on his computer in the same 
room so I can hear him tapping away at his keyboard and sighing because 
he can’t work his computer. Erm, and, I’m asking my dad questions about 
if he thinks this is nice or not and he doesn’t really know.  
 
(Not salient, close) Experimental cue: Trying a new recipe. 
I’m in my friend’s kitchen in, on campus. Erm, I’m attempting to make a 
quiche erm, which I don’t know why because I don’t even really like 
quiche. But, I’m adding flour and eggs into a bowl. Erm my friend’s sitting 
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at the table and rolling her eyes because I’m making quite a big mess. Er, 
but the flour feels quite soft and the egg feels sort of warm. Erm I’m 
attempting to follow a recipe book that’s erm quite dirty but quite a big 
recipe book. Erm and it doesn’t really smell of anything at the moment but 
I think that when I start to make the middle bit it probably would start to 
smell. Erm I’m mixed everything up together and it doesn’t look very nice 
erm but I thought I’d just go with it anyway because I’ve made it now. Erm 
so I put it in the oven and I set the timer and it starts to cook.  
 
(Salient, distant) Experimental cue: Improving at tennis. 
Erm it’s quite dark and cold and I am walking down to the tennis courts on 
the university campus. Erm it’s the usual training time, so that’s on a 
Thursday and erm I’m walking down with my friend erm we start to play 
tennis and we are having a really good time and we start to get to know 
the team more. Erm we get selected for matches which makes us really 
happy even though it is still really really cold out. Erm I am wearing quite a 
lot of layers but because we are running around a lot I can’t really move in 
them very well erm but still it’s quite funny and everyone is laughing. Erm 
we are having quite a high intensity session but it’s still good fun, erm. And 














Table L.1: Study 4(a) Phase 1 Ratings by Global Score Descending Order  
  Rating  
Event n Plausible Frequent Image Global  
Stay in with a f riend, partner or 
family member and share pizza 
and a movie  
31 5.81 4.68 6 5.5 0.76 
Go on a shopping trip to buy a 
specif ic item (e.g. clothes, shoes, 
equipment) 
33 5.64 4.79 5.76 5.4 0.88 
Meet up with a f riend for coffee/ 
hot chocolate  
32 5.19 4.09 5.44 4.91 0.89 
Friend’s house to watch a f ilm 33 5.3 3.85 5.33 4.83 0.81 
Go to the cinema  33 4.94 3.39 5.27 4.53 0.78 
Go out for a meal  33 4.79 3.45 5.3 4.51 0.74 
Do some voluntary work (e.g. work 
experience, giving up time without 
being paid)  
32 4.53 3.34 4.97 4.28 0.87 
Attend a party or some sort of  
celebration 
29 4.79 3.31 4.52 4.21 0.85 
Make a new recipe that you have 
never cooked before 
32 4.28 3.38 4.78 4.15 0.91 
Attend a routine medical or dental 
appointment  
31 4.26 3.06 4.42 3.91 0.79 
Attend a progress meeting at 
work/school/College  
29 4.31 2.48 4.83 3.87 0.65 
Work out in a gym or at a f itness 
class * 
31 4.1 3.23 4.03 3.79 0.87 
Invite someone round and cook 
dinner for them  
31 3.45 2.45 4.03 3.31 0.81 
Go to a club night or event  32 2.97 2.09 3.53 2.86 0.84 
Note * 31 nominations for other types of  f itness were made in Phase 2. Thus this item 




Table L.2: Study 4(a) Frequency & Specificity of Events in Phase 2  
N = 136 High Frequency and 
/or Low Specificity* 










Leisure (23)  
Creative 
(17) 











craf t (7) 


























 Football (4) 












Note * Potentially so frequently experienced they would not be suitable for the not -salient 




Study 4(b). Drawings with bystanders 










































Key (Study 5 drawings) 
1 = Truth teller 
2 = Liar 
3 = Liar 
4 = Liar 
 
 
